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In recent years there has been a body of studies relating nostalgia and fiction 
in political, sociological, feminist, or historical ways. This thesis, instead, sets 
out to perform an unusual textual study of nostalgia in modern fiction in 
order to work towards a poetics of nostalgia. Although the experience of 
emotion is private, the object of analytical discourse must be to approach this 
experience with objective tools. The thesis therefore develops a method for 
analyzing the experience of nostalgia in literary texts and then uses this 
method to study how nostalgia can be evoked in readers. The method works 
through close textual readings, developed through reader-response and 
narratological theories and validated through a thorough investigation of 
modern nostalgia in general. The result is a taxonomy of nostalgic strategies 
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On the back cover of the Penguin edition of Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse 
(1927) one can read: “Virginia Woolf’s lyrical, nostalgic novel […].” Likewise, 
the back cover of the same company’s edition of Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead 
Revisited (1945) reveals that it is indeed the “most nostalgic and reflective of 
Evelyn Waugh’s novels.” Apropos of the publishing of Fitzgerald’s short 
story collection, All the Sad Young Men (1926), Brooks Cottle writes that,  
 
Unlike most titles under which books of short stories 
are published, the tag F. Scott Fitzgerald has put upon 
his third collection of stories is significant. “All the Sad 
Young Men” very accurately supplies the key to the 
dominant mood of the best stories in the book. That 
mood is the nostalgia of his young men growing out of 
their youth, the sadness with which they gaze back into 
that “country of illusion, of youth, of the richness of life, 
where their winter dreams had flourished.” (276) 
 
What do the readers actually mean when they call a work of fiction 
nostalgic? The answer to that question is the foundation of this thesis. 
Certainly one aspect of nostalgia is that of content; a narrative about 
nostalgia naturally can evoke nostalgia in the reader. Brideshead Revisited is 
about a man who looks back on his past with nostalgia, and the young men 
in All the Sad Young Men do occasionally dream back to their youthful 
experiences. Even Mrs. Ramsay in To the Lighthouse has occasional rushes of 
nostalgia, such as when she is reading a story to her youngest boy, James: 
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 Oh, but she never wanted James to grow a day older 
or Cam either. These two she would have liked to keep 
for ever just as they were, demons of wickedness, 
angels of delight, never to see them grow up into long-
legged monsters. Nothing made up for the loss. When 
she read just now to James, ‘and there were numbers of 
soldiers with kettle-drums and trumpets’, and his eyes 
darkened, she thought, why should they grow up, and 
lose all that? (67-68) 
 
Mrs. Ramsay obviously feels nostalgic for her own childhood even though 
this emotion is first directed towards her son, and later at both her son and 
her daughter. For many readers, the identification with Mrs. Ramsay might 
make themselves nostalgic since she is nostalgic. However, that is not the 
kind of nostalgia we will be concerned with for two reasons. First, it is very 
obvious. If a text is about nostalgia then there is always a chance that this 
nostalgia will be transferred into the imagination of a reader. Second, and 
with a similar caution, we will not be interested in what a character feels, 
unless this affects the mood of the narration.  
Furthermore, we will not be concerned with what could be called 
contextual nostalgia, that is, studies of nostalgia that are interested in how 
nostalgia works sociologically, historically, or politically. When it comes to 
Fitzgerald for example, critics such as Arthur P. Dudden in “Nostalgia and 
the American” have dealt with historical and social contexts of nostalgia 
within the idea of the American nation, and Wright Morris in “The Function 
of Nostalgia: F. Scott Fitzgerald” addresses nostalgia as subject matter in 
Fitzgerald’s fiction. Cottle though first does not mention nostalgia as content 
matter but as a distinct and “dominant mood.” 
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 So we will speak of a nostalgic mood, or more specifically nostalgic 
aesthetics. Nostalgia is not only about reviving the past, about commercial 
retro ideas, about liking French new wave films. It is also about a specific 
aesthetic mood, and this mood can be evoked in a reader through a nostalgic 
poetics. 
The critical literature about this experience has been very sparse. Fred 
Davis, in his monumental Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia 
(1979), is one of the few who acknowledges the part aesthetics play in 
nostalgic art: “So frequently and uniformly does nostalgic sentiment seem to 
infuse our aesthetic experience that we can rightly begin to suspect that 
nostalgia is not only a feeling or mood that is somehow magically evoked by 
the art object but also a distinctive aesthetic modality in its own right […]” 
(73). In his chapter “Nostalgia and Art” he commences a project that defines 
a nostalgic style in art. Davis complains that “the musicologist, the art 
historian, and the literary critic” (83) have not yet defined such a style. For 
example, the scene from To the Lighthouse is about nostalgia but it also 
contains certain nostalgic stylistics which reinforce the nostalgic content. 
Could there be something about the narration itself, in its use of free indirect 
speech, which arouses nostalgia? What role does the expression “long-legged 
monsters” play when it is contrasted with “angels of delight”? How strong is 
the juxtaposition between present and past, adulthood and childhood? What 
exactly is it that the characters will lose? We are not about to answer all these 
questions now; we just cite them to illustrate what kind of questions we will 
deal with. However, in order to illustrate the process, here is one example. 
The image of “long-legged monsters” is cleverly contrasted with the 
childhood imagination of soldiers and kettle drums in order to emphasize 
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present and past times, and this makes identification with one’s own 
childhood possible, as well as establishing the result of the time arrow as 
something forever lost. 
We do not necessarily have to work with something that so explicitly 
contains nostalgic content. Another line from To the Lighthouse also possibly 
evokes nostalgia: 
 
 The nights now are full of wind and destruction; the 
trees plunge and bend and their leaves fly helter skelter 
until the lawn is plastered with them and they lie 
packed in gutters and choke rain pipes and scatter 
damp paths. (146) 
 
Here there is no obvious nostalgic content: no characters remembering their 
pasts, and no reflective commentaries about the passage of time. Still, readers 
might experience this nostalgically? Why? The clash between clock time 
(arising from the polysyndeton) and the presence of the poetic description 
activate our imagination for something outside time, or more specifically, 
something that resists time. At the same time the rhythm reinforces the 
notion of time passing illustrated by the accentuated motion in the sentence 
from active verbs such as “plunge,” “bend,” and “fly” as well as addressing 
autumn as a symbol for change. 
 Another example of nostalgic style can be found in the following 
quotation from The Great Gatsby: 
 
[…] only the dead dream fought on as the afternoon 
slipped away, trying to touch what was no longer 
tangible, struggling unhappily, undespairingly, toward 
that lost voice across the room. (142) 
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The citation above illustrates how nostalgia might flow from the text itself in 
its stylistic qualities: repeated alliterations, rhythmical flow, the use of words 
such as “no longer,” “lost,” and “slipped away” that allude to elusiveness, 
temporal directions in “toward,” distance in “across”; all creating a nostalgic 
modality of its own. This analysis of nostalgic stylistics is an example of what 
is the focus of this thesis. 
If we return to Davis’ theory of an aesthetic nostalgic modality, it can 
be seen as inspirational since he himself did not develop the subject in any 
detail. Nevertheless, his ideas have gone mostly unnoticed and they were 
even reviewed as “provocative” on the webpage for the Nostalgia and the 
Shapes of History conference at Queen Mary’s College (2008). The increasing 
number of texts about literary nostalgia have primarily focused on the public 
nostalgia from a social or cultural context, thus not recognizing the private 
subjective nostalgic experience or questions about nostalgic style. These texts 
include Svetlana Boym’s The Future of Nostalgia (2001), Linda Hutcheon’s 
“Irony, Nostalgia, and the Postmodern” (2000), Narratives of Nostalgia, Gender 
and Nationalism (1997), or Linda M. Austin’s Nostalgia in Transition, 1780-1917 
(2007). The very title of Renée R. Trilling’s The Aesthetics of Nostalgia: Historical 
Representation in Old English Verse (2009) illustrates how desirable it is to 
study aesthetics but how the result ends up in contextual nostalgia.  
The few articles that claim to study nostalgic style never reach their 
intentions. Catharine H. Savage writes in “Nostalgia in Alain-Fournier and 
Proust” that the author can evoke memory “through the conjuring powers of 
poetry, using perhaps entirely different verbal and sense materials from 
those of the ‘memory’ but creating the past again in himself and his reader 
through this suggestive magic […]” (167) but never follows up this intention 
and ends up reflecting about the function of nostalgia for the characters in 
 16 
the novels instead. Likewise, Tamara S. Wagner sets out in Longing: Narratives 
of Nostalgia in the British Novel 1740-1890 (2004) to look at nostalgia 
structurally in Jonathan Lamb’s A Tale of Rosamund Gray since “[n]ostalgia,” 
she writes, “is central to the novel’s structure as well as to its interrelated 
stories” (41), but is still caught up in the web of nostalgic representation.  
There are a couple of exceptions though. Aaron Santesso studies the 
stylistics of nostalgia in A Careful Longing: The Poetics and Problems of Nostalgia 
(2006). He investigates the nostalgic aspects of romantic eighteenth-century 
poetry, and how the elegies and pastorals of Goldsmith and Gray among 
others created familiar nostalgic tropes that are still in function today.1 His 
work is a continuation of Laurence Lerner’s The Uses of Nostalgia: Studies in 
Pastoral Poetry (1972). Ruth Abbott explores the textual memory and the 
process of remembering and forgetting a text in Wordsworth’s “Immortality 
Ode” in a paper at the Nostalgia and the Shapes of History conference held at 
Queen Mary’s College in June 2008. In addition, Vera Dike’s Recycled Culture 
in Contemporary Art and Film: The Uses of Nostalgia (2003) at least performs 
close readings that acknowledge a relationship between stylistics and 
nostalgia. However, these examples are rare enough for the critical 
community to appreciate a more thorough study of nostalgia and texts. 
In order to develop something of a poetics of nostalgic literature, we have to 
establish a theory of doing so. Nostalgia is an emotion, and as such it will 
prove hard to grasp, identify, and validate in a critical context. How do we 
analyze an emotion through art? What is the role of the reader? Where 
                                                
1  Fred Davis makes a similar suggestion; we must separate a real nostalgic experience 
from a textual one: “The audience, too, without necessarily having any immediate or 
‘real’ reason for feeling nostalgic, will upon seeing or hearing the material respond 
nostalgically since it, too, has through long associative exposure assimilated the aesthetic 
code that evokes the emotion” (82). 
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should our focus lie? Our first chapter “The Fictive Experience: Art and 
Emotion and Towards a Theory of an Analysis of Emotional Experiences in 
Fiction” deals with these problems and establishes in the end a method for 
examining how and why emotions are evoked in a reading. We will talk 
about experience since we will focus on the reader and their experience of 
nostalgia; hence we will lean heavily on reader-response theories. Since the 
experience of emotions is inevitably private, we must acknowledge that there 
is a speculative aspect of this method. But we always try to use objective 
tools in order to understand the personal emotion, and will always speak of 
possibility rather than truth. If nostalgia is evoked in one person, there is a 
possibility, even probability, that it also will be evoked in other people. When 
we looked at the examples from To the Lighthouse and The Great Gatsby earlier 
we emphasized vague words like “might” and “can” in terms of evocations 
of nostalgia since we have to speak about possibilities. In the process of 
developing a pragmatic methodology we will survey the terrain of art and 
emotions and reception theories. Advances in philosophy, psychology, and 
science have allowed for a more precise evaluation of how emotions do 
work, and this has largely constituted a cognitive model for analyzing 
emotions. Still, since our object of study is the subjective experience of 
emotions, we will discuss psychoanalytical reception theories along with 
social constructivist approaches when appropriate. The cognitive idea of 
emotions seems to be valid in terms of how certain garden-variety emotions 
(anger, fear, etc.) constitute a cognitive aspect. The concept that a belief has to 
be part of the experience supports this theory. However, emotions are 
obviously not only cognitive since there are physical, biological, and 
evolutionary forces active such as sweating, increased heart beats, and 
altered blood pressure. A prominent critic in our development of a pragmatic 
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methodology will be Noël Carroll who wisely and pragmatically 
acknowledges that emotions are made up of two components: “a cognitive 
component […] and a phenomenological experience” (196). In terms of 
emotions evoked by fiction he prefers to use the term “thought” rather than 
“belief” in order to bridge the well known paradox of fiction (how we can react 
emotionally to art which does not constitute a real belief) that common 
cognitive critics struggle with. Additionally, philosopher Derek Matravers 
will provide an important distinction from the usual emotional cognitive 
theory with his arousal theory. Cognitive theories of emotions in art have 
mainly focused on how we identify with characters, mostly the protagonists, 
and how we express emotions towards other characters in a fictive narrative. 
Matravers opens up a field of study that is less cognitive and more 
phenomenological. He also deals with the ways emotions are aroused in a 
more subconscious way and incorporates moods in the field of emotive 
studies. This is important, as we will see in chapter two, when dealing with 
such a complex emotion as nostalgia that is created by many emotions and 
where there is doubt how cognitive nostalgia actually is. 
Both Carroll and Matravers are philosophers; as such, they provide 
crucial entrances into some of the most demanding issues with art and 
emotions, but neither speaks clearly from a literary perspective or offers few 
insights into the methods of studying emotions in fictive narratives. 
Therefore it is convenient to engage with reader-response theories that offer 
tools about ways the actual analytical process should be executed. The choice 
of this particular analytical school stems from, as both Carroll and Matravers 
identify, the ideas of emotions as phenomena. In a study of emotions evoked 
by art, the subject who experiences them has to be at centre. 
Phenomenology’s attraction is its refusal to evaluate art and its preference for 
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understanding how the essentials of phenomena are communicated to the 
receptor. In pure phenomenological criticism, though, the objectivity and 
complete formalistic modus operandi unhinges it from any literary context 
such as history, author biography, production mode, and critical reception. 
Although our method will be primarily a formalistic one, we will also 
consort to what Jonathan Culler names “the competent reader” in our re-
experience of the text, a reader who is aware of contextual issues when they 
are crucial to the analytical process. Particularly two reader-response 
theorists will figure prominently in our development of method: Wolfgang 
Iser and Stanley Fish. Both provide necessary tools for understanding and 
analyzing the reader’s involvement in and concretization of the text. Where 
phenomenology tends to see experience as purely subjective, the more 
pragmatic and cognitive oriented phenomenological reception theorists, like 
Iser and Fish, understand that there are certain conventions and agreements 
between text and reader that facilitate similar reading experiences. Both Iser 
and Fish articulate the importance of the chronology of the reading 
experience. Iser’s theory is useful in order to understand the more explicit 
reader reactions to the major narrative strategies, especially how a reader’s 
wandering viewpoint is manipulated by the narrative. Fish provides a way of 
slowing down the reading process in order to access more implicit stylistic 
details within the analytical process. A companion tool to Iser’s and Fish’s 
strategies is the narratological apparatus of French structuralist Gérard 
Genette. Although Genette might not be linked to reception theories, his 
distinguished and detailed taxonomy of Narratology is useful in order to 




Since one of the basic conclusions of our method developed in chapter 
one is that we have to gain very specific knowledge on how the particular 
emotion functions, the next chapter, “The Nostalgic Experience,” will deal 
with nostalgia as an experience. In this chapter, the essentials of nostalgia as 
an emotion will be reviewed, essentials that will then be a springboard for 
our literary analysis. But we will also make the distinction between nostalgia 
as an emotion and as a mood, a difference that will be important for our 
future analysis. It is vital that we speak of modern nostalgia as ideas about 
nostalgia that are firmly established around the beginning of the twentieth 
century and that prevail today. In speaking of the essence of nostalgia we, in 
a phenomenological way, submit ourselves to trans-historicity. At first sight 
there might be a conflict between studying nostalgia as a trans-historical 
emotion and at the same time defining a modern nostalgia. This conflict is a 
chimera though, but it has to be settled. Disregarding the linguistic 
complications of the word “nostalgia” since Johannes Hofer coined it in 1688, 
the essence of the emotion nostalgia should be considered a trans-historical 
one. There is no reason not to believe that people in all times and cultures 
have experienced the essence of nostalgia. However, nostalgia as a definition 
and word did not reach this essence until late modernity in the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Therefore, the modern concept of nostalgia equals that 
of the essence of nostalgia. In what basically seems to be a formalistic 
analysis of literary texts and nostalgia, there is still a need to briefly engage 
in the contextual events that led to the modern definition of nostalgia in 
order to understand its essence. This need instigate, for example, the 
divergence into the role modernity played in the stabilization of this 
nostalgic essence. Consequently, the historical interests are not motivating a 
study of why literary nostalgia became prominent in the era of modernity. It 
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is just a tool, in concordance with our methodology, to understand the 
essential aspects of the emotion itself. 
Chapter three, “The Fictive Nostalgic Experience” is an introduction 
to the relationship between fiction and nostalgia, and will refine the method 
as developed in chapter one to suit the particular needs that nostalgia urges 
for. Chapter three merges the idea of fictive experience with nostalgia as an 
experience which results in a fictive nostalgic experience. The focus on 
subjective nostalgic experience is rather radical: when John N. Swift writes 
that Willa Cather “looked frequently and fondly back toward an 
uncorrupted, regularized and essentially masculine classical past […]” (108) 
he represents a traditional and common way of studying nostalgia. Swift’s 
approach to nostalgia illustrates an attitude and focus we desire to abandon; 
we would never write that an author “looked frequently and fondly back” 
but rather how this attitude influenced the reading experience towards 
evoking nostalgic sentiments. As the title of this thesis exclaims, we will 
focus on modern fiction. The term “modern” is used specifically because of 
its vagueness and because we prefer to avoid the term modernistic, although 
many of our examples do arise from the modernist era. The main reason for 
this limitation is that the idea of modern nostalgia, as we will see in chapter 
two, emerged during the early stages of the twentieth century, and 
modernism was particularly bound, due to its reactions to modernity and the 
First World War as well as to new scientific results from Einstein, Bergson, 
Freud, among others, to engage in nostalgic discourse. By using the term 
modern rather than modernistic, we do not isolate our method and analytical 
tools to a specific period. As later examples will prove, the tools we develop 
will be equally applicable to postmodern texts or later. Equally, although this 
is not the case in this thesis, the same tools should be valuable in analysis of 
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earlier texts as well. The motivation of choice of texts from predominantly 
the modernist canon do not have to do with a desire to answer to the 
question why modernism was especially prone to evoke nostalgia but that 
these texts are brilliant examples of literature that create nostalgic 
experiences in readers and, as such, are exemplary in order to illustrate our 
theoretical propositions. 
In both chapter one and three we consult examples of films rather 
than literature. Since film is fiction just as much as literature and shares 
much with literary narratives, there should be no real antagonism between 
them. Much that can be said about narratives of film is equally valid in terms 
of narratives of literature. However, there are crucial differences, especially 
in the ways literature necessitates a more active mental and imaginative 
phase in terms of interpretation. In a film a chair is already the visual image 
of a chair, but in literature we need the additional mental phase where we 
through linguistic communication visualize the word “chair” into an actual 
mental image of a chair. This means that the filmic chair will be visually the 
same for every viewer, whereas the literary “chair” will be more variable in 
the reader. From an analytical viewpoint it is easier to discuss examples of 
films than examples of literature, and this motivates the use of film in the 
earlier stages of this thesis in order to properly and pedagogically illustrate 
some of the more general theoretical issues that arise when we are 
developing our methods. 
Chapters four through six will then be a survey of different strategies 
in literary fiction that create the possibility of nostalgic experience in the 
reader. The survey will resemble a slow zoom out, looking first at the 
smallest segments of literary texts such as stylistics and micro-narratology, 
then examining nostalgic imagery before looking at how whole narrative 
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structures work nostalgically. We will once again emphasize that we are 
working with possibilities and probabilities, and that the analytical method 
must contain a certain element of private speculations, even though the 
object always is to generalize these speculations into a more objective theory. 
In the final chapter, we will use our method, and our analyzing tools, 
to perform a complete investigation of what constitutes the nostalgic 
experience in William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury. 
Hopefully this thesis will make two contributions to literary criticism. 
The first, and more general one, is to explore how the reader can experience 
emotions in texts and develop a valid method for a proper analysis of this 
reading process. The second one is more specific: how can we account for the 
fact that certain reading experiences of texts are nostalgic? I sincerely hope 
that this thesis will provide resources for analyzing emotions, nostalgia in 
particular, and show how nostalgia occurs as a part of a reading experience. 
With these tools perhaps we can make sense of what it actually means when 





The Fictive Experience: Art and Emotion and Towards 






“poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings […]” (Wordsworth 
116) 
 
Art and Emotions 
It is fundamental that one strong aspect of the attraction of literature lies in 
the emotional responses it is able to evoke in us. We read for pleasure 
suggests Norman Holland, implying that pleasure means the pleasure of 
experiencing emotions (4). Nevertheless, relating art and emotions has often 
been considered either too subjective to attach a scientific value to an 
analysis, or a detour from the structures of the text as the central aim of 
research during the era of structuralism and deconstruction. A consideration 
of subjective emotional responses to literature was wildly criticized by 
Wimsatt and Beardsley in their highly influential essay “The Affective 
Fallacy” (1949) where they tried to prove that the affective suggestiveness in 
certain words creates such a variety of interpretations that any kind of 
objectivity is lost in literary criticism. Even though they did not neglect the 
importance of emotions in experiences of art, they disqualified it for 
academic studies. Especially troublesome was what they called the affective 
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relativism, based on the different subjective, historical, and social contexts 
within the experience (Wimsatt and Beardsley 27). 
Perhaps the common negative attitude towards exploring art and 
emotions descends from Plato whose opinion was that art primarily 
addresses the emotions and therefore was an evil plague in undermining 
reason.2 Thus, in a way, Plato’s ideas exhibit, long before Wimsatt and 
Beardsley, a tendency to assess and evaluate art based on how (or if) it 
arouses emotions. William James, in The Principles of Psychology Volume 2 
(1890), made a case for how there were different kinds of taste in emotional 
response, “classic taste” and “romantic taste” where the classic taste was 
valued higher than that of the romantic taste (468-70). We also find Kantian 
ideas of the sublime in Robin Collingwood’s The Principles of Art (1938) where 
he describes how art that uses literary conventions or formulas to create 
emotional response among audiences are less artistic (275-76). The valuating 
approach has also accounted for the common scholarly distaste for 
sentimentality.3 One such example is what Linda Williams refers to as body 
genres (horror, sex, and melodrama)4, art that arouses the most physical 
emotional responses in us and hence is not “intellectual” or refined (Williams 
                                                
2  Plato’s reservations against poetry are expressed in The Republic, mainly in books 2, 3, and 
10, as well as in the dialogue Ion. The arguments against poetry can be concluded as 
mistrust in the poet’s knowledge of the truth. The antagonism against feelings is most 
clearly expressed in book 10 of The Republic 605a-606d. Plato acknowledges the strength 
of emotions in art but banishes its function within the republic as misleading and un-
educational: “And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of 
desire, and pain, and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all 
of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them 
rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness 
and virtue.” (Plato 334, 605d) 
3  For a brilliant defense of sentimentality see Robert C. Solomon’s “In Defense of 
Sentimentality.” 
4  The term was actually coined by Carol  J. Clover in “Her Body, Himself: Gender in the 
Slasher Film” but then only to include the two genres horror and pornography (189).  
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5). This distaste is well articulated by Martha C. Nussbaum in The Therapy of 
Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics: “According to some influential 
modern views that have left a deep mark on popular stereotypes, emotions 
like grief, anger, and fear come from an animal irrational side of personality 
that is to be sharply distinguished from its capacity for reasoning and for 
forming beliefs. Emotions are simply bodily reactions” (79). 
Returning to ancient philosophy, Aristotle had a more positive 
attitude towards emotions in art and believed in the positive effects of 
catharsis through an emotional art experience. New Criticism was one of the 
first theoretical schools that paid attention to how the organic whole as well 
as stylistics affected the reader. In Principles of Literary Criticism (1924) I. A. 
Richards discusses how certain emotions in reading experiences are 
triggered by psychological factors (73-82). It is a revolutionary attempt, and 
one of the first to establish a theory that considers the value of the reader’s 
emotional reactions.5 He tried to show that literary emotions are not 
exceedingly different from ordinary emotions, and therefore the literary 
emotions are human feelings in their own right, brought about by the 
particular aesthetics of the text.6 
The interest in the psychology behind emotions and Freud’s theories 
about the way art fulfils our desires, as seen in Richards’ work and somewhat 
later Charles Mauron’s Aesthetics and Psychology (1935), stimulated studies 
                                                
5  Richards drew heavily on Aristotle’s ideas of catharsis; Aristotle merged the emotions 
fear and pity, but Richards preferred an oscillation between them as he placed them in 
opposition to each other (Russo 287). Richards was also much in debt to biologist Charles 
Scott Sherrington, whose concept of nerve integration provided him with a neural 
background for his organization of psychological activities in the reading process (Russo 
179). 
6  This is a general thesis, also acknowledged by Bleich (34), Richards argues throughout 
Principles of Literary Criticism. Examples of this argumentation are to be found, for 
example, on page 11 and 232. 
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that put emotions and art within the jurisdiction of psychoanalytic thinking. 
Both Norman Holland’s The Dynamics of Literary Response (1968) and David 
Bleich’s Subjective Criticism (1978) engage us in how fantasy, desire, and 
pleasure relate to our experiences of fiction. However interesting their 
approaches are, their ambitions still appear somewhat narrow. This limited 
perspective has also been criticized by Noël Carroll. “Psychoanalytical 
critics,” he writes, “seem more concerned with certain generic, ill-defined 
forces like desire and pleasure […]” (“Art, Narrative, and Emotion” 191). 
Psychoanalytical critics thus do not seem much occupied with what Carroll 
calls “the garden-variety emotions” (191) such as anger, fear, and pity. 
Since Holland’s and Bleich’s studies there has been further advances in 
modern psychology and cognitive theories about emotions that have sparked 
renewed interests in the relationship between art and emotions. Much of this 
debate has returned to either the basic issues of the general nature of 
emotions or how we can account for emotions in experiences of either fiction 
(not real) or abstract art. The former usually resides in psychological studies, 
whereas the latter is discussed within philosophy. Furthermore, social or 
cultural studies have recently shown an interest in how emotions are 
configured within social, cultural, and historical contexts. Even if these areas 
of research stumble into the world of art and fiction, the perspectives from 
literary studies are surprisingly few. 
Since nostalgia is a complex affective experience we need to develop 
something of a nostalgic poetics in order to both validate its existence in 
correlation with literature and create a toolbox for analyzing how texts 
engage us in nostalgic literary experiences. This will be done in chapter three, 
but in order to do so we first have to explore more generally how feelings 
and art are associated. In this chapter we will deal with the most critical and 
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demanding questions and arguments within the latest theoretical contexts 
about art and emotions. More specifically, we will deal mostly with fiction 
since our project is focusing towards literature. In the end of the chapter we 
will summarize our findings and settle on a method for analyzing emotions 
in fiction. But first we need to define the basics of our attitude towards art. It 
is fundamental for this thesis that we have to appreciate fiction as an 
experience in order to evaluate and analyze subjective emotional responses 
to texts. This needs further clarification and confirmation and we need to 
address what Wimsatt and Beardsley called the “affective relativism,” which 
we will refer to as the problem of experience. 
 
 
The Experience of Fiction 
 
Fiction as Experience 
The importance of looking at literature as an experience is adequately 
expressed by Derek Matravers: “To appreciate a work of art it is not usually 
sufficient merely to have heard of it or heard about it, one has actually to 
have experienced it” (86). The connection between literature and experience 
has a history that, at least semantically, commences in New Criticism and I. 
A. Richards’ pioneering work in Principles of Literary Criticism (2). It is then 
developed implicitly in Roman Ingarden’s theories of the concretization in Das 
literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, 
Logik und Literaturwissenschaft [The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the 
Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature] (1931) and finds its most 
creative outlets among the critics of the schools of Phenomenology and 
Reader-Response Criticism of the late 1960s and 1970s. The interest in 
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reading as experience is analogous to the shift of focus from the author and 
the objectivity of the text, to the subjectivity of the actual experience of the 
text. The theorists of Reader-Response Criticism all have varied approaches 
and definitions of this process, but they all share a common idea that it is the 
reader’s response to the text that creates reactions such as “meaning” or 
“value” and thus has to be the focus for any literary theory. Consequently, we 
will now look at how some theorists relate literature and experience. 
The two representatives from the psycho-analytical branch of Reader-
Response Criticism, Holland and Bleich, both acknowledge the correlation 
between reading and experience, but in their accounts it is the psychological 
mechanisms that control our reading experience. Holland continues the 
tradition of New Criticism and shows no interest in author intentions and a 
considerable trust in the objectivity of the text. What he introduces, as a 
continuation of Richards’ ideas, is the importance of the subjective response 
to the objective text. His theory depends on a dualism between the object 
(text) and the subjective understanding/interpretation7 of the object. In his 
introduction he clearly sketches the critical method he proposes. First we 
have to study the text objectively, then we have to value our own subjective 
response to it, and finally we have to try to connect these (The Dynamics of 
Literary Response xiv). It is a valuable method but Holland never really 
develops this method or is able to fuse his classic separation of object and 
subject. When he writes that “this book must mingle subjectivity and 
objectivity, for that is its task: to build a conceptual bridge from literary texts 
objectively understood to our subjective experience of them” (The Dynamics of 
Literary Response xiv) he steps in the problematic sphere of how we can both 
                                                
7  This is Bleich’s terms. His distinction between understanding and interpretation is that 
understanding is how you construct verbal meaning while interpretation is the 
explanation of this meaning (Bleich 94). 
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understand a text objectively and subjectively. 
Wolfgang Iser, in “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological 
Approach” develops Ingarden’s division of a literary work’s two poles, “the 
artistic [which] refers to the text created by the author, and the esthetic 
[which refers] to the realization accomplished by the reader” (50), to 
encourage the idea that the crucial aspect of the reading process lies between 
the text and its realization:  
 
the literary work cannot be completely identical with 
the text, or with the realization of the text, but in fact 
must lie halfway between the two. The work is more 
than the text, for the text only takes on life when it is 
realized, and furthermore the realization is by no 
means independent of the individual disposition of the 
reader – though this in turn is acted upon by the 
different patterns of the text. (50)8 
  
Like Iser, Stanley Fish speaks of the importance of regarding literature as an 
experience and stresses its temporal qualities and the objectivity of the text as 
a crucial difference between the classic hermeneutic question “what does this 
                                                
8  Iser’s praise for Ingarden’s phenomenological reading theories can be attributed to 
Ingarden’s development of how the text is concretized in the reader, thus acknowledging 
the importance of the reader in the reading process. Furthermore, Ingarden represents a 
crucial development of Husserl’s phenomenology into a literary theory. Iser, however, 
disagrees on several points with how Ingarden views the relationship between reader 
and the text. Menachem Brinker in ”Two Phenomenologies of Reading: Ingarden and Iser 
on Textual Indeterminacy” identifies primarily two of Iser’s objections. The first one is 
that Ingarden imagines that there are more or less successful concretizations of the text. 
Iser argues that there is no need to view concretizations as ”appropriate” or ”in-
appropriate” rather just as different concretizations of the same text without any specific 
value connected to them (Brinker 204). The second one has to do with the degree of 
activity in the reader: ”The 'original emotion'  which sets the reader on his way by 
attracting him to the artistic quality of the literary work, is tied to the actual words used 
in the text rather than to the gaps, blanks and hidden meanings of the work which are not 
formulated in the text” (Brinker 204). 
 
 32 
sentence mean?” and his substitution “what does this sentence do?” (72). 
This substitution sparks one of the key issues of the Reader-Response 
Criticism, one that almost fanatically departs from the old school idea of 
valuation. For critics like Iser and Fish, then, meaning is experience, is effect. 
It is never a matter of valuing something as superior or inferior, it is only a 
matter of reporting that something is happening. 
Jonathan Culler in his theory of the competent reader is not 
completely freed from the structuralists’ fondness for the text, but he is well 
aware of how meaning is created through the use of an “internalized 
grammar” (101) that produces a variety of interpretations. Culler is less open 
in regard to Iser or Fish as to the complete integrity of the reader’s 
experience: 
 
we have only to ask what we want a theory of literature 
to account for. We cannot ask it to account for the 
“correct” meaning of a work since we manifestly do not 
believe that for each work there is a single correct 
reading. We cannot ask it to draw a clear line between 
the well-informed and the deviant work if we believe 
that no such line exists. Indeed, the striking facts that 
do require explanation are how it is that a work can 
have a variety of meanings but not just any meaning 
whatsoever […] (110) 
 
In Culler’s literary theory, the reader is central, but his experience is not 
unlimited. Rather, it is controlled by not only the reader’s literary 
competence but also the limited possibilities that the text gives him. 
Michael Riffaterre addresses a common problem: that of the difference 
between a stylistic study and an analysis of a reader’s experience. If we look 
at a text as a text and define structure and style from a perspective of looking 
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at the text as a whole, we lose what actually is the reading experience, a 
temporarily chronological experience. Riffaterre writes about how these 
structuralist critics “assume that the definition of categories used to collect 
data is also valid to explain their function in the poetic structure […]” (33). 
Although showing differences in how the exact mechanisms of the 
reading process are executed and how important the pseudo-objectivity of 
the text is, the Reader-Response theorists all embrace the idea of literature as 
experience and stress the importance of the chronological experience of the 
text.  They all encourage the study of how the reader engages in the text but 
differ in how this engagement is constituted. It can be re-experiencing the 
author’s experience (Poulet), co-creating the work of art by filling in the gaps 
(Iser), “[…] the developing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they 
succeed one another in time” (Fish 73), playing out our inner subconscious 
drives in the experience (Holland), the “symbolizations” of the text by the 
reader (Bleich 111), or the literary conventions perceived by the competent 
reader (Culler). Similarly there is a transition from still observing the text as 
objective (Riffaterre, Culler) to more or less abandoning the text completely 
(Fish). Of course, this abandonment does not mean that they do not 
recognize that the text is what actually triggers the readers’ responses, only 
that it should not be the focus of analysis. 
Stressing the perspective of seeing literature as an experience is not 
radical; in what now seems to be a consensus around the most adequate 
entrance into effective textual studies, experience plays a central role, 
especially when a critical study embodies the sometimes speculative 
subjective sphere of emotional response. Along with focusing on experience 
comes a swarm of potential difficulties and problems within critical analysis. 
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The Problem of Experience 
“The Problem of Experience” is the name of the penultimate paragraph in 
Gregory Currie’s essay “The Paradox of Caring: Fiction and the Philosophy 
of Mind” (74). It is a striking fact that it comes so late in his essay, since in the 
end he has to abandon any kind of objective aim and yield to the subjectivity 
of emotive experience and acknowledge how problematic it is to study 
subjective experiences whether they are emotional or otherwise. There seem 
to be two main factors, sometimes intertwined: the psychological aspects of 
experience and what we will call the role of cultural determinators. In the 
following section we will address some perspectives of the problem but leave 
the problem unsolved for later.  
The range of contexts and private biography, in the reading situation, 
is what Iser refers to as the structural reading act where the “mental images 
will be colored by the reader’s existing stock of experience […]” (The Act of 
Reading 38). It can be a rereading of a text; it can be the particular mood we 
are in when we are reading, our state of health, the place we are reading in. 
Both Iser and Fish are also aware of the psychological dimension of reading. 
Fish talks about the “‘psychological effects’ of the utterance” (70) and Iser 
about text as mirror, how the “manner in which the reader experiences the 
text will reflect his own disposition […]” (“The Reading Process” 56), thus 
leading us to Holland’s and Bleich’s incorporation of psychoanalytical theory 
in the theory of literary experience and Holland’s idea of the identity theme. 
Holland identifies how the reader constructs the meaning within the 
limitations of the text (The Dynamics of Literary Response 25), how the reader 
connects all parts of the text in his present reading position and “abstracts 
recurring images, incidents, characters, forms and all the rest into certain 
themes” (The Dynamics of Literary Response 28). The key issue with Holland’s 
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study lies in his preoccupation with psychoanalysis. He addresses reading 
basically as stimuli of the Freudian pleasure principle, and that the pleasure 
lies in how the text stimulates our deepest desires or dreams. Still he warns 
against these ideological interpretations:  
 
People have fantasies. That quite commonplace, 
extraliterary fact is one of two postulates on which this 
book rests. The other is also an empirical observation: 
whatever their sect, literary critics find central or core 
ideas that permeate and inform the literary work – this 
is what we mean when we say literary works have 
‘organic unity.’ Psychoanalytic critics find a core of 
fantasy; other kinds of critics find cores of social, 
biographical, political, philosophical, moral, or 
religious meaning. (The Dynamics of Literary Response 31)  
 
He continues: “Whenever we talk about symbols, however, it is most 
important to remember that symbols are flexible and dynamic: they vary 
with the context. They do not represent a code of one-to-one 
correspondences that can be looked up in some ‘Freudian’ dreambook” (The 
Dynamics of Literary Response 57).  
Holland distinguishes what he terms identity theme as a certain 
personal way of dealing with everyday situations that spill over on our 
interpretation of texts as well (“The New Paradigm” 338). Bleich develops 
this and writes: “The basic motive for any response is the person’s need to 
replicate his personality style” (121). It seems probable that we bring, 
subconsciously, certain central ideas about life and the world, that we want to 
be confirmed through the text. This means that our evaluation of the text is 
based upon how well the text stimulates, or answers, these demands.  
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Bleich also speaks of the reader’s symbolization of the text as 
interpretation (Bleich 111). Whereas Holland still sees the objective text as an 
authority, controlling the symbolization, Bleich denies the text that quality. 
Instead he is preoccupied with how the subjective experience is objectified 
within the different interpretative communities that we share. He spends a 
considerable time defending subjectivism against objectivism by citing 
important scientists and philosophers like Husserl as well as defining the 
paramount of the observer through Einstein, Bohr, and Heisenberg (18-21). 
Nevertheless, he seems to believe that there is a pseudo-objectivity that is 
gained by universality, repeatability, and predictability (38).  
  
Cultural Determinators and Emotions in Art 
Iser, Holland, and Bleich all identify the need to not only penetrate through 
the psychological subjectivity within experience but also to realize that this 
psychology is necessarily based on a variety of cultural components and 
contexts. This position is equally valid when it comes to emotions. Just like 
emotions in general9, emotions in art are bound in various degrees to the 
specific culture of a time when the art was produced and consumed. The 
contemporary moral and aesthetic code, in combination with criticism, 
commercialism, and theories of interpretation, sets the frames for 
acknowledged conventions and a shared background in both authors and 
audiences: “Within the boundaries of certain cultures, there are certain 
criteria concerning which emotional responses are normatively correct – that 
                                                
9  There has been a general division of those who mainly see emotions as biological 
functions (William James, MacLean), those who see emotions as evolutionary and thus 
universal (Darwin, Paul Ekman), and those who are more or less bound to see emotions 
in terms of social and cultural contexts (Hochschild, Collins). Seeing emotions as 
biological functions do not prevent us from regarding them as socially changeable 
(Carroll, “Art, Narrative, and Emotion” 198-99). 
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is, which emotions certain situations are supposed to elicit” (Carroll, “Art, 
Narrative, and Emotion” 206). Emotions such as jealousy, anger, repulsion, 
and fear are deeply grounded in what it is in our culture, at a certain time, 
that makes us jealous, angry, or scared.  
However, temporality seems not always to be the main factor, but 
rather the cultural heritage, which can be seen in our habitual use of the term 
classic; we still today feel sorry for Odysseus when he returns to Ithaca and 
finds the suitors in charge, fear for Dante’s infernos, or pity for Don Quixote 
in his futile attempts of heroic imaginations. These emotions are still within 
the diffuse definition of Western culture, and thus sharable through times. 
This appears to confirm that culture precedes time in importance, which is 
argued by Rom Harré who refers to the unpublished “Georgetown 
Experiments” conducted by Rom Harré and W. G. Parrott in 1991. These 
experiments, according to Harré, promote the idea of cultural variety of 
emotional response rather than its temporal disposition and show that at 
least a Western audience is more able to reach a consensus of certain 
emotions expressed in Western classical music than in choir music from 
Nepal (Harré 114-15). The obvious limitation of these experiments is that the 
opposite was never investigated: how a Nepal audience would respond to 
Western classical music. Nevertheless, there have been numerous cases 
where one cultural audience has “misinterpreted” the emotional content of 
art from another culture. This can also happen within the same culture. 
Consider Quentin Tarantino’s Kill Bill Volume 1 (2003), for example, where the 
extremely gory sword fights could create disgust or fear in a normal Western 
audience, but awe and aesthetic appreciation in those subcultures that are 
interested and immersed in Asian martial arts films. Perhaps we in a global 
society are more individuated than cultural in our responses to art than 
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before, and it is more valuable to consider the persona of the audience rather 
than its cultural context. Clearly we are all subject to a greater and greater 
diversity of influences now than before. 
The more extreme claim is given to us by Robert Solomon who 
suggests that there might be no universal emotions at all (Solomon, “The 
Cross-Cultural Comparisons of Emotion” 262). Solomon argues that there is 
a greater individual difference in emotions within cultures than between 
cultures themselves (261-63). However, most theorists see the biological 
function as well as the social aspects which form emotions as important in 
the way emotions shape our perception of situations, focus our attention, and 
force us to act in certain situations (Carroll, “Art, Narrative, and Emotion” 
198-99). It is probably a general consensus that different social, political, 
cultural, economical, lingual, and historical contexts will play a part in how 
we experience emotions even though these emotions might very well be 
biological. 
 
The Nature of Emotional Experience 
At this point we have generally been speaking of experience as experience of 
the text and how cultural and psychological dimensions affect primarily the 
textual experience. This will prove to be a simplification of experience and 
we will here need to carefully sketch the different ways in which an 
experience works in terms of emotive response. 
 An emotional experience can be triggered either by the text itself or 
extra-textual aspects such as rumours, criticism, knowledge, media, and the 
actual context of the experience. As an example of extra-textual triggering 
imagine hypothetically that you are visiting your aging grandmother and 
after dinner you retire to a room that you used to sleep in when you visited 
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her as a boy. In one of the drawers you find a book – Stephen King’s It – 
which you read in this room when you were young. You study the cover and 
it scares you, both because the frightening eyes that stare at you make you 
feel uncomfortable and because the cover itself reminds you of when you 
read it as a young boy and how scared you were then. A sudden rush of 
nostalgia hits you when you sense both how long ago it was you were a boy 
and that those times are forever gone. This feeling in connection with hearing 
your grandmother’s voice in the stairway makes you sad that her life is 
approaching an end. Suddenly you get angry because you recall a critic you 
read lately that had a very negative attitude to Stephen King’s prose. You 
start reading and after a while you feel upset over how difficult it is to read 
the small font; it makes you think about that you have to make an 
appointment to the doctor and this, in turn, worries you. Then suddenly on 
page 3 you see a red dot that resembles blood and you feel disgusted but are 
quickly comforted when the smell of the dusty book reminds you of one of 
the summers in this very room when you read everything Ernest 
Hemingway wrote. As we can see, the actual process of reading (reading 
experience) in this case involves a whole spectrum of emotions and feelings, 
even moods, but none are directly linked to the actual text. It is not a reaction 
to the narrative, nor the fictive characters, nor its style and form. It is 
reactions that are triggered by the experience of reading the book but not its 
text. I propose to call such emotional experiences extra-textual since they are 
not triggered by the text itself. The opposite, and what we generally deal 
with when discussing art and emotions, would then be called textual.  
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The division between extra-textual and textual can be more 
complicated; there could be both extra-textual and textual triggers working 
simultaneously. You continue to read, and when Bill’s brother meets the 
clown down in the sewer, a branch of a tree outside the window suddenly 
hits the glass and you react with terror. Would we call this reaction extra-
textual or textual? I argue that this is basically a textual reaction since it is 
connected to the status of the text we are reading. Assuming we are reading 
The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy instead, we would probably not have 
reacted with terror at the sudden sound of the branch hitting the window. It 
is not the reading experience per se, but the actual reading of It and its text 
that have influenced us into an emotional state that makes us more aware of 
sounds around us. 
Returning to the text, we can distinguish two different ways that we 
react to the text. The first, and most obvious, is a reaction to the 
representation of the story (plot and character). This will be discussed later as 
part of the simulation of the text. The second are emotions triggered by the 
narrative discourse (style, structure) in what I will call aesthetics and mood. 
Finally, the emotions that are triggered in the subject of experience can 
either be emotions that are part of the text (diegetic) or personal, 







Fig. 1. The Emotional Experience of Art. 
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We do not need to explain this further now; we will return to these 
categorizations when we examine the nature of the actual emotional 
response to fiction. 
 
 
The Experience of Emotions in Fiction 
 
Just like we have seen with fictive experience in general, there is a range of 
issues with connecting fictive experience with emotions. This section will 
deal with both how we should interpret and deal with emotions in general 
and how we should deal critically with emotions evoked through art. 
Entering and problematizing the contemporary fields of emotional studies, 
we will in the end suggest the usefulness of dividing emotions into emotions 
and moods in order to bridge the alternative theories of cognitive and non-
cognitive emotions. 
 
The Paradox of Fiction 
The issue of the paradox of fiction is a side effect created by the now 
commonly cognitive approach to emotions. If real emotions are cognitive 
reactions, how can we experience fictive emotions? However, before heading 
into the debate about the paradox of fiction let us briefly explain emotional 
reactions. 
 Emotional reactions can be divided into psychic or physical. “On the 
one hand,” writes Holland, “affect is psychic: we are of a certain feeling of 
rage, say, or joy or sadness or anxiety. At the same time, this feeling is 
accompanied by somatic changes: we laugh or cry or shudder. Pulse rate 
rises or falls. Breathing slows or quickens. Hands sweat. Thus, there can be 
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‘unconscious affect,’ where the physical symptoms show, but we are unaware 
of any feeling” (281). Emotions with physical effect, if they are unconscious, 
are non-cognitive based emotions, but Holland does not describe the other 
feelings as cognitive. One can imagine that a person can experience a psychic 
feeling without any cognitive attributes. However, modern studies seem to 
favour a cognitive approach to emotions and discard feelings as a synonym 
for emotions, since they consider the experience of emotion to be a cognitive 
act. Still, Holland probably means emotions in the modern sense when he 
writes about feelings, or? The confusion of meaning is probably a result of 
linguistic usage. We simply mean emotions when we say feelings and vice 
versa. Other times, feelings are clearly distinguished from emotions. Thus, it 
is wise to adopt a division between a feeling, or sensation, and a thought- or 
cognition-based approach. The former puts the actual sensation of the 
emotion at the core, whereas the latter holds the belief that emotions are 
referred to as conscious evaluation or judgment.  
Much of the debate has been focusing on the intentionality or object of 
emotions. If we feel fear we fear something; if we experience anger, this anger 
is directed towards something or somebody. Involved as well is the idea of 
belief – that we have to believe the reality of the object of our feeling: if we feel 
fear of a dog, we have to believe that this dog is dangerous. This 
intentionality and belief constitute a cognitive behaviour. The degrees of 
cognitivism and the intensity of sensations change from one emotional 
reaction to another. It is very high in the fear of a snake and its sudden 
physical implications and rather low in that of frustration of a missed 
opportunity. 
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If we consider the intentionality as crucial, it is more difficult to 
explain how fiction actually can cause emotional response. It is called a 
paradox, since everybody agrees that we can feel genuine emotions through 
art but we should not because we are not reacting to real life but fiction. If we 
think that emotions can only be felt when we react to something within 
reality that affect us (the death of a family member or knowledge about our 
spouse’s infidelity) it is hard to explain why we would feel anything for 
fictive characters and situations. This paradox addresses two issues. First, we 
are all aware that emotional reactions are not always rational. If someone has 
phobia for snakes, he will react with fear even though he knows it is only a 
harmless Garter snake. However, in the sense of the belief, the snake is still 
there, whereas if the snake occurs in fiction we know it is not present. Second, 
what is actually the difference between mourning the death of Marilyn 
Monroe whom we never met nor saw in real life and the suicide of Anna 
Karenina? One is a real life event and the other a fictive event.10 This paradox, 
however, has sparked a renewed interest in reception theories; how do we 
actually experience fiction and can an explanation of this experience shatter 
the paradox? 
I think we can all agree that emotions are a combined and complex set 
of feelings, sensations, and physical and phenomenological changes, and that 
this involves a varied degree of cognitivism in the attention to the object for 
the emotion. An experience of emotions can coexist with both the more direct 
feelings and a cognitive thought process. As Rom Harré has distinguished, 
“we can retrospectively disentangle the bits and pieces of evidence, of 
interpretation […]” (111) after our emotional response; this suggests that 
                                                
10  For an interesting discussion on how documentary and fiction produce different 
emotional reactions see Derek Matravers’ Art and Emotion (57-82). 
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perhaps the chronology of the emotion is first sensational and then cognitive. 
Of course, we can turn things around: Noël Carroll prefers to see emotions as 
“made up of at least two components: a cognitive component, such as a belief 
or a thought about some person, place, or thing, real or imagined; and a 
feeling component (a bodily change and/or a phenomenological experience), 
where, additionally, the feeling state has been caused by the relevant 
cognitive state […]” (“Art, Narrative, and Emotion” 196). 
 
Fiction as Simulation 
One of the earlier and more famous propositions of how we can bridge our 
emotional responses to fiction over the paradox of fiction was Kendall 
Walton’s theory of make-believe. In a now legendary illustration of how 
audiences participate in a game of make-believe towards art Walton showed 
that we substitute the real emotion’s belief with a quasi belief or a fictional 
truth. In Walton’s illustration Charles is watching a horror movie where a 
huge green slime is moving towards him on the screen. Charles feels fear, but 
this fear, Walton interprets as different from real fear and calls it quasi fear: 
“He experiences quasi fear as a result of realizing that fictionally the slime 
threatens him. This makes it fictional that his quasi fear is caused by a belief 
that the slime poses a danger, and hence that he fears the slime” (Mimesis as 
Make-Believe 245). What Walton means is that we create a belief and a truth 
through our interaction with the fictive world in a game of make-believe, but 
that the emotions are not real emotions. This idea of quasi-emotions was 
quickly dismissed by several theorists, most notably Noël Carroll who 
explained that at least he was genuinely horrified by The Exorcist and did not 
feel quasi about anything (The Philosophy of Horror, or Paradoxes of the Heart 
74). There is no validity in describing emotions triggered by art as not real, 
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considering the phenomenology and arousal states of these emotions that 
have been certified through the physiological effects of emotional responses.  
Later, Walton also clarifies his idea, and while defending the importance of 
distinguishing real emotions from emotions derived from art, he rather talks 
about simulation than a game of make-believe (“Spelunking, Simulation, and 
Slime: On Being Moved by Fiction” 40).11 The idea of simulation is, according 
to Keith Oatley, what Aristotle actually meant by mimesis rather than the 
misinterpretation by Henry James as “imitation” or “representation” (“A 
Taxonomy of the Emotions of Literary Response” 65). Aristotle did not mean 
that art had to imitate life, but rather simulate it, or more precisely create the 
fundaments for a mental simulation in the audience (Oatley and Gholamain 
266). Although the idea of simulation is mostly connected to the information 
age and computer games and programs, Oatley and Gholamain 
acknowledge that the idea of how humans are able to create models of reality 
and thus engage in simulation is not new (265-66). Simulation of reality 
through fiction is a complex process and an analysis of it includes the role of 
narrator, narration, focalization, identification, semantics, and the 
subjectivity of the one engaged in the simulation. Simulation can either be, as 
Robert Louis Stevenson expressed it in his essay “A Chapter on Dreams” 
(1888), quite close to the state of dreaming (127) or more like a report of 
events (Matravers 40).   
There is no need to dwell further on these aspects; they will be closely 
examined in due course when appropriate. For now, it is only important to 
                                                
11  In what has been mostly an interest in audiences’ feelings toward fictional characters 
there has been discussions on how our emotions towards fictive characters are closer to 
that of empathy and sympathy than the feelings the characters feel or experience 
themselves, building somewhat on Walton’s distinctions (Feagin; Gregory Currie “The 
Paradox of Caring”). 
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notify that simulation through imagination opens up possibilities for us to 
simulate reality through fiction. Let us instead return to the paradox of 
fiction. In mental simulation we are able to simulate real life, which then 
must include emotions as well. This leads me to what seems the most 
plausible attitude to the paradox of fiction, one that Carroll accommodates:  
 
My answer to this challenge relies on my rejection of 
the supposition that emotions require beliefs in all 
cases. The cognitive theory of emotions requires a 
cognitive component, but, I would argue, the form that 
component can take is diverse, including not only 
beliefs, but thoughts and perhaps even patterns of 
attention. And, furthermore, the form that is most 
relevant to understanding our emotional responses to 
fictional narratives is thought, not belief. (“Art, 
Narrative, and Emotion” 209) 
 
What Carroll actually means with “thought” is, of course, our ability to 
simulate through using our imagination. This is very different than the often 
used example of phobia and the snake. In the case of the phobia we are 
actually not simulating, but experiencing the snake although our beliefs are 
distorted about the danger of the reptile. If a person is phobic he can fairly 
easily experience the physic-psychological phenomena (shivering) of a real 
snake only by imaging it.  We apparently are able to simulate emotions, as 
shown by our capacity to arouse ourselves sexually by pure imagination 
(Carroll, “Art, Narrative, and Emotion” 209). 
 
The Meta-Experience 
Walton’s notion about a game of make-believe might actually have some 
validity since simulation does require that we play by the rules otherwise we 
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won’t be able to simulate reality. If we, for some reason, are watching a 
horror film and do not engage in the simulation we might laugh at the green 
slime rather than fear it. This can, of course, be a choice of our own or a 
matter of the contexts of the actual experience. But it can also be, supposedly, 
due to the nature of the narrative discourse. 
Many have considered Bertholdt Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt and ideas 
of the epic theatre as a contrast to the classic drama in its lack of emotional 
involvement, at least empathy. Brecht’s aim was to take the audience out of 
the dramatic rollercoaster ride in order for them to evaluate the play’s 
political content. This evaluative process, one imagines, is closely connected 
with that of a more cognitive process in watching the play and perhaps a 
lesser degree of simulation. Brecht’s characters sang songs about themselves, 
tore down the fourth wall, interacted with the boundaries of the realistic 
drama, and discussed their own roles in the play. They were engaged in what 
then was called Verfremdungseffekt, or distancing effects, and now is more 
commonly known as meta-aspects. These were not new ideas; we can trace 
them all the way back to the ancient Greek drama, but Brecht did theorize 
and conceptualize them in a new way. Brecht’s plays were undeniably more 
explicitly political than Strindberg’s or Ibsen’s, but I do not recall being 
emotionally untouched by Die Dreigroschenoper [The Threepenny Opera] (1928) 
or Der kaukasische Kreidekreis [The Caucasian Chalk Circle] (1945) for example. 
Neither have the modernist film directors of European art cinema in the 
1960s, who were deeply inspired by Brecht’s epic theatre, neglected to 
address my feelings in films such as Federico Fellini’s La Dolce Vita (1960) or 
Michelangelo Antonioni’s L’Avventura [The Adventure] (1960). And why 
should the epic qualities of fiction (epic in Brecht’s terms) not evoke emotions 
since we have decided that emotions also have cognitive aspects? Not being 
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“in the drama” and not being seduced by classic narration and identification, 
does not mean a lack of emotional involvement. However, the game of 
simulation is somehow still altered and challenged by a narration that 
challenges its own narrative and this could effect our simulation of emotions 
as well. This issue has been addressed by several theorists of art and 
emotions. 
 “If too much mental prodding is necessary,” writes Susan L. Feagin in 
“Imagining Emotions and Appreciating Fiction,” “then you can’t even 
imagine the emotion: it all gets lost, as it were, in irrelevant thoughts” (59). 
This line of thought is carried to extremes by Carroll who illustrates, through 
works by Frank Stella, how some art “address[es] cognition exclusively” and 
therefore “does not traffic in emotions […]” (“Art, Narrative, and Emotion” 
193). But in fairness, the art Carroll depicts having no emotional impact (at 
least not garden-variety emotions) is quite rare. As I reported about my 
experience of Brecht earlier, the question of how meta-fiction affects the 
emotional experience is not a binary one, but rather a question of degrees. 
Matravers, influenced by Walton, observes this subtlety in reading as how 
“the experience of the game of make-believe must not compete with the 
experience of reading the book – the actual experience of running one’s eyes 
along sentences” (44). He suggests that a few breaks with the illusion of 
imagination and simulation are permitted as long as they do not disturb the 
actual fictive experience, or in Walton’s words everything has to be 
“integrated into a single complex phenomenological whole” (Mimesis as 
Make-Believe 295). Matravers asserts that it has nothing to do with the reality 
of the fiction; as an example, he uses Gulliver’s Travels where the fictive world 
obviously is not realistic but the actual narration tells the story in such a way 
that the fact of its unreality does not disturb the “phenomenological whole” 
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of our experience (45).  
Matravers also spends time trying to explain the complexity of 
characters addressing the audience in film and theatre. He calls this common 
experience “disconcerting” (50). An excellent example of this is one 
particular scene in cinema, when Harriet Andersson’s character Monika looks 
right into the camera for an extended time in Ingmar Bergman’s Sommaren 
med Monika [Summer with Monika] (1953). It happens only this time and it 
occurs totally unexpectedly since there is nothing in the film’s form or style 
(nor in the history of cinema at this point) prior to this that accentuates even 
the slightest possibility of meta-film. This gaze, when it occurs in the end of 
the film, made a deeply emotional impact on me. We have seen how Monika 
deserts her husband and child and is unfaithful with another man while her 
husband is working in another city to support the family. We have judged 
her morally (the American title of the film was Monika: A Story of a Bad Girl) 
but simultaneously been aroused by her sensuality and explicit nakedness 
earlier. This gaze into the audience does not only break the illusion of being 
“safe” as a voyeur in the cinema but also challenges our moral depiction of 
her. It is obviously a break against the illusion, but is it a break with the 
simulation as well? I would say no. It certainly violates the game of 
simulation, but like Matravers argues, games of make-believe “can absorb 
violations provided they do not become prevalent” (51). Furthermore, the 
violation is still in the way it forces the audience to interact with the character 
of Monika, part of the fictive world of Monika and the diegetic world of the 
film. Matravers raises an important question: “If it is fictional that we are 
looking at the characters in a drama, why is it seldom fictional that they are 
looking at us?” (51). The normal response would be that it violates the rules 
of the game: in this case the rules of the classic cinema where actors are never 
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allowed to look into the camera and where the audience should not be 
engaged in the actual film-making props. We do not have to exaggerate the 
role of conventions; surely there are many cases where violations of the 
illusion do not interfere with the fictive simulation as long as these violations 
are not too frequent and as long as they are connected in some way with the 
fiction per se. 
 So if we are agreeing on the fact that meta-aspects do not need to 
interfere neither with our simulations nor with the cordiality of emotional 
experiences, is there any necessity to be cautious about meta-fiction? I think 
so, in two instances. One is that even though an aspect of fiction violates the 
sense of a whole in an experience (the whole work of art) it does not mean 
that this actual event cannot create an emotional, isolated reaction in an 
audience. This is something we will look into further in the section about 
fiction and mood below. The second one is more complicated and not yet 
addressed by critics: does meta-fiction account for other types of emotional 
responses than the traditional realistic fiction? 
 One of the main reasons why Hollywood so long persisted in keeping 
a film style that favoured dramatic story telling and neglected the initiatives 
of the more experimental film communities was that they believed that this 
very style was the foundation of creating the emotions (sentimentality, 
excitement, and spectacle) they aimed at. This was especially true in 
preserving the classic film rules of continuity. The feelings they aimed for 
belong to what Carroll returns to as “garden-variety feelings” and include at 
least two of the body genres, melodrama and horror. When Hollywood had 
to adapt to the younger audiences’ growing interest in European art cinema 
in the 1970s, the film style changed rapidly together with the emotional 
range favoured by the audience. Instead of melodrama there should be 
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political and intellectual analysis of contemporary American issues such as 
the Vietnam War, the violent and imperial past, the situation of the youth, or 
the complications of capitalism. The change of emotional interests and film 
style was not a coincident but a parallel and natural shift. The classic Western 
by John Ford aimed at feelings such as heroism, fear (of Indians), and awe of 
the small man in the big world. The anti-genre films, such as Robert Altman’s 
McCabe and Mrs. Miller (1971), allowed the only real cowboy in the film to be 
shot in the back in a snowy outpost of the western trail with Leonard Cohen’s 
deep, anti-genre voice on the soundtrack. Instead of heroism, disgust was 
expressed. Perhaps the shift of emotions was one from “garden-variety 
emotions” to more complex emotions and emotions that needed a more 
active audience involvement in terms of cognitive behaviour.12 
 A similar change can be observed in the transition from realistic 
literary fiction, through modernism and into postmodernism. The feelings 
for Charles Dicken’s Oliver Twist certainly do not resemble the feelings one 
might have for Samuel Beckett’s Malone or Josef K. in Kafka’s Der Prozeß [The 
Trial] (1925). Realism awakens one set of feelings, closely related to how it 
favours representation: the plot and fate of its characters. Expressionism and 
perhaps modernism in general, addresses more existential emotions through 
its explorations of interior landscapes. Futurism aims at awe. Postmodernism 
exhibits feelings closely related to irony, humour, and more autobiographical 
or cultural associations due to its preference for ontological issues. The meta-
aspects so often found in postmodern literature, what Ron Sukenick calls 
“suspension of belief” (99), distracts the imaginative simulation process, but 
it does not mean that it is emotionless. An example that echoes the gaze in 
                                                
12  For further reading about the change of classical Hollywood into new Hollywood see the 
appropriate chapters ”Hollywood in Transition: 1946-1965” and ”The New Hollywood: 
1966 – 1978” in Gerald Mast’s A Short History of the Movies. 
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Sommaren med Monika is John Fowles’ The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969). 
What seems at the beginning a quite ordinary “Victorian” tale turns out in 
the end to be a book not only about the characters Charles and Sarah but also 
about writing, about fictive characters, about the customs and morals of the 
Victorian age and how they have been presented. Does the interfering 
narrator, when he flips the coin for the future of his fictive character really 
alter our emotions towards Charles and Sarah? I argue that the emotions we 
had until this event are already experienced and the fact that perhaps this 
intrusive narrator forces us to revalue them does not nullify them. Our 
emotional capacity does not die because of the narrator’s comments. We have 
probably grown to care for these characters and share there interests and will 
continue to do so even though we are offered several different endings. The 
intrusion on the simulation might even provide other emotions that would 
not have been addressed otherwise. 
 My point is that there is no need to value emotions in art in terms of 
either quality or quantity in regards to whether we are engaged into a full 
imaginative simulation or one that is disrupted once or more. It is important 
how the different narrative strategies can aim at different emotional registers, 
which may also overlap. The simulation model works best with plot and 
characters and addresses the “garden-variety emotions” whereas other more 
complex narratives might engage us in more external and complex sets of 
emotions since the degree of cognitivism is higher as well as our personal 
engagement with and to the narration. 
 
Subjectivity and Simulation 
The need to involve psychological factors in the emotional experience of art, 
such as the audience’s “actual psychological makeup, attitudes, interests, 
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values, prejudices, hang-ups […]” (Walton, “Spelunking, Simulation, and 
Slime” 47), is evident as we have seen in our section about the problem of 
experience. This need is given topical interest among theorists of art and 
emotions, just like in Walton’s own works, but never seems to be taken into 
account when discussing the experience of simulation. 
Gregory Currie suggests that the subjective difference of experience is 
“not easily accounted for on a simulation model” (74). Currie, as well as 
Walton and Carroll (Walton, “Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime” 39; Carroll, 
“Art, Narrative, and Emotion” 204), addresses an important issue; if the belief 
is that the simulation model captures the audience and enrols them in a 
fictive imagination, there seems to be little room for introspection or other 
experiences to determine the emotional impact of an experience of art. 
Currie’s solution, and one with which I agree, is that “our emotional 
responses to fiction are not, after all, entirely a matter of simulation. 
Simulation might be the primary or triggering factor, but other factors may 
play a role” (74). Currie especially emphasizes the role memory plays 
together with simulation, how art triggers our own autobiographical 
memories and creates a variety of more or less intensive emotional 
experiences (74-75). For example, persons A and B cry when Catherine dies in 
the end of Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms (1929). Person A is responding to 
the narrative and plot, and the loss of a fictive character. This happens to 
person B as well but enhancing the feeling of sadness and grief is the 
autobiographical fact that person B’s own wife died in childbirth a few years 
earlier. In this case both person A and B share the emotional impact of 
sadness and grief but in a variety of intensities. Both emotional reactions, 
though, are triggered by the fictive story through simulation. 
However, it is less common that there is something specific and 
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particular in the narrative that triggers an autobiographical memory, a detail 
or scene that would pass unnoticed by another person with a different 
background. Maybe an ordinary fictive scene that takes place in a boarding 
school triggers memories of being in a boarding school which as a 
consequence triggers emotional reactions of anger over how one was treated 
by the staff at boarding school. This example differs from the one with 
Farewell to Arms in that it is not triggered by a commonly shared emotional 
expression in the narrative through simulation.  From an analytical 
perspective, such subjective experiences are difficult to study or even 
incorporate in any theory of emotions and art. When there is a sense of 
consensus in an audience (either through reviews, diaries, or critical studies) 
that many people have the same emotional experience, it would also prove 
valid to say that this text creates a possible emotional experience in the 
audience (or at least the audience when this emotional consensus was 
proven). The key word is possibility, since we can never guarantee such a 
response. But I would also like to use the word possibility in an extended 
sense. Is it not possible that certain narratives, styles, and forms can trigger 
personal memory in a higher degree and thus be isolated and analyzed? 
  
Fiction and Mood 
Since we already have moved away from the hegemony of the simulation 
model, let us look at how differently mood operates in fiction compared to 
that of emotion. In this section we will conjoin moods with aesthetics.  
 Moods are “typically less intense and more chronic than emotions” 
(The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 35). They are also less 
bound to the intentionality we find in emotions. We have all experienced a 
sense of feeling sad without really knowing why or finding a rational cause 
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for it. The more subconscious nature of mood, which includes a lesser 
intensity but prolonged feeling, is a sign of a less cognitive state. Although 
not recognizable, certainly there is some cause that motivates the mood. We 
can also suppose that a mood can become an emotion when a person 
becomes aware of why and what he is feeling. 
 Mood, then, is less cognitive than emotion, and therefore it is less 
confined within the whole of a work of art and more of an episodic sort of 
affective response.13 The non-cognitive affective experience in literature is 
something that Matravers claims to be of considerably higher importance 
than the usual cognitive models. He methodically departs from the cognitive 
model to what he calls the arousal model: the position that most of our feelings 
through art are less conscious and cognitive than the current theoretical body 
believes. The weakness of Matravers’ analysis is that when he discusses 
cognitive emotions he uses examples from literature and film, which are 
highly narrative art forms. However, when he enters the stage of arousals he 
instead uses music primarily as an example. Much more interesting, but of 
course more difficult, would be if he would look into narrative art with his 
arousal theory. He shares a common deficiency with other critics: the 
preference for discussing plot and character when discussing emotions in 
narrative art. The reason for this is conveniently explained by Jerrold 
Levinson: “Emotional response to abstract art is puzzling, principally, 
because the strategies that provide obvious explanations of both why we 
respond emotionally, and what we are responding to, in the case of 
representational art, here seem not to be available” (27). Of course, Levinson 
is approaching “abstract art” and thus not considering fiction, but if we 
would discuss formal and stylistic matters and how we respond to them, 
                                                
13 We will discuss mood more in detail in chapter two when we define nostalgic mood. 
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would it not be the same procedure as how we respond to abstract art? 
Livingstone and Mele offer the same line of thought but in regards to fiction: 
“Attempts to define the specificity of the artistic and aesthetic responses to 
works of fiction along purely formalist lines have been notoriously 
problematic […]” (164). The details of this formalist approach are identified 
by Feagin as “length of sentences, vocabulary and diction, shifts in voice, 
recurrence of images, allusions, and juxtaposition of episodes” (58). These are 
surely but a few of the different formalistic and stylistic aspects of a work of 
fiction. More importantly, Feagin points out that they actually might play a 
more significant part in creating emotional responses in audiences than the 
more cognitive emotions considering plot and character (58).  
The well-stated difficulties in recognizing how style and form address 
our emotions depend on a serious mistake, or limitation. The cognitive 
model cannot account for emotional response that is without belief (thought) 
and without a cognitive reaction. The cognitivists might be right in their 
analysis of emotion, but in that process they seem to forget that mood is also 
an affective state. If we talk instead about mood in relation to form and 
stylistics we can preserve the idea of emotion for other contexts without 
altering its cognitive form. 
 What we really are talking about is, of course, aesthetic responses and 
how they seem more sensational than cognitive. Consider William James’ 
description from 1890 of aesthetic emotions: “Aesthetic emotion, pure and 
simple, the pleasure given us by certain lines and masses, and combinations 
of colors and sounds, is an absolutely sensational experience” (468). A 
hundred years later, Ronald de Sousa again connects aesthetic experience 
with that of sensations: “Aesthetic experience has, in the classic and 
etymological sense of the word aesthesis, an essential connection with the 
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sensory” (182). Because sensory experiences make the emotions more 
subconscious and not as perceptible, they are difficult to explain. However, 
they might not be all subconscious either. This is argued clearly by Frank 
Sibley: “It is of importance to note that, broadly speaking, aesthetics deals 
with a kind of perception. People have to see the grace or unity of a work, 
hear the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music, notice the gaudiness of a color 
scheme, feel the power of a novel, its mood, or its uncertainty of tone” (137). 
The mood that is extracted from narrative discourse still needs to be 
perceived, and that involves a certain degree of both literary consciousness 
and perceptiveness in the audience. 
 These sudden, episodic, sensory, and more subconscious affections 
could seem to contradict the general idea of mood as being a longer term and 
less intense emotion, but modern theory about mood accounts for its extreme 
variety in length and intensity. It is the less cognitive state of mood that 
interests us and that is crucial in understanding the link between aesthetic 
experience and feelings, and in calling these feelings moods we create a 
distinct separation between cognitive emotion and sensory mood in art, or in 
Matravers’ words, “between the content of a work and the way the content is 
presented [where the] former arouse our feelings through a cognitive 
intermediary, the latter can arouse our feelings directly” (95). What 
Matravers says is that aesthetic mood evolves as a result of the way a 
narrative is told. Furthermore, it seems to suggest, as noted by Charles 
Mauron in Aesthetics and Psychology, that aesthetic emotions have nothing to 
do with subject matter, since you can have emotions from music and that 
pure music has no symbols (18-19). Mauron identifies the external aspect of 
music when he wonders why we are “moved deeply by certain sequences of 
notes which arouse no suggestion of any experience in actual life” (23). 
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In this less cognitive emotional state it would seem that we are less 
likely to wander away into autobiographical memory and, as such, the 
aesthetic mood is less personal. This is not necessarily the case, since the 
aesthetic mood could also trigger autobiographical memory although in a 
more subconscious way. This could be seen as an analogy to that of the 
voluntary memory (cognitive) and involuntary memory (non-cognitive). 
 Aesthetic mood, then, is triggered by the discourse of narrative, in its 
form and style. It is less cognitive than emotions experienced through 
imagining or simulation. However, we must not deny that aesthetic mood 
also aids the process of simulation as well. It is primarily aesthetic mood that 
we will deal with in the rest of this thesis. I will use the general term emotions 
to include both the cognitive emotions and the aesthetic mood. 
 
 
Towards a Method of Analyzing Emotional Response to 
Fiction 
 
A Direction of Research 
Due to the intensified interests in art and emotions lately, one would think 
that there would be several attempts to create a workable and approachable 
theory of how we best should utilize our new knowledge and competence in 
order to properly analyze our emotional responses to art. This is not the case. 
Walton carries his idea of the game of make-believe to its furthest limits, 
Currie argues for the concept of congruence (explained on page 69), and  
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Matravers speaks of his arousal theories. What is lacking is a more pragmatic 
scheme about the ways one should approach this difficult task. 
 We might remember Holland’s schedule of analysis: first, we have to 
study the text objectively, and then we have to value our own subjective 
response to it, and last, try to connect these. Can this be a convenient 
structure and order to work from? The first two stages seem to be 
problematic in terms of an examination of the subjective emotional 
experience of a text. It would prove impossible to first study a text and then 
draw conclusions of how we respond emotionally to it. No, we have to start 
with our experience.  
 There is one pragmatic critic in the area of art and emotions though, 
Carroll, who suggests a “certain direction of research” in ways we should 
analyze a text’s triggering of emotional response:  
 
Using herself as a detector, the critic begins with a 
global sense of the emotions that the text has elicited in 
her. Then, using the criteria of the emotion in question 
as a hypothesis, she may review the way in which the 
text is articulated to isolate the relevant descriptions or 
depictions in the text that instantiate the concept of the 
emotion in question. In following this procedure, one 
can pith the emotive structure of the text. (“Art, 
Narrative, and Emotion” 207) 
 
In all its simplicity, I generally agree on the basic structure and order of 
emotional analysis in texts that Carroll suggests. It seems appropriate that we 
start from the audience’s point of view and use our own reading experience 
as a base for localizing the nature of the emotions that we have experienced. 
This is usually a straightforward process, especially when we deal with 
simple emotions. We then have to use the knowledge of the nature of the 
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specific emotion, determine what usually causes it (its object, beliefs, and 
direction), and evaluate how the text possibly can evoke the necessary 
ingredients of the emotion. The last stage of the analysis will be the most 
burdensome, and before we supply an example of how such an analysis 
could be performed, we have to present the different relationships between 
author, text, and audience and assess where our focus has to be. 
 
The Different Emotional Reactions to Art 
It would be appropriate now to summarize the rather long and winding road 
through the arduous landscape of art and emotions. We will do so by trying 
to categorize the different emotive relationships between author, text, and 
audience. This categorization is much in debt to the one William Lyons 
proposes in relation to painter-painting-viewer in “On Looking into Titian’s 
Assumption” (143). 
The major head categories do not purport that in all instances there 
are different degrees of interaction between them. Even category 4, which is 
sorted under the heading of “text,” would be pointing both at the author in 
terms of how he is aware of the conventions involved and to the audience 
having to interpret these conventions in order to activate the emotional 
expression. I also use the word “emotion” when I am actually talking of both 
emotions and moods. 
  
Author  
1 – Author produces text during an emotional state 
where the text is the direct consequence of this 
emotional state. 
 
2 – Author produces text in or after an emotional state  
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where the text expresses the same emotions as the artist 
felt at a certain time. 
 
3 – Author produces a text that expresses emotions that 
are not the artist’s own. 
 
Text (Representation) 
4 – Emotions are clearly expressed in the text either by 
use of manifested conventions or common clichés. 
 
5 – Emotions are expressed through simulation 
(identification). 
 




7 – Emotions are expressed through metaphors and 
symbols. 
 
8 – Emotions are expressed through narrative 
discourse. 
 
9 – Emotions are expressed through style and form. 
 
Audience 
10 – Audience experience emotions through the text 
that are part of the fictive world (diegetic) and also in 
line with the author’s intentions. 
 
11 – Audience experience emotions through the text 
that are part of the fictive world (diegetic) but not in line 
with the author’s intentions. 
 
12 – Audience experience emotions through the text 
that are not part of the fictive world (non-diegetic) but 
in line with the author’s intentions. 
 
13 - Audience experience emotions through the text that 
are not part of the fictive world (non-diegetic) and not in 
line with the author’s intentions. 
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14 – Audience experience emotions through the text in 
correlation with extra-textual knowledge. 
 
Non-Textual 
15 – Audience experience emotions not through the text 
but the actual experience. 
 
Author 
1 – Author produces text during an emotional state where the text is the direct 
consequence of this emotional state. 
In this case the author is producing the art in a state of affect with less 
cognitive awareness and more of an intuitive approach. This is more 
common in non-representational art, but could include, for example, 
surrealist auto-writing. 
 
2 – Author produces text in or after an emotional state where the text expresses the 
same emotions as the artist felt at a certain time. 
Much more common than (1) is when the author tries to capture his own 
emotions, but in a more distanced way and transfers them into the art. 
 
3 – Author produces a text that expresses emotions that are not the artist’s own. 
It is not unusual that an author sets out to convey a certain emotion which is 
not his own, in order to manipulate his audience or to work within a certain 
genre or convention. 
 
Text (Representation) 
4 – Emotions are clearly expressed in the text either by use of manifested conventions 
or common clichés. 
This refers to the common cultural language between author and audience 
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where the emotional content is easily identified in the text through certain 
cultural and aesthetic conventions and clichés. The commonly used mother 
with child that is threatened by the enemy is a typical such example from 
war propaganda films. 
 
5 – Emotions are expressed through simulation (identification). 
If we are engaged in fictive simulation, and thus believe we are in danger 
when a character in the fiction also is in danger, we talk about emotions that 
are conveyed through simulations. Identification does not only mean with 
characters but also with situations, and is due to the narrative strategies 
employed such as the focalization of narration and narrative mood. Different 
kinds of verfremdungs-techniques obstruct this kind of identification. 
 
6 – Emotions are expressed through our response to fictive characters. 
This category is very close to (5) but regards cases where our emotions are 
directed more directly towards characters, most common in terms of 
sympathy and empathy, but also less commonly in terms of disgust and 
hatred. The strongest reaction might be one of strong sadness or sorrow if a 
fictive character we learned to like suddenly dies. 
 
Text (Aesthetics) 
7 - Emotions are expressed through metaphors and symbols. 
Even though there might be debate whether metaphors and symbols are 
representational or not, I have decided to put them in the category of 
aesthetics. This category is more constrained within the cultural milieu it 
exhibits than other categories. 
 
 64 
8 – Emotions are expressed through narrative discourse. 
Close to (5) this exhibits cases when the formalistic devices are more central 
than that of actual representation. 
 
9 – Emotions are expressed through style and form. 
When emotions are triggered through the use of specific stylistics such as 
syntax, grammar, tenses, rhythm, and meter, they fall within this category. 
 
Audience 
Categories 10 and 11 are quite self-explanatory. 
 
12 – Audience experience emotions through the text that are not part of the fictive 
world (non-diegetic) but in line with the author’s intentions. 
This is an important category because it is rarely mentioned in theoretical 
work. There are instances when one suspects that even though the emotional 
experience is outside the fictive world (that is personal/autobiographical 
emotion), it is triggered intentionally by the author through the text. 
Consequently, there are ways for an author to trigger non-diegetic emotions 
by using either standard formulas or culturally appropriate and shared 
devices and clichés. 
 
13 - Audience experience emotions through the text that are not part of the fictive 
world (non-diegetic) and not in line with the author’s intentions. 
The result of (13) is the same as (12) but impossible to trace to any specific 
author technique or intention. This category is so private that it is 
uninteresting in terms of emotional textual analysis. 
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14 – Audience experience emotions through the text in correlation with extra-textual 
knowledge. 
As we have seen, there are bountiful of instances where our experience of the 
text is influenced by knowledge of the author, the text’s publication history, 
criticism, opinions, and advertisements. This category is a useful part of our 
competent reader when analyzing a text. 
 
Non-Textual 
15 – Audience experience emotions not through the text but the actual experience. 
This category contains those experiences that are not related to the actual text 
but more to the experience of art and its externalities, thus also not 
interesting in terms of textual analysis. 
 
The Death of the Author and Birth of the Narrator 
We have been speaking of fiction in terms of experience thus far because the 
focus of our study is the subjective experience of emotions that are evoked by 
fiction; this has had the consequence that we more or less have ignored the 
role of the author and ignored the first three categories in the above scheme. 
The focus on the text and reader seems the appropriate one. “The statements 
authors make about the process of composition,” writes Culler, “are 
notoriously problematic, and there are few ways of determining what they 
are taking for granted. Whereas the meanings readers give to literary works 
and the effects they experience are much more open to observation” (105). 
Culler, in concordance with our focus, emphasizes text, reader and 
experience. A similar line of thought is presented by Linda Hutcheon in 
Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony (1994). Since the experience of 
irony, similarly to that of emotions, is subjective, what are Hutcheon’s 
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strategies to handle the intentions of the author? Hutcheon is very clear in 
dividing her study of irony into three interacting aspects since they are 
“dynamic and plural relations among the text or utterance […] the so-called 
ironist, the interpreter, and the circumstances surrounding the discursive 
situation […]” (11). She questions the usual assumption, that the ironist’s 
intentions are central, and that there is only one way to interpret irony – the 
intended one. Her first chapter is, appropriately, titled “Risky Business,” 
since this presumption is rather risky. She points out that there is never a 
guarantee that the interpreter will interpret a text just like the author wishes 
(11). Nevertheless, if an interpreter is experiencing irony, then there must be 
irony for that interpreter. Since her focus is more on the contextual and social 
aspects of irony, the “scene” of irony and not ironic poetics specifically, she is 
not committed to exclude the authorial or contextual aspects altogether. 
Perhaps Hutcheon’s attitude not to abandon the author altogether is wise. 
Even though the author plays a very little role in our actual experience, it 
does not mean that we cannot gain further knowledge in our analysis if we 
keep an open mind about the author. Let us look into our possibilities. 
Despite scepticism towards studying the author, there is a general idea 
that communication between a real author and reader can be successful and 
that the author can manage to communicate the set of emotions he sets out to 
communicate. Livingstone and Mele write that “authors usually have settled 
on at least some broad outlines with regard to the kinds of emotions they 
want to produce in a target audience […]” (169) and Carroll proposes that 
authors “are able, fairly reliably, to induce the emotions they set out to evoke 
– especially basic emotions (like anger, fear, hatred, and so on) […]” (“Art, 
Narrative, and Emotion” 205). Carroll later puts his own idea in scrutiny 
when he refers to how Brett Easton Ellis with American Psycho expected his 
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audience to “respond with hilarity – because he intended a postmodern 
parody – whereas they greeted the book with disgust” (“Art, Narrative, and 
Emotion” 205). Carroll calls such cases “rare,” but I do not think they are that 
rare. It seems often enough that artists complain about being misunderstood 
or misinterpreted. Even though these miscommunications do occur, they are 
rare enough in order to suppose an often fulfilled intention by the author. 
And even if there is no consensus between author and audience, our 
knowledge about these intentions might actually influence our experience. 
For example, if we knew that Ellis aimed for parody, this knowledge might 
have influenced our reading as such. Likewise, we are influenced by critics, 
media, friends, and extensive knowledge of the author and the cultural and 
aesthetic contemporary ideas, all which might influence our artistic 
experience. If we know that the author was murdered recently this might 
give us another experience than if we knew nothing about the author’s fate. 
This was the case with some of the First World War poets, whose death 
immediately after completing a poem sometimes added enormously to its 
appeal at the time. 
 Approaching the first three categories above that concerns our 
authors’ different involvements in the emotional creativity phase, it seems 
probable that we could draw conclusions about what it is in the text (if this 
has been the intent of the author) that triggers our emotions. Even though we 
have cases like American Psycho, we also have cases like Stephen King’s The 
Shining where one of the author’s aims obviously was to scare the audience, 
which evidently succeeded. What can we do with an extended knowledge 
like this? We could ask Stephen King about his writing and efforts to create a 
scary narrative, but more often than not such information is disappointing 
since there is much intuitive work among authors. Perhaps we could gain 
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some insights into his techniques through interviews or reading On Writing, 
his book about fiction. Or we could skim through his oeuvre in order to 
crystallize some recurring motifs and stylistic devices. These all belong to 
knowledge that a reader can bring with him into textual analysis, and even 
though it is not worthless, it probably will not bring that much assistance 
into the analytical process. I suppose, since collecting evidence of emotional 
experiences in audiences is notoriously difficult, we could use this evidence 
of communication as proof that a certain style actually triggers specific 
emotions. 
If we look beyond an authors’ emotional background, it can still be 
useful. We could put Stephen King into a cultural context of late 1970s 
America when he wrote The Shining. What were the cultural determinators 
from that time and place and how are they reflected in his style? What kind 
of conventions and clichés are being used in order to convey certain 
emotions?  Can we compare King with other authors of fiction from the same 
time? What scared people in the 1970s? These questions belong to that of the 
competent reader (see next section), but are less exclusively connected to the 
author and more to cultural contexts. 
Livingstone and Mele come to the peculiar conclusion that “readers 
need not and should not make assessments about a work’s expressive 
features by means of speculations about a fictional author’s attitudes. 
Instead, they should assess the textual evidence directly, making inferences 
about the real author’s expressive aims” (167). On the whole, I think what is 
really interesting, contrary to Livingstone and Mele, is to study narrative 
discourse – the role of the narrator, whether implied or not. 
If we think of fiction as simulation, the narrator is in charge of this 
simulation, and thus plays a significant part in our experience. We have seen 
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briefly in the section about meta-fiction, how an intrusive narrator can 
change our emotional outcome. Instead of talking about how the feelings of 
the real author influence the text, it makes more sense to speak of how the 
narrator’s feelings influence the text. “Hence, if the representation is sad,” 
writes Matravers, “it simply follows that the narration is sad. A natural 
interpretation of the narration’s being sad is that it is narrated sadly. The 
narrator’s emotions do not need to be explicit, hence the cognitivist’s solution 
cannot be refuted by showing that there are cases of expression in which no 
trace of the narrator’s emotion can be found” (96). Matravers distinguishes 
that the emotions do not only spill over into pure representation but also into 
the narrative’s style and form. Style and form are an inevitably consequence 
of the discourse of the narrative. Matravers then would claim that emotions 
are primarily expressed in the narrative style rather than in the suspected 
emotions in the narrator which a cognitivist such as Gregory Currie believes. 
For Currie, fictional emotions are connected strongly to the emotional state of 
the narrator through what he calls congruence: “the work is expressive of an 
emotion just in case it provides evidence that the fictional author experienced 
that emotion” (The Nature of Fiction 214). This attitude, as Matravers 
identifies, creates problems when we are dealing with narrators that are not 
explicitly expressive, or are unreliable. It is better then to avoid the emotional 
status of the narrator and focus on the expressiveness of the narration (which 
of course is connected to what kind of narrator is used). 
To avoid misunderstandings, let us at the very beginning clarify an 
important and now accepted distinction: in narrative fiction there is a 
difference between the real author and the narrator. If we see fiction as a 
report of events, this report is narrated by someone. Using Gérard Genette’s 
terminology we are dealing with what he refers to as a narrative’s voice. A 
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narrator can be either heterodiegetic (one that stands outside the world he is 
reporting about) or homodiegetic (a character in the narrative). Furthermore, 
Genette divides narrators into extradiegetic (narrator in the first degree) and 
intradiegetic (narrator in the second degree) (248). This gives us four different 
general types of narrators and a table like this: 
 
Table1. Different types of narrators. 
 
Chaucer is the main narrator of a narrative he is not part of. He is what is 
usually called an implied author. But within that narrative (the first narrative) 
the Knight will tell “A Knight’s Tale” (second narrative), a narrative in which 
the Knight is not a part. In The Great Gatsby the main narrator of the first 
narrative is Nick Carraway who also happens to be one of the characters of 
the narrative he narrates. But within that narrative there is a section which is 
a memory clearly narrated by one of the characters, Jay Gatsby, a second 
narrative in which he takes part himself. When it comes to the extradiegetic 
and heterodiegetic narrator, in this case Chaucer, it is easy to confuse this 
narrator with the real author when they are, in fact, the same person. The 
important distinction is that we have to separate the beliefs, ideas, and 
emotional strata from the real author and that of the hetero- extradiegetic 
narrator. If we look at The Great Gatsby, we find numerous negative attitudes 
towards Jews, attitudes we normally do not point to as being Fitzgerald’s 
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view on the topic. One of the reasons we do not do this is because in the case 
of The Great Gatsby, the extradiegetic narrator happens to be homodiegetic: 
Nick Carraway is a fictional character in the story he narrates. Therefore it is 
a simple task to make Nick responsible for any negative attitudes towards 
Jews rather than the actual author, Fitzgerald. This is an easy case, but it 
becomes more complicated if we are dealing with an extradiegetic narrator 
that is heterodiegetic, because this means, usually, that the real author and 
the narrator is one and the same person. Stig Larsson’s controversial novel, 
Komedin I, is about a man who is sexually attracted by young pre-pubescent 
girls. The real author, Stig Larsson, is also the extradiegetic narrator but 
stands outside his narrative. It would be absurd to presume that Stig Larsson 
shares the sentiments of his protagonist; however, this is not an uncommon 
presumption. Stig Larsson the narrator might very well believe in the story 
he narrates, narrating it with the full force of paedophilic imagery to make 
the narrative believable. But the author Stig Larsson might actually find the 
narrative and its characters revolting. The reason for confusing an 
extradiegetic narrator with the real author is probably one reason why most 
controversial novels usually apply a homodiegetic narrator as the 
extradiegetic narrator. Nabokov allows Humpert Humpert to narrate his 
Lolita and Burgess creates a distance from himself as an author and the ultra 
violence he portrays in A Clockwork Orange by using Alex as a narrator. 
 Even if the author is not an explicit part of our experience, awareness 
of his role, his style, and his cultural context should be part of our analysis 
and of our competent reader. Just like Roland Barthes argues in “La mort de 
l’auteur” [“Death of the Author”] (1968), the internal aspects of the work are 
more important than the external. In defining poetics we are into literary 
criticism not literary biography. Nevertheless, if we are to be confident in our 
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theory, and also influential on others, it might prove necessary to bring into 
the analytical methods a certain awareness of the specific author’s style or 
recurring literary strategies. More meaningful, though, is to closely examine 
the actual narration and the mood and voice of the narrator. 
 
The Competent Reader 
Even though we accept the subjective experience as a valid experience for 
analysis, which is more or less how we interpret and analyze fiction both in 
theoretical works and criticism, it is convenient to explore a possible way of 
creating a theoretical reader that can be useful in order to analyze emotional 
responses to art. We need a reader theory that brings in both the subjective 
experience and a set of rules that also makes this experience valid in a wider 
critical context. In short, it is finally time to address the problem of 
experience. 
Many speak of an informed reader of some kind, such as Culler’s 
“competent reader,” Umberto Eco’s “model reader,” or Riffaterre’s 
“superreader.” What these theorists have in common is the belief that in 
order to grasp the literary experience, we need to construct a reader that has 
some kind of literary competence in order to expose the meanings of the 
texts. Therefore, naturally, there is a sense of validation in the meaning of 
texts, and a belief that the texts contain something that a competent reader 
will decipher into an experience. 
 Culler’s much debated concept about literary competence, is an 
expansion of Noam Chomsky’s “linguistic competence.” When Chomsky 
talks about an inner grammar he means fundamental linguistic knowledge, 
often unconscious, in people to understand language. Culler’s extension 
means that we also have a set of rules that we have to learn in order to make 
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the most of our literary experiences. It is not clear how this competence is 
working, nor how we perceive it, but it opens up a spectrum of questions as 
to how the reader’s background and knowledge interacts with the reading 
experience. According to Culler, a work “has structure and meaning because 
it is read in a particular way, because these potential properties, latent in the 
object itself, are actualized by the theory of discourse applied in the act of 
reading” (102). This means, frankly, that there is a rather limited way of 
perceiving the work, or at least, there is a more legitimate way to do it. 
 Eco’s approach is more semantic in that he proposes a dialectic theory 
of how the author has to choose his model reader when he is writing, a 
model reader who will be able to reconstruct the ideas of the writer when he 
wrote the text (The Role of the Reader 8). The selections available to the writer 
are several: the choice of language, encyclopaedic knowledge, a conscious 
choice of a lexical and stylistic heritage, genre expectations, and the 
geographical place of the narrative (7). It is not a one-directional 
communication; the author does have expectations of his own model reader 
that the text itself, if fortunate, will bring out if the reader chooses to engage 
in the text. 
 Riffaterre’s super-reader is an analytical tool that is built up of all 
possible knowledge that can be gathered about a specific text and its 
contexts, much in the manner of the hermeneutic circle of Hans Robert Jauss. 
This has to be done to fully grasp the possibilities of a “correct” reading. 
However, his reading differs from that of Jauss, Levis-Strauss, or Roman 
Jakobson, in that this competence should still be used according to how a 
reader meets the text – in a chronological order of successive events and 
impressions. Riffaterre’s super-reader of Baudelaire’s “Les Chats” is 
composed of,  
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Baudelaire (correction of line 8, placing the sonnet, in 
the ensemble of the collection); Gautier (his long 
paraphrasis of the sonnet, in his preface to the third 
edition of the Fleurs), and Laforgue (some echoes in 
Sanglot de la Terre, “La Première Nuit”); the translations 
of W. Fowlie, F. L. Freedman and F. Duke; as many 
critics as I could find, the more useful being those 
whose reason for picking out a line had nothing to do 
with the sonnet; Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss for those 
points in the text where they deviate from their method 
[…]; Larousse’s Dictionnaire du XIXème Siècle for the 
entries which quote the sonnet; philological or textbook 
footnotes; informants such as students of mine and 
other souls whom fate has thrown my way. (38) 
 
 It entails most of what is usually expected when doing a textual close 
reading, but where the novelty lies is in how to handle the reading 
experience. 
 Both Iser and Fish seem to give more autonomy to the reader, and as 
such they partly depart from the idea of the competent reader, although they 
do not dismiss that the qualities of a competent reader can indeed also be 
found in a normal reader, and that competence alters the reading experience. 
Fish is definitely more radical in his methods, since he validates the 
literary experience from an actual reader, that of the critic. His warning that 
“[t]he objectivity of the text is an illusion […]” (82) forces us into the deeper 
subjectivity among the psycho-analytics such as Holland and Bleich. He is 
defending the subjective reading by stating that if there is one particular 
reading, there must be others as well that can identify with this reading: 
“When I talk about the responses of ‘the reader,’ am I not really talking about 
myself, and making myself into a surrogate for all the millions of readers 
who are not me at all? Yes and no. Yes in the sense that in no two of us are 
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the responding mechanisms exactly alike. No, if one argues that because of 
the uniqueness of the individual, generalization about response is 
impossible” (83). Iser refers to the idea of competence, and defines, also, a 
competent reader as one who is “a competent speaker of the language out of 
which the text is built up,” “is in full possession of ‘the semantic knowledge 
that a mature […] listener brings to his task of comprehension,” and “has 
literary competence” (86-87). He continues to validate the findings of one 
competent reader, since “[w]hat happens to one informed reader of a work 
will happen, within a range of nonessential variation, to another. It is only 
when readers become literary critics and the passing of judgment takes 
precedence over the reading experience, that opinions begin to diverge” (89). 
In short, experiences are alike, but the valuation of them differs. How does 
this differ from the other theorists’ ideas about the competent reader? Culler 
is very well aware of the problems and shares Fish’s central perspective of 
how an experience of a text does not vary that much: “The critic would not 
write unless he thought he had something new to say about a text, yet he 
assumes that his reading is not a random and idiosyncratic phenomenon” 
(112). Fish’s difference lies more in method and tone than factuality. First of 
all, the competence is not used to value literature, but to describe it (88). Fish 
is not creating a super-reader, an artificial creation, but wants a reader, a real 
person, to achieve necessary talents about a work and style, and then 
describe his reading experience. Importantly, he also acknowledges that the 
competence a reader brings in depends on what century or period the 
reading is performed (85). He seems, then, resistant to Culler’s idea of how 




 Iser’s reader is a co-creator, whose participation in the game of the 
text is crucial in creating meaning. The reading experience, thus, is two-fold: 
one is still dependent on the superiority of the text and fulfils what the text 
intends, and the other experience is the reader’s own imagination at work, 
filling in the text’s mysteries or gaps. So, in the end, the reader is still very 
much the slave of the text. Iser’s term for this dialectic reader is implied reader 
where he attempts to solve the key problem of how to have both an intended 
reception and a subjective one. Iser divides the reader’s role into two aspects, 
one “as a textual structure” and another as “a structured act” (The Act of 
Reading 35). The role of textual structure comprises how the author’s 
intentions are realized through the structure and surface of the text. This 
means that there is a way to interpret the text; that the text more or less forces 
the reader to experience the text in a certain way. Iser sees this more as a 
dialectic aspect, since the reader’s textual role is carved into three pieces: “the 
different perspectives represented in the text, the vantage point from which 
he joins them together, and the meeting place where they converge” (The Act 
of Reading 36).  This aspect of reading diminishes a huge variety of 
interpretations, but still allows a certain freedom in the meeting between 
author and reader through the text. This meeting is then played out against 
the structured act, where the textual reading affects the reader, and creates 
mental images (The Act of Reading 36). 
The advantage of Iser’s method is that he provides a set of tools to 
understand certain aspects of how a text manipulates a reader into a specific 
experience. His division of the reader into “textual” and “structural” allows 
us to incorporate the structural way a text creates meaning and emotion, but 
also how these possibilities – or in Iser’s term “potentials” (The Act of Reading 
18) – are realized through the subjective interpretation of the reader. 
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This has been a survey of some ideas about the competent reader. We 
will not at this point with accuracy define our own competent reader 
although we should keep in mind some of the above notions. Our competent 
reader will grow out of our needs as established later in this chapter. 
 
Theory in Practice  
Let us recall Carroll’s structure of analysis of emotions in literature:  
 
Using herself as a detector, the critic begins with a 
global sense of the emotion that the text has elicited in 
her. Then, using the criteria of the emotion in question 
as a hypothesis, she may review the way in which the 
text is articulated to isolate the relevant descriptions or 
depictions in the text that instantiate the concept of the 
emotion in question. In following this procedure, one 
can pith the emotive structure of the text. (“Art, 
Narrative, and Emotion” 207) 
 
We can now put this structure into practice, together with the ideas about the 
competent reader. 
In John Ford’s Western classic Stagecoach (1939) one scene shows an 
alcoholic doctor, a prostitute, a woman with a newly born child, a gambler, a 
business man, and an outlaw travelling through Arizona in a stagecoach. 
They are suddenly attacked by Apache Indians. It is a long action sequence 
in high tempo when the people in the stagecoach try to defend themselves 
against the ravaging Indians. Let us say that, during this sequence, we feel a 
variety of emotions: awe, excitement, fear, disgust, anger, and that we now 
want to analyze why we experience these particular emotions. Awe and 
excitement are basically due to the sequence’s rapid cutting techniques, high 
tempo, daring camera angles, use of subjective perspectives, extended use of 
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close ups in order to emphasize speed but also to infuse a certain spatial 
confusion in the viewer. Furthermore, the sequence is accompanied by an 
intensive sound effects track. As we can see, these emotions are mainly 
created by non-narrative aspects of the film. Disgust, fear, and anger are 
closely related, and their object is, of course, the Apache Indians. When we 
first see them they are filmed up on a hill from a low camera angle in order 
to reinforce their power and meanness. These repeated images are 
accompanied with an atonal sound that amplifies their inhumanity. There is 
no sense of individuals among them; they are clearly just a bunch, a them. 
This is then contrasted with the characters in the stagecoach whom we might 
have developed feelings for.  As I stated, they are a doctor, a gambler, etc., 
and it is easy to identify oneself with them and their situation. They have no 
unfinished business with the Indians; they just want to get to the next town 
with the mother and the newborn child. They become a we. This is a typical 
emotional situation that has been used in propaganda films ever since the 
start of the film medium: how films create a clearly defined we and them. 
Stylistically this identification is strengthened by shooting many shots from 
within the claustrophobic stage coach, showing close ups of the scared 
women and the little child. These shots are contrasted with a few long shots 
that present how little and vulnerable the stage coach is in this unfriendly 
eternal desert covered with avenging Indians. According to the nature of the 
emotion fear, it has to be fear of something (likewise with anger) – in this case 
it is fear of and anger at the Indians. In the very end of this sequence, before 
they are rescued by the US cavalry and when it seems like they are losing, 
the gambler points his gun towards the mother and is about to shoot her in 
order to protect her from whatever nastiness the savages have in mind for 
her. Death certainly is better than a fate in a tipi. In this instance, fear and 
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anger dissolve into disgust for the way the Indians live and for what they 
might do to our honourable women, not to mention the poor, pure, white, 
little new born baby. 
In following the general order of Carroll’s scheme, I have first 
identified my emotions and then tried through an analysis of the scene to 
distinguish what it is in the filmic text that has evoked these emotions. 
Looking at the text, I have identified both aesthetic and narrative values; 
sometimes they have worked together in order to create my simulation. For 
example, the different camera angles and subjective cameras have drawn me 
into the action, forced me to identify with the people in the stage coach and 
therefore aided my simulation. 
 However, any reader receptive to irony cannot have missed how my 
analytical description hints that I did not really feel the way I was supposed to 
do. In fact I did not; the above was just a hypothetical scenario. I do feel awe, 
but this is perhaps more an awe for the creativity of the film makers and how 
they managed to create such an action scene in the late 1930s when cameras 
where bulky and not very movable. I definitely feel anger and disgust, but 
not at the Indians. The simplified propagandistic way of creating sympathy 
for white heroes and hatred for the Native Americans disgusts me. The 
Native Apaches die like flies, impersonal deaths en masse, not to mention the 
poor horses that constantly fall in the dust. The standard of classic 
Hollywood disgusts me as well in its way of appealing to emotions rather 
than intellect. Likewise, the views of Natives as a barbaric and savage people 
(with its atonal music) who only tried to defend their country and their way 
of life, disgusts me.  
My hypothetical viewer seems to be more identical to the viewers of 
cinema in 1939, whereas my real viewer is loaded with postcolonial theory 
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and film history and looking back from a more recent perspective. This 
problem, if it is a problem, is addressed by Carroll:  
 
Of course, in many cases, especially those in which we 
as ordinary readers are dealing with texts that are 
remote from us in time and place, we will not be able to 
depend on our own emotional responses to the text 
because we do not have the appropriate cultural 
background. This is exactly where literary history, film 
history, art history, dance history, and the like have an 
indispensable role to play. For historians can supply us 
with the background necessary to make the emotive 
address of texts from other cultures and other periods 
in the history of our own culture emotionally accessible 
to us. (“Art, Narrative, and Emotion” 208)  
 
In order to be able to qualify as an interpreter of contemporary emotional 
responses, in case the contemporary is sought after, we need a competent 
reader. The competent reader has to pay attention to how different genres 
generate different meanings, an issue Culler identifies: “The operations will, 
of course, be different for different genres. […] The same sentence can have a 
different meaning depending on the genre in which it appears” (116). We 
have to be aware of what Iser calls the “repertoire” of the literary texts, and 
how they perform according to not only “social and cultural norms” but also 
“elements and, indeed, whole traditions of past literature that are mixed 
together with these norms” (The Act of Reading 79). Our horizon is not the 
same as when the texts were written, but through a competent reading, we 
are able to recognize the expectations of the contemporary readers. Just like 
the critics of the Reader-Response school, I do believe that my competent 
reading will prove to be other peoples’ reading, within a certain variety. In 
order to encompass the variety of readers, their subjective and cultural 
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diversity, it is best to speak of how a particular style, structure or simulation 
creates the possibilities, or potentials, of such an experience. 
 
A Method of Analyzing Emotional Experiences in Fiction 
We have now decided that the focus of analyzing an emotional response to 
art has to be based on the actual qualities of the emotion that is activated 
through our first reading experience. We will then focus on the text and the 
experience in order to understand why this is happening. We will use a 
competent reader to widen our horizon and to incorporate the different 
cultural and subjective determinators involved. Our interest in the author is 
minimal, which dismisses the first three categories of the relation between 
author-text-audience (see page 60) and diminishes the use of category 14, but 
the mood and voice of the actual narration remains essential. Likewise, the 
extreme personal reactions such as in categories 13 and 15 will be banished. 
Autobiographical emotions are interesting if we can see that they are 
triggered meaningfully and intentionally through the text. Finally, we will 
talk about a text’s potential to create a certain specific emotional response in 
an audience, in order to reserve ourselves from making strict constitutional 
laws for emotional experiences. Studying the text will be imperative through 
how the simulation and aesthetics work. Still, we need to further investigate 
if there might be a method readily available for the actual textual analysis. 
 When, as such a method requires, a reading is done chronologically, 
and great attention is paid to every detail in the text that the reader acts 
upon, then there is no real division in form and content, but, just as Fish 
declares, “everything counts and that something (analyzable and significant) 
is always happening […]” (97). When Iser writes, “Whatever the size of the 
unit, the focus of the method remains the reader’s experience of it, and the 
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mechanism of the method is the magic question, ‘what does this ―———— 
do?’” (“The Reading Process” 81-82) he raises two important issues in our 
own method.  
The first one, addressed by Iser in terms of the size of the unit, is about 
differentiation between the study of macro and micro units. This division is 
also supported by Genette (43). Emotional response can, as we have seen, be 
divided into emotions and moods, where emotions tend to be incorporated 
more into the whole of the narrative (macro) and moods more episodically 
(micro). The division into macro and micro units is convenient in 
approaching these different kinds of emotional responses since macro 
studies will deal more with the wider structures of the whole texts and micro 
studies with small stylistic devices, or handling small parts of texts. This is 
important, since an emotional reading experience does not have to be 
complete. It can also be partial.  
The second one has to do with the focus on effect. The reader-oriented 
theories we will use are based mainly on Fish’s and Iser’s, since theirs are the 
ones least concerned with valuing texts. Fish writes: “My method allows for 
no such aesthetic and no such fixings of value. In fact it is oriented away from 
evaluation and toward description” (88). Likewise, we will not rate the way a 
certain text evokes a certain emotion, only demonstrate its causality and then 
try to establish an understanding of why this is happening. Thus, the magic 
question, “What does this (text) do?” has already been answered before we 
do our analysis: it creates a specific emotional experience in us. In that sense, 
our method differs from the “fresh approach” of Iser and Fish, since we 
know what to look for. One caution is necessary, since every reading, as Iser 
so well observes, is likely to change our relation to the text. A revised analysis 
is bound to alter the one from the first reading. This is a natural process in 
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reaching a deeper understanding of the mechanism behind an emotional 
experience, but it should not interfere with the chronology of the reading. 
Our re-experience will serve as an understanding of the first reading, which 
is the central one. Our method is still bound by a reading of a text, and 
therefore not a classic hermeneutic strategy. 
 The advantages of using the method, as it is developed by Iser and 
Fish, are several; conducting a method that follows closely to that of a 
reading makes the distance between the emotional experience and the 
emotional reading experience less insuperable. It also focuses on where it 
should focus, namely on the subjective experience of the reader. More so, 
“what the method does is slow down the reading experience so that ‘events’ 
one does not notice in normal time, but which do occur, are brought before 
our analytical attentions” (Fish 74). Both Iser and Fish supply resources that 
simplify the analysis. Iser’s interest in the temporalities of the reading 
experience, “anticipation and retrospection” (“The Reading Process” 57), is a 
valuable contribution to understanding narrative time. The process, of how 
we alter our expectations, how our expectations of characters and events 
change in course of reading, Iser calls “[t]he act of recreation” (“The Reading 
Process” 62). Iser also raises important questions about reader activation, the 
oscillation “between involvement in and observation of those illusions […]” 
and ideas about the ways the illusory world are experienced by the reader as 
a reality (simulation) (“The Reading Process” 61). Furthermore, he is 
interested in reader identification (“The Reading Process” 65-67). Through 
Genette we will gain an understanding of the role of the narrator and 
narration, and a vocabulary to be precise in narration’s mood, voice, 
duration, frequency, and order. 
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Fish’s contribution is more on the micro level, since he advocates the 
close reading of how stylistics alters our reading experience and emotional 
reactions. He shows how differently we experience a sentence. We must 
consider how it is rearranged in different orders, not from a point of 
information, but from affections: “There is no difference in these two 
sentences in the information conveyed (or not conveyed), or in the lexical and 
syntactical components, only in the way these are received. But that one 
difference makes all the difference […]” (74). 
Conclusively, we can now present a practical structure of analysis of 












Fig. 2. The Experience of Emotion and Mood through a text. 
 
This structure is then divided into the actual experience of an emotion, the 
analysis of the nature of the emotion, and the actual textual study through 
our competent reading and our re-experience of the text. This process should 
be used to evaluate more precisely how the specific emotion is evoked in 
readers. The division between macro and micro is, as mentioned before, a 
way of dividing the textual analysis into two approaches. The macro study 
focuses on how the narrative as a whole triggers the specific emotion. It will 
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deal more with the simulation model and the main consequences of the 
narration and therefore be more occupied with the cognitive aspects of 
emotions. The micro study will serve as close textual readings of smaller 
segments of texts and therefore focus more on stylistics and aesthetics as well 
as emotional mood. Let us begin, then, with the second part of the method: 









Nostalgia can be defined many ways. It can be seen as a “social disease” 
(Stewart ix), a falsifying component of historicism (Jameson), a literary style 
during Romanticism (Santesso), a way of understanding socio-psychological 
phenomenon in the end of nineteenth century (Simmel), an “immigrant 
psychosis” (Frost 801), a variant of depression (Kaplan), or part of a Freudian 
concept of regression (Casey). But first and foremost nostalgia is a distinct 
transhistorical human experience, and it is this definition that we primarily 
will explore in this chapter. 
 The particularities of the nostalgic experience are not easy to define. 
As Fred Davis assesses through his interviews in Yearning for Yesterday: A 
Sociology of Nostalgia (1979), everybody seems to know what nostalgia feels 
like, but cannot really explain it (Davis 7). This is often the case when we 
enter the realm of emotions; still, it appears that there are some given 
regulations of what this experience consists of. It is a clash of emotions, 
usually described as joy and melancholia that creates a sense of the bitter-
sweet. Linda Hutcheon, in “Irony, Nostalgia, and the Postmodern,” declares 
that nostalgia is less perceiving and more feeling “when two different 
temporal moments, past and present, come together for you and, often, carry 
considerable emotional weight.” The joyful aspect lies in the object we long 
for, our remembrance or dream. The melancholia is a result of the 
irreversibility of time; that this “memory” is for ever gone. Although it is 
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accompanied with sadness, most people regard nostalgia as a fundamentally 
pleasant experience (Davis 14; Kaplan 465).14 
There are so many ambivalences and paradoxes around the notion of 
nostalgia that it is necessary to try to refine the nostalgic experience as far as 
possible. There are two methods in doing this, and we will use both: 
empirical and historical. The best source of a nostalgic experience has to be 
personal, and the choices of sources to depend on as well as the general 
direction of this outline, is therefore very dependent on my own nostalgic 
experiences. Historical and literary accounts of nostalgia and how it has been 
interpreted will serve as an illuminating light on my own limitations. 
Obviously, one difficulty in defining nostalgia is the way the word has 
changed meaning through history. Jean Starobinski is correct in “The Idea of 
Nostalgia” (1966) when he assumes that in “tracing the history of emotions 
and of mentalities, one is immediately confronted with a question of method 
resulting from the interplay of emotions and language” (Starobinski 81). 
Johannes Hofer’s nostalgia from his Medical Dissertation on Nostalgia or 
Homesickness (1688) is not the same nostalgia as the one in the Encyclopedia 
Britannica’s 11th edition.15 The way we interpret nostalgia seems different 
depending what Western culture we come from; the definition in the Oxford 
English Dictionary differs slightly from the one in Enciclopedia Treccani, and 
Brockhaus Enzyklopädie provides yet another bearing. 
With a slightly more positive tenor Karin Johannisson acknowledges, 
in her book Nostalgia: en känslas historia [Nostalgia: The History of an 
                                                
14  This is further supported by Batcho (1998) and Jackson (1986). There are, however, those 
who consider nostalgia primarily a negative emotional experience: Best and Nelson 
(1985), Hertz (1990), Holbrook (1993), and Peters (1985). 
15  The definition of ”nostalgia” in the Encyclopedia Britannica’s 11th edition is ” home-
sickness, the desire when away to return home, amounting sometimes to a form of 
melancholia” compared to Hofer’s description of nostalgia as a “disease”. 
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Emotion] (2001), the importance of naming an emotion, in order to explore 
and analyze it much like a medical diagnosis (15). Making nostalgia public 
means that our own identification of nostalgia changes according to the 
current use of the term. Johannisson emphasizes the importance of the 
semantic process in deriving a meaning equalling our feelings, referring to 
La Rochefocauld’s famous remark that there are people who would never fall 
in love if they had not heard about love (Johannisson 16). 
 Tracing the semantic changes of the word “nostalgia” through history 
is standard practice among critics in order to understand the complexity of 
modern nostalgia.16 But let us not completely void its meaning of other 
historical contexts. As seen in world literature17, nostalgia naturally existed 
before it attained a linguistic status; it just did not have a name. Nostalgia is a 
beautiful name; it echoes well the emotional content of the experience. When 
Hofer named the sometimes deadly disease of being separated from one’s 
home, nostalgia (from nostos, return home, and algos, painful), he Latinized, in 
the common practice of the times, a well known feeling publicly known as 
homesickness, or in Swiss dialect heimweh. This was of course not only a 
Swiss phenomenon; we find similar words in most languages: Maladie du 
pays in French, mal de Corazon in Spanish, litost in Czech, toska in Russian, 
tesknota in Polish, and hemlängtan in Swedish. In English we find notions of 
homesickness mentioned as early as 1621 in Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of 
Melancholy (Johannisson 18) before it first appears, according to the OED, as a 
                                                
16  For a more thorough historic survey see Boym, Johannisson, Smith, and Starobinski. 
17   Nostalgic emotions are described in old Chinese poetry, in the Arabic verses and 
Gilgamesh; we find it in the Jews’ tears at Babylon when they remembered their beloved 
Zion in the Old Testament; we are familiar with Odysseus’ longing for home in Homer’s 
Odyssey and Don Quixote’s introspective past, and we encounter its theories in St 
Augustine’s Confessions and in Confucius’ longing for the golden age of the Chou 
Dynasty. 
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translation of heimweh in 1756. 
If we return to Hofer’s definition, the idea of nostalgia as a medical 
condition prevailed much through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 
a state of melancholia or anxiety. The nineteenth-century romantics nurtured 
the melancholic aspects of the “disease” and created out of the private 
dimensions a more public, atmospheric, mood-like, and constructed aesthetic 
nostalgia, inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Enlightenment 
reinterpretation of nostalgia as less a longing for a place than as an 
overexcited state of the senses with an attraction for freedom and childhood 
(Johannisson 21). This change also coincided with new ideas of temporality 
as initiated by Immanuel Kant18 and a general transition from an older, static, 
and cyclic view of time to linear temporality. The linearity of time 
corresponded with the idea of progress, which saw unprecedented changes 
in people’s lives during the post-revolutionary times of industrialization, 
thus creating new desires for past stability and order.19 In the era of 
modernity there was a renaissance for medical interests in nostalgia when 
sociologists were exploring it as a psycho-pathological state grounded in a 
lack of adaptability20 and later in Freudian theories about regression, 
oppression, and libido (Starobinski 102). The interest for nostalgia gradually 
vanished during the first half of the twentieth century, culminating in the 
                                                
18  Kant rejected the earlier time theories in Aristotelian and Newtonian physics and, to state 
it simply, favoured a temporality that can be seen as a ”sensible intuition” in that it exists 
only within our own consciousness. See the section ”Of Time” in Kant’s The Critique of 
Pure Reason (43-53). For an excellent account and modern critique of Kant’s ideas about 
time see Lawrence Friedman’s ”Kant’s Theory of Time”. 
19  A thorough analysis of how the idea of progress changes people’s relations to past and 
future in the end of the eighteenth century can be found in Reinhart Koselleck’s Future 
Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. 
20  See Johannisson (132-136) where she draws conclusions from sociologists Max Weber, 
Émile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tönnies. See also Simmel. 
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absence of nostalgia in dictionaries after the Second World War, until 
postmodern ideas politicized it in the late 1950s and 60s, thus completing a 
long shift of interest from private nostalgia to public nostalgia. 
Nobody today considers nostalgia to be equal only to homesickness, 
nor a Freudian psychoanalytic state or a political tool; through romanticism, 
modernism, and postmodernism, history has added and deducted meanings 
of the word and thus actually fine-tuned it into a more specific and precise 
meaning. At the same time it has opened up the interpretations of nostalgia 
to cover a wider area of experience than was conceived at the beginning. 
Johannisson writes that “within the variable meaning and historical change 
of the word remains a non-corrupt essence that can be described as longing” 
(10).21 In that sense, nostalgia is trans-historical; the essence of nostalgia is 
longing for the lost. Its history has not changed its essence, but illuminated it. 
Aaron Santesso claims, in A Careful Longing: The Poetics and Problems of 
Nostalgia (2006), that the first time the word “nostalgia” was used in its 
modern sense was in D. H. Lawrence’s The Lost Girl from 1920 (13): 
 
The terror, the agony, the nostalgia of the heathen past 
was a constant torture to her mediumistic soul. She did 
not know what it was. But it was a kind of neuralgia in 
the very soul, never to be located in the human body, 
and yet physical. Coming over the brow of a heathy, 
rocky hillock, and seeing Ciccio beyond leaning deep 
over the plough, in his white shirt-sleeves following the 
slow, waving, moth-pale oxen across a small track of 
land turned up in the heathen hollow, her soul would 
go all faint, she would almost swoon with the 
realisation of the world that had gone before. (315) 
 
                                                
21  All citations of Johannisson are translated by me. 
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 In Lost Girl, nostalgia has found its modern liberal expression, as an 
experience of both individual and collective consciousness, influenced by the 
distant observation, and with a home that is freed from its early spatial 
limitations and now is the “heathen past,” a mythical impersonal one rather 
than an individual one. 
A modern concept of nostalgia, then, has to be a collection and 
gathering of the different ways nostalgia has been interpreted in the course 
of both its etymological and actual history. We need to formulate a modern 
concept of nostalgia that retains these liberties of its meaning, derived from 
the subjectivity of its nature, while at the same time keeping a convenient 
term that can be used more objectively. 
This chapter’s main aim is to investigate nostalgia as an individual 
experience rather than a historic phenomenon; this is in order to properly 
understand and create a relationship between a nostalgic experience and a 
fictive nostalgic experience. It means that tracing the history of nostalgia, in 
all its disguises, is not a prior goal. As we will encounter, the experience itself 
is related to the external interpretations of it, and therefore history will 
occasionally interfere with our hermeneutics. This is particularly true when it 
comes to the relationship between nostalgia and modernity which effects our 
interpretation of literary nostalgia in the modern period. 
First, we must define why it is an experience and not an emotion, and 
interpret the different phases of what I choose to call the nostalgic reaction. 
Following the structure of the experience we will distinguish how these 
phases interact. In this process we distil the essentials of nostalgia in each 
phase: its resistance and protest against the progress of time will be 
interpreted in the light of modernity, followed by its ambivalent relationship 
to temporality and memory; then we will look at its liberating division in  
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public and personal time consciousness; last, we will conclude on a note on 
nostalgia’s relation to death as a consequence of its resistance to time. 
 
The Nostalgic Experience 
I propose that we refer to nostalgia primarily as an experience rather than 
just an emotion. First, it is not my invention; James G. Hart refers to nostalgia 
as an “experience” in his essay “Toward a Phenomenology of Nostalgia” 
(397), and Davis carries this further and incorporates the term “experience” 
to describe the various emotions and reactions that emancipate into feelings 
of nostalgia (Davis 1-30). Johannisson also refers to a nostalgic experience, 
although she prefers to articulate nostalgia mostly as an emotion, as implied 
in the title of her work, just like her predecessor Starobinski. Second, as we 
will see later, there is a point in making the distinction between experience 
and emotion in order to more fully understand how experience differs from 
emotion. 
According to The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, an 
emotion is a basic, strong, individual experience with a relatively short 
duration such as joy, sadness, happiness, anger, and fear. The term “emotion” 
is often misused to convey a whole affective experience (35), but in modern 
research the former limitations of an emotion has been modified to include a 
variety of emotions and their cultural associations; they refer to basic and 
complex emotions, whereas the basic emotions are singular and pure, and 
the complex are constituted of more than one emotion. Clearly nostalgia is 
more complex than one singular emotion and often includes several basic 
emotions such as joy and sadness. However, nostalgia’s complexity is not 
only a result of different emotional contexts, but also a variety of social,  
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cultural, and historical implications; hence, calling it an experience includes a 
wider range of variables.   
Perhaps what we in language refer to as “a feeling” is better conveyed 
as a mood. Davis sometimes acknowledges the advantage to “treat nostalgia 
as a distinctive form of consciousness” (74) and Susan Stewart declares 
nostalgia as both “a sadness without an object” and a “desire for desire” (23). 
When we use the term mood it is equivalent to consciousness as well as, 
concluded in chapter one, aesthetics. 
For the sake of being able to separate two different emotional 
reactions, we will divide the nostalgic experience into one that follows the 
theories of emotions with its more cognitive phases (The Nostalgic Emotional 
Experience) and one that embraces the more vague contours of mood (The 
Nostalgic Mood Experience). We will spend more time discussing the former 
because many aspects of the nostalgic emotion will be valid for the nostalgic 
mood as well. 
 
The Nostalgic Reaction 
The nostalgic emotional experience can be divided into three main phases: 
motivation, nostalgia, and reflection. The different phases create, in 
chronological order, what we will refer to as the nostalgic reaction, since they 
trigger each other. 
In motivation, we belong to the present now and are subjectively and 
subsequently transported into the object of our longings. This transportation 
is triggered by what we will refer to as a memorative sign in combination with 
a dependence on the present moment as well as psychological and 













Fig.3. The Nostalgic Reaction. 
 
Nostalgia is our term for the space or time of our longing, our 
remembrance, and our idealized, or selective, recollection of a distant then or 
there. This phase is exemplified by a strong joyful, happy, positive emotional 
reaction.  
When this dreamy phase ebbs out into an act of reflection (cognitive 
state), there is a gradual transformation from joy to sadness resulting in 
melancholia or even a bitterness that is a reaction to an emerging knowledge 
of the transient quality of our nostalgia, the irreversibility of time. The choice 





The “petites madeleine” in Marcel Proust’s Du côté de chez Swann [The Way By 
Swann’s] (1913) is perhaps the most famous example of a memory stimuli; 
through the combined taste of the cake and tea, the narrator is momentarily 
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transported away from the “gloomy” present to the paradisiacal memories of 
his childhood. We have all experienced something similar, but what is the 
nature of the different stimulus that triggers nostalgic experiences? And how 
important are the personality and characteristics of the person experiencing 
nostalgia, and what is the social context of this person? 
 
The Nostalgee 
In the centre of the nostalgic experience is the person who experiences it. We 
will call him the nostalgee. There are several reasons for not clutching to an 
established term, such as “nostalgic.”  One is the multitude of meanings that 
can be derived from the word “nostalgic.” First it was used as an adjective, 
describing the specificity of a certain longing or yearning as in R. M. Bird’s 
Peter Pilgrim (1838), “[…]A nostalgic longing for the bright and beautiful 
world we have left behind us” (qtd. in OED),  or later in D. M. Jones’ In 
Paranthesis (1937), “He heard..the nostalgic puffing of a locomotive, far off, 
across forbidden fields” (qtd. in OED). Then, in 1938, the word “nostalgic” 
begins to address the nostalgic as a subject and becomes a noun as in this 
New York Times Book Review article: “Writers are forever going back where 
they came from to distil The True Essence of the American scene. New York, 
not generally admitted to the Union, seldom figures in these nostalgics” (qtd. 
in OED). 
Besides the confusion of meanings, the main reason for our objection 
against using “nostalgic” to describe the person experiencing nostalgia is that 
the noun seems more to rely on voluntary motivations; a person searching 
for nostalgic desire. This can certainly describe some persons’ nostalgic 
eventualities, but it definitely does not encircle the whole group. It also 
entails the problems of a chronic state of mind, as discussed above, and this 
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is further expressed in the term “nostalgist” which is explained as “A 
professedly or habitually nostalgic person; a person who attempts to recreate 
or sentimentally recollects the past” (OED).  
Finally, the use of “nostalgic” is often preceded with words such as 
“these” or “that” giving it a negative ring. Additionally, it is an external 
description, public if you wish, that does not convey the complexities of the 
individual personal experience. We have therefore chosen the word nostalgee 
instead, deriving from the narrative term “narratee” of the listener to a 
narrator’s narrative. This seems to correspond more exactly to an experience 
triggered by a nostalgic motivation; the nostalgee responds to the motivation 
as the narratee responds to the narrator in a cause and effect situation. It also 
means that we can not call a person a nostalgee, if he suffers from a tendency 
to be nostalgic. Instead nostalgee refers to each and every one of us when we 
are having a nostalgic experience. 
Once we have settled with the semantics, what is to be said about the 
importance of the social, cultural, and psychological status of the nostalgee? 
As suggested above, there might be a strong voluntary force, a desire to be 
nostalgic. We can notice Walter Benjamin’s attitude in Das Passagen-Werk [The 
Arcades Project] towards experiencing the past, in which he requires certain 
attitudes in the person in order for him to relive the past. Instead of 
knowledge, he promotes lived experience, Erlebnis. In Benjamin’s example, 
the idle stroller in Paris experiences not only a present but also a non-
personal past through the sloping streets: “It leads downward – if not to the 
mythical Mothers, then into a past that can be all the more profound because 
it is not his own, not private” (Benjamin 880). In that sense it is not a memory, 
but an absolute past. The stroller needs to be “available to time” in fact he 
has to be wasting time (Agacinski 55). Benjamin’s requirements not only go 
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far beyond simple desire, but also encourage thoughts about how we can 
prepare ourselves for the past. However, the subconscious, involuntary 
forces behind nostalgia are more interesting. 
Davis spends several chapters discussing the relationship between 
identity and nostalgia, and presents the importance nostalgia plays in 
individual development and maintenance (Davis 31-71). How does the 
personality affect the nostalgic experience? In addition to the analogues 
between certain cultures and nostalgia, Davis asserts that individual 
psychology and social states are reflected in the need for nostalgia. Davis 
claims that “the nostalgic evocation of some past state of affairs always 
occurs in the context of present fears, discontents, anxieties, or uncertainties, 
even though they may not be in the forefront of awareness […]” (Davis 34). 
This, what we will call the theory of the disillusioned present, was noted already 
by Haspel in his 1873 study: “A harsh present makes [the patient] look into 
the past, because the past means security” (qtd. in Smith 512). Before that, the 
longing for home by exiled soldiers was initiated by this lack of security in 
foreign lands. Davis refers to this need as a matter of identity continuity, or 
in Aristotelian terms, creating order out of chaos. This seems to correspond, 
on a cultural level, with the well known notion of an increase in nostalgic 
awareness during times of revolution or recessions in societies. As Jameson 
seems to prove, the political use of nostalgia in totalitarian fascist states 
usually coincides with economical depression (“Walter Benjamin, or 
Nostalgia” 82). The political use of nostalgia reinforces the individual 
anxieties of the times. 
So it seems that people are more inclined to have nostalgic experiences 
in times of personal crises or times of national instability. Individual crises, in 
a psychological sense, occur during times of identity crises such as 
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adolescence, early adulthood, middle age, and old age. On a personal level 
we not only deal with failure, divorce, deceased friends or relatives but also 
more existential issues such as loss of a meaning of life or alienation. In this 
category we can also include psychological defects and drug abuse. It 
corresponds with Freud’s idea of melancholia as grounded in a lack of self-
esteem and strong self-accusations (“Mourning and Melancholia” 244-49). 
From a gender perspective and for an extended time, men were 
considered to be nostalgic than women. This seems to conflict, as Davis 
acknowledges, with the more common presumption that women are “more 
romantic, more open to emotional influence” and hence more prone to 
nostalgia (55). According to the theory of nostalgia as identity continuative, 
Davis reports that much anthropological research in the 1960s concludes that 
it is the Western male “who experiences the sharper transitional 
discontinuities of status, role, and often geographical location […]” through 
work, military service, and other disruptive faculties (55). This might have 
had some validity in the 1960s and earlier, or in cultures where gender 
equality has not yet been prolific or had a withstanding impact on the 
evolution of society. In most countries in the West, however, the 
“discontinuities” of professional status and geographical location can equally 
include women. Conclusively, propensity for nostalgia is not a matter of sex, 
but a matter of cultural gender issues and personal relationships to contexts 
of home, such as family and kin (Davis 56). The non-gendered and non-
ethnic aspects of nostalgia are further supported by three studies: Batcho 
(1995; 1998) and Best and Nelson (1985). 
Are there other aspects of our upbringing that have impact on our 
nostalgia as well? If we briefly ponder the fate of the Swiss soldiers who felt 
such strong longings for their beloved Alps, we must consider the influence 
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of geography. Perhaps, if we grow up in a particularly beautiful landscape 
(and this, of course, depends on personal taste), we often create more 
everlasting memories that might occur later and more frequently than 
someone who grows up in a more mundane environment. Eighteenth-
century essayist James Beattie explains why the mountains have such impact 
on homesickness: “For precipices, rocks, and torrents are durable things; and, 
being more striking to the fancy than any other natural appearances in the 
plains, take faster hold of the memory; and may therefore more frequently 
recur to the absent native” (qtd. in Salvesen 41-42). There can be a connection 
between the experienced landscape and nostalgia, but I still think that how a 
certain person experiences his surroundings has more to do with personality 
than geographical background. Surely the Eskimos have the capacity to feel 
nostalgic for their snowy and icy childhoods even though these 
characteristics are not durable. 
As mentioned above, nostalgia seems more common for persons 
experiencing an identity crisis. “Things aren’t what they used to be” is a 
common complaint from the aged. In old age we have many of the following 
experiences: loss of loved ones, alienation in terms of technology, existential 
issues, and validation of our choices. Although many people age gracefully, 
many are plagued by ill health and sadness, and there is a discontent with 
their present state. Stephen Priest draws the following scheme over the 
chronology of life, based on the theories of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: 
 
1. Life 
2. Consciousness of Life 
3. Consciousness of Death 
4. Death (Priest 42) 
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This simple chart explains the preoccupation with death among older people. 
The final crisis in life is also the tip of the iceberg of nostalgic escapism. It 
responds to the consensus that children rarely experience nostalgia, since the 
nostalgee needs to be conscious of death. To focus on old age as the age of 
nostalgia contradicts earlier psychological studies that reveal adolescence as 
the age of nostalgia, a time when people are usually separated from home 
(McCann 170). I think it has more to do with anticipation of death, which, as 
Agacinski writes, “we cannot help thinking about […]” and has two 
consequences closely related to nostalgia: “melancholia” and “love for finite 
things or beings […]” (14). Adolescence, like old age, can be a time of 
existential doubts concerning the extinction of one’s self; in the former case 
perhaps triggered by the separation from the stability of home and family. 
Maurice Halbwachs has an additional explanation for older people’s 
nostalgic tendencies. He juxtaposes them with younger people and 
distinguishes different relations to the past: 
 
It seems fairly natural that adults, absorbed as they are 
with everyday preoccupations, are not interested in 
what from the past is now irrelevant to these 
preoccupations. But this is not the case with old people. 
These men and women are tired of action and hence 
turn away from the present so that they are in a most 
favorable position to evoke events of the past as they 
really appeared. (On Collective Memory 47) 
  
Nostalgia and Modernity 
In our understanding of nostalgia’s refusal to accept the conditions of life, the 
flowing of time (the time arrow), and the inevitability of extinction, we owe 
much to modernity which fuelled nostalgia with an unprecedented 
awareness of time. 
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Modern nostalgia, naturally, bears a significant relation to modernity, 
as identified by recent scholars. Kimberly K. Smith argues that nostalgia 
actually is the “product of – and indelibly shaped by – nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century conflicts over the political significance of the past” and as 
such is related to progress as a “progressive paratheory” (505-06). Agacinski 
writes that “[t]he idea of modernity refers less to a situation in time than it is 
itself a certain way of thinking about time, free from both eternity and so-called 
historical necessity” (20), thus configuring the temporally liberated notion of 
nostalgia. Also Svetlana Boym’s modern concept of nostalgia originates in its 
reaction to modernity: “I realized that nostalgia goes beyond individual 
psychology. At first glance, nostalgia is a longing for a place, but actually it is 
a yearning for a different time – the time of our childhood, the slower 
rhythms of our dreams. In a broader sense, nostalgia is rebellion against the 
modern idea of time, the time of history and progress” (xv).  
Jay Gatsby’s peculiar and pathetic gesture in The Great Gatsby, 
stretching “out his hand desperately […]” (160) towards the past, 
emblematizes both modern nostalgia’s teleological concern and entropic 
vision of modernity, and the melancholia and pain involved in this 
retrospection. The modern concept of nostalgia is heavily influenced by 
reactions to the era of progress in post-revolutionary Europe. To illustrate 
this, let us speculate on the nature of a typical nostalgia: that of the desire to 
return to our childhood’s domains and how this nostalgia can be linked to a 
reaction against modernity. 
This desire is brilliantly conveyed in Pascal Mercier’s Nachtzug nach 
Lissabon [Night Train to Lisbon] (2004) when the writer within the narrative 




Now I finally seem to know what keeps compelling me 
to undertake the trip to the school: I’d like to go back to 
those minutes in the schoolyard when the past had 
dropped off of us and the future hadn’t yet begun. Time 
came to a halt and held its breath, as it never again did. 
Was it Maria João’s brown knees and the fragrance of 
soup in her light dress that I’d like to go back to? Or is it 
the wish – the dreamlike, bombastic wish – to stand 
once again in that point in my life and be able to take a 
completely different direction than the one that has 
made me who I am now? (55-56) 
 
According to this description, we want to return to our past and that magic 
liberated feeling of having our whole life in front of us. The idealized nature 
of our pasts, in concordance with dissatisfaction with our present state, 
makes us ponder on the righteousness of our choices. But that is not, as the 
fictive writer in Nachtzug nach Lissabon soon understands, the crucial reason 
behind our longing for our past. Like him, when we return to that crossroad 
in our past, we are not the same person as we were back then and cannot 
make our choices based on a future not yet experienced. There is “something 
peculiar about this wish,” Mercier writes, “it smacks of paradox and logical 
peculiarity” (56). I think the clue is to be found in the book’s epigraph, by 
Jorge Manrique: “Our lives are rivers, gliding free / to that unfathomed, 
boundless sea, / the silent grave!” (qtd. in Mercier). It is not really only a 
desire to change our lives; it is silent cry against the avalanching time we call 
progress. 
These cries can be found throughout history. St. Augustine’s mourning 
about the inevitability of time and loss in Confessions is but one example, but 
the extent of these “cries” echoed louder than ever during the industrial 
revolution in post revolutionary Europe and the US. This culminated in a 
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wave of nostalgic sentiments as a response to unprecedented enormous and 
rapid change in people’s lives. 
In the midst of the improvements in social affairs and life style, a 
strong technological development, urbanization, a modernized 
administration and bureaucracy, new means of transport, communications 
and media, the explosive growth of newspapers, and the world exhibitions 
pushed society forward for a universally shared world and a constant 
improvement. This all changed people’s attitude towards time.22 Boym 
writes:  
 
The idea of progress through revolution or industrial 
development became central to the nineteenth-century 
culture. From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, 
the representation of time itself changed; it moved 
away from allegorical human figures – an old man, a 
blind youth holding an hourglass, a woman with bared 
breasts representing Fate – to the impersonal language 
of numbers: railroad schedules, the bottom line of 
industrial progress. (9) 
  
As most critics have acknowledged, a crucial development in this change can 
be seen in a new perception of time, especially in the aftermath of Kant’s 
radical reinterpretation of nostalgia (Johannisson 23; Starobinski 94; Boym 9). 
In his Anthropologie in pragmagtischer hinsicht [Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View] (1796/97) he asserts that nostalgia is not curable, since one’s 
longing is not for the place of childhood but the childhood itself; the loss is 
absolute:  
 
                                                
22  On how modernity affected the human consciousness, see Berman or Berger, Berger & 
Kellner. 
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The homesickness of the Swiss (and, as I have it from the 
mouth of an experienced general, also the Westphalians 
and Pomeranians from certain regions) that seizes them 
when they are transferred to other lands is the result of 
a longing for the places where they enjoyed the very 
simple pleasures of life – aroused by the recollection of 
images of the carefree life and neighborly company in 
their early years. For later, after they visit these same 
places, they are greatly disappointed in their 
expectations and thus also find their homesickness 
cured. To be sure, they think that this is because they 
cannot bring back their youth there. (Kant 71) 
 
The new concepts of time started a teleological rampage, a strong belief in 
the ideas of progress. The past was outdated; the future goal of progress was  
 
a constant improvement in human social affairs and life style. This rapid 
change also created, or demanded, a new sort of person: 
 
The first code was; changeability. Enlightenment and the 
mentality of the revolution had formed the ideal: 
liberation, disengagement, moveable, openness, plastic, 
adaptable. The second code was: rational. The modern 
person was rational, disciplined, with total control over 
emotions, impulses and instincts. Debauching emotions 
must be held back. Also longing back and home, must 
be reconstructed. (Johannisson 129) 
 
It was a time of contrasts, of conflicts between the old and the new. Maybe 
this time even could be described as “schizophrenic” as Johannisson argues, 
an interior break as a result of living in two different worlds at the same time, 
alienation to the new urban world and modernization (133). Growing out of 
this “schizophrenia” was a strong longing for the past times, and “the slower 
rhythms of the past, for continuity, social cohesion and tradition” (Boym 16). 
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If being modern was to be part of a universe in which, as Karl Marx said, “all 
that is solid melts into air” (qtd. in Berman 15), then being nostalgic is a 
symptom of poor adaptability to the modern way, and as such is a despicable 
“disease” in the eyes of progress. Kimberly K. Smith writes that nostalgia 
“silence[d] the victims of modernization […]” and made their emotions 
“suspect” (507). The modern man had to emigrate west, search for gold, 
travel far, move into the city, and adapt to the new culture of the urban 
society – not look back into the past. Nostalgia became conservative and 
reactionary in the age of rationalization. Rationality was temporarily halted 
by the Romantics. Francis Hutcheson in his Essay on the Nature and Conduct of 
the Passions and Affections (1728) asserts that there was no space for the kind 
of emotions that were considered wild, physical, and unsound; only 
emotions that motivated action such as greed, jealousy, and vanity were 
respectable. That led to a division not between rationality and feeling, but 
rather between emotions as something sound and passions as something 
dismissible (Johannisson 131). As such, nostalgia, being a passion, was 
discarded from the rationality project and became “a crack in the modern 
world” (Johannisson 135). Nostalgia became exiled and alienated. 
Assessing critically the effects of the modern world of progress is part 
of the whole project of modernity, and is why we can see a heightened 
interest in anti-progressive nostalgia both in theoretic consciousness and art 
in the age of modernity. “Modernity and modernisms,” writes Boym, “are 
responses to the condition of modernization and the consequences of 
progress. This modernity is contradictory, critical, ambivalent and reflective 
on the nature of time; it combines fascination for the present with the longing 
for another time” (22). Johannisson presents three reactions to the modern 
demand of rationality: a critique of modernity based on that longing for 
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home/past confirms that man is un-rooted from his origin and sense of value; 
a loyalty to modernity, which finds new ways in the modern world to express 
and experience the past in more institutionalized external ways (museums, 
living history museums and societies); and finally, an adaptable strategy, in 
which man finds new ways, within modernity, to create new foundations for 
roots and social interventions within the modern society (134). Georg 
Simmel, in his groundbreaking dissection of modern life, asserts similarly in 
“The Metropolis and Mental Life” that there was an aspect of modernization 
that interfered with human well-being.  
Charles Baudelaire, the “father of modernity,” employs in “The 
Painter of Modern Life” (1859-60) this exact ambivalence; he wants to both 
capture the modern but also flirt with the eternal. Modernity is the transitory, 
“the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half 
is eternal and the immutable” (The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays 12). 
Baudelaire embraces modernity and the urban life style: “The modern city is 
the poet’s imperfect home,” as Boym writes, where the word “imperfect” 
suitably emphasizes Baudelaire’s critical agenda towards progress (21). The 
anti-modern discourse is clear; modernity has uprooted and alienated the 
human being from its centuries-old traditions, norms, and value systems. It 
has created an egotistical monster, only with materialism and imaginary 
freedom as profit, undoubtedly heading towards the domains of verfremdung, 
shallowness, and superficiality (Johannisson 134-35). 
This digression into modernity has served its purpose to illuminate 
two of the strongest forces motivating nostalgia: our fear of death and the 
progress of time. These feelings were obviously not exclusive to the age of 
modernity, but they became more acute due to the rapid changes of people’s 
lives. In pre-industrial thought, time was not a factor in the same way. 
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Stability and circular temporality, stimulated by traditions and a rural life 
cycle, did not initiate voluntary reactions towards time.23 But it means not, as 
St Augustine proves, that these sentiments were not realities, only more 
unconscious and unarticulated realities. Similarly, as Hutcheon notes, there 
has been a strong “attempt to defy the end, to evade teleology” in more 
recent times of change, particularly in the apocalyptic millennium change. 
 
Memorative signs 
The disillusioned present, the persona of the nostalgee, and contemporary 
collective forces play important parts in triggering the nostalgic reaction. 
Equally important are the actual stimuli, which we choose to call memorative 
signs, derived from Rousseau’s A Dictionary of Music (1775), where he reflects 
on how music “does not […] act precisely as music, but as a memorative 
sign” (Rousseau 267). Memorative signs can be divided into souvenirs 







Fig. 4. Memorative Signs. 
 
Sometimes, the triggering of the nostalgic reaction is a combination of several 
or all of these types. The signs often have a direct relationship to the nostalgia 
such as the “petite madeleine”; the signs appear in both the present and the 
                                                
23  See Koselleck for a further analysis of how modernity and the idea of progress changed 
concepts of time. 
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past, as signposts through time. However, this is not always the case; 
occasionally there is no direct link between the two. That is, there is some 
kind of relationship, but this does not have to be immediate; it can be of a 
more symbolic and representative nature. We can refer to signs as being 
direct (an explicit link) and indirect (representational). 
Before we discuss the memorative signs further we have to enter the 
debate about the division between voluntary memory and involuntary 
memory. In recent scientific memory studies, the terms explicit memory and 
implicit memory are used to separate memories we recall by will and those 
which are recalled or “used” without conscious effort.24 Although explicit 
memory correspond exactly to voluntary memory, studies of implicit 
memories tend to focus more on how we learn things subconsciously 
through repeatedly valuing our past experience in a present state and 
perform simple tasks without remembering how, such as riding a bicycle or 
tying our shoes, than actual recollection of past events. Therefore we will rely 
                                                
24  Explicit memory, also known as episodic memory, is a memory of personal experiences 
organized in a temporal order. Endel Tulving describes them as a means of traveling back 
in time. Semantic memory, on the other end, is a structured record of facts, concepts and 
skills that we have acquired. Semantic information is derived from accumulated episodic 
memory. Together they make up what is called declarative memory. Recent cognitive 
neuroscience places episodic memory in the medial temporal lobe and the prefrontal 
cortex. For more on episodic memory see Tulving’s “Episodic Memory: from Mind to 
Brain”. Implicit memory, or procedural memory, consists of memories that are recalled 
with less conscious effort than explicit memory. It is a long term memory that is based on 
repetition, practice, and learning of certain activities such as tying your shoes or riding a 
bicycle. Confabulation is a memory disorder where a verbal statement of a past event is 
false but is usually unintentional. Confabulation is divided into spontaneous and 
provoked memory disorder, where the spontaneous is an involuntary memorial of a false 
memory whereas provoked confabulation is a normal response to a false memory. 
Confabulations do not have to be verbal but can also be behavioral; an example occurs 
when a person acts upon his false memories. Subjects that confabulate could be linked to 
that of the idealized, selected memory of nostalgia, although this connection has never 
been made. For more on confabulation see Moscovitch “Confabulation”.  
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on the classic division between voluntary and involuntary memory.25 
Voluntary memory is triggered by our intelligence, as, for example, by 
voluntarily remembering past events or people. This can mean that the 
triggering factor is contained within our fantasy, dreams and thoughts, and 
that the memory is provoked by thought related mechanisms – what we call 
imaginations. More importantly, it can also make use of outer stimuli such as 
voluntarily playing a recording that you are aware will trigger memories. In 
this latter case, it represents something in between voluntary and 
involuntary memory, since the act of remembering is voluntary, but the effect 
of the record might have a more subconscious effect. 
Involuntary memory, on the other hand, catches us off guard and 
flows over us, but it is still triggered by something. The most famous 
memorative sign, the smell and taste of the “petite madeleine,” is definitely 
involuntary: “But at the very instant when the mouthful of tea mixed with 
cake-crumbs touched my palate, I quivered, attentive to the extraordinary 
thing that was happening in me” (Proust, The Way by Swann’s 47). 
Hart claims that “a memory of nostalgia, cannot be recalled at will” 
and uses Proust as an example (397). Certainly, much of our nostalgic 
reactions are triggered by involuntary memories, and were also triggered 
already among the Swiss soldiers when they accidentally heard cow bells or 
drank milk that reminded them of their native land. Perhaps there is, as 
Proust argues, a more reverent and strong nostalgic reaction involved when 
it is triggered involuntarily. The narrator in Du côté de chez Swann laments the 
fact that the “past is hidden outside the realm of our intelligence and beyond 
its reach […]” (Proust, The Way by Swann’s 47). The affect of the memory is 
                                                
25  In some psychological theoretical work it is preferred to use the terms passive and 
deliberate instead of involuntary and voluntary. 
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more vivid and strong, catching us off guard and triggering memories that 
are stored deeper down in our memory bank; therefore it appears more 
surprising to us. Still, Proust is contradicting himself since the earlier 
voluntary remembrance in Du côté de chez Swann, where the narrator 
recollects his desire for his mother’s kiss during his sleepless night, is just as 
alive and strong as the later involuntary one (Madeleine cake), at least in a 
literary sense.  
The absolute freedom of consciousness, according to Halbwachs, is 
only to be found in dreaming. Challenging Bergson’s belief in subjective time 
and individual consciousness26, he asserts that it is only in a dream state that 
our consciousness is involuntary and that “we are incapable of reliving our 
past while we dream” except in the form of images that “are introduced in a 
fragmented state” (On Collective Memory 41). Proust’s narrative certainly is 
not a fragmented memory, like something out of Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, but a 
                                                
26  Henri Bergson’s concept of duration is a very complicated issue and evolves around 
his whole philosophical system of intuition and free will. For our concerns it is 
enough to distinguish duration in terms of time. Duration is the flux of memories, 
passions, thoughts, and emotions that cannot be put in one temporal progression 
but defines the inner consciousness of a subject. This is strongly contrasted to that of 
mechanical clock time: ” When I follow with my eyes on the dial of a clock the 
movement of the hand which corresponds to the oscillations of the pendulum, I do 
not measure duration […] I merely count simultaneities, which is very different. 
Outside of me, in space, there is never more than a single position of the hand and 
the pendulum, for nothing is left of the past positions. Within myself a process of 
organization or interpenetration of conscious states is going on, which constitutes 
true duration” (Bergson, Time and Free Will 107-08). The idea of an inner time and 
inner consciousness, freed from the clock time, became very influential on the 
artistic movements of modernism. Arnold Hauser describes this forcefully: “The 
accent is now on the simultaneity of the contents of consciousness, the immanence of 
the past in the present, the constant flowing together of the different periods of time, 
the amorphous fluidity of inner experience, the boundlessness of the stream of time 
by which the soul is borne along […] In this new conception of time almost all the 
strands of the texture which form the stuff of modern art converge: the 
abandonment of the plot, the elimination of the hero, the relinquishing of 
psychology, the 'automatic method of writing' and, above all, the montage technique 
and the intermingling of temporal and spatial forms of the film” (226). 
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very deliberately constructed one, although it follows the ideas of memory 
association. Halbwachs defines all memories as reconstructions which are 
based on several reinterpretations during the course of life. These 
reconstructions are also as a result of the factors and forces in the present 
state where these memories are recollected. For him there is no involuntary 
memory. I think he is correct that there has been confusion between 
involuntary triggering and involuntary memory. The motivation for our 
memories is basically a mix of voluntary and involuntary probabilities; they 
can be either one or both. Involuntary forces have the capacity to transport us 
to a certain memory, much like a time machine. But the actual memory is a 
construction based on the motivation and the signpost of our past. That 
explains why the actual triggering tends to fade in our recollection. We see a 
photograph and we are involuntarily transported to this photo in a past 
event. We see it hang over our bed as children, but then it fades away, and we 
voluntarily reconstruct a past that emanates out of this photograph. It could 
be memories that took place in this bedroom or something quite different 
related to it. 
Let us return to the memorative signs. Inspired by Susan Stewart, we 
will refer to memorative signs of physical objects as souvenirs. The “capacity 
of objects to serve as traces of authentic experience is,” writes Stewart, 
“exemplified by the souvenir” (Stewart 135). Stewart divides souvenirs into 
two categories (136). The first she calls “homomaterial” from Umberto Eco (A 
Theory of Semiotics 217), which means that it is a part of something real from 
the past. This could be a lock of hair or a piece of clothes. It will thus act in a 
metonymic way. The second she names “representational,” which means a 
reproduction of something real, like a miniature gondola from Venice. 
Furthermore, souvenirs can be divided into public (external) and private 
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(internal); public souvenirs are post cards, or general souvenirs of all kinds, 
which have no direct attachment to a real experience, whereas private 
souvenirs are not meaningful to anyone else because they are “mapped 
against the life history of an individual” (Stewart 139). A homomaterial 
souvenir tends more often to be internal, naturally, but we can imagine that a 
preserved lock of hair of Mary Queen of Scots could be a memorative sign for 
someone and thus external. Stewart emphasizes that the souvenir is always 
incomplete (136). The nostalgic power is due to its incompleteness; if it were 
complete, or an exact replica of an experience, it would not be nostalgic. 
Usually, as noted above, the souvenir itself is not the memory; the links 
between present and past are initiated and structured by the souvenir, but 
when we reach the souvenir in the past we voluntarily start to recreate the 
past we desire, often leaving the actual sign behind. 
Let us consider Chopin’s Nocturne nr 8, from a CD recording on 
Deutsche Gramophone with Daniel Barenboim, playing an important part in 
one’s past. If we refer to the physical CD, its cover or the actual disc, it acts as 
a souvenir. But if it is the music itself, it falls within the category of sensations. 
Sensations are non-physical, non-visual things27 that attract our senses, such 
as smell, taste, touch, sounds, and music. There is much evidence that it is 
the sensational memorative signs that play the most important part in 
triggering our nostalgic experience.28 As Proust’s narrator tells us, “The sight 
of the little madeleine had not recalled anything to me before I tasted it; 
perhaps because I had often seen them since […] and their image had 
therefore left those days of Combray and attached itself to others more recent 
                                                
27  Provided they are not artistic expressions such as an artistic photo or film. 
28  For an extended discussion on the ways visual perception differs from gustatory and 
olfactory sensations in terms of recovering memories see Lennon (58-62). 
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[…]” (Proust, The Way by Swann’s 49). Our visual contact with memorative 
signs is perhaps more ordinary than the rarity of sensational ones. 
The importance of sensational triggering is confirmed by the first 
testimonies of nostalgia. The early motivations for homesickness were related 
to either sound or music (Starobinski 89-94). When the Swiss soldiers heard 
folk melodies from the Alpine regions they evidenced nostalgic reactions, 
Swiss scientists observed. Similarly, Highlanders proved to feel nostalgic 
when they heard bagpipe music reminding them of the Highlands (Boym 4). 
Somewhat later Rousseau talks about how the sound of cow bells triggered 
memories of the youthful summers in the Swiss soldiers, evidencing that it is 
not music per se but sounds in general that speak to our hearts (267). As 
Boym writes, “[t]he music of home, whether a rustic cantilena or a pop song, 
is the permanent accompaniment of nostalgia […]” (4). There was a diverse 
and exciting debate in eighteenth-century science about the relationship 
between memory and music, sparked by the work of the Edinburgh School 
of Science, which applied theories of memory and ideas of association to 
nostalgia (Starobinski 89-90).  John Gregory wrote in 1765:  
 
The different passions naturally express themselves by 
different sounds […] When particular sounds and a 
certain strain of melody are impressed upon young 
minds, in a uniform connection with certain passions 
expressed in a song, this regular association raises these 
sounds, in progress of time, into a kind of natural and 
expressive language of the passions. […] We generally 
hear with pleasure the music we have been accustomed 
to in our youth, because it awakens the memory of our 
guiltless and happy days. (qtd. in Starobinski 92).  
 
Certainly ways of freezing time have historically been important for 
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nostalgia: the photograph, with an event or subject from the past staring into 
the present; the moving images, maybe even more so with their realistic 
depiction of life; and audio recordings of our beloved. There is something 
evocative in the voices and images of the past. In their reproductive manner, 
in their three dimensions, or digitalized bits, in “conserving the traces of 
people and things […]” (Agacinski 89), they remind us even more so of the 
lack of life in their subjects. The frozen time in photos or films can be divided 
into two kinds. They can be souvenirs (private memoirs of people we have 
known), or they can be public works of art and therefore public souvenirs, if 
we consider them as physical objects. Much art, such as film, benefits more 
from being called sensations; few reflect on the physicality of a film. 
Naturally, this is not the case with sculptures or paintings. Art has a strong 
history in triggering nostalgia; we often mention that a certain song, film, or 
painting makes us nostalgic. Most of the time, this has to do with the work’s 
position in our temporal past rather than its actual content. It triggers the 
times rather than a time and reminds us more often of a general atmosphere 
in a past time rather than in a specific event. This is especially true with 
popular art, like music that is played on radio, at a friend’s home, or in bars.  
There is no doubt that music and sound have played and still play an 
important part in triggering nostalgic reactions. But as the most famous 
trigger, the “petite madeleine” reminds us, taste (and smell) is of equal 
importance and was reported to have caused nostalgic epidemics among  the 
Swiss soldiers when fat milk, or rustic soups, like the ones their mothers had 
prepared for them, reminded them of their homes (Starobinski 87;  Boym 4). 
 The third category of memorative signs we call situational. As an 
example, we see how the seasons trigger emotions about the passage of time, 
which in turn facilitates nostalgic notions. Classical situational signs are 
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situations, or maybe more like symbols, that encourage ideas of stability and 
repetition. As mentioned above, the anticipation of death creates in us a 
desire for the stable values of life, the repetitions that conquer our own life 
span. Such repetitions include waves, full moons, sunsets, and the change of 
seasons. Repetitions have also, as Kimberly K. Smith acknowledges, “long 
been considered to be the chief characteristic of agrarian life” and therefore, 
as a cycle of nature, connected to a pre-modern, traditional, and secure life 
style (517). 
 The situational memorative signs can be more complex as well. They 
can be a broader reminder that includes both sensations and representational 
souvenirs within a situation. These situations often correspond to the times 
and places of our most common longings: traditions, rites of passage such as 
childhood to puberty, holidays, times of individual crises, or seasons –  what 
Davis refers to as our “life cycle” (Davis 52-71). It is in the ritualized 
traditions that the public nostalgia can become private. When I attend my 
nephew’s graduation, the whole sensation brings me back to my own 
graduation, even though there might be very few similarities between the 
two. Christmas is also classic in the way it evokes our past memories and all 
the connotations that are included with the season (childhood, parents, loved 
ones). This is especially true for people who, for one reason or another, are 
separated from family and traditions, such as the European emigrants in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as evidenced in this poem from 
1906 by Gustav Wicklund: 
 
When Christmastime draws near again 
the Swede-American feels melancholy 
remembering his childhood’s happy days, 
the joy of Christmas and tree and holly. 
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The trees of bygone years were not so fine 
as what he lights today, but they were bright 
with precious memories of joy and love, 
which rise like stars against his sorrowing night. (qtd. 
in Skårdal 266) 
 
Most of the above observations are confirmed by a study of what triggered 
homesickness among East German refugees in West Germany in 1956. Their 
strongest feelings of nostalgia were triggered by music, pictures in 
newspapers, celebratory parties, rituals, holidays, festivals, and birthdays 
(Neff 77-144). 
  Imaginative memorative signs are dreams, thoughts, hopes, that are 
created within our intelligence and being, and act as the motivation for 
recreating our memories or dreams. Hofer insisted that nostalgia was 
fundamentally due to the “strength of the imagination alone […]” (388). It is 
interesting to speculate on the role imagination plays, not only in the 
motivating phase of the nostalgic experience, but also in recreating the object 
of nostalgic longing in vivid and exciting ways. Imaginative memorative 
signs should not be confused with subconscious activities, such as 
psychological states mentioned before in regards to the nostalgee. The 
imaginative memorative signs are voluntary imaginations, forcing the 
recurrence of memories through a conscious thought process, but often they 
are triggered by involuntary signs. 
One last aspect of motivation is the “lack of motivation.” One early 
theory about the Swiss soldiers’ homesickness was identified by Jean-Jacques 
Scheucher: the nostalgia was a reaction to lack of atmospheric pressure when 
they entered the plain grounds below (Starobinski 88). We can mock 
Scheucher now, but maybe we can derive some truth from it. It had nothing 
to do with atmospheric pressure but with the uniqueness of the Swiss 
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landscape. Maybe the Swiss soldiers actually missed their mountainous 
landscape because they were wandering in the plains. Similarly, a conductor 
on a Swedish train once told me that he always missed the Swedish milk 
when he was abroad; he was always disappointed in the foreign dairy 
products. His story remained in my mind and it confirmed that a motivation 
for longing can also be a lack of something rather than a memorative sign. 





We will call the place or time that is the object of our longings the nostalgia. It 
might evoke certain misunderstandings, since it is used as the general noun 
for the whole experience. If we say “I feel nostalgic” it is an incomplete 
sentence, not grammatically, but content-wise, since we want to ask “about 
what”? We would then answer, “We feel nostalgic about our first love.” This 
corresponds with “nostalgia for our first love.” We see this use of the word 
becoming more common in the 1950s, exemplified by this excerpt from The 
Observer in 1959: “Nostalgic for one’s childhood does not necessarily mean 
that the childhood was a happy one” (qtd. in OED). It is fine to refer to it as 
the “object of our longings,” but the word nostalgia will include the whole 
set of events that are surrounding the object, such as idealization and 
imagination. We will therefore use nostalgia as the actual place or time 
triggered by the memorative sign. To avoid confusion though, we will 
predominantly refer to the objects of nostalgia in definite forms such as the 
nostalgia or nostalgias, distinguishing it from the general use of the term 
nostalgia. 
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 Nostalgia is also more adequate than “memory,” since memory is not 
always at work in the second phase of the nostalgic experience, and it is wise 
to avoid confusions between memory and nostalgia. Therefore we will look 
closer at how memory functions. 
  
Memory and Temporality 
In addition to the theories of voluntary or involuntary memory, much debate 
in recent memory studies has been about the relationship between personal 
memory and collective memory, and whether our memories are trustworthy 
or even false. It is obvious that, as we will see in our discussion about 
external and internal nostalgia, our memory is influenced and sometimes 
forcefully created through external forces. The idea of false memory, or in our 
case the “idealized” memory, has to do with ideas of shared memory or 
collective pressure in external cases, and in internal situations it has more to 
do with voluntary personal forces. A confusing aspect is the different 
terminology that exists. Some speak of private and public remembering, 
others about individual versus collective memories. Are they the same?  
As Halbwachs clearly demonstrates, collective memory does not exist 
as a phenomenon, but only as a measuring device for the influence of 
collective history and culture on the individual memory: “While the 
collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent 
body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember” (The 
Collective Memory 48). That means that the terms private/public, 
individual/collective cannot be regarded in terms of experience or 
consciousness. As we have seen in the section about motivation, all 
experiences are individual and subjective even though they can be affected 
by a popularization of the past: conventions, usage in media and politics. The 
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important question is rather how the individual memory relates to personal 
and collective history. Halbwachs believes, as we have seen, that the only 
consciousness that is not directly influenced by external forces is dreaming, 
where memory is not a crucial aspect since our pasts are fragmented and put 
together in new ways (On Collective Memory 41). 
 Halbwachs also makes a sharp distinction between historical and 
autobiographical memory. The first engages a person only through written 
records and other types of records and is kept alive through 
commemorations, celebrations, and festivities. Autobiographical memory is 
memory of events that we have personally experienced in life. 
Autobiographical memory is also constantly reinforced by people who 
shared it and by memorative signs; otherwise it fades away. That means that 
the personal memory is also a reconstruction through social interventions, 
much like the historical, and therefore individual memory in its pure form 
does not exist. This is not what Bergson believed, when he created a two-
folded memory, “one made of habits and turned toward action, and another 
which involves a certain disinterest in present life” (Halbwachs, On Collective 
Memory 47). Since nostalgia is not dependent on a “truthful” memory, its 
quintessence, much like Bergson predicts, lies in our capacity to freely relate 
to time in a social and personal way. This means that some of our memorial 
constructs are void as well as liberated from external influences. 
The discussions about memory also touch upon the matter of the 
past’s actual existence. This has been challenged by several recent proponents 
of presentism such as Mark Currie and Craig Bourne. Perhaps they were 
influenced by Halbwachs’ assertion that the past is a construction of the 
present. Halbwachs, though, is the first to admit that it does not mean that a 
past does not in fact exist. Sociologist Barry Schwartz has shown that if we 
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refuse a past, there is no continuity in history at all (374-97). The past is 
changed due to reinterpretations, but it is also persistent and continuous. 
Schwartz exemplifies with the classic metaphor of a river, that we never step 
into the same river, but this river still has “persistent characteristics” not 
shared by any other river. 
“[M]odern temporality is the endless interlacing of the irreversible 
and the repetitive,” writes Agacinski, touching upon the temporal paradox of 
nostalgia (12). In order to have a “past” we need to have a present and 
probably a future; time has to be linear and irreversible as confirmed by 
physics by the second principle of thermodynamics and Joseph Fournier’s 
equation for heat. Our longing for the past is strong, we are all “boats against 
the current,” desperately trying to reverse time. Irreversibility is essential to 
nostalgia, it is an incurable phenomenon: the longing for the past is an 
impossible mission. Time is thus not equal to Newtonian time; events are not 
physically saved in a container to be restored. Nostalgia is a personal 
consciousness. It relates on one hand to the linearity and empirical realism 
and on the other hand to Neo-Kantian subjectivism. Nostalgia dwells in the 
grey zone between Husserl’s internal time consciousness and an external 
temporal measurement. The subjectivity of time, the Bergsonian durée, 
subverts the irreversibility of time and permits a subject to relive past, and 
future, events in individual consciousness. 
Memory and nostalgia are, thus, fundamentally related but still 
different phenomena. The confusion between nostalgia and memory is often 
due to the fact that nostalgia incorporates an element of memory, whereas 
memory does not involve nostalgia. “Memory,” as Johannisson writes, “can 
be recollection, remembrance, flashback, or sentimental or therapeutic 
return. It can be yearning, searching, idealizing, forgetful, build on vague 
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reminiscences, fleeting impressions or a single symbolic detail” (145). The 
crucial difference between memory and nostalgia is that memory does not 
require reflection, whereas in nostalgia it is automatically included. 
All the above has consequences on our interpretation of the nostalgic 
experience. The traditional division of nostalgia in private and public has to 
be challenged. 
 
Internal and External Nostalgia 
We will use the terms internal and external to refer to the types of nostalgic 
experience. Internal nostalgia is related to a personal memory, what 
Halbwachs refers to as autobiographical memory. If the degrees of social 
influence on this nostalgia vary from case to case, how can we measure it? An 
external nostalgic experience, on the other hand, includes every kind of 
nostalgia that is not related to one’s personal past. The definitions of internal 
and external, thus, are not reflections of how much social or private influence 
the experience contains, but only a marker of when or what we are nostalgic 
for. If we are nostalgic for antiquity it is clearly external. If we are nostalgic 
for our childhood home, it is internal. If we watch a film about another planet 
far away, our nostalgia is external. If another film takes place in our 
childhood, we are internally nostalgic. Of course, the social interventions in 
our nostalgia are often higher in external cases than internal. 
 A well known nostalgic division has been that between private and 
public nostalgia. I argue that these definitions are definitions of nostalgia as a 
social, psychological, and political force, and they should not be confused 
with private experiences. Nevertheless, it is necessary to briefly engage in its 
history, since our external and internal nostalgia partly depends on them. 
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The scientific interest in public nostalgia commenced in the later half 
of the nineteenth century. When early sociologists, like Simmel, became 
aware of the psychological dimensions of alienation and nostalgia, they 
started to treat these symptoms more structurally. Sociological work was, for 
example, done in order to minimize risks for children to develop nostalgia as 
a reaction to new economics. A study of public nostalgia would deal more 
with structures and groups than individuals and was built on a multitude of 
private nostalgias. It also explored the consequences of public nostalgia on 
the individual, such as nationalism, cultural conformity, and capitalism. 
Before researchers became interested in “public” nostalgia though, 
there had been a gradual shift from private to public nostalgia. One 
perspective was the institutionalized past that emerged in forms of living 
past societies, home coming days, and museums (Johannisson 136-37). Also 
in the bourgeois world the style and space of the summer houses acquired 
nostalgic artefacts; the evolving butterfly houses and aquariums allowed the 
myth of nature to invade their artificial lives (Boym 16). Boym cites Walter 
Benjamin who assessed that the “bourgeois home in nineteenth-century Paris 
[…] [was] a miniature theater and museum that privatize[d] nostalgia while 
at the same time replicating its public structure […]” (Boym 15). The reason 
for this was, as we have seen, the modern era’s suspicion towards nostalgia, 
and the need to institutionalize and privatize it in order to control it, a 
dislocation from individual experience to a collective experience. The 
negative aspects of public nostalgia were evident already in this shift. Boym 
demonstrates this clearly by stating that ruins of the past before were 
“fragments that carry ‘age value’” and allowed “one to experience historicity 
affectively, as an atmosphere, a space for reflection on the passage of time” 
(15). 
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The private nostalgic past, studied as private nostalgias in recent 
criticism, has been regarded as something positive. Johannisson concludes in 
her book that nostalgia is in its modern sense about “the subjective time kept 
inside a larger feeling of passing time. Its triumph is that it allows the 
individual to long for and fantasize about the own self in a stream of images, 
experiences, bodily reminders, moods, associations and vague reminiscences 
in order to communicate with one’s own life story” (159). From a 
psychological point of view, this subjective time in relation to clock time is a 
crucial component in understanding the world and the subjective self. Boym 
similarly defends this private nostalgia: “There is, after all, something 
pleasantly outmoded about the very idea of longing. We long to prolong our 
time, to make it free, to daydream, against all odds resisting external 
pressures and flickering computer screens” (xix). Also Davis shares this view 
in what he names continuity of identity: “nostalgia […] is deeply implicated in 
the sense of who we are, what we are about, and […] whither we go. In short, 
nostalgia is one of the means―or, better, one of the more readily accessible 
psychological lenses―we employ in the never ending work of constructing, 
maintaining, and reconstructing our identities” (Davis 31). 
Public nostalgia since the 1960s, on the other hand, has been 
considered either too popular or commercial as well as a literary weakness or 
a danger in obscuring historicity. Fredric Jameson posits nostalgia as an 
eclectic cannibalism of past styles and more dangerously a deceitful and 
commercial historicism (Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism 18-30). Similarly, Jean Baudrillard detests the quest for the past, 
declaring its economical and non-artistic qualities and defining, in 
accordance with Jameson, its lack of critical edge – its pastiche qualities (194-
99). This is all in order since public nostalgia has been in close company with 
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expressions of late capitalism and nationalism. There are few markets today 
that are not dependent on nostalgia as a marketing strategy. Advertisements 
incorporate nostalgic music, films, studio design in television, and 
typography in magazines. Every novel year of fashion refurbishes a past 
decade, be it the 1950s or the 1970s. Furthermore, no one denies the 
connection between, for example, the autocracies of Stalin or Hitler and their 
use of public mythical nostalgia in favour for establishing and maintaining 
their own particular nationalisms, or the USA’s constant striving after the 
pseudo creation of a mythic past. 
From a more sociological perspective, there have also been voices 
supporting the positive aspects of public nostalgia, such as escapism from 
the burdened present (Gabriel) and reinforcing cultural stability and a sense 
of belonging (Baumeister and Leary). Furthermore, the external nostalgia 
does not have to be part of the public nostalgia; it can be a very individual 
yearning for a time or place outside one’s own memory, such as a fictional 
place. 
Internal nostalgia, then, refers to memories from the individual’s own 
past, his own lived experience, what we will name memorial nostalgia. In our 
analyses of the nostalgias, we will widen this description by including also 
the longing for personal space, which we will call spatial nostalgia and 
nostalgia for the present, hypothetical nostalgia. However, the memorial 
nostalgia is Davis’ only criteria for nostalgia when he denies any other 
possibilities for the experience but a personal one (Davis 8). Kimberly K. 
Smith is more diplomatic; she acknowledges the possibilities of external 
pasts, but denies future-oriented nostalgia (508). Thus, there is no consensus 
in the matter. Santesso declares, “Nostalgia today is no longer simply a 
synonym for homesickness: we can be ‘nostalgic’ for hula hoops and ancient 
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Greece; we can be ‘nostalgic’ for homes we never had and states we never 
experienced” (14), and Merleau-Ponty articulates it beautifully as “a past that 
has never been a present” (242). Davis insists that “the past which is the 
object of nostalgia must in some fashion be a personally experienced past 
rather than one drawn solely, for example, from chronicles, almanacs, history 
books, memorial tablets, or for that matter, legend” (8). He prefers to call 
such feelings antiquarian rather than nostalgic (8-9). It is a weary debate to 
enter, since apparently people do feel nostalgic about non-lived pasts, and we 
prefer to have a more liberated view on the matter of external nostalgia, 
especially since it is important in relation to literature. 
External nostalgia will then mean an individual response to a place or 
time one has not experienced in life, what Arjun Appadurai calls “nostalgia 
without memory” (30). It also includes the future-oriented nostalgias such as 
utopias, myths, and fictional worlds. 
Merleau-Ponty separates the external pasts into two categories: the 
“immemorial past” a past that cannot be remembered and as such is 
metaphysical rather than epistemological, and one where the past is a “world 
as perceived” in which the past is not historical or specific in time, such as 
childhood (Merleau-Ponty 364-65). The immemorial past we divide into two 
categories: ontological and metaphysical. The “world as perceived,” when it is 
either temporally vague, or includes a memory that does not exist but feels 
like one, we prefer to call pseudo-memorial. However, the borders between the 
external categories are not as strict as in the internal categorization, and 
cross-overs are certain to be found, especially in terms of fictional memories. 
The distinctive difference between internal and external nostalgia lies 
much in concepts of subjective time. External nostalgia usually requires a 
“shared” time belonging not only to clock time, but also to a whole 
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institutional architecture such as art and religion, as well as political, social, 
and economical powers (Agacinski 46). What will be referred to as external 
nostalgia changes according to history and politics, whereas internal 
nostalgia resides outside this social framework. Important is also that 
external nostalgia does not include a personal loss, since it is outside 
memory. The loss can be just as real, or strong, if the external nostalgia 
symbolizes something that will never be fulfilled. 
It is worthwhile, finally, to distinguish what we mean with an 
“idealized memory” and if this idealization is different if it is an internal or 
external nostalgia. According to general perception, the memorial component 
in nostalgia rarely includes sad memories but rather prefers to refer to the 
happy ones. If memories in reality were not happy, they often undergo an 
idealization, and the negative values are lost while the positive are enhanced. 
It might be argued that when nostalgia is not a longing for a personal 
memory, this qualification is meaningless. The glittering and charged 
realities of our nostalgias, however, appear likewise in both internal and 
external nostalgia. In the internal cases, the idealization is based on 
psychological mechanisms that filter out the bad memories and retain the 
good ones. In external nostalgia, this selection is a conscious process from the 
one who creates the bases for our experience, often inclined using clichés and 
well established tropes. I think that, in terms of internal nostalgia, the 
emphasis on the idealized nature of the nostalgic longing is overrated. First, 
there are degrees in how much or little this idealization works and it seems 
to have to do more with the nature of the emotional state and the vividness 
of the experience, together with human forgetfulness, than an actual 
idealization. It is in the selective nature, not the idealizing, of the nostalgia 
that it differs from pure memory; in order for the bittersweet effect to take 
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place in the reflectory phase, it has to be a nostalgia, a selection, that reminds 
us of the positive aspects of reality of life, feelings that are “infused with 
imputations of past beauty, pleasure, joy, satisfaction, goodness, happiness, 
love, and the like, in sum, any or several of the positive affects of being” 
(Davis 14). Second, the nostalgia is strongly linked to the disillusioned 
present, from which one departs, even flees, and must as such be measured 
with an equally biased reality. It is better to refer to, like Davis, “[t]he ‘special’ 
past of nostalgia” that we “juxtapose […] to certain features of our present 
lives” (Davis 13). 
We can now summarize our ideas of nostalgia and illustrate them 


















The internal past, a past which is grounded in the individual’s own 
experience, memory and history, is obviously the most common type of 
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nostalgia and will be called memorial nostalgia. We hear a song that triggers a 
memory of a past event that we cherish and long for. We study the old photo 
album of our adolescence and remember what once was and is no more with 
sadness. Sometimes the nostalgia is specific and passing, but often it is more 
general, as in Wayne Gretzky’s observation below, which does not only refer 
to a single event but also several events creating a whole memory of a vague 
temporal distinction or an ambience of a life époque: 
 
My last game in New York was my greatest day in 
hockey […] Everything you enjoy about the sport of 
hockey as a kid, driving to practice with mom and dad, 
driving to the game with mom and dad, looking in the 
stands and seeing your mom and dad and your friends, 
that all came together in that last game in New York 
(Wayne Gretzky qtd. in Morrison 66) 
 
There has been some debate regarding the duration between the present state 
and the past state of memory, or in Davis’ words: “how far past must past be 
before it is experienced as past?” (Davis 11). It is, of course, impossible to 
structure and organize this in a scheme; is a day too little but one month 
enough? If there is a nostalgic reaction, then the duration is not relevant. It is, 
as Davis observes, maybe more important to take into consideration 
subjective time, or Bergsonian durée, which considers the subjective time as 
relevant in relation to clock time or mechanical time (Davis 11).  
In addition to involuntary activity, we in adult age voluntarily search 
for those places in our youth that were meaningful and magical, and if we try 
to recover them by visiting them we are vastly disappointed. “It just does not 
look the same,” we say when we approach our old family house. “I don’t 
remember this tree.” This is usually the case; time’s firm destructive nature 
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performs this. It is, however, not always true; sometimes we are perplexed 
with the lack of change when we return to our past places. This confirms that 
what we miss is not actually the props and scenography of our pasts but the 
past itself; the opportunities and choices we had then, which explains why 
our longings often return to the rites of passage, birth, childhood, early 
adolescence. The interiors and exteriors of a certain place are nothing more 
than triggers and motivators for our experience.  
 
Spatial nostalgia 
Edward S. Casey asks: “are we not nostalgic about places as well as times?” 
(361). What we will refer to, when considering a spatial nostalgia, is a 
longing that is more concentrated to a place, and especially home, than an 
actual time. Still, it shares much with the memorial nostalgia in relying on 
past places. If the space is either utopian or anticipated, it will not qualify as 
spatial but rather ontological or hypothetical. 
We can long for a place, but this does not necessarily mean that the 
longing is a nostalgic one; it might be more like homesickness. Even 
homesickness can be considered as a sort of nostalgia, especially in 
conjuncture with space as time, if it is incurable. Hence, “home” and its 
connotations occupy a dear place in our nostalgic hearts, as thematized 
endlessly in literature and art. Some of the most vivid and strong nostalgic 
literature has been produced by exiled writers, who, voluntarily or not, have 
used their distance from their homes as a force or catalyst of remembrance 
and loss. In fact, most nostalgic yearnings seem to involve our homes or 
native soil in one way or another. Spatial nostalgia is the longing of exiles, 
emigrants, and refuges. 
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In order to fully understand this relationship we can briefly return to 
the original meaning of Hofer’s medical term. At first glance, the Swiss 
soldiers’ yearning for their beloved Alps seems like nothing more than 
homesickness and will not qualify as nostalgia in the modern sense. Their 
heimweh preserves the initial phase of the nostalgic reaction, with motivators 
such as milk, soup, cow bells, souvenirs, or folk music, and these motivators 
create a sense of loss and longing for their native soil. This loss and longing, 
however, is curable; once back home the strong symptoms of nostalgia 
become weak or vanish altogether. Perhaps we should benefit from 
distrusting Hofer’s analysis; maybe it really was nostalgia these soldiers 
experienced. Naturally, being in military service far from home under the 
reign of French or Spanish armies created feelings of homesickness. We can 
derive three observations from the soldiers’ experiences.  
First, in the seventeenth century space was still time, even before 
Einstein. The distance of hundreds of miles between the Swiss soldiers and 
their homes would actually equal tremendously long times in travel. If they 
stayed in military service for a long time, chances were considerable that 
there had been significant changes to their homes in family related issues 
such as births and deaths as well as other relationships such as love and 
friendship. The home they longed for was surely not the home they would 
face, but one that did not exist anymore; even though changes were not as 
rapid in those days.  
Second, the change does not only occur at home, but also in the person 
who returns. When Paul Bäumer returns to his hometown during a short 
leave from the trenches at the Western Front in Erich Maria Remarque’s Im 
Westen nichts Neues [All Quiet on the Western Front] (1929), he finds 
everything changed, when in reality it is he who is changed. 
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Finally, and most importantly, as Johannisson so thoroughly argues, 
home does not only mean the actual space where one’s family lives, but 
rather alludes to a variety of ideas and feelings such as security, identity, 
community, and belonging that have temporal implications (33). Casey 
notices that in the case of Ulysses, Ithaca is “less a particular geographical 
site […] than it is a world, a way of life, a mode of being-in-the-world” (363).  
When the Danish poet Hartvik laments on his departure from 
Copenhagen, bound on a one-way journey over the Atlantic, his words 
become emblematic of these observations. It is his home he recollects, but the 
real loss, as he already recognizes, is his youth. And if he ever returns, he 
knows he will be a different man: 
 
 Long he stands at the rail looking back. He sees the 
last glimpse of Copenhagen disappear; the green-clad 
banks of the coast glide past and are lost to view; as 
Kronborg passes he is seized by a strange melancholy, 
an oppressive sadness, which he cannot explain. 
 He knows that this is the last he will see of Denmark 
for many years, perhaps forever. 
 All the best and most glorious memories of his life 
sweep past him now – yes, even more – it is his very 
youth that calls to him and bids him farewell. 
 He clutches the rail and feel his eyes grow dim, and 
his heart swells with a hot and violent wave of longing 
– a first feeling of homesickness – the need to clasp it all 
in his embrace. (qtd. in Skårdal 65-66) 
 
If nostalgia, as Johannisson suggests, means separation, then there is no 
greater nostalgia than during times of migration and exodus.29 The evidence 
                                                
29  Johannisson enumerates several cases of migrations over the times for different reasons: 
poverty, political, religious, and ethnical persecution, industrialization and urbanization, 
wars (35). 
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of the homesickness of the exiles is endless. According to Dorothy Skårdal as 
much as three quarters of all newspaper poetry in the US in the times of 
migration were about longing for home (264). The Atlantic crossing, due to 
its perilous and expensive nature, usually meant separation from loved ones 
and home for ever. 
Nostalgia, of course, becomes stronger the more unsatisfactory the 
new situation appears in comparison with what was left. Additionally, for 
refugees, whose moves are out of necessity, the nostalgia can be graver than 
for chosen exiles such as travellers, adventurers, or emigrants. The longer the 
time that passes between the departure and the remembrance the greater the 
impossibility of a return to familiar grounds. Then, fortunately, nostalgia 
appears as a rescuing angel in the disguise of souvenirs, such as old Karl 
Oskar’s map in Vilhelm Moberg’s Sista brevet till Sverige [The Last Letter Home] 
(1959): 
 
 It was a map of Ljuder parish. It was his home 
district that was spread before him here on the blanket. 
Charles O. Nelson always had the map handy, was 
always eager to look at the thick, heavy paper with a 
miniature of his home village. […] 
 Here before him he had his whole home parish with 
well-marked borders, from Lake Laen in the north to 
Lake Loften in the south. Across this paper his index 
finger found the markings, followed the roads he once 
had walked, stopped at places he knew well, familiar 
names of farms and cottages. Here was the crossroads 
where he had danced in his youth, the grove where 
they had celebrated sunrise picnics, wastelands where 
he had hunted, lakes, rivers, and brooks where he had 
fished. He followed lines and curves, he stopped at 
squares and triangles. There was so much to look for, so 
much to find. And at each place where his finger  
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stopped his memories awakened: This was his 
childhood and youth. (212-13) 
 
Perhaps maps, what Stewart calls miniatures in their capacity to withhold 
our nostalgic desires for that “other” domestic place (37-69), play an 
important part as memorative representative souvenirs in recalling places 
rather than times, and it does not matter if they are maps, photos of places, or 
other kinds of microcosms.  
The longing for the lost home, in its internal context is a wish to return 
to something real and biographical. This impulse might be a self-deceiving 
one, since places and people change, even if we don’t consciously think they 
do. An important distinction has to be made: when the return home cures the 
symptoms of loss and longing and when separation becomes unification, it 
has to be called homesickness and not nostalgia because one of the 
fundamental aspects of the nostalgic experience is its incurability. We have 
seen that the basic motifs of a nostalgic experience reside already here: the 
motivations, the dissatisfaction with the present situation in a clearly defined 
now and then, and melancholia triggered by separation and distance. Even 
though the home is a geographical place, it also has emotional connotations. 
These connotations are still connected to the individual’s history and life, 
internalized as such, but can also be of a more symbolic, metaphysical 
character as we will discover when we discuss the metaphysical external 
nostalgia later.  
 
Hypothetical Nostalgia 
Dissolution of time, as we will see in the poem “A Une Passante” and the 
future-oriented nostalgia in Der Zauberberg, is an essence of nostalgia since 
the nostalgic experience and its melancholia rest upon the fact that the 
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present is the past of the future; that our experiences, feelings, and thoughts 
during the course of a split second irrevocably belong to history. This 
dissolution of time we would like to call hypothetical time, borrowing the term 
from Gary Saul Morson: “In hypothetical time, the entire sequence of past, 
present, and future comes for one reason or another to seem insubstantial. It 
is as if real time were in some other dimension, to which we have no access; 
as if our lives were a dream and real life were something we can only dream 
of” (214). The dissolution of time is also the core of Mark Currie’s book About 
Time: Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time (1997) where he argues for a 
future-oriented un-tensed time which is not based on the distinction between 
past, present, and future in favour of a more traditional tensed time (15). The 
hypothetical a-temporal quality of nostalgia can sometimes coexist with the 
use of less time specific descriptions of the past such as “the good old days” 
or “our time at college.” 
The title of Boym’s book is The Future of Nostalgia and one of her theses 
is that our present is, in fact, a direct result of our past dreams or past 
generations’ dreams: “Nostalgia is not always about the past; it can be 
retrospective but also prospective. Fantasies of the past determined by needs 
of the present have a direct impact on realities of the future” (Boym xvi). If 
we are reminded of this fact, that our present is the past of the future, we can 
feel nostalgic about a present moment before it actually becomes a past 
moment. Boym uses as an example Baudelaire’s poem “A Une Passante” [“In 
Passing”] from Les Fleurs du Mal [Flowers of Evil] (1857) about “love at last 
sight”30, where the narrator passes a woman and later regrets what could 
have been: “Elsewhere! Too far, too late, or never at all! / Of me you know 
nothing, I nothing of you – you / whom I might have loved and who knew it 
                                                
30  Coined by Walter Benjamin. 
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too!” (Baudelaire, Le Fleurs de Mal 98). It is a present moment but “might 
have loved” includes first future tense and then past tense at the same time; 
it is nostalgia not for the future, nor for the past, but for the possibilities of 
the present. 
 Less a-temporal, still hypothetical, is the nostalgia in Hans Castorp’s 
introspection in Thomas Mann’s Der Zauberberg [The Magic Mountain] (1924): 
 
But on the whole he was sound and fit, an adequate 
tennis player and rower; though actually handling the 
oars was less to his taste than sitting of a summer 
evening on the terrace of the Uhlenhorst ferry-house, 
with a good drink before him and the sound of music in 
his ears, while he watched the lighted boats, and the 
swans mirrored in the bright water. (29) 
 
The nostalgia is echoed in the summer with distant music and swans in the 
water, but there is also something nostalgic about his anticipation of a future 
voyage stimulated by the boats. I think we can find this peculiar version of 
nostalgia when we wait in places of transition such as harbours, airports, and 
train stations. Perhaps it is connected to the romantic idea about the poetic 
journey away (as opposed to the journey home) as means of distantly 
observing the passage of time. Or is it the actual symbols of transition and 
movement that encourage one to anticipate the future of nostalgia? 
The journey away touches upon the idea of the disillusioned present, 
just like the journey home.  It is usually considered the opposite of nostalgia 
and is termed apodemialgia, derived from the Greek words apo (away) and 
demios (people), and with the same ending as in nostalgia, algia (pain). The 
equivalence in German is fernweh. In English we have not yet coined a term 
for this experience. However, as we have argued, we should not look at 
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apodemialgia as the opposite of nostalgia but rather as a version of nostalgia. 
We categorize hypothetical nostalgia as internal, even though strictly 
speaking it is not part of a person’s biography. It is easy to parallel the 
dissolution of time, or future-oriented anticipations, with myths, utopias or 
fictional objects of nostalgia, or what we call external nostalgia. However, we 
think the nature of the hypothetical nostalgia is that it includes not elements 
of fantasy or illusions but rather a time in or out of one’s own perceptive 
limitations. The “love at last sight” is triggered by a factual meeting, a 
personal encounter. Likewise, Hans Carstorp’s shipping dreams are within 





As we have been arguing, the past of our nostalgic experience does not have 
to be personal. Thousands of Swedes yearn for the Christmas portrayed in 
Ingmar Bergman’s Fanny och Alexander [Fanny and Alexander] (1982) when 
they watch it on television every year, yet it is a Christmas that never existed, 
neither in reality nor in the living experience of the audience. It is more of a 
“Victorian” dream, but as such it still manages to create a mood of nostalgia 
for those who watch it; it is the Christmas par excellence. This is pseudo-
memorial nostalgia. 
The external past of a pseudo-memorial nostalgic experience is a past 
that does not belong to the nostalgee’s own life history. It is not a complete 
fantasy, because then we will call it a metaphysical past. It is a “real” past, 
just not a past experienced by the nostalgee, such as a nostalgia for the age of 
Napoleon or Antiquity. 
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However, one can argue that the past of a film is not a “real” past, but 
a constructed one. If we yearn for a past that is not our own, it is rarely a past 
that has any foundation in somebody else’s true memory, but rather a past 
constructed through different media whether those are film or historical 
accounts. The difference between the metaphysical and pseudo-memorial 
past is the degree of possibility that this is the way the past once looked. 
As noted, there is no consensus as to whether the external past has the 
capacity to be a nostalgia or not, but the significant problems are rather 
problems of historicity. In reconstructing the past, questions of who and why 
emerge together with the reality of this past. “The list is not a list of facts or 
historical realities (although its items are not invented and are in some sense 
‘authentic’),” Jameson writes in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism, “but rather a list of stereotypes, of ideas of facts and historical 
realities” (279). This is why we choose to call this nostalgia pseudo-memorial, 
since it has the capacity of inflicting itself together with a true personal 
memory; who knows in the end what actually is a memory or pseudo-
memory? The use of clichés and stereotypes is important in falsifying and 
exaggerating our own memories and in idealizing the past. Perhaps the 
idealization is the core of the pseudo-memorial experience, since it has to 
both convince the nostalgee that this is almost an experienced memory and 
reinforce the marketing values included in its commercial use. In terms of life 




Metaphysical external nostalgia is a nostalgia where the object of nostalgia is 
grounded in human existence but used metaphorically or symbolically to 
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convey a bigger idea – a metaphysical idea, a melancholic state of mind in 
relation to death versus life. This is a kind of nostalgia we encounter in 
Gray’s “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard”: 
 
Beneath those rugged elms, that yew-tree’s shade, 
Where heaves the turf in many a moul’ring heap, 
Each in his narrow cell for ever laid, 
The rude Forefathers of the hamlet sleep. 
 
The breezy call of incense-breathing Morn, 
The swallow twitt’ring from the straw-built shed, 
The cock’s shrill clarion, or the echoing horn, 
No more shall rouse them from their lowly bed. (112) 
 
This attitude played an exceptional part in the poetry and theories of the 
romantics. Santesso writes that “the history of nostalgia in eighteenth-
century poetry suggests that nostalgia, then and now, is not a desire for the 
past per se; nor is it ever an emotion rooted in empirical reality or concrete 
autobiography. Rather, it is a longing for objects that are idealized, 
impersonal, and unattainable” (16). There is a link between the individual’s 
life story, in the sense that the metaphors used mostly are derived from 
vague, not exact, situations such as childhood, birth, spring. Therefore, the 
externality of the nostalgia sometimes borders, or commingles, with internal 
memories.  
As we have seen with the anti-progress quality of the internal 
memorial nostalgia, the metaphorical external nostalgia resembles it in its 
sadness about the irreversibility of time. For Johannisson, the difference 
between the two regarding this shift is that the romantics31 tend to see 
                                                
31  Johannisson refers mostly to German Romanticism and writers such as Novalis and 
Heinrich Heine. Boym also speaks of the German romantics, usually the early Sturm und 
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nostalgia as “an existential basic condition, colored by melancholia, which is 
about everything’s mortality, the constant present loss” (23). The places of 
Hofer’s homesickness became the metaphysical places of our inner lives and 
as such resemble the Greek particular of nostalgia, named pothos – a return to 
metaphysical origins (Casey 370).  
As nostalgia changed from a space to a time, it also became more 
external in the sense that the symbols and metaphors of the artists became 
conventions of nostalgia rather than the earlier internal memorials of true 
biography or space. These conventions are mostly universal but we observe, 
for example, an alternation in the symbols of home depending on our 
culture: for the Russians it seems like home is their soil, the Scandinavians 
prefer nature, and the Americans prefer the family (Johannisson 33). 
 This does not mean that the experience in itself becomes more 
externalized, but rather the opposite; the romantics favoured a 
correspondence between these conventions and the inner landscape of 
humans; it was just that these conventions were more universal. Boym makes 
a division between Enlightenment’s Universality and the romantics 
obsessions with the particular (11-12). It is true that the romantics became 
interested in local manners, folk songs, traditions, and the particularity of 
local cultures and later in primitivism. They used this particularity indeed to 
create a universal nostalgia by conventionalize these particulars into symbols 
that were used and reused in art. Boym also confirms this, and emphasizes 
the importance of distance in evaluating the particular: “It is the romantic 
traveler who sees from a distance the wholeness of the vanishing world. The 
journey gives him perspective. The vantage point of a stranger informs the 
                                                                                                                                     
Drang movement and their reaction to the age of Enlightenment. However, the idea of 
universal nostalgia (below) is equally applicable to the English romantics as 
demonstrated by Santesso (see page 243). 
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native idyll. The nostalgic is never a native but a displaced person who 
mediates between the local and the universal” (12).  Initiated by Rousseau’s 
savage, “Home” became either a longing for a prior existence before the age 
of revolution and industrialization, or in Hart’s words: “The nostalgic return 
to childhood is a return to the aurora of springtime, the dawn of hope” (408).  
This means that in metaphysical nostalgia we experience a strong 
interest in the unspoiled and natural child or a world associated with this 
child’s innocence and freedom. It also signifies symbolically a return to 
nature, with the consequence of celebrating the beauty and magic of the 
cosmos. In its most radical interpretation, it also means a Freudian desire to 
return to the mother or the womb.  
Gregory Nagy tracks the origins of the Greek nostos back to the Indo-
European root nes, which means return to light and life, and interprets 
Odysseus’ return to Ithaca as a metaphor about human fate, human loss and 
renewal: “the theme of Odysseus’s descent and subsequent nostos (return) 
from Hades converges with the solar dynamics of sunset and sunrise. The 
movement is from dark to light, from unconsciousness to consciousness. In 
fact the hero is asleep as he floats in darkness to his homeland and sunrise 
comes precisely when his boat reaches the shores of Ithaca.” (219).  
 
Ontological Nostalgia 
There is another space/time for longing that we categorize as a utopian, 
mythical or fictive time outside the temporal reality. Hart notes that the 
“character of the nostalgic world resembles the time of the mythic world” 
(406-07). Hart continues by naming these utopian and mythical nostalgic 
places “ontological” (408), a term very suitable for a nostalgia that is 
preoccupied with “the other world” or another temporality. The utopian time 
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corresponds with the mythical time in the sense of its idealized character and 
its escapism. “The time of the mythic world is that of the founding powers 
and deeds of the great supernatural beings whose activities are the 
exemplary model for all significant human activities […] It is a time which is 
generally designated as golden and paradisal because all idealizations of the 
actual present are there realized” (Hart 411). As found in metaphysical 
nostalgia, these paradises are often heavily idealized to contrast with reality. 
An example is found in Roy Orbison’s popular song Blue Bayou: 
 
I’m going back some day, gonna stay on Blue Bayou 
Where the folks are fine and the world is mine on 
Blue Bayou 
Oh, that girl of mine by my side the silver moon and 
the evening tide 
Oh, some sweet day gonna take away this hurting 
Inside 
I’ll never be blue, my dreams come true on Blue 
Bayou. 
 
 Here the “folks are fine” and “dreams come true.” As derived from the 
meaning of utopia, the ontological universe is the perfect universe. 
Other paradises exist as well. We can observe it in the religious 
literature of Romanticism where a longing for home is interchanged with 
longing for paradise. Johannisson exemplifies this with a quote from the 
German mystic Heinrich Jung-Stillung’s novel Homesickness: “Blest be those 
who have homesickness, for they shall come home” (qtd. in Johannisson 22). 
 In utopia we find a sort of pastness as is seen in the biblical paradise 
with its references to Eden, the Greeks’ and Romans’ desire for their Golden 
Age, the Aztecs’ wish for the return of their God, and Ancient peoples’ 
conceptions of Elysium. In the utopian ideal of the future, an aspect of the 
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virginal dreams of the past always resides, involving a return to myths or a 
former culture prior to industrialization such as the Middle Ages or 
Antiquity. In a sense, this contradicts the ideas of linear time, since many of 
these myths rely on the circularity of connecting origins with endings. 
Ontological nostalgia shares much with some of the essentials of 
nostalgia: a wish for immortality and the disillusionment of the present. 
Sylvia Mary Darton writes in Nostalgia for Paradise (1965) that the “memory of 
a ‘lost’ paradise’ has never ceased to haunt the minds of men, arousing in 
them a mysterious ‘nostalgia’, a longing for some perfection, some 
happiness, freedom and complete sense of well being of which it feels itself 
to have been deprived” (13). 
In the worlds of ontological nostalgia, we encounter reused symbols 
that are derived from the different paradise myths: the tree, the river, water 
in general, and the garden. Many of these symbols are to be seen in the 
metaphysical nostalgia as well. 
The fictional universes of film or literature can be seen in a strict sense 
as ontological and can be objects for longing. If these fictive worlds are more 
or less realistic, they can be considered as being part of establishing pseudo-
memories. However, if they have more fantastic or science-fictive ambitions, 
such as Middle Earth in Tolkien’s fantasies, they seem to be more ontological 
in the sense that they border with ideas of myth. 
The ontological nostalgias have a-temporal qualities since they are 
outside clock time and temporally vague. They are perhaps more related to 
the early notions of nostalgia, where, as we have seen, space was more 






The Bittersweet Reflective Phase 
Nostalgia could be envisioned as a bonbon with a sweet cover and a 
bitter core, and if we suck it long enough we will experience a 
transition from sweet to bitter, which concludes in the melancholic 
bittersweet. The bittersweet conclusion is the reflective phase in the 
nostalgic reaction. 
 The reflective phase is in many ways a counter procedure to the two 
earlier phases. It is in this phase that nostalgia gains its unique set of 
qualities. It is a bipolarity of oppositions that create that particular nostalgic 
feeling and separates it from memory. Boym brilliantly conceives this 
bipolarity as a cinematic double exposure or “a superimposition of two 
images – of home and abroad, past and present, dream and everyday life” 
(xiii-xiv). Stewart, in her analyses of the souvenir points out most 
importantly that it is in “the gap between resemblance and identity that 
nostalgic desire arises. The nostalgic is enamored of distance, not of the 
referent itself. Nostalgia cannot be sustained without loss” (Stewart 145). 
Starobinski equally considers the relation of the referent “to a partial 
presence which causes one to experience, with pleasure and pain, the 
imminence and the impossibility of complete restoration of this universe 
which emerges fleetingly from oblivion” (Starobinski 93). 
Besides the gap between the reality of the referent and the loss of 
nostalgia we find, in the transition from happiness of the selected memory to 
the melancholia of its reflective phase, Starobinski’s “pleasure and pain.”  
If we consider the illustration of The Nature of Emotions (below) by Robert 
Plutchik, we realize that this feeling of contrasting emotions is supported by 
 145 
Plutchik’s positioning of feelings in his wheel of nature of emotions. The 
emotions on one side of the wheel correspond with the ones that are its 
neighbours and contrast with the ones on the opposite side. The warm 
emotions of the nostalgia, serenity, joy, and ecstasy are all contrasted with the 
cold emotions that arise out of the reflective part: grief, sadness, and 




Fig. 6. The Nature of Emotions by Robert Plutchik. 
 
Similarly, the nostalgic experience dwells on the antagonism between 
two temporal states, the present and the other. The reaction is triggered 
within the present state, and, at least partly and subconsciously, triggered as 
a reaction to the present state, whether it is dissatisfaction, fear, or general 
unpleasantness. The present state then gives way to the nostalgia of another 
temporality, which contrasts in many ways, through idealization or selection 
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with the present. We can speak of a distinct now and then (deliberately 
vague) or perhaps even a here and there. 
The emotional strength of the reflection is really what Davis touches 
upon when he divides the nostalgic experience into three categories: “Simple 
Nostalgia,” Reflexive Nostalgia,” and “Interpreted Nostalgia” (17-26) where 
the order of them signifies their quantative aspects. The “Simple Nostalgia” 
is uncritically enhanced by the “‘Beautiful Past’” and the “‘Unattractive 
Present’” (18). The emotional response is strong. The reflexive nostalgic 
experience is still an emotional one, but it is contrasted by a certain critical 
consciousness about the idealized past (21). Finally, “Interpreted Nostalgia” 
creates a problem with the whole emotional reaction by objectifying and de-
romanticizing it (24). The ascending order of the three categories suggests a 
shift from emotional to intellectual response. To simplify, a nostalgic person 
would supposedly be inclined to “Simple Nostalgia” whereas the sceptic 
more towards “Interpreted Nostalgia.” This division is interesting, but I 
think it has several faults. “Simple Nostalgia” is an experience, but the 
experience of nostalgia is not complete, when it lacks the reflective aspect. It 
is more like the French moment bienheureux, which means a “very happy, or 
blissful” memory. “Interpreted Nostalgia” is also not a complete experience, 
since it denies its object an emotional response. “Reflexive Nostalgia,” 
however, agrees more with what we consider a nostalgic experience. The 
unreflective memory, the “idealized” sensation and longing for the past, has 
to be contrasted with the notion of this past’s non capturable and fleeting 
character. Otherwise, we could not call the experience bittersweet.  
Instead of Davis’ division, we would like to talk about a basic 
nostalgic reaction and a complex one, considering a spread from one to the 
other in the intensity of the reflective phase. The more complex the reaction 
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is, the longer its duration. A basic nostalgic experience will have a short but 
strong emotional impact, whereas a more complex one might have a longer 
nostalgic phase with a more consequential reflection. To me a basic reflection 
seems to keep the joyfulness from the nostalgia better than the more complex 
ones. 
In tracking the actions of the phases of motivation and nostalgia, there is 
much in common with a plain joyful memory, except that it does not always 
have to be a memory. It is the last leg, the reflective part, of the nostalgic 
reaction that makes it nostalgic. The nostalgic experience is concluded by a 
combination of reflection upon the place or time for the longing (the 
nostalgia) in relation to its demise, and the unique affection of loss and 




The Nostalgic Mood 
 
Hart writes that, even though death is not considered part of nostalgia it is 
nevertheless related “to times recalled by nostalgia, because it is the most 
complete expression that these golden times are irretrievably lost to us” 
(407). It is peculiar that Freud’s oeuvre is remarkably devoid of explicit 
mention of nostalgia, even though its main focus is of the personal past’s 
importance in our presence.32 It seems, like Casey suggests, that nostalgia 
                                                
32  According to Casey, the only time Freud uses a word in family with nostalgia is in the 
Appendix A to “The Interpretation of Dreams” in the Standard Edition: “She may then 
have quite well had a nostalgic dream one night which took her back to the old days” 
(Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams” 624). However, Freud wrote this essay already 10 
November 1899 and in the German original he does not, as the English translation 
suggests, use the words “nostalgic dream” but “sehnsuchtstraum” which corresponds 
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“has been driven into the underworld of the unconscious, where it survives 
under the metapsychological rubric of ‘internalization.’” ( 371). However 
interesting Casey’s study is in explaining the link between Freud’s theories of 
regression and fixation33, Casey’s theories seem, in their total dependence on 
the unconscious, to be relatively far from how we see nostalgic emotion but 
closer to that of nostalgic mood. 
 In comparison to nostalgic emotion, nostalgic mood is less cognitive 
and more of a subtle background state, which means that we experience a 
sensation or sensations. These might very well be complex and physical, but 
the actual chain of emotional and cognitive events, such as described in the 
nostalgic reaction, is incomplete. There will be a motivator of some sort, but 
in the nostalgic emotion this motivator can be either voluntary or involuntary 
whereas the motivator in the nostalgic mood is undeniably involuntary. In 
the nostalgic mood there is more of a sense of flow or gradual awareness of a 
state of affection. I think, in most cases though, the motivators described 
before will be suitable also in the case of nostalgic mood. The most important 
difference is the lack of an obvious nostalgia, an object for the nostalgic 
experience. During a nostalgic emotion we often quite clearly can specify 
what we are nostalgic about. This appears more diffuse in the event of 
nostalgic mood, probably due to the lower cognitive aspect of the experience. 
However, there is great deal of overlap between emotion and mood and no 
real consensus on how to use the terms. The most common definition is that 
                                                                                                                                     
more generally to a dream of longing for something (Freud, “Eine ertsällte Traum 
ahnung” 22). 
33  Additionally, Freud regards the past as a burden, or oppression, requiring liberation 
whereas admirers of nostalgia sees the past as liberating from the oppressed presence. 
Nevertheless, Freud’s ideas might play a significant part of the total complexity of the 




mood usually implies a longer time than an emotion and is of a lower 
intensity. A typical example is that of feeling fear (emotion) when seeing a 
dog rapidly approaching and being in a state of anxiety (mood) for a while 
after the dog has disappeared (Thayer 14).  We will, however, not judge 
emotions or mood in aspects of time or intensity, since we believe that moods 
can occur in quite small temporal segments and that valuing the intensity of 
an experience is both a fragile business and not necessary for our needs. In 
order to simplify things, we will use the term mood when a nostalgic 
experience is lacking a conscious motivator, a precisely defined nostalgia and 
a cognitive reflection.34 Just as in the story of the dog, there might be a 
correlation between nostalgic emotions and moods in the sense that a 
nostalgic mood is triggered by a nostalgic emotion. 
The affective content of the nostalgic mood is very similar to what is 
gained from the dualism of emotions discussed earlier, the bittersweet 
mixture of joy and sadness with an emphasis on one of them that constitutes 
whether the mood is positive or negative. This might seem to contrast 
research that shows that we often speak of mood as being either “good” or 
“bad” as in being in a good or bad mood (Thayer 15). If we connect this to 
the positive or negative general interpretation of the mood this opinion still 
seems valid, but what about the two contrasting emotions? One of Robert E. 
Thayer’s main theories about moods is that they are indeed built up of a 
combination and interaction of two separate moods, what he names energetic 
and tense moods (110-36). Overtly simplified, the energetic mood 
(positive/high arousal) tends to activate the person and the tense mood 
(negative/low arousal) to calm him. The multidimensional arousal model, as 
                                                
34  There are several studies that show that moods are not as separated from thinking as 
might be expected. See Nowlis and Green (1965) and McNair, Lorr & Droppleman (1971). 
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presented by Thayer, allows for a complex interaction of these apparent 
contrasting emotional states. One of Thayer’s examples accounts for exactly 
this: “A continuing state of high anxiety would certainly characterize high 
arousal, and yet the fatigue and tiredness that usually reflect low arousal 
states is also found in these cases” (115). Although nostalgia is not an anxiety, 
it seems probable that we can apply Thayer’s model also on that of nostalgic 
mood. 
Nostalgia is inevitably tied to a personal teleological, entropic idea 
that the progress of our lives must end in death. The sense of the nostalgic 
mood is much the one of carpe diem. Nostalgia is not fear of the present: it is 
fear of death. Our longing back into the past corresponds with our futile 
endeavours to slow down the life process or retard our eschatology. 
Hutcheon clearly distinguishes this aspect of nostalgia as “an attempt to defy 
the end, to evade teleology” (“Nostalgia, and the Postmodern”). To travel 
back into our subjective time is an uprising against mechanical clock time. Of 
course, the futility of the project unfolds when we discover that it does not 
help; this is the bitter part of the nostalgic experience. 
The dualism of Nostalgia, as described above, corresponds well with 
Freud’s polarities between life instincts and death instincts (Freud, “Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle” 53). The play between pleasure, Eros, and death, 
Thanatos, harmonizes with the two last phases of the nostalgic reaction. The 
joyfulness (defeating the irreversibility of time, the idealized or selected 
memory, the life strengthening aspects of the nostalgia) seems to parallel that 
of the Freudian pleasure principle. Simultaneously, the return to origins can 
also be integrated in the death drive. Freud writes, backing his observation 
with the biological science of the times that “the aim of all life is death” and 
that “organic life [strives] to restore an earlier state of things” (Freud, 
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“Beyond the Pleasure Principle” 38, 36). He continues by quoting 
Schopenhauer’s famous remark that death is the “true result and to that 
extent the purpose of life” (qtd. in Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” 
50). 
The dualism between death and life is also observed by Ann C. Colley 
in Nostalgia and Recollection in Victorian Culture (1998) where she connects it to 
the myth of Orpheus: 
 
It is as if nostalgia roams between the tenor of death 
and the vehicle of life. Like Orpheus, nostalgia attempts 
to recover what darkness imprisons so that it might 
lead what is lost back towards the light of the living 
present. Nostalgia charms death with its bitter-sweet 
melodies […] But, as Orpheus learns, nostalgia can 
never completely resurrect what it releases. The past 
can never join the present. […] Nostalgia, therefore, 
continually repeats Orpheus’s journey and, thus, knows 
a double death. (209) 
 
In the nostalgic experience it is the knowledge of our short time, in 
combination with the strong notion of extinction that initiates the stout 
sadness of lost time. It can only be regained in our subjective minds, but that 
is not satisfactory. 
The strange sadness of nostalgic mood is seen in Freud’s distinction 
between mourning and melancholia: mourning is the loss of something real, 
a person, a place or something equivalent, and it heals in course of time – 
melancholia is the loss of something abstract and time won’t heal it (Freud, 
“Mourning and Melancholia” 237-60). In a contradictory way, the abstraction 
of death embraces life in the nostalgic mood experience. And despite all the  
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The Nostalgic Fictive Experience 
 
 
The Nostalgic Fictive Experience 
 We have agreed that narrative art, in its capacity to evoke emotions, and 
nostalgia should be considered experiences. Can we then speak of a nostalgic 
fictive experience? Certainly, and the fusion between nostalgic experience 
and fictive experience is the foundation of this thesis. The use of the word 
fictive should not diminish either its importance or its capacity to evoke 
emotions, as we have seen in our discussion about the paradox of fiction.  
 Paul Grainge makes a distinction between “nostalgia mood” and 
“nostalgic mode.” This distinction should not be confused with the way we 
defined nostalgia as emotion and mood in chapter two, but rather as a way of 
dividing the theoretical approach to nostalgia. “The nostalgia mood 
articulates a concept of experience,” writes Grainge, where “nostalgia is 
understood as a socio-cultural response to forms of discontinuity, claiming a 
vision of stability and authenticity in some conceptual ‘golden age.’ This 
approximates the conventional sense of nostalgia as a yearning” (21). 
Nostalgic mode, on the other hand, “articulates a concept of style, a 
representational effect with implications for our cultural experience of the 
past” (21). Nostalgic mode is derived from Fredric Jameson’s interests in 
nostalgia as a symptom of commodification and lack of historicity in the 
postmodern society (Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism 19-20). Since nostalgic mood is based on the very experience of the 
nostalgee, its essential quality, according to Grainge, deals with loss (21). 
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Nostalgic mode then is not preoccupied with the actual nostalgic feelings 
people may experience, but only in the way nostalgia functions in a wider 
contextual perspective. The emphasis on nostalgic mode as a matter of 
aesthetic style is confusing, since concepts of style should be valid also in 
studies of private experiences in art. Furthermore, not all style is working 
within the framework of political or commercial interests. Still, the 
distinction provided by Grainge can be useful in illustrating the focus of this 
thesis.  
 The key is which question should be answered: the why, or the how? 
Even if Jameson’s ideas about nostalgia are confined to postmodern times 
(the idea of how rapid change in our society evokes an interest in the 
recycled past), they are valid beyond the postmodern era as well. They can 
equally include the extreme changes of urbanization, migration, and 
industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century and some way into the 
twentieth. If the question we desire to answer would be why there are very 
many texts that are nostalgic in the modern period, then nostalgic mode 
would bring an external perspective to the analysis. How did the modernists 
react to these rapid changes, to the First World War, to the new theories of 
Einstein, Bergson, and Freud? In what ways did they provide the audience 
with an emotional quality such as stability or hermetic space through their 
use of nostalgia? These are not the questions that we are concerned with. 
Again, since we are speaking of nostalgic fictive experience, we are first and 
foremost engaged in how certain texts evoke nostalgia in readers. Hence, we 
are concerned with nostalgic mood, but modified to also incorporate ideas of 
style and aesthetics. Most of our examples, but not exclusively, date from a 
time that generally is considered modernism, since this was indeed a time 
when writers deeply engaged themselves in theories of nostalgia. Looking at 
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experience means that we abandon any interests in the political and social 
ways that nostalgia interacts with art, such as Jameson’s critical political 
perspective on the matter or how the idea of nostalgia has fluctuated through 
history. Furthermore, we will not be bothering with whether a specific author 
was especially inclined to nostalgia, nor how the public responded to these 
nostalgic texts. These texts will be used to evaluate how a nostalgic poetics 
could possibly work from our rather limited perspective. This possibly means 
that a poetics of nostalgia might look quite differently if somebody with 
other cultural backgrounds would look at other kind of texts. We can 
presume that certain nostalgic devices will be universal, but others might be 
very provincial. Neither can we be assured that the contemporary readers of 
these texts responded in the same way as we do now. Limitations are 
necessary when dealing with emotions and art, since these emotions are all 
private experiences in the end, even though we will be using objective tools 
and a competent reader. The private nature of these experiences, and the 
analysis of them, should provide a method that also will be useful for 
analyzing emotions in new perspectives. Once again, we must emphasize 
that we are dealing with possibilities and probabilities rather than poetic 
truths. 
On a general note, much of the methodology we worked out in 
chapter one is still valid also in our exploration of nostalgic experience in 
fiction: first, we must understand what nostalgia is and how it operates 
before we can investigate what it is in the texts that make us feel nostalgic. 
Chapter two dissected the nostalgic experience in detail; still it would be 
informative to summarize its essence in order to more firmly establish what 
exactly we are looking for. Just like we noticed, in more general words about 
emotions and art in chapter one, the different and complicated relationships 
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between author-text-audience have to be nuanced and configured to fit 
nostalgia, and we have to pinpoint what exactly it is in this experience that 
we must focus on. We will do this in close collaboration with an analysis of 
the different ways to approach nostalgia in a comparative examination of 
two films: George Lucas’ American Graffiti (1973) and Peter Bogdanovich’s The 
Last Picture Show (1971). Although not literature, they are in fact a form of 
fictional narratives and thus appropriate for a general analysis. They are also, 
in their capacity as visual arts, easier to relate to in this initial stage. Then, 
finally, we will close in on literary fiction and draw the maps for our 
exploration of specific literary nostalgic experiences. 
 
The Essence of Nostalgia 
In a strict sense, there are two crucial definitions of nostalgia: one has to do 
with the dichotomy of now and then (and more spatially here and there), and 
the other is concerned with universal grief, the fear of death and progress. 
The nostalgic efforts from fiction are all based on either one of these or on a 
set of variations and combinations of them. 
 The opening sentence in the second chapter of Stephen King’s “The 
Body” reads as follows: “We had a treehouse in a big elm which overhung a 
vacant lot in Castle Rock” (293). The use of past tense clearly signals a then, 
something that happened subsequent from the narrative point. Is it 
nostalgic? Hardly, but perhaps the image of a tree house sparks a few 
internal nostalgic memories in readers. It is definitely a memory, a past. 
There is, in a sense, a now as well, since we know through the past tense that 
it is narrated from a fictive now. The next sentence though adds a clear now 
to the experience and adds a valuation: “There’s a moving company on that 
lot today, and the elm is gone” (293). The now of narration is also a time 
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when the dreams of childhood have vanished physically; gone is the tree and 
the innocence of childhood. There is something, although not explicitly 
expressed, sad about this change. The tree house is something positive, the 
change into a moving company signals regret and sad sentiments, a loss both 
physically and symbolically. The emotions of the two sentences are then 
made explicit through the single word that follows: “Progress” (293). I think 
this constitutes the absolute essentials of nostalgia, the clearly defined and 
juxtaposed now and then, where the valuation of the then is that something 
was lost in the past through time’s progress into the now. Even though the 
narrator does not spell out that he is nostalgic, we as readers certainly 
interpret his narration as sad. 
The idea that universal grief is more a mood than an emotion takes the 
idea of the “evil progress” further. It does not necessarily need the 
dichotomy of past and present in order to communicate the essential lack of 
meaning in life. Rather, it tries to abolish the sense of temporality: the present 
is the past of the future. This grief is a sense of Nietzschean nihilism and 
entropy where nothing has any value anymore. It is a fleeting mood, a 
consciousness without time. The idea of carpe diem encourages this mood, 
because the reason we want to live in our present is because life is short and 
we are soon fertilizing worms. And although this seems to encourage the 
negative aspect of nihilism, it is the actual nihilism that triggers the idea of 
living in the moment since nothing else is important, neither our future nor 
our past.  We will call this way of looking at the loss of temporality 
hypothetical nostalgia (see page 134) and it will be discussed in detail later.  
The essence of nostalgia will found the basis for most of the 
discussions that occur in chapters four through six. 
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The Non-Textual Nostalgia 
First we must dismiss one aspect of nostalgia and art from our analytical 
approach – that of non-textual nostalgia. Perhaps the most common relation 
between art and nostalgia is when art is working as a motivator for nostalgic 
reactions. We hear tunes that spark nostalgic reactions because we either 
remember what we did when we heard these songs before, or they remind us 
more generally of a certain time of our lives. There is perhaps not so much 
nostalgic about the songs themselves; they become more of time markers or 
time machines. As an example, imagine that we are watching American 
Graffiti (1973) in a small art house cinema in 2012, and it gives us a nostalgic 
experience. Hypothetically, what are the specifics of our particular 
experience? Well, it is possible that it triggers memories of a previous 
viewing, that either contains something lost from that screening (girlfriend, 
friend, even a personal item, a cinema that has been demolished, a certain 
person at the box office, a janitor, a smell, the taste of that popcorn, or the 
particular snow that fell that evening) or a more contextual memory (that 
city, our family, our youth, the work we had then, our student friends, our 
car: actually anything from the era of the previous viewing). It can also be 
triggered through epiphenomena, such as the poster outside, reviews, 
conversations before about the film, trailers and other advertisements. In this 
sense, there is nothing about the filmic text itself that works as a memorative 
sign; it is external sources of the art that trigger nostalgic reactions. It could 
have been any film really. This nostalgia is naturally internal, since it relates 
to our own biography, but at the same time it relates to the externality of the 
text, since it is not the text itself that is responsible for the experience. This 
would constitute the category 15 that we laid out in chapter one, “Audience  
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experience emotions not through the text but the actual experience” and will not be 
valuable in our analysis of nostalgic experiences since it is too private. 
 
Nostalgic Experience through the Text 
When we have decided to focus on the text, there are several aspects of 
nostalgic reactions to texts that have to be considered. First, we still have to 
deal with the difference between internal and external nostalgia. Second, we 
have to discuss which part of the textual nostalgia should be our main 
concern; the representational or the aesthetic.   
 
Internal and External Nostalgic Fictive Experiences 
The idea of a division of emotions between internal and external might seem 
oddly novel, although the issue of the paradox of fiction touches implicitly 
on the subject. If we connect this discussion to that of internal/external 
nostalgia, an internal emotion would be an emotion that is closely connected 
to one’s biography, whereas an external emotion would be one that is 
triggered through art but which does not, in an obvious way, work in ways of 
private and personal experience. Perhaps this is purely theoretical; is there 
any emotion that we feel that is not in some way connected to our history 
and experience? Maybe the overt physical ones. However, nostalgia, as we 
have seen, works differently since it can both be connected to our own past 
(internal) and with fantasies about another time and place (external), such as 
the ontological nostalgia. Are they separable and is this distinction 
important? Of course, if we are to develop our nostalgic poetics we cannot 
totally depend on private experience only and our ideas about emotions and 
aesthetics would be disqualified. Let us look at the categories we constructed  
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in chapter one that clarified the different attitudes between audience, text 
and author: 
 
10 – Audience experience emotions through the text 
that are part of the fictive world (diegetic) and also in 
line with the author’s intentions. 
 
11 – Audience experience emotions through the text 
that are part of the fictive world (diegetic) but not in line 
with the author’s intentions. 
 
12 – Audience experience emotions through the text 
that are not part of the fictive world (non-diegetic) but 
in line with the author’s intentions. 
 
13 - Audience experience emotions through the text that 
are not part of the fictive world (non-diegetic) and not in 
line with the author’s intentions. 
 
14 – Audience experience emotions through the text in 
correlation with extra-textual knowledge. 
 
Categories 10 and 11 are quite straightforward; if we feel nostalgic about the 
text, it does not matter if it is within the author’s intentions or not. Since the 
nostalgic emotions in these categories are working within the fictive world 
they will be what we name external. Category 14 circles the need for the 
competent reader that we discussed in chapter one. That leaves us category 
12 and 13. 
Category 12 would point at the sort of internal nostalgic experience 
that is still triggered intentionally by the author whereas category 13 entails 
the sort of private, internal nostalgia that is impossible to trace except in 
individual cases and thus is not interesting to us. Therefore, only category 12 
is important to us.  
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I would like to distinguish between two different types of internal 
nostalgia. One is inherently private and entails specific biographic memories: 
my wedding, my first football match, and fishing with Dad. However, there 
is also another kind of internal nostalgia that is less private, but still within 
biography, such as weddings, the first time I did something, and moments 
with your parents. As we see, these are still biographical but less specific and 
more contextual. These kinds of internal nostalgias, on the other hand, 
should be available for our analytical process, especially since we have noted 
that it is of interest to study how art intentionally triggers internal nostalgia. 
Furthermore, the more contextual internal nostalgia is easier to validate in 
the analytical interpretation of our experience. We are personal but not 
private, to use a cliché. 
Conclusively, we will be mostly attentive to external nostalgia. 
However, when internal nostalgia is triggered as part of an established 
strategy from the author, it is of greatest importance. These strategies then 
aim for the personal, internal nostalgias that we clearly share contextually, 
but not in private detail with other people. This approach is fundamental, 
since addressing our own internal nostalgia through external nostalgia 
makes the nostalgic experience much stronger and forceful. 
 
Art about Nostalgia or Nostalgic Art? 
Considering the classic issue of content and form, perhaps it is wise to make 
a distinction between nostalgia in art and nostalgic art. Paul Ricœur talks 
extensively, inspired by Mendilow, in Temps et Rècit Vol. 2 [Time and Narrative 
Volume 2] (1984) about the crucial difference between tales of time and tales 
about time (101). He writes: “All fictional narratives are ‘tales of time’ 
inasmuch as the structural transformations that affect the situations and 
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characters take time. However only a few are ‘tales about time’ inasmuch as 
in them it is the very experience of time that is at stake in these structural 
transformations” (101). He means that there are a few novels (modernism 
and later) that actually give you a phenomenological experience of time, 
where the actual experience of fictive time is at heart of the work’s themes 
and meaning (Ricœur 62). To create a parallel to nostalgia might seem 
contrived at first, since fiction is always in time whereas you cannot say that 
all fiction is in nostalgia. The word about is also unfortunate since it could just 
as well describe fiction that discusses time and does not necessarily give us a 
temporal fictive experience. If we understand that there is a difference 
between fiction whose content is about nostalgia and fiction where the 
experience of the text is nostalgic we make a very important distinction. If we 
would study Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited (1945) from the former 
angle we would look at how the narrator values the nostalgia of Charles 
Ryder, or how England changed from the innocent Belle Époque of pre-war 
times through two world wars.35 If we would study if from the latter 
perspective we would settle on our nostalgic experience of the text and 
consider what it is in the text that made us nostalgic. It could be that some of 
the reasons behind our nostalgic experience can be found in the thematics of 
the novel, but the approach is different. Then, borrowing the analogy from 
Ricœur, we will speak of art about nostalgia and nostalgic art. 
It seems that a nostalgic content is less prone to evoke nostalgic 
experiences than nostalgic aesthetics. Perhaps this is true regarding all 
emotions expressed through art, but it seems even more so when it comes to 
nostalgia. Although we are scared of Dracula because of how he is described, 
                                                
35  Although the memories in Brideshead Revisited do not reach further back than the 1920s, 
the book is still thematically obsessed with the ideals and times of the Belle Époque.  
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we also fear what he represents and what his actions portray. With nostalgia 
it is different; if a character is nostalgic we do not explicitly experience 
nostalgia but rather other feelings such as pity or sadness. When we have a 
nostalgic experience it is rarely content-based. This does not mean that the 
content is not important; it is just not the most important thing. If we are to 
explore how nostalgia is evoked, we must focus on aesthetics but not dismiss 
theories of simulation altogether. Content and representation work as an aid 
together with the aesthetics; perhaps it is even the content that initiates a 
process of experiencing art nostalgically. If we read on the back cover text of 
Brideshead Revisited that it is the “most nostalgic and reflective of Evelyn 
Waugh’s novels” it might open up a consciousness that is prepared for a 
nostalgic experience. 
In chapter one, we acknowledged the aesthetic response to art and 
how it seemed to play a crucial role in evoking emotions. Nostalgia is not an 
exception. As mentioned in the introduction, Fred Davis is one of the few 
who recognises the part aesthetics play in nostalgic art: “So frequently and 
uniformly does nostalgic sentiment seem to infuse our aesthetic experience 
that we can rightly begin to suspect that nostalgia is not only a feeling or 
mood that is somehow magically evoked by the art object but also a 
distinctive aesthetic modality in its own right” (73). If we regard nostalgia in 
art as “a distinctive aesthetic modality” rather than a personal emotion, it 
opens up a field of study that engages us to look into the formalistic aspects 
of nostalgic experience rather than the internal, private emotions triggered. 
We will still look at both nostalgic emotions and moods, but from a more 
specific aesthetic perspective. However, nostalgia is definitely also a more 
closed and personal emotion than sadness or anger, since it usually is so 
closely related to one’s own biography. Although we should not dismiss that 
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other emotions usually engage previous personal emotions of the same kind 
in a direct relationship, the fundamental element of nostalgia is the past, 
usually a private past. Thus, even though we approach nostalgia from a more 
objective, aesthetic perspective, we always have to keep in mind that the 
nostalgic emotions cooperate deeply with personal biography, and that this 
internal nostalgia will be interesting for as, as we discussed above.  
In order to examine a nostalgic aesthetic in art, we need to focus on the 
external aspects of a nostalgic experience. In the externality of the experience, 
we can create a taxonomy of nostalgic textual strategies that seems to work 
for more than a single person. We must also avoid speculating on private 
subjective issues. We have to do this, as we have seen, in accordance with the 
ways external nostalgia plays along with internal nostalgia; some subjects are 
more subjected to nostalgia depending on the different ways the external 
aesthetic strategies trigger internal nostalgic memories. This is also 
supported by Wolfgang Iser when he stresses how the internal experience is 
“the reader’s incorporation of the text into his own treasure-house of 
experience […]” and that this subjective “element of reading comes at a later 
stage in the process of comprehension […]” (The Act of Reading 24). The 
strategies of aesthetic nostalgia lie much in luring the receiver into a nostalgic 
mood that in a secondary effort will trigger internal nostalgic memories, 
since internal, more private experiences, have a stronger emotional content. 
In this sense, we are also, in a way, dependent on the status of the subject in 
order to formulate a nostalgic aesthetic. When it comes to whether the 
internal or external aspect of art is concerned, we will focus on the internal 
aspects, the text itself, and avoid the interference of external aspects such as 
epiphenomena. Nevertheless, this concentration on the text does not halt our  
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speculations about how the text addresses external aspects such as the use of 
allusions, symbols, or in a wider perspective, intertextuality. 
Now that we know that we are focusing on nostalgic fiction, let us then 
look at how nostalgia fits into the categories about text and aesthetics that we 
described in chapter one and then discuss how simulation still can be a valid 
tool to understand nostalgic reactions. 
If we return to our categories about the relationship between artist, 
text and audience in chapter one, we can now see that what we will focus on 
is mainly categories “7 – Emotions are expressed through metaphors and 
symbols.,” “8 – Emotions are expressed through narrative discourse,” and “9 
– Emotions are expressed through style and form.” These are the categories 
that are situated under the headline “Text (Aesthetics)” and thus constitute 
the formalistic approaches to text that, as we have seen above, are the most 
interesting for our study. It seems that nostalgia is in a lesser (or perhaps 
none at all) degree evoked through our relation to fictive characters which 
dismisses category “6 – Emotions are expressed through our response to 
fictive characters.” The other two categories in that subgroup should not be 
completely disregarded at this point. Category “4 – Emotions are clearly 
expressed in the text either by use of manifested conventions or common 
clichés” will be part of how we look at the romantic nostalgic conventions 
and how they spill over into modern texts in chapter five. Category “5 – 
Emotions are expressed through simulation (identification)” might at first 
glance seem far away from how we experience nostalgia, but we will see that 
when we work with textual memories, for example, the idea of a narration 




Testing the Methodology 
To further establish the difference between art about nostalgia and nostalgic 
art, let us spend some time doing a comparative analysis of American Graffiti 
and The Last Picture Show in order to expose our methodology for its 
limitations or problems.  
 Both films look back on their respective director’s childhood era from 
a 1970s perspective and in this sense provide an established “looking back” 
feeling. Furthermore, both films are generally considered nostalgic, but in 
different ways. “One of the most influential of all teen films, American Graffiti 
is a funny, nostalgic, and bittersweet look at a group of recent high school 
grads’ last days of innocence” is the consensus on the Rotten Tomatoes website 
with viewer comments such as “Trend setter, nostalgic, feel good hit,” and 
“the ultimate nostalgia movie of all time.” A quick look at the reviews of The 
Last Picture Show at Rotten Tomatoes yields no comments about nostalgia, but 
instead uses words in the same general category: “timeless film,” and 
“evocative and bittersweet slice-of-life ‘picture.”  
We have two films that contently work towards questions of the past. 
They are films about nostalgia. But are they nostalgic films? I will argue that 
American Graffiti is more so and The Last Picture Show is less. As we have seen 
above, there are plenty of possibilities in creating nostalgia, and these 
possibilities are all very subjective and internal. In terms of a nostalgic 
aesthetics, we approach an external nostalgia that is not linked immediately 
to one’s own memories, although they can use our own memories in a second 
motivational phase. 
Both narratives are about adolescence in the US in the rather trouble-
free and innocent period after the Second World War but before the dawn of 
the Vietnam War. In their coming-of-age themes, they both describe a time 
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where experiences are crucial in forming the lives of the characters. American 
Graffiti focuses on one iconic summer night in 1962, the night before some of 
the main characters are supposed to leave their home town, Modesto, 
California, for college. It is a time of breaking up, a definite marker between 
youth and adult life. Changes are in the air as envisioned by the characters. 
Wolfman Jack’s encouragement of “Live life” is contrasted sharply with 
Curt’s mantra, “It doesn’t make sense to leave home to look for home, to give 
up a life to find a new life.” Even John Milner who desires to live in the past 
and refuses change, cannot deny those very changes when he comments that 
the broads are not what they used to be and that he despises “that surfing 
shit” because “Rock`n´Roll has gone downwards ever since Buddy Holly 
died.” In a central scene he is walking through a junkyard with a young girl, 
reflecting on a past symbolized by the wrecked cars. His nostalgia is bitterly 
ironic, since we will know through an added end title that he dies himself in 
a car accident some years later. In the end he wins the car race and is still the 
king, but he realizes the horrible reality of time when he confesses to Terry 
that he was, in fact, losing. Even though the film is not explicitly discussing 
nostalgia, it has a certain nostalgic content.  
The Last Picture Show, on the other hand, takes place over a longer 
period of time. Its central theme is the change that blows over a small Texas 
town during the Korean War in 1951. This change is symbolized by the little 
movie theatre that, after providing the teenagers a place of social exchange, 
eventually has to close down because it has been defeated by the new TV 
medium. The structure of The Last Picture Show, in contrast to American 
Graffiti, is a circular structure, leading us through a year that commences 
with school start in the autumn, represented by the football season, and 
ending in the same windy autumn one year later. This structure is enforced 
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through the dialogue, constantly mentioning either the football season or the 
cold wind that blows through the town each autumn. More so, the film’s 
imagery effectively captures this; the tumble weeds that blow through the 
sandy and desolate streets, the exteriors of the shabby cinema, and for 
further emphasis, the camera movement in the absolute last shot that 
parallels that of the first: a slow, meticulous pan over a crushed window and 
the street, ending on the cinema, with the difference that the pan is reversed. 
The reversing of the last shot seems to tell us that, yes, life is repetitious, but 
in these repetitions there are also changes. When we are reminded of the 
passing of time, often through the repetitious nature of holidays or seasons, 
we are generally set in a nostalgic mood, and thus the circular structure 
seems effective in evoking nostalgia. It creates a feeling that times passes by 
us too quickly, and the constant use of cars in movement creates a feeling of 
change and restlessness. This is something that is experienced by the older 
generation in the film who are feeding off their past memories from their 
younger years. An example is Sam’s remembrance of his love experiences 
with Jacy’s mother. Sam and all the other adults seem to live in the past, 
whereas these questions are not yet fermented in the youth. There is a sense 
of determinism in how these young people will inevitably be like the older 
generation, created mainly through the use of doublings; Jacy goes to the 
same lake as her mother had done before, and the notion of becoming her 
mother is brilliantly conveyed in a mirror scene between mother and 
daughter, where they both are framed in such a way that they seem almost to 
melt into one character. It is also mediated through the two returns of Duane; 
his first return is essentially different to the second one. In the first return, he 
comes home with a new car and clothes and a rebellious nature whereas in 
the last one he has conformed into adulthood and is dressed in military 
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uniform ready to embark to Korea. The sense of mortality within this circular 
structure is further envisioned by the weathered and experienced face of Sam 
the Lion; his death emphasizes the mortality of life, since he is a strong heroic 
character, “A Lion.” He dies unnoticed, without the audience ever seeing it. 
Instead it is recounted in a simple dialogue scene, without sentiment. 
The most crucial difference between the movies is in the way American 
Graffiti creates a definite now and then in the text through its chronological 
narrative when it posts the fates of the characters in the end of the film just 
before the end credits. Posts of success and death intervene over the pictures 
of the youngsters and establish the narrative as subsequent. It forces us to 
look back on the narrative with a certain regret and melancholia; the past 
seems very much passed. In a sense we feel an emotional loss of the 
characters, too, since we are distanced from their experience in knowing their 
fates. This means that there is a textual nostalgia at work as well as a loss of 
fictive characters. When The Last Picture Show is over we leave the cinema 
together with the characters, and we can only speculate about their fates. We 
might miss them, if they had made a certain impression on us, but we are not 
forced to consider their lives in a broader, longer perspective. This means 
that it is not the actual time of the narrative that is crucial in the nostalgic 
aesthetics, but when it is narrated. It is obviously not enough that the film 
was made later, but we need a confirmation of a narrative structure that is 
divided into a now and then. Nevertheless, the time of narrative is important 
in another way. It can either signal a collective past through its use of clichés 
and conventions, that forces us into a nostalgic mood, or work on creating a 
“selected memory” due to its heightened awareness of the iconographic 
status of the images. 
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The Last Picture Show gives us a rough and grim, almost realistic, 
depiction of the times around the Korean War in the small town in Texas. It is 
quite far away from the public image of those days. The details of interiors, 
clothes, and cars are not made to shadow the narrative; there is no particular 
focus on these things, they just seem to exist naturally, and the viewer might 
not be aware of them at all. They are in black and white, and as such might 
remind us that it is a past narrative. This, however, is not enough to make it 
nostalgic. Approaching a past time, using a convention like black and white 
in visual arts, or simply telling a past narrative (a historical novel/film) is not 
by any means necessarily nostalgic. As we have seen in the section of the 
nostalgic experience, we also need the reflection of the past, or at least 
something that stimulates the subject to experience past and reflection 
simultaneously. If the black and white images would be postulated against 
colour to show different narrative times, it might have worked more 
favourably in a nostalgic way. The use of only black and white is more, as we 
will see below, a celebration of a past cinema art.  
The realistic and grim imagery, though, in The Last Picture Show has a 
definite political touch. We are confronted by the luxurious interiors of the 
country club people and the shabby arena of the workers on the oil rig, and 
this contrast raises ideas about class and the American dream, that somehow 
stands between our nostalgic experience. The world is not idealized; people 
are mean and egotistical, and the exteriors and interiors rough and dusty. 
American Graffiti, on the other hand, is in lively colour, catching all the 
signs of neon in full Technicolor. It does not avoid the icons of its time; it is 
crowded with cars, hamburgers, diners, radios, dances, and everything 
associated with the early 1960s. It uses stereotypes and clichés, and all events 
happen on one beautiful summer night only. They work to create a nostalgic 
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atmosphere, and an idealized space that we will miss in the last moments of 
the film. The pastness of the past is in the centre and in many ways more 
important than the actual action of the characters. It is not a recreation of the 
early 1960s, but a re-visualization or a re-symbolization that creates a strong 
presence for the viewer. This nostalgic strength of a re-visualization conforms 
to Stewart’s idea about how nostalgic souvenirs necessarily have to be 
incomplete and not exact replicas (Stewart 136) 
The idealized aspects in American Graffiti are carried further into the 
well-behaved middle class town, where people generally are nice, and where 
even the youth gang, The Pharaohs, seem as dangerous as a Disney film. The 
violence that exists, a fight scene late in the night, is also very soft. There is 
no hard core violence, no graphic sexuality, the characters are all middle class 
(perhaps with the exception of Terry), and generally the great dangers of the 
world are neatly stuck under the pink pillows. Contrary to The Last Picture 
Show, there are no political impacts; it is a dream world, and as such 
something that illustrates how nostalgic memory tends to work, selecting the 
good parts. Furthermore, this idealization further avoids the contrast 
between generations that is implicit in The Last Picture Show. The young 
people seem almost parentless, and with the exception of some wise words 
of Wolfman Jack, the few adults that are present are either satirized or 
portrayed like goofs.36 The characters all represent different stereotypes, and 
it is easy to find someone there to identify with, and this increases the 
possibility of sharing the nostalgic experience with the characters. 
                                                
36  This is also mediated through the poster of the film, which is a caricature of the 
characters in the film, tightly together in a hotchpotch of their respective happenings. 
This is a strong contrast to the realistic black and white photos we see on the poster for 
The Last Picture Show. 
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The feeling of movement and change in American Graffiti is evidenced 
by cars, the sounds of trains, and airplanes, and is more physical than in The 
Last Picture Show. The eventful narrative, almost epic in its variety of scenes, 
seems to represent the whole variety of adolescent life which is confirmed by 
Terry when he exclaims the next morning, “What a night!” It corresponds 
strongly with the ways we tend to see our past, in terms of not a single event, 
but a kaleidoscope of experiences all blending together. That is why the 
formula of one night is very successful in creating nostalgia; it is replicating 
how our own nostalgic memory works. The detailed scenography forces us 
to feel the film as a past, whereas The Last Picture Show, although it is set in a 
past era, does not. American Graffiti is a celebration of youth, the times 
around it, and that feeling of possibilities and change. The music 
commemorates “the glad season of life” through “Sweet Sixteen,” and is a 
heavy contrast to The Last Picture Show’s blue country lyrics sung by Hank 
Williams. “The music [in American Graffiti] was as innocent as the time. Songs 
like ‘Sixteen Candles’ and ‘Gonna Find Her’ and ‘The Book of Love’ sound 
touchingly naive today,” writes Roger Ebert in his review of the film. The 
deterministic qualities in the doublings and repetitions in The Last Picture 
Show, do not allow us to identify with the possibilities among the young 
characters, but this creates oddly another sense of nostalgia. 
 If we are familiar with film history, The Last Picture Show reminds us of 
the American film style of the 1940s, particularly that of John Ford. 
Bogdanovich copies Ford’s extensive alternations between long takes and 
close ups with a straight cutting style. It is possible that this pastiche can aid 
us towards a nostalgic memory of our own, especially if we are very familiar 
with film history. The film ends with the last picture show at the little movie 
theatre; there is a celebration of the art and history of American film when 
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John Wayne and his fellow cowboys raise their hats and shout. The 
celebration of cinema, in this way, is not only an honour to the great films of 
early Hollywood, and cinema per se, but also to that past era. Its pastness is 
established by the symbolic last picture show, but also in the way the TV has 
become the central piece of furniture in every home where families now 
gather. 
American Graffiti ends quite differently on a different emotional note; 
for the first time the camera moves down through the branches of trees and 
focuses on Curt’s little blue car. The night has turned into morning, and all is 
empty and quiet. The feeling of a dream that is slipping away is aesthetically 
foreshadowed by the desolation in the end of the film. It is as if the dream 
has suddenly vanished. After the farewells (in a larger sense, farewells to an 
era), Curt is on his way gazing thoughtfully out the window of the plane, 
spotting the mysterious white car. The scene echoes Baudelaire’s “A Une 
Passante” in its hypothetical nostalgic mood since it is a nostalgia for what 
might have happened. As his face shows, he is already remembering recent 
events. The ultimate break is then performed by “that surfin’shit,” when the 
Beach Boys, representatives of the new 1960s, accompany the end credits 
with their “All Summer Long.” It is the end of something concrete: a morning 
vanishes, people disappear, and loneliness and melancholia take over. More 
generally, it is the end of an epoch in every viewer’s life. Through the 
lightheartedness of the final song, the whole feeling of the past seems, like 
the whole film, an idealized past – a moment bienheureux. 
Both American Graffiti and The Last Picture Show contain different 
possibilities of nostalgic experiences. When American Graffiti focuses on 
creating a distinct now and then through narrative structure and the use of 
an idealized time/world we miss and long for, The Last Picture Show 
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encourages nostalgic moods more intellectually through its entropic vision of 
life and its sense of meaningless and mortality. The nostalgia in American 
Graffiti is, through its idealistic nature, less occupied with the mortality of 
life, although this is, of course, also provided through the deaths of two 
characters in the end title. The Last Picture Show plays much more with the 
hopelessness of life and its inevitable spiral towards extinction. The past in 
American Graffiti has, to use the words of Vera Dika in Recycled Culture in 
Contemporary Art and Film: The Uses of Nostalgia, “a lived resonance” in the 
sense that its idealization is not so much from images from the 1950s as the 
collective memory of these images (Dika 91). The conflict between idealized 
time and historical time raises a conflict in the audience that recreates the 
nostalgic reaction in its contrasts between joyful memory and a regretful 
present. “And it is precisely this conflict between memory and history,” 
writes Dika, “that encourages a new set of meanings to arise” and relates to 
the “juxtaposition of the coded material against the historical context of the 
film itself […]” (91). We are not only made aware of the “coded material” 
through the fates of our characters in the end titles, but also through our own 
“knowledge of the impending destruction of this innocent world […]” (92). 
When I choose to call American Graffiti more nostalgic than The Last Picture 
Show, I refer to the way American Graffiti opens up more possibilities for 
nostalgic experiences through its open and physical experience as well as this 
juxtaposition of history and memory. This contrasts to the more intellectual 
nostalgia (film history) of The Last Picture Show. We could speak of an open 
nostalgic experience and a closed one, definitions of how specialized or 
categorized the nostalgia is. American Graffiti contains a more open nostalgia 
and The Last Picture Show a more closed nostalgia. 
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What Is Not Nostalgic? 
Does all art have the capacity to evoke nostalgia in the audience? The easy 
answer has to be yes, but who knows and controls an emotional experience 
in another? Since we are talking about possibilities rather than truths or facts, I 
would say no. There are a certain elements that work against nostalgic 
experiences – that minimize the possibilities. Let us look at a few of these. 
We have already mentioned the subtle but crucial difference between 
memory and nostalgia. Although we must distinguish clearly between 
remembrance and nostalgia, undoubtedly the two are related and pure 
remembrance, without the quality of loss that defines nostalgia, has the 
capacity to create possible nostalgic reactions. Nostalgia from pure 
remembrance is retrieved through how the audience invest the sense of loss 
themselves in the memories. Thus, memories, or past narration, can work 
nostalgically without intention. But it is important to note that not all past 
narration automatically evokes nostalgia in audiences. The so called 
historical novels are a prime example of this. Carl Rollyson writes in Uses of 
the Past in the Novels of William Faulkner: “After Scott, much of Victorian 
historical fiction concentrated on the past as pageant and spectacle. Historical 
novels were escapist exercises in nostalgia and antiquarianism, and forays 
into the quaintness of the past, into its manners and mores” (14). The 
nostalgia Rollyson refers to is not that of the reader’s experience but of the 
writer’s antiquarianism. Of course, if the reader has a specific interest in the 
times that the historical novel engages us in, there is a possibility that this 
will open up to an external nostalgia in the reader. In most cases, though, this 
is not so, and we benefit from disregarding historical novels and past 
narration from our research, especially when they are narrated in a style that 
totally encompasses the times they take place in. If the narrative style aims 
 176
for a total simulation of past times, the feeling of loss and dichotomy of now 
and then will be entirely a matter for the interpretation and persona of the 
reader. 
More significant are narrative modes that work more intrusively 
against nostalgia, especially irony and parody, and novels that are much 
centred on philosophical or intellectual discourse as well as explicitly sexual 
content. I think it has to do with the basic romantic quality of nostalgia: its 
seriousness and immensely private character. Nostalgia is much like a dream 
and the bubble of the dream explodes when sharp things like irony, sarcasm, 
or graphic eroticism enter it. The same could be said of texts that are too self-
reflective or experimental. This has to be viewed in terms of experiences as a 
whole, and does not necessarily dismiss shorter, episodic moments of 
nostalgia.  
James Joyce’s Ulysses is a good example of a novel that ends in a very 
nostalgic tone through Molly’s soliloquy about past and lost times, but as a 
whole fails to evoke a full nostalgic experience because of its recurring 
stylistic games. Likewise, Thomas Mann’s Der Zauberberg, which is a novel 
about time in Ricœur’s sense and has many episodes that have nostalgic 
qualities, fails to become a nostalgic experience basically because of its long 
and complicated philosophical and historical argumentations or its 
preoccupation with detail. Illustrating this narrative ironic tone is a scene in 
which Hans Castorp is lost in a snow storm. It starts with a romantic and 
poetic description of the weather condition: 
 
The position of the sun was hard to recognize, veiled 
as it was in haze. Behind him, at the mouth of the 
valley, above that part of the mountains that was shut 
off from view, the clouds and mist seemed to thicken 
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and move forward. They looked like snow – more snow 
– as though they were pressing demand for it! Like a 
good hard storm. Indeed, the little soundless flakes 
were coming down more quickly as he stood. (Mann 
479) 
 
As we will see later, identification with seasonal symbols, such as snow, work 
as memorative signs. Whatever identification the audience might experience 
in the above sequence, through his own associations with snow or that 
particular weather, is demolished a few lines later when the narrator explains 
in great detail the nature of the snow: 
 
For this powder was not made of tiny grains of stone; 
but of myriads of tiniest drops of water, which in 
freezing had darted together in symmetrical variation – 
parts, then, of the same anorganic substance which was 
the source of protoplasm, of plant life, of the human 
body. And among these myriads of enchanting little 
stars, in their hidden splendour that was too small for 
man’s naked eye to see, there was not one like unto 
another; an endless inventiveness governed the 
development and unthinkable differentiation of one 
and the same basic scheme, the equilateral, equiangled 
hexagon. Yet each, in itself – this was the uncanny, the 
anti-organic, the life-denying character of them all – 
each of them was absolutely symmetrical, icily regular 
in form. (Mann 479) 
 
We do not question the brilliance of Mann’s prose or his thematic urges, and 
the sequence of words is both exclusive and elusive. However, in both its 
scientific approach to snow and its philosophical consequences in its 
allusions to human beings and life in general, it de-romanticizes the snowfall 
in the beginning. Whatever ideas of nostalgia that might have occurred in the 
reader during this snowfall, have vanished into other imaginary territories. 
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A similar fate happens to Richard Aldington’s Death of a Hero (1929). 
The “memorial to a generation” (back cover text) starts out very 
nostalgically: “But the twentieth century had lost its Spring with a 
vengeance. So a good deal of forgetting had to be done” (11). What stands 
between Death of a Hero and nostalgia is the ironic narration which seems to 
ridicule the past rather than glorify it. This ironic tone is apparent from the 
very start: 
 
 Mrs. Winterbourne liked drama in private life. She 
uttered a most creditable shriek, clasped both hands to 
her rather saggy bosom, and pretended to faint. The 
lover, one of those nice, clean, sporting Englishmen 
with a minimum of intelligence and an infinite capacity 
for being gulled by females, especially the clean English 
sort, clutched her unwillingly and automatically but 
with quite an Ethel M. Dell appearance of emotion, and 
exclaimed: 
 “Darling, what is it? Has he insulted you again?” (13-
14) 
 
A reason why irony, and its relatives parody and satire, obstruct nostalgic 
sentiments can be found in the famous distinction between naïve and 
sentimental poetry by Friedrich Schiller in his essay Über naïve und 
sentimentalische Dichtung [Naïve and Sentimental Poetry and On the Sublime] 
(1795). Schiller distinguishes between two main types of literary expressions: 
satire and elegy. A poet is satirical when the divergence between ideal and 
reality is expressed through humorous or penalizing texts. But if the poet 
focuses on the ideal before reality in a serious tone, then he is elegiac. The 
elegy becomes, in Schiller’s taxonomy, a shape of the sadness of lost nature or 
ideals. Schiller’s definitions are expressive for much of the romantic dualism 
we find in Kant and Hegel and can articulate the romantic concern for the 
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division of two apparent attitudes towards the serious literary material: 
nature, culture, past, and ideals. Nostalgic literature does not need to be 
humourless, but the narration’s attitude towards the past has to be sincere 
and elegiac in order to emphasize the specific relationships between a 
disorderly present and an idealized past. 
Like irony, overt eroticism might work against the romantic style of 
nostalgia. Robert Hemmings writes in “ A Taste of Nostalgia: Children’s 
Books from the Golden Age” that “nostalgia conceals aspects of childhood 
the adult writer and reader choose to disregard—sexuality, solipsism, and 
hedonist desire […]” (59). Certainly, one of the main drivers in the 
idealization of childhood is to preserve the innocence and the natural stage of 
that longing. The intervention of typical adult desires diminishes the quality 
of the innocent past and thus works counter-nostalgically. It is important to 
justify that the mood of sensuality is crucial to nostalgia but when sensuality 
transforms into explicit eroticism, or even pornography, the sensibility of 
childhood is lost. This is shown in Eric L. Tribunella’s “From Kiddie Lit to 
Kiddie Porn: The Sexualization of Children’s Literature” where modern adult 
retellings of famous children stories release the childhood memories of 
nostalgic values. 
 Now, this sense of innocence travels way beyond the concept of 
childhood representation. It seems to be a necessary nostalgic mood in more 
adult nostalgic literature as well. Have we not heard complaints about how 
asexual the characters are in Tolkien’s literature, and is not this very fact one 
of the strong devices behind the nostalgic appeal of his tales? And F. Scott 
Fitzgerald has been described as a prude, since the furthest erotic stage in his 
stories is indeed the kiss. 
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There is a reason to believe that, in most cases, eroticism and 
pornography work counter-nostalgically in any kind of literary work since it 
disturbs the essential qualities of nostalgia – that of the notion of nature, 
innocence, simplicity, childhood, and the purity of sensations that stem from 
these essentials. 
  
Nostalgia and Literature 
Much has been spoken of fiction in general, and many examples from films 
have been used. This is due to the fact that it is easier to discuss films since 
they might be more vividly remembered and easier shared than literature. In 
addition, films lack that aspect of interpretation that involves our realization 
of images from words (we construct the spatiality of prose into our own 
images of interiors and exteriors, people, and things), which means that the 
range of individual experience is somewhat smaller. This thesis is not about 
art and nostalgia but about nostalgic experiences in modern literature, and 
even though film and literature have much in common, they also, as noted, 
differ on several important aspects. 
This above noted difference in the experience of literature from film, 
that the reader has to invest more of himself in order to visualize the prose, 
has consequences for our project. It means that prose lacks many of those 
clearly nostalgic devices such as sound and images provide. The strong 
nostalgia that characterizes music for example, and is used in films, is 
missing in literature. We can refer to music of course, but music will not be 
heard. And the sounds of summer, although suggested in literature, will still 
not be heard. Likewise, the special brand of jeans that was favoured in the 
1970s, and part of the filmic image in films from that time, will only be 
“jeans” in a novel written at the same time. Of course, the modern novel has 
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ways to bring in contemporary culture through various techniques such as 
providing images in the books (Aragorn and the surrealists), using a 
montage technique that includes aspects of the popular (Döblin’s Berlin, 
Alexanderplatz) or referring to which songs are being heard (The Great Gatsby). 
Nevertheless, images and sounds are missing.  The way prose approaches 
the audience’s sense of musicology and audibility will be touched upon in 
chapter four as part of the stylistics of prose. Furthermore, as noted above, 
there seems to be a greater variety in how we experience literature than film, 
since we have to imagine the physicality of the fictive universe through a few 
guidelines, which means that one person’s room is perhaps not exactly 
another person’s room. The danger lies in that every reading experience 
tends to be more private than a film viewing and thus more difficult to 
analyze in terms of a shared emotional response. The analytical problems 
that arise here have been justified enough in chapter one. 
Nostalgia in literature can operate on a number of varieties of the two 
essential aspects of nostalgia (now and then, and universal grief), and it is 
important to keep them in mind when we now move on and distinguish the 
different ways literature can evoke nostalgic experiences in the reader. This 
taxonomy will be divided loosely into three chapters according to the 
division of micro and macro that we provided in the end of chapter one. In 
the chapter “Nostalgic Stylistics and Narratology,” we will concentrate on the 
smaller units of the texts, episodic micro-nostalgias: the ways tenses and 
grammatical temporalities can affect our experience, and what are the 
narratological implications on nostalgia in narrative voice, mood, duration, 
frequency, and anachronies. In chapter five, “Nostalgic Tropes,” we will 
focus on how certain images and ideas of nostalgia can be reproduced in 
different forms through style, imagery, and representation. Chapter six will 
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then solely look at macro units, such as whole narratives and some nostalgic 
strategies which include the analeptic structure and the use of textual 
memory that affect the experience of the whole text. The structure of this 
taxonomy is logical, since the larger perspective is dependent on the smaller 
details. Finally, chapter seven will provide a full analysis of the nostalgic 
experience of Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury in order to test the nostalgic 
tools and methodology as developed. 
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Chapter Four 
Nostalgic Stylistics and Narratology 
 
 
This chapter sets out to explore some of the stylistic and narratological 
aspects concerning nostalgia. Although it is aiming for the micro-perspective, 
certain narratological perspectives, especially that of mood and voice, require 
a wider context and will unavoidably relate also to macro-perspectives. The 
first part deals exclusively with the smallest parts of stylistics such as tenses, 
specific grammar, and syntax. The narratological section will then investigate 
how narration and narrator possibly creates nostalgic experiences. Finally we 






“Nostalgia is like a grammar lesson:  you find the present tense, but the past 
perfect!” (Owens Lee Pomeroy). 
 
Since nostalgia, in most cases, is a retrospective movement, it might be 
appropriate to think of the past tense as the standard nostalgic mode. And 
true enough, the signalling of a text as a past event through the past tense 
does carry the possibilities of nostalgic tone, especially if the time of the 
narrating is a clear contrast to the time of the past narration. However, as 
Paul Ricœur notices, “it is not the past as such that is expressed by the past 
tense but rather the attitude of relaxation, of uninvolvement” (Ricœur 69). 
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The use of a present tense in a past narration can, at times, create an odd 
sense of nostalgia since, just as Ricœur proposes, it activates the moment, 
isolates it, idealizes it, and slows it down, as we can see in Peter Walsh’s 
introspection in Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1925): 
 
 As a cloud crosses the sun, silence falls on London; 
and falls on the mind. Effort ceases. Time flaps on the 
mast. There we stop; there we stand. Rigid, the skeleton 
of habit alone upholds the human frame. Where there is 
nothing, Peter Walsh said to himself; feeling hollowed 
out, utterly empty within. Clarissa refused me, he 
thought. He stood there thinking, Clarissa refused me. 
(42) 
 
It is, of course, not only the present tense at work here, but also the 
shortening of sentences that slows down the rhythm considerably, compared 
to the main part of the narrative. It is only the first part that is in the present 
tense; the narrative recovers its past tense after “Peter Walsh said to himself.” 
The change between present and past tense can modify the mood of the 
narration; in this case the present tense as part of Peter Walsh’s thoughts 
exactly captures his emotional occupation. 
The use of both past and present tense can naturally be part of 
nostalgic narration depending on other aspects involved, but perhaps 
nostalgia benefits from a more “active” tense such as the past progressive. 
 
Past Progressives 
The active aspect of past progressives lies in how “[t]hey do not express any 
‘neutral’ facts about a situation, but reflect the character’s (and narrator’s) 
intense involvement and subjective perspective on the situation” (Toolan 96- 
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97). However, their active force also stems from how they create a feeling of 
something unfinished, ongoing, or recurring. 
A typical past progressive sentence is as follows: “He was talking 
when the car drove by.” The past is conveyed by “was” while “talking” is the 
progressive form of “talk,” thus making the present tense of “talk” into 
something that is progressing. Often, there is also a signal word, that defines 
time such as “while.” The use of past progressives does signal a temporality 
somewhere in between past and ongoing present; it does not completely 
belong to a past event, but it is not entirely a present activity either. Frances 
O. Austin actually claims that the ambiguity of past or present time naturally 
leads to something “out of time” (“Ing forms in Four Quartets 24). In his study 
of the past progressives (and present participles) in T. S. Eliot’s Four Quartets 
he concludes in a reply to Peter Barry that Eliot uses them as representation 
of “Eternity – which he sets against the time of clock and calendars” 
(“Making Sense of Syntax: A Reply to Peter Barry “167). This sense of “out of 
time” makes past progressives very appropriate for conveying a nostalgic 
tone, since they have this unique mix of temporalities in the tense itself 
The use of past progressives also makes scenes more visual, 
actualizing a feeling that it is happening before us. This is confirmed by 
Michael J. Toolan, in Stylistics of Fiction, as he observes that “progressives are 
not swiftly passed over in the process of reading the text. The co-occurring 
adjuncts help to retain the reader’s attention, elaborating upon those 
predicates and their implications, and diverting the reader yet further from 
the linear sequence of events ordinarily signaled by a succession of non-
expanded predicates in simple past tense” (113). What Toolan means by 
retaining the reader’s attention is what Michael Hogan suggests as being an 
“immediacy,” an “immersion in the flux of the moment, and suspension 
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within a single moment of time” that creates a dreamlike quality (qtd. in 
Toolan 102). In the wading scene in Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man (1914-15) we see the forceful use of the past progressives: 
 
His soul was swooning into some new world, fantastic, 
dim, uncertain as under sea, traversed by cloudy 
shapes and beings. A world, a glimmer or a flower? 
Glimmering and trembling, trembling and unfolding, a 
breaking light, an opening flower, it spread in endless 
succession to itself, breaking in full crimson and 
unfolding and fading to palest rose, leaf by leaf and 
wave of light by wave of light, flooding all the heavens 
with its soft flushes, every flush deeper than the other. 
(186-87) 
 
If we consider exchanging the past progressives with past tense we realize 
the slight difference in mood. “His soul swooned into some new world,” 
feels like something completed whereas “His soul was swooning” does 
retain the feeling of something ongoing, something accentuated, important, 
unique, and almost “dreamlike.”  The sensation of dual times through 
progressives is conveyed by Toolan as an activity that “was or still is in 
progress at the time specified by accompanying indicators (tense inflections, 
time adverbials)” (99). 
 In the excerpt above we also find several participles that, although not 
conveying the same sense of dual times as the past progressives, still retain a 
sense of being in between something as a result of their transformation from 
verbs to adjectives. The repetitive quality of “glimmering and trembling, 
trembling and unfolding” also creates a notion of something “out of time,” 
ongoing and enhancing. Likewise, these participles possess a certain sound 
quality that is mesmerizing in their sharing of the -ing ending. Austin notices 
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that participles accidentally share “the same ending as words that are 
associated with continuous and vibrating sounds, words such as ring; sing” 
(“Ing forms in Four Quartets” 23). 
 
Proximate and Non-Proximate Words 
Toolan describes another stylistic idiosyncrasy where words, mostly deictic 
pronouns, in their proximate and non-proximate form can unfold the duality 
of time and space. He illustrates this with the following table: 
 
Proximate  Non-Proximate 
I    You 
this   that 
here   there 
now   then (Toolan 128) 
  
In applying these sets of antagonistic pairs in different ways we can achieve a 
sense of nostalgic temporality and space between two values. A simple 
sentence such as “Things were better then than now” (Woolf, To the 
Lighthouse 156) carries enormous nostalgic potentials through the use of two 
charged deictic pronouns. The use of “I” and “You” can freely be extended to 
incorporate “I” and “She” or “Today” and “Tomorrow,” or why not “Hither” 
and “Thither” as in the waves in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man which 
move “hither and thither, hither and thither […]” (Joyce, Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man 185). 
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Asyndeton and Polysyndeton 
As we will see in chapter five, nostalgic imagery is often constituted by long 
and winding sentences. The way clauses are coordinated in a sentence can be 
divided into asyndeton and polysyndeton. This is interesting from a nostalgic 
perspective since the trend to use polysyndeton exists in the works of Proust, 
Woolf, Joyce, Lowry, and especially Fitzgerald. Asyndeton connects clauses 
through the use of comma, while polysyndeton mainly uses the word “and.” 
Let us look at an example that uses predominantly polysyndeton: 
 
By seven o’clock the orchestra has arrived―no thin 
five piece affair but a whole pit full of oboes and 
trombones and saxophones and viols and cornets and 
piccolos and low and high drums. The last swimmers 
have come in from the beach now and are dressing 
upstairs; the cars from New York are parked five deep 
in the drive, and already the halls and salons and 
verandas are gaudy with primary colors and hair shorn 
in strange new ways and shawls beyond the dreams of 
Castile. The bar is in full swing and floating rounds of 
cocktails permeate the garden outside until the air is 
alive with chatter and laughter and casual innuendo 
and introductions forgotten on the spot and 
enthusiastic meetings between women who never knew 
each other’s names. (Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby 44) 
 
F. H. Langman writes about The Great Gatsby that “the element of wonder, 
delight, nostalgia, comes from the unashamed romanticism of the phrasing 
[…]” (35), but what is it exactly that is nostalgic about the phrasing? If we 
study the excerpt above, we find only three periods, which means there is a 
flow, a rhythm defined by how the length of the sentences and how the 
clauses are coordinated. Commas and, in particular, “and” function as 
pausing elements instead of periods. The repeating rhythm is most 
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prominent in the enumeration of instruments in the beginning of the passage 
or the phrase “the air is alive with chatter and laughter and casual innuendo 
and instructions forgotten on the spot and enthusiastic meetings between 
women who never knew each other’s names,” where several “and[s]” create 
a feeling of being breathless. This can be compared to that ecstasy, or over-
ambition, so often found in children when they experience something 
important and immediately want to tell somebody about it. Hence, the 
specific phrasing in this case seems to emphasize action and eventfulness in 
an almost impressionistic manner, so that the atmosphere of the actual scene 
is syntactically transferred into the reader’s experience.  This is further 
enhanced by the switch into present tense (as discussed earlier) in the middle 
of the description which minimizes the distance between the reader and the 
narrated impressions. 
Surely asyndeton increases the sense of speed and energy by 
disregarding normal punctuation, and this can be valuable if one attempts to 
convey motion, tumult, and vigour as part of an exceptional memory. This 
also helps to involve the reader in the scene. However, I argue that it actually 
is the use of polysyndeton that carries the most nostalgic value. “And” in 
normal context signals both the oral and the ordinary, such as a single 
occurrence in an opening phrase like “And then we went there.” The 
repetitive “and” has another connotation: that of pathos and expansive 
emotions. In Genesis 1:2 we find it contributing to the high-toned style: “And 
the earth was waste and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep: 
and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters” (Gen 1.2). 
Polysyndeton has the capacity, as in the example from The Great Gatsby, to 
infuse awe, pathos, and poignancy to a text. Its general seriousness combines 
well with lyricism or symbolism in order to fulfil the gravity of the nostalgic 
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emotion, in opposition to more ironic or satirical moods as discussed in 
chapter three. 
There is also another factor that makes polysyndeton suitable for 
nostalgic emotions; the purely rhythmic contributions it makes to a sentence. 
The following sentence from Woolf’s To the Lighthouse clearly illustrates how 
the polysyndeton, with its repetitive character and how it graphically stands 
somewhat aside from other words and thus is easily recognizable, sets a 
rhythmic pattern that alludes to time, clocks, and progress: 
 
 The nights now are full of wind and destruction; the 
trees plunge and bend and their leaves fly helter skelter 
until the lawn is plastered with them and they lie 
packed in gutters and choke rain pipes and scatter 
damp paths. (146) 
 
It is not a sentence that is in any obvious way about anything nostalgic, 
except that the poetic description of autumn might connote memories of 
readers’ autumns. Still, there is something nostalgic about it, and it has to do 
with the phrasing. The clash between clock time from the polysyndeton and 
the presence of the poetic description activates our imagination for 
something outside time, or more specifically, something that resists time. At 
the same time, the rhythm reinforces the notion of time passing 
(appropriately the name of the section in the novel is “Time Passes”) 
illustrated by the accentuated motion in the sentence from active verbs such 
as “plunge,” “bend,” and “fly” as well as addressing autumn as a symbol for 
change. 
 In short, asyndeton and polysyndeton have the ability to emphasize or 
create movement, energy, impressions, pathos, and rhythms that can either 
enhance a scene already containing other nostalgic connotations, or they can 
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create a nostalgic mood by themselves. This is especially true of the 
polysyndeton that can create both awe and emotional emphasis as well as 
provide repetitions and rhythmic patterns. 
 
 
Narratological Perspectives on Nostalgia 
 
Anachronies 
The discrepancy between story and narrative, what Genette calls anachronies, 
is a well known fact. According to Genette, a study of anachronies is a study 
of the “connections between the temporal order of succession of the events in 
the story and the pseudo-temporal order of their arrangement in the 
narrative” (35). In order to make narrative sense, reading is dependent on 
remembering what came before the present sentence (the past events of the 
reading) and assessing this memory in the present reading. Wolfgang Iser 
writes that “what has been read shrinks in the memory to a foreshortened 
background, but it is being constantly evoked in a new context […]” (The Act 
of Reading 111). If this was not true, reading a book would be a process of 
reading thousands of separate sentences, in their own right understandable, 
but in a narrative perspective incomprehensible. The chronological reading 
order, or “consumption” of a text, is a fact: “one can run a film backwards,” 
Genette writes, “but one cannot read a text backwards, letter by letter, or 
even word by word, or even sentence by sentence, without its ceasing to be a 
text” (34). Reading is linear. A narrative is linear in terms of “consuming” it. It 
is the expectations aroused by what we have read, our alertness for the 
future narrative, which is the driving force behind our reading. That does not 
mean, however, that what is narrated, the order of story events, necessarily 
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has to be presented in chronology; on the contrary, the case is more often not.  
 When narrative and story differ in time, we achieve anachrony. This 
leads to a possible analepsis (retrospection) of going back into story time. On 
a narrative scheme it would be illustrated as follows: BCAD, where the 
emphasized A represents a retrospective move back to the beginning of the 
story. Similarly, it is possible to have a prolepsis (anticipation) into the future 
of the story which would be illustrated as follows: ABDC, where the 
emphasized D indicates the prolepsis.37 
At this stage we will not bother with the complexities that anachronies 
provide within a whole narrative structure on a macro level (chapter six) but 
rather look at these anachronies as isolated phenomena in order to study the 
art of addressing story past and story future and to investigate the nature of 
these jumps in time. Hence, it is the actual transitions between times that are 
at the core. 
 
Analepsis 
A good way to illustrate how analepsis might work nostalgically is to study 
some famous examples from Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu38 whose 
multiple retrospections create nostalgic meaning through their ability to 
“modify the meaning of past occurrences after the event […]” (Genette 56). 
To clarify, the ability to either revalue or recharge the past event with a 
present meaning creates a possibility of giving this event a nostalgic content. 
It is not automatically so, because this event could be treated just like a 
memory. Often in the Recherche it is contrasted with the present attitude 
                                                
37 This is a simplification since anachronies can be either internal or external; analepsis 
reaching back before (BCAD or after (ACBD) the zero degree. They can also be repeating 
(ABAC). The same goes for prolepsis. 
38 I will here on refer to A la recherche du temps perdu as the Recherche. 
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towards the past which makes it nostalgic. Du côté de chez Swann begins with 
the time of sleeplessness, “For a long time, I went to bed early” (7), and the 
first pure and longer analepsis occurs on page 12: 
 
[…] I would not try to go back to sleep right away; I 
would spend the greater part of the night remembering 
our life in the old days, in Combray at my great-aunt’s 
house, in Balbec, in Paris, in Doncières, in Venice, 
elsewhere still, remembering the places, the people I 
had known there, what I had seen of them, what I had 
been told about them. 
 At Combray, every day beginning in the late 
afternoon, long before the moment when I would have 
to go to bed and stay there, without sleeping, far away 
from my mother and grandmother, my bedroom again 
became the fixed and painful focus of my 
preoccupations. (12-13) 
 
Then we enter the analepsis of Marcel’s anguish of not being kissed by his 
mother the night of Swann’s visit which, together with some more general 
descriptions of those days in Combray, occupies some thirty-four pages until 
we, after a short return to the main narrative, once again are moved back in 
story time: 
 
So it was that, for a long time, when, awakened at night, 
I remembered Combray again, I saw nothing of it but 
this sort of luminous panel, cut out from among 
indistinct shadows, like those panels which the glow of 
a Bengal light or some electric projection will cut out 
and illuminate in a building whose other parts remain 
plunged in darkness: at the rather broad base, the small 
parlour, the dining-room, the top of the dark path by 
which M. Swann, the unconscious author of my 
sufferings, would arrive, the front hall where I would 
head towards the first step of the staircase, so painful to 
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climb, that formed, by itself, the very narrow trunk of 
this irregular pyramid; and, at the top, my bedroom 
with the little hallway and its glass-paned door for 
Mama’s entrance; in a word, always seen at the same 
hour, isolated from everything that might surround it, 
standing out alone against the darkness, the bare 
minimum of scenery (like that which one sees 
prescribed at the beginnings of the old plays for 
performances in the provinces) needed for the drama of 
my undressing; as though Combray had consisted only 
of two floors connected by a slender staircase and as 
though it had always been seven o’clock in the evening 
there. (46) 
 
The narrator’s experience of the memory as a distinct theatrical and almost 
unreal event highlights its capacity as a selected memory. The narrator 
himself relates it to “old plays.” The juxtaposition of the illuminated places 
and objects of importance to the other forgotten parts “plunged in darkness” 
clearly distinguishes how the nostalgic memory operates. The rather 
detailed, but at the same time expressionistic, conveyance of time and space 
as well as mood gives it a nostalgic touch. More importantly, the 
commingling of past and present times through the way the analepsis 
superimposes itself over present narration, grants it a stronger emotional 
experience of past and present. The tone of the prose evidently belongs to a 
present narration in its theatrical and commenting aspects. Still, the past 




Narrative order is not only about analepsis but also about anticipation, what 
is called prolepsis. We find two sorts of nostalgic prolepses. Internal prolepsis, 
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the most common, uses a future event as a return to the time of narrating, to 
remember or evaluate the present event. An example of an internal prolepsis 
occurs when the narrator in Du côté de chez Swann exclaims in regard to 
Swann and his own anguish at bed time that “as I learned later, a similar 
anguish was the torment of long years of his life […]” (33). The other is called 
external prolepsis and occurs when the future event is not decided and 
addressed often in an imaginary way: “I saw myself standing in our new 
garden watering the plants.” Internal prolepsis has a movement from the 
present narrative point into a later event and then back again, whereas the 
external prolepsis tends to have a single movement towards the future event. 
In the internal prolepsis the present situation is evaluated, and in the external 
prolepsis the departure is from the present situation but the focus is on the 
anticipated event. The external prolepsis declares that the narrator does not 
know the whole story, or the end of it, whereas the internal prolepsis 









Fig. 7. Internal Prolepsis. 
 
 
 The internal prolepsis plays an important part in creating a 
reverberation of how the present time is soon to be the past time. As Genette 
recognizes, prolepsis is most favourably used together with first person 
subsequent narration (67). It is not particularly the content that interests us 
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but rather the fact that the narrator “learned later” that creates a temporal 
flux, a notion of already remembering the event that is described. The notion 
of remembering an event from a future perspective grants this event a 
particular, even strange, sense of importance and truly transient character. 
This makes it highly nostalgic to Genette who considers them having,  
 
 
an inverse weight that is perhaps more specifically 
Proustian and that betokens rather a sentiment of 
nostalgia for what Vladimir Jankélévitch once called the 
“primultimateness” of the first time: that is, the fact that 
the first time, to the very extent to which one 
experiences its inaugural value intensely, is at the same 
time always (already) a last time […] (72) 
 
The atmosphere involved around an internal prolepsis consists of a 
spotlighting of the present event as something forever past/lost. This is 
exactly what happens in the end of chapter nine in Dickens’s Great 
Expectations (1860-61) when Pip the narrator remembers the particular day 
from a future time: 
 
I fell asleep recalling what I “used to do” when I was at 
Miss Havisham’s; as though I had been there weeks or 
months, instead of hours, and as though it were quite 
an old subject of remembrance, instead of one that had 
arisen only that day.  
That was a memorable day to me, for it made great 
changes in me and my fortunes. But it is the same with 
any life. Imagine one selected day struck out of it, and 
think how different its course would have been. Pause, 
you who read this, and think for a moment of the long 
chain of iron or gold, of thorns or flowers, that would  
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never have bound you, but for the formation of the first 
link on one memorable day.  (Dickens 93-94) 
 
Typical for these prolepses are, as Genette described, the use of a first person 
narration where the narrator has the capacity to value and charge the present 
with nostalgic values from his point of later narrating. 
 This typical kind of narration forcefully arouses nostalgia in Stephen 
King’s “The Body” where the small insertions of proleptic truths about the 
passage of time become emblematic for the nostalgic tone of the whole story. 
The narrator leaves his recollection of childhood dinners with the family to 
reflect upon that memory: “It took me a long time after that summer to 
realize that most of the tears I cried were for my mom and dad” (299). The 
future story event is then perhaps not exactly the time of narrating, it occurs 
as if it were somewhere in between the time of narrating and the memory. In 
another prolepsis, the time is more specific: “It never occurred to me to 
question this set of priorities until about twenty years later” (307). When the 
boys are stunned by the view of the railroad tracks and the river the 
narration again becomes proleptic: “I’ll never forget that moment, no matter 
how old I get” (332). In this case, the a-temporality of the anticipation 
fortifies the magnitude of the event as something exceptional and something 
to be nostalgic about. This way of creating hyper memories of the present 
events and establishing them as unique reaches its climax in the very 
nostalgic prolepsis when the gang is sitting under a tree: “[…] he meant 
those things but it seems to me now that there was more, and that we all 
knew it. Everything was there and around us. We knew exactly who we were 
and exactly where we were going. It was grand” (339). It is a celebration of 
the innocent and uncomplicated era of childhood, maybe what we actually 
miss from our past childhoods. The embrace of simplicity is, as we will se in 
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chapter five, a staple of nostalgic concern. To further establish both the 
grandeur of childhood and its fleeting quality, the narrator exclaims: “I never 
had any friends later on like the ones I had when I was twelve. Jesus, did 
you?” (341). The address directly to the reader with the “you?” is interesting 
since it invites us to share this revelation. Even though it is not true, perhaps 
we did not have very good friends when we were twelve, the intimacy 
between narrator and reader makes us agree with that statement. 
 
 
Fig. 8. External Prolepsis. 
 
External nostalgic prolepsis, on the other hand, involves an 
anticipation of a future event in which one feels nostalgic for the present 
event. The difference from the internal prolepsis is that the temporal 
movement goes from the present event into the future event rather than from 
the future event back into the present event. If we alter the prolepsis from 
Great Expectations we could easily make it an external prolepsis: “That day 
would certainly become memorable to me, for it made great changes in me.” 
The original prolepsis is clearly internal since it involves a future story event 
that lies within the totality of the narrative – the narration occurs at a later 
stage than the story event. But the altered prolepsis is external and more 
prophetic perhaps, since it approaches a story event that will not be within 
the realm of the narrative. 
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 A variation of this kind of prolepsis is acknowledged by Santesso as a 
main nostalgic style found previously in romantic nostalgic poetry (62-63). In 
this kind of proleptic nostalgia there is a vision of a future event that will 
make the present situation nostalgic. An example of future nostalgia happens 
when someone hears a new song and already realizes that this song will 
function nostalgically in the future to evoke this very moment. It can also 
entail a future imagination that carries nostalgic weight because of its sense 
of idealization. Such a nostalgic prolepsis occurs late in Lowry’s Under the 
Volcano (1947) when Yvonne dreams of her future with the consul, a future 
imagination that suddenly is scattered by the presence of reality: 
 
 But their house was in her mind now as she walked: 
their home was real: Yvonne saw it at sunrise, in the 
long afternoons of south-west winds, and at nightfall 
she saw it in starlight and moonlight, covered with 
snow: she saw it from above, in the forest, with the 
chimney and the roof below her, and the foreshortened 
pier: she saw it from the beach rising above her, and she 
saw it, tiny, in the distance, a haven and a beacon 
against the trees, from the sea. It was only that the little 
boat of their conversation had been moored 
precariously; she could hear it banging against the 
rocks; later she would drag it up further, where it was 
safe. – Why was it though, that right in the centre of her 
brain, there should be a figure of a woman having 
hysterics, jerking like a puppet and banging her fists 
upon the ground? (281) 
 
The rare punctuations through commas and colons make this future 
daydream into visual segments, associations appear one after another, 
ending in the harsh reality of the impossibilities of such a dream. The 
constant filmic movement of Yvonne’s point of view as well as the different 
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temporalities further enhance the grandeur, splendidness, and idyllic 
character of the dream. The idealization seems to scatter when the image of 
the moored boat appears since it introduces an image that is both hard to 
interpret (“the little boat of their conversation”39) and that carry an intruding 
sound in the idyll: “banging against the rocks”. This “banging” sound 
transfers itself into the final image of reality – that of Yvonne seeing herself as 
a hysterical woman “banging her fists upon the ground”.  
 
Frequency 
Frequency deals with the quantative relationship between story and narrative. 
The different relationships are: 
 
1. Narrating once what happened once 
2. Narrating several times what happened several times 
3. Narrating several times what happened once 
4. Narrating once what happened several times 
(Genette 114-16) 
 
What interest us are categories 3 and 4. Category 3 is generally what we can 
name repetitions. Within the text we can identify two different repetitions, 
one that is exactly, or at least almost, identical (“I ate breakfast yesterday. I 
ate breakfast yesterday.”), and one where the repetitions differ but they 
regard the same actual event, perhaps from different point of views (“I ate 
breakfast yesterday. Yesterday I had an egg for breakfast.”). Category 4 is 
called an iterative frequency such as “For many years I had an egg for 
breakfast.” The discussions of the different frequencies will be short and 
                                                
39  According to The Malcolm Lowry Project this boat can refer to the image of a love boat that 
transcends all the storms of life as depicted in Lowry’s short story ”The Bravest Boat” 
(279.5). 
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To separate the two different kind of repetitions we will call them repetition 
(identical) and recollection (different) respectively. I base this definition on 
Kierkegaard’s distinction between repetition and recollection: “Repetition 
and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions; for 
what is recollected has been, is repeated backwards, whereas repetition, if it 
is possible, is recollected forwards. Therefore repetition, if it is possible, 
makes a man happy – whereas recollection makes him unhappy […]” (3-4). 
Repetition, due to its exactness, forces the reader back into the narrative, but 
it also carries, as Kierkegaard mentions, a movement forward. Recollection 
does not necessarily force the reader back into the narrative, but rather opens 
up new ways of looking at the story. 
 Repetitions are quite common in nostalgic narratives. Often they 
create the impression of being outside the story for both the reader and the 
narrator due to their narrative oddity. These repetitions thus become 
emotionally charged bursts from either the narrative itself or the 
consciousness of a character. However, they can also be props of the actual 
story, such as the poster of the film “Los Manos de Orlac” in Under the 
Volcano, or simply cues in a dialogue, such as the repeated “―Do you mind if 
I pull down the curtain?” in Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Night (1934). Generally, 
repetitions seem to work in five different ways: (1) as rhythmical time 
markers, such as we have seen with polysyndeton or the repetition of certain 
specific words and phrases; (2) as a means of emphasizing clock time 
through addressing the actual essence of repetition in embracing 
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Kierkegaard’s notion of the impossibility of real repetition; (3) as a tragic 
element, hammering in the unavoidable progress of time as well as an 
upcoming tragedy; (4) as a reinforcement of a specific meaning or 
atmosphere through the repetition of key words, as in Hemingway’s prose; 
(5) as a means of forcing the reader back into textual time in order to either 
re-evaluate or remind of a past textual event (see chapter five on textual 
memory). 
Recollections, on the other hand, trigger a past story event in the 
narrative and acknowledge the importance of this past scene and thus can 
inflict idealization or a stronger sense of loss. Since recollections are not exact 
and often charged with the frames of a character’s or narrator’s memory, they 
inheritably become sad and melancholic in the way that they cannot 
reproduce the truth or reality in an exact degree.40 As we will see in chapter 
seven, the single event of Caddie climbing a pear tree in The Sound and the 
Fury creates multiple recollections from her brothers that adds and subtracts 
meaning to and from the initial event. 
 
Iterative Frequency 
Genette recognizes that iterative frequency is a very common form of narration 
in the first three sections of the Recherche (117). Instead of the common use of 
past tense “happened,” things “used to happen” instead. The iterative is a 
sort of summarizing form; it explores rituals and recurring events and 
therefore evokes the nostalgic idea of how rituals and seasons trigger 
nostalgic memories. It also regards memory as nostalgic rather than 
memorial, since it lacks the specificity of memory and embraces the 
vagueness of nostalgic memory. A phrase such as “I remember the day in 
                                                
40  Again, this echoes Stewart’s concept of the incomplete souvenir (see page 113). 
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June 1942 when dad caught that big fish” is less nostalgic than “I remember 
that dad and I used to fish in the summers.” Sometimes the iterative 
frequency is so detailed that one suspects that this is not exactly how it 
happened each time, but in reality there were certain variations of it. This is 
what Genette calls pseudo-iterative (121). The pseudo quality arises out of the 
unbelievable detailed repetitiousness of the acts. With Genette’s words: 
“pseudo-iterative―that is, scenes presented, particularly by their wording in 
the imperfect, as iterative, whereas their richness and precision of detail 
ensure that no reader can seriously believe they occur and reoccur in that 
manner, several times, without any variation” (121). The pseudo quality of 
the iterative removes it even further from that of real memory into the sphere 
of nostalgic idealization and how some details come to represent a memory 
that embraces more vaguely a certain time or era in one’s life. 
 
Duration 
The difficulties in comparing narrative time with story time are discussed in 
detail by Genette (86-94). The actual act of reading a narrative cannot be 
gauged in terms of precise time and thus we have to resort to a hypothetical 
theory instead of the precision that can be achieved by the use of a zero 
degree in narratological order and frequency.41 Nevertheless, with the help of 
Genette we can identify four basic forms of “narrative movement” (94). At 
one end we have what Genette refers to as a “descriptive pause” (94) which 
means that the narrative slows down usually due to a heightened number of 
details or detours. In the other end we find ellipsis, which is a clean break or 
shortage of story time in the narrative. In between there we have scene which 
                                                
41 Zero degree is a hypothetically perfect and identical temporal correspondence between 
story and narrative (Genette 36). 
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occurs when narrative and story are close in execution, as in dialogue, and 
summary which speeds up the narrative to convey a longer stretch of story 
time (Genette 94-95). In which ways can these narratological tools be helpful 
in order to analyze nostalgia in texts? 
 First one has to mention that there is no single strategy of duration 
that is nostalgic, but rather different strategies that work nostalgically 
depending on what they aim for in a larger narratological perspective. The 
most common, descriptive pause, is used in order to enhance and idealize a 
moment, a memory, and encourage reader identification with the experience, 
a strategy we will encounter often when we discuss nostalgic imagery in 
chapter five. We have already mentioned one strategy; the change into 
present tense can slow down the narrative. In Proust we find more strategies. 
Proust’s bursts of nostalgic imagery are famous for their extremely 
detailed remembrances. In the highly detailed prose we face much of the 
subsequent idealization of the moment at the same time as the accurately and 
meticulously arranged episode echoes its virginal appearance. Here we 
encounter a true accomplishment of past and present, of the now of narration 
and the presence of the past moment: 
 
Suddenly the air was torn apart: between the puppet 
theatre and the circus, on the clearing horizon, against 
the opening sky, I had just spied, as though it were a 
fabulous sign, Mademoiselle’s blue feather. And already 
Gilberte was running as fast as possible in my direction, 
sparkling and red under a square fur hat, animated by 
the cold, the lateness and her desire to play; a little 
before reaching me, she let herself slide along the ice 
and, either to help keep her balance, or because she 
thought it more graceful, or pretending to move like a 
skater, her arms opened wide as she came forward  
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smiling, as if she wanted to take me into them. (The Way 
by Swann’s 401) 
 
The commingling of details and narrator’s thoughts in these two long 
sentences creates a sensational experience of this event, while the tone of the 
narration still clearly defines it as a past one. The long sentence, besides 
giving the text a sense of awe, also slows down the reading tempo due to the 
more complicated syntax. 
 It seems then that nostalgic texts, with their dependence on details, 
sensations, and lyricism, often lean on a slower narrative tempo and that the 
use of scenes, summaries and ellipses are limited. However, the sense of awe 
that can be derived from a high speed narrative can also benefit nostalgia. If 
we see nostalgic memory as a vague rather than a specific moment, the 
higher speed can capture the eventfulness of a certain time or era. In fact, that 
is, as Genette observes, what happens quite often in Proust’s descriptive 
sections, where the descriptions are detailed but they convey an iterative 
time. Genette exemplifies this point with the descriptions of the church at 
Combray (Proust, The Way by Swann’s 61-65) which is a very long description 
of the church, but the information about the church was not gathered at one 
specific moment but out of many (Genette 99-100). Thus, the use of ellipsis 
and summary can prove valuable if the desired effect is to capture a time 
when there is much going on, which is not unusual in the case of nostalgic 
memory. 
 
The Sensations of Anachronies 
Nostalgic anachronies approach our sensations, either directly or in the use 
of the onomatopoetic and through synaesthesia where language tries to 
trigger other sensations such as taste, smell, and hearing. This is 
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predominantly done in order to seduce the reader into the phenomenology 
of memory and nostalgia, which rather, as we have seen in chapter two, 
resides within other sensational context than merely the text. Triggering 
sensations of sounds and smells, in addition to the visual details, all work 
toward intensifying the temporal leap. There has to be something that boosts 
the temporal departure, and somehow fulfils the nostalgic ideal of past and 
present incurably inseparable. For example, an analepsis like this one in The 
Great Gatsby carries no nostalgia whatsoever: “and he could tell it no longer 
and Myrtle Wilson’s tragic achievement was forgotten. Now I want to go 
back a little and tell what happened at the garage after we left there the night 
before” (163-64). It is a very matter of fact transition. But the following 
remembrance from Jordan has a different nostalgic weight: 
 
I turned toward Mr. Gatsby, but he was no longer 
there. 
 
 One October day in nineteen-seventeen― 
 (said Jordan Baker that afternoon, sitting up very 
straight on a straight chair in the tea-garden at the Plaza 
Hotel)―I was walking along from one place to another 
half on the sidewalks and half on the lawns. I was 
happier on the lawns because I had on shoes from 
England with rubber nobs on the soles that bit into the 
soft ground. I had on a new plaid skirt also that blew a 
little in the wind and whenever this happened the red, 
white and blue banners in front of all the houses 
stretched out stiff and said tut-tut-tut-tut in a 
disapproving way. (79) 
 
There are several things working nostalgically with this analepsis. First, there 
is a long duration due to the amount of details, and this creates a visual 
stimulus in the remembrance. Although not directly addressing the auditory, 
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the nobs that “bit into the soft ground” still carry implicitly the sound of the 
shoes and perhaps even the earthy smell of the autumn grass. We can hear 
the rustling sound of the skirt blowing in the wind and, of course, the 
disapproving sounds from the flags in the wind. Here we also see a great 
example of how the involvement of the prolepsis (Jordan telling this story 
later) within the analepsis does create that exact feeling of grandeur over the 
past event that Genette acknowledged. 
Likewise, the transition into past times becomes so effectual in Mrs 
Dalloway when Lady Bruton’s nostalgia is evoked by the transitional sounds 
of summer childhood: 
 
She sighed, she snored, not that she was asleep, only 
drowsy and heavy, drowsy and heavy, like a field of 
clover in the sunshine this hot June day, with the bees 
going round and about and the yellow butterflies. 
Always she went back to those fields down in 
Devonshire, where she had jumped the brooks on Patty, 
her Pony […] And there were the dogs; there were the 
rats; there were her father and mother on the lawn 
under the trees […] (98) 
 
The important difference here between pure memory and nostalgia lies in the 
non-specificity of the memory, which is evoked by the iterative effect: she 
had not “jumped the brooks on Patty” once, but several times; there were 
cats around, not once, but always; her parents used to sit under the trees. We 
see an absence of decisive time markers or singular occurrences and instead a 
vagueness that resembles nostalgic memory. 
A rather common stylistic device to convey the faculty of transition 
from present into past is the use of an ellipsis. We see it in the most romantic 
analepsis in The Great Gatsby when Gatsby remembers his romance with 
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Daisy, “he could find out what that thing was…. […] ….One autumn night, 
five years before […]” (117), or when Yvonne remembers her father during 
the bullfight in Under the Volcano: 
 
 The poor old creature [the bull] seemed now indeed 
like someone being drawn, lured, into events of which 
he has no real comprehension, by people with whom he 
wishes to be friendly, even to play, who entice him by 
encouraging that wish and by whom, because they 
really despise and desire to humiliate him, he is finally 
entangled. 
 …Yvonne’s father made his way towards her, 
through the seats, hovering, responding eagerly as a 
child to anyone who held out a friendly hand, her 
father, whose laughter in memory still sounded so 
warmly rich and generous, and whom the small sepia 
photograph she still carried with her depicted as a 
young captain in the uniform of the Spanish-American 
war, with earnest candid eyes beneath a high fine brow, 
a full-lipped sensitive mouth beneath the dark silky 
moustache, and a cleft chin – her father, with his fatal 
craze for invention, who had once so confidently set out 
for Hawaii to make his fortune by raising pineapples. 
(259-60) 
 
The transition from the bull to the father seems like an involuntary one, 
almost as if the image of the bull reminds Yvonne of her father. The ellipsis, 
besides signalling to the reader that we are now entering Yvonne’s memory, 




The voice in a narrative primarily is the voice of the narrator or narrators who 
report the narrative. When we explore the aspects of voice we study the 
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“relations between the narrator – plus, should the occasion arise, his or their 
narratee[s] – and the story he tells” (Genette 215).  
The most crucial matter of the narrating’s voice is when the narrative is 
being narrated. Subsequent narrating is, as Genette acknowledges, by far the 
most common narrative (Genette 220). It is identified basically by the use of 
the past tense, or a progressive past, that creates a sense of something past 
(see earlier this chapter). However, as we will see, this past tense can 
occasionally change into present tense and still be categorized as a 
subsequent narrating. This is, for example, the case in the description of the 
parties in The Great Gatsby: “In the main hall a bar with a real brass rail was 
set up […]. By seven o’clock the orchestra has arrived […]” (my emphasis, 
44).  When this happens, we often refer to the mood of the narrating when 
the dominant narrating voice still is subsequent. The difference between a 
standard subsequent narrating and a nostalgic one lies in the role of the 
narrator and how he is presented. As we have seen in the Recherche, the 
typical nostalgic narrative voice is done by an extradiegetic, homodiegetic 
narrator – a narrator that is himself part of the story he tells and one who is 
in charge of all levels of the narrative. The narrating is also mostly being 
performed as a first-person narrative. Both the extradiegetic and the 
homodiegetic aspects of the narrating must be clearly announced in the 
opening of the narrative (in the frame favourably). “In ‘first-person’ 
narrative,” writes Genette, “this isotopy is evident from the beginning, where 
the narrator is presented right away as a character in the story […]” (221). 
The extradiegetic narrative level can be established through a simple “I 
remember” or any such equivalence, the homodiegetic nature preferably 




Far more consequential for nostalgic narration is its mood. If voice is about 
who tells, mood is about the distance between story and narrative as well as 
who sees (focalization). If the narrator is nostalgic, what he narrates becomes 
nostalgic as well; thus we can speak of a nostalgic mood. Just as the 
subsequent narrative voice creates a temporal distance between the time of 
narration and the actual narrative, narrative mood also can alter the level of 
narrative detachment or involvement. In terms of distance in mood, Genette 
identifies two divergences: narrative of events, and narrative of words (164).  
Narrative of events can never be totally mimetic because that would 
be utopic; instead we talk about different degrees of detail and the amount of 
the narrator’s emotions and thoughts that are narrated. Literary nostalgia, as 
we have seen, depends more on lyrical and descriptive prose, and the 
importance of commentary and evaluation of the narrative from the narrator 
is crucial as well. Therefore, there seems to be a dependence on scene 
(detailed narrative) and a narrator who is involved in what he narrates, as 
opposed to a more transparent narration as is often the case with 
Hemingway. 
Narrative of words deals with speech (both dialogue and thoughts), 
and compared to the narrative of events, we can speak about true mimetic 
style, reported speech, or direct speech, (“I will get married,” said I to my 
mother”) as well as more distanced, indirect speeches such as narrated speech 
(I informed my mother that I would get married) and transposed speech (I told 
my mother that I would get married) (Genette 171). The nostalgic mood 
favours generally more distanced speeches, since that does not obliterate the 
role of the narrator and the time of the narrating. The distance reinforces the 
pastness of the narrative. Thus, narratives that use a high degree of reported 
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speech, both as standard dialogue and in analepses, are less nostalgic. 
It is easy to confuse the idea of narrative of words with that of the 
classic point of view, but Genette makes an important distinction between the 
two. Narrative of events and words are about the distance between the 
narrator and the narrative, but it concerns only speech or thought. For the 
other instance, whether or not the narrative is filtered through a character’s 
consciousness is defined as focalization (Genette 189-94). A narrative can be 
non-focalized, that is classic narration where we deal with an omniscient 
narrator, internally focalized when the narrative is filtered through the mind of 
one character, and externally focalized where the narration is limited by what a 
character choose to report, often called objective narration (Genette 189-90). 
Focalization, as Genette is well aware of, “is not necessarily steady over the 
whole length of a narrative […]” (191). Narrative of events is strongly 
coloured by the emotional status of the narrator. If the narrator also is a 
character in his own narrative, we cannot only speak of narrative of events 
but focalization as well. When we have an extradiegetic, homodiegetic 
narrator, situations can arise when we have to separate the narrator and the 
character. We will then refer to the narrator and the character as the Narrator 
and the Hero (Genette 252). 
 
Free Indirect Speech42 
There are several suggestions that there is a relationship between past 
progressives and free indirect speech (FIS) in the way that they reside between 
temporal units (see Erlich; Raybould). Toolan writes about FIS that it “has 
formal characteristics which seem to locate it somewhere between direct and 
indirect speech: it retains the back-shifted tenses and third-person pronouns 
                                                
42  I use Genette’s term which means the same as Free Indirect Discourse or Free Indirect Style. 
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of indirect speech, but ‘freely’ dispenses with any framing introductory 
clause (such as he thought, she said)” (74). FIS is described by Genette as a 
narration when “the narrator takes on the speech of the character, or, if one 
prefers, the character speaks through the voice of the narrator, and the two 
instances are then merged […]” (174). This is contrasted with the stream of 
consciousness, or what Genette names immediate speech, where “the narrator 
is obliterated and the character substitutes for him” (174). To prove my point 
that FIS is a more nostalgic narrating mode than that of the immediate 
speech, let us take a look at the most famous immediate speech to date, 
Molly’s soliloquy in Joyce’s Ulysses (1922): 
 
[…] so there you are they might as well try to stop the 
sun from rising tomorrow the sun shines for you he 
said the day we were lying among the rhododendrons 
on Howth head in the grey tweed suit and his straw hat 
the day I got him to propose to me yes first I gave him 
the bit of seedcake out of my mouth and it was leapyear 
like now yes 16 years ago my God after that long kiss I 
near lost my breath yes he said I was a flower of the 
mountain yes so we are flowers all a womans body yes 
that was one true thing he said in his life and the sun 
shines for you today […] (643) 
 
I have deliberately chosen a segment that is nostalgic to prove the point. The 
nostalgic aspects lie in both the use of a few past progressives, especially 
when the memory starts, “we were lying,” in the memorial aspect due to the 
use of “16 year’s ago,” and in the nostalgic imagery’s details of sensuality. 
Besides that, the tone of the narration is strangely present and intimate as 
immediate speech usually tends to be even though it is narrated in past 
tense. The immediate speech neutralizes the pastness of the narration due to 
the lack of either proleptic devices that remind us of the narrator, especially 
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when the duration of the speech is as long as in this case. However, I also 
think that it is in the private, intimate nature of the immediate speech that the 
possibilities of nostalgic identification diminish, even though this intimacy in 
a certain sense invites the reader into an inner consciousness that at least 
resembles nostalgic consciousness. The loss of a higher narrative instance in 
the immediate speech (because of its intimacy and internal focalization) 
annihilates the sense of a nostalgic past due to the lack of a narrative present 
point of departure where the narration stems from; an obvious example is “I 
remembered.”  
Molly’s soliloquy is, of course, extreme, but let us explore the other 
end of fictive interior consciousness in another earlier work by Joyce, “The 
Dead”: 
 
He [Gabriel] watched her while she slept, as though he 
and she had never lived together as man and wife. His 
curious eyes rested long upon her face and on her hair: 
and, as he thought of what she must have been then, in  
that time of her first girlish beauty, a strange, friendly 
pity for her entered his soul. (Dubliners 254) 
 
We are clearly entering the mind of Gabriel here, but it should rather be 
considered indirect speech rather than free indirect speech since the 
narration stays faithfully in the third person and the use of “he thought” 
indicates higher narrative control. We never enter into this sense of free 
consciousness. Just one paragraph down we can notice a subtle change: 
 
He wondered at his riot of emotions of an hour before. 
From what had it proceeded? From his aunt’s supper, 
from his own foolish speech, from the wine and 
dancing, the merry-making when saying good night in 
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the hall, the pleasure of the walk along the river in the 
snow. Poor Aunt Julia! She, too, would soon be a shade 
with the shade of Patrick Morkan and his horse. He had 
caught that haggard look upon her face for a moment 
when she was singing Arrayed for the Bridal. Soon, 
perhaps, he would be sitting in that same drawing-
room, dressed in black, his silk hat on his knees. The 
blinds would be drawn down and Aunt Kate would be 
sitting beside him, crying and blowing her nose and 
telling him how Julia had died. He would cast about in 
his mind for some words that might console her, and 
would find only lame and useless ones. Yes, yes: that 
would happen very soon. (Dubliners 254-55) 
 
What we see here is much less narrative authorial control. Although we still 
never leave the third person and enter into first person narration, it still feels 
much more as if we are entering the consciousness of Gabriel. This feeling of 
internal focalization stems from the notion of imaginative associations from 
the extended list of possible events that caused his emotions, but also the 
details of his fantasies about the future. It is exactly the kind of nostalgic 
proleptic movements we discussed earlier about Yvonne’s anticipation of her 
house in Under the Volcano. They are clearly his fantasies and not the 
extradiegetic narrator’s. But first and foremost it is the sudden personal 
exclamations such as “Poor Aunt Julia!” and later “Yes, yes: that would 
happen very soon” that clearly signals the free indirect speech.  
In this way it resembles Woolf’s style in Mrs Dalloway in the tension 
between authorial voice and the inner voice of a character, the changeable 
focalization between non-focalized and internally focalized discourse. 
Randall Stevenson writes in Modernist Fiction: An Introduction (1992) about 
Woolf’s particular style in Mrs Dalloway and how the inner voice “never 
replaces the author’s completely” and that exclamations and “frequent cues 
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such as ‘thought Clarissa Dalloway’[…] are a constant reminder of an 
authorial organization and presentation of thoughts” (Modernist Fiction 54). 
The highly nostalgic style of Woolf can partly be directed to her particular 
sudden insertions of FIS, stretching it at times almost towards a stream of 
consciousness but never allowing a total independence from the 
extradiegetic narration. She usually avoids a first person present tense 
narration, but instead, as Stevenson recognizes, alters between “she,” “we,” 
and “one” (Modernist Fiction 54). One exception seems to be Woolf’s The 
Waves (1931) where, at first sight, the six characters all wonder in first person 
present tense. The use of recurring “said” and a quite ordinary punctuation 
do not allow the monologues to become a complete immediate speech. 
Instead, the author’s voice is always present. Stevenson writes that the inner 
life of the characters “is presented almost as if written in a letter. Their 
thoughts are carefully organized, clearly expressed, and show a sophisticated 
capacity to find metaphors for states of mind and the various pangs of 
contact between consciousness and the intractable world around it” 
(Modernist Fiction 54). 
 If we return to the very nostalgic end of “The Dead,” we notice how 
the text slowly invites us to share the fundamental truth of the story through 
Gabriel’s imagination without losing the nostalgic narrative tone of the 
subsequent narrative instance. It started with a rather classic indirect speech 
and then entered into a free indirect speech. The final step is not, as expected, 
that of immediate speech, but rather something more complex: 
 
 A few light taps upon the pane made him turn to the 
window. It had begun to snow again. He watched 
sleepily the flakes, silver and dark, falling obliquely 
against the lamplight. The time had come for him to set 
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out on his journey westward. Yes, the newspapers were 
right: snow was general all over Ireland. It was falling 
on every part of the dark central plain, on the treeless 
hills, falling softly upon the Bog of Allen and, farther 
westward, softly falling into the dark mutinous 
Shannon waves. It was falling, too, upon every part of 
the lonely churchyard on the hill where Michael Furey 
lay buried. It lay thickly drifted on the crooked crosses 
and headstones, on the spears of the little gate, on the 
barren thorns. His soul swooned slowly as he heard the 
snow falling faintly through the universe and faintly 
falling, like the descent of their last end, upon all the 
living and the dead. (255-56) 
 
There is no doubt that the dream of travelling westward is Gabriel’s own. The 
next sentence, however, is puzzling since it at first seems to fit perfectly in 
the exclamation theory with a “Yes.” What follows after the colon is 
information about where it is snowing right now in Ireland. Or is it? Gabriel 
watches the flakes “sleepily” and thus we can imagine that he is in a state 
between being awake and asleep. Can this state account for his mind 
wandering around the island imagining snow at certain places he knows? It 
is impossible to be certain, but it seems probable since the last image belongs 
to the grave of Michael Fury who is, of course, closely connected to the 
emotional state he is in. “His soul” must refer to Gabriel’s soul, since there is 
no other indication in the last pages that the subjects mean anything else than 
what is clearly referred to. The swooning could mean falling a sleep or 
dreaming, and the final sensation is the sound of the snow which in that 
exact moment gives Gabriel a nostalgic notion of past and future times. In a 
reading like this, it appears that the whole ending is, indeed, part of Gabriel’s 
inner world, focalized entirely through him, but the narration muddles this 
fact, and we can read it as a purely non-focalized statement as well. It is this 
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exact ambiguity in the narration that creates a nostalgic mood, the presence 
of both the temporality of narration and the temporality of character 
consciousness. The flexibility in tense, which allows for a broader variety of 
durations and presence, is more accessible in FIS than in immediate speech. 
This is not to say that any other narration cannot be nostalgic – it depends 
deeply on other facts as well – but that there is something particularly 
nostalgic about varieties of free indirect speech. 
 
The Phenomenology of Childhood 
As we will see in chapter five about childhood as nostalgic imagery, the use 
of childhood in order to evoke nostalgia about the reader’s own childhood is 
a proven strategy. It is also possible to extend this further, to actually 
transport the reader into not only the idealized world of childhood, but more 
so into the very phenomenological experience of childhood through the use 
of different kind of narrative moods. We will look at two such possible 
identifications. 
 
The phenomenology of Childhood One: The Waves 
The initial chapter in Woolf’s The Waves is a journey for the reader through 
the consciousness of childhood, which through its phenomenological 
approach opens up the possibility of childhood identification and hence 
nostalgia. Although the six children do employ some different personal 
characteristics, they share a common non-linguistic syntax. The slight variety 
in their respective personalities helps the reader to find one of them to 
identify more directly with. 
 Steve Pinkerton has briefly explored this idea of childhood 
consciousness in his article, “Linguistic and Erotic Innocence in Virginia 
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Woolf’s The Waves,” where he notices the children’s “infantile relation to 
language […]” (75). He discusses their wide use of catachresis that at times 
“[suggests] the poetic fecundity of a child’s mind […]” (75). It is an accurate 
description of a style that creates the odd and liberated metaphoric world of 
a child who has to make up their own language in order to communicate, or 
understand phenomena yet unknown to them. Thus, leaves “are gathered 
round the window like pointed ears […]” (The Waves 4), and when “the 
smoke rises, sleep curls off the roof like a mist […]” (5), “[b]ubbles form on 
the floor of the saucepan […]” (5), and “the tablecloth, [is] flying white along 
the table […]” (5). 
 The use of poetic catachresis is but one aspect of the childhood 
consciousness in the first chapter. Notable is the microscopic view the 
children possess, and how disjointed one impression is from another. The 
microscopic aspect creates a world of wonder and a world where sensations 
come before intellect. This becomes obvious already in the first six 
soliloquies: 
 
‘I see a ring,’ said Bernard, ‘hanging above me. It 
quivers and hangs in a loop of light.’ 
 ‘I see a slab of pale yellow,’ said Susan, ‘spreading 
away until it meets a purple stripe.’ 
 ‘I hear a sound,’ said Rhoda, ‘cheep, chirp, cheep, 
chirp; going up and down.’ 
 ‘I see a globe,’ said Neville, ‘hanging down in a drop 
against the enormous flanks of some hill.’ 
 ‘I see a crimson tassel,’ said Jinny, ‘twisted with gold 
threads.’ 
 ‘I hear something stamping,’ said Louis, ‘A great 
beast’s foot is chained. It stamps, and stamps, and 
stamps.’ (The Waves  4) 
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Each impression is either embedded with “I see” or “I hear,” and this 
immediately establishes the importance of the sensational aspect of the 
impression. Colours, shapes, or sounds, usually described with 
onomatopoetic words, catch the children’s imagination. The impressions are 
unrelated, and the exact impression they are trying to convey is still 
uncertain. The use of “I” not only forces the reader into the subjectivity of 
each child, but also illustrates how isolated each individual subjectivity is, 
because communication with other children is not yet developed. This 
isolation of each child changes immediately in the second round of 
impressions when this imminent “I” is abandoned for a communicative 
word. “Look at the spider’s web on the corner of the balcony […]” (4) is what 
Bernard says to the others. This means that the other impressions are 
conducted within the same space, the garden, and are still very much 
divided through the different children’s minds. We also notice this change 
from an isolated subject experiencing sensations into a subject aware of its 
own body. “Stones are cold to my feet […]” (4) says Neville, and this is 
countered by Jinny’s sensation: “The back of my hand burns […] but the 
palm is clammy and damp with dew […]” (4). It is not only the syntax of 
children that gives the impression of early childhood; it is also the choice of 
impressions that carry childhood and nostalgic weight in their remarkable 
detail. 
 We also notice the duration of the impressions, which start out small 
and then become more entangled with other impressions. A couple of pages 
later Jinny expresses a line of thought that is a fast development from the 




‘I was running,’ said Jinny, ‘after breakfast. I saw 
leaves moving in a hole in the hedge. I thought, “That is 
a bird on its nest.” I parted them and looked; but there 
was no bird on a nest. The leaves went on moving. I 
was frightened. I ran past Susan, past Rhoda, and 
Neville and Bernard in the tool-house talking. I cried as 
I ran, faster and faster. What moved the leaves? What 
moves my heart, my legs? And I dashed in here, seeing 
you green as a bush, like a branch, very still, Louis, with 
your eyes fixed. “Is he dead?” I thought, and kissed 
you, with my heart jumping under my pink frock like 
the leaves, which go on moving, though there is 
nothing to move them. Now I smell geraniums; I smell 
earth mould. I dance. I ripple. I am thrown over you 
like a net of light. I lie quivering flung over you.’ (6) 
 
As Pinkerton observes, now the use of “I” coincides with the use of “my” 
which “negotiate the self as both subject and object of desire” (Pinkerton 76). 
The sequence above shows a development towards more prosaic language – 
gone is the catachresis and the fragmented way of perception. Added is a 
self-knowledge and awareness of their own physiques. The description of the 
first innocent kiss is very precise in its consequences.  
  
Although the prose becomes more “ordinary” as we follow the 
development of the children, their particular childhood perception prevails. 
Reading the first two chapters is a phenomenological experience of the 
process of a child maturing. In the way the six children represent six different 
personalities, there are further possibilities for childhood identification. This 
reading process makes it possible to experience nostalgia through the strong 




The Phenomenology of Childhood Two: Tarjei Vesaas’ Is-slottet [The Ice 
Palace] 
The most important factor that creates a childhood consciousness in Tarjei 
Vesaas’ Is-slottet [The Ice Palace] (1963) is undoubtedly the extensive use of 
free indirect speech in order to captivate the inner world of the two children, 
mainly that of Siss. It is a FIS that, for the most part, is lacking any initial 
word signal (such as “thought”) that obscures the fact that it is FIS. Through 
the use of FIS, the world of the children or childhood is communicated 
through a similar, but less radical, focalization as we have seen in The Waves. 
The lack of rationality, limitations in expression, simplicity, repetitions, and a 
tense detailed experience of the physical, form the phenomenological base 
for childhood identification. 
 FIS works much better in conveying this childhood experience than a 
stream of consciousness narration, because of its unusual feeling of a mixture 
between the real and the unreal, between reality and dream. This stems from 
the intimacy of the FIS while at the same time it retains the use of third 
person narration. When one reads the subject “she,” one is eventually 
assured that this “she” is in fact “I.” The narration mixes factual events and 
enters into FIS without any warning. For example, on the very first page we 
are transported into FIS only through the use of the word “thoughts”:  
 
She gave a start. A loud noise had interrupted her 
thoughts, her expectancy; a noise like a long-drawn out 
crack, moving further and further off, while the sound 
died away. […]  
Biting cold. But Siss was not afraid of the cold. It 
wasn’t that. She had started at the noise in the dark, but 




“She gave a start” can refer to both an omniscient action, but also that she felt 
startled. The use of “her thoughts” clearly indicates that we are and have 
been inside her consciousness. The thoughts that were interrupted were that 
she “was on her way […] to something unfamiliar, which was why it was so 
exciting” (7). The extensive use of sensational descriptions, as in The Waves, is 
already declared by the rather specific description of the sounds of the ice 
from the lake. Sentences are generally short and somewhat fragmented in 
order to show the fragmented but poetic world of the child. Even a phrase as 
short as “Biting cold,” where there is a lack of subject and verb, confirms 
both that this is what she feels and what she thinks. These two words are the 
ones one would use if one thought out loud that it, indeed, was biting cold. 
The mystery and the irrational are then unfolded through a phrase such as 
“It wasn’t that.” 
 The apparent, but subtle, perception of the child can be seen in a 
phrase such as “Auntie seemed to be talkative […]” (18). A non-focalized 
narrator would hardly use the word “seemed” since he would know if she 
was talkative or not. Obviously, we find this kind of expression in classic 
narration, but in this case the “seemed” appears to indicate how Siss is 
experiencing Auntie. 
 The children’s experience of the world is charged with repetitions in 
order to show how the frames from within their minds are working. Instead 
of using different expressions or synonyms as a normal writer would, the 
repetitions illustrate the lack within their consciousness to find these 
variations in experience. They also connect, in a poetic way, situations and 
feelings with each other, especially when these are forceful. Thus we find the 
odd phrase “gleams and radiance” repeated four times in one paragraph 
when Siss and Unn are looking at themselves in the mirror (23), and Siss 
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repeatedly refers to her fear of the dark as something that is “at the sides of 
the road” (32-34) while she heads home from Unn in the night.  
 Likewise, in the cardinal chapter “The Ice Palace” when Unn meets 
her fate in the ice formation at the waterfall commonly referred to as the Ice 
Palace, her experience is conveyed with greatest emotional strength through 
her observant senses, as well as through the limitations of her language. “The 
black lake” and “rhime-white trees,” and close variations on these, occur 
regularly within this chapter as well as a return of the previous “gleams and 
radiance.”  
 The simulation of children’s rationale is to be found here as well. It can 
be simple things such as a forest being “hostile” or a fear  of falling “down 
into a hollow where the shadows were […]” (45) where the odd and charged 
words “hostile” and “shadows” communicate this rationale. It also follows 
closely to a child’s line of thinking as when Unn is meditating upon why she 
could not go to school: 
 
It was no use sitting down and saying that she didn’t 
want to go to school. Auntie would never accept that. It 
was too late to say she was ill too―besides, she was not 
in the habit of making excuses. She looked at herself 
quickly in the mirror: she did not look the least bit ill, it 
was no use telling fibs. She would leave for school as 
usual, and then make off before she met anyone. Make 
off and hide until school was over. (38) 
 
First and foremost this cardinal chapter echoes the sense of the microscopic 
experience we saw in The Waves, where the details of sensation predominate 




Even the bottom was white with rime and had the thick 
layer of steel-ice on top of it. Frozen into this block of 
ice were broad, sword-shaped leaves, thin straws, seeds 
and detritus from the woods, a brown, straddling 
ant―all mingled with bubbles that had formed and 
which appeared clearly as beads when the sun’s rays 
reached them. (42) 
 
Here the sentences are much longer, since this is not a fragmented experience 
but a series of impressions tied together either in the thought process or in 
the chronology in which Unn sees these things. The use of sounds to evoke 
the impression of the waterfall becomes an elegant transition from far to 
near. It starts with a “distant roar” (45) and the assertion that you are “not 
supposed to be able to hear the falls from here” (45). Then the stream’s 
“noiseless water beg[ins] to whisper” (45), later making “more noise” (46) 
until it “surge[s] more loudly” (46) and the roar suddenly is much “stronger” 
(47). When she gets closer to the falls, the sounds become more 
onomatopoetic. There is a “booming” (48) and the “water dashe[s] itself into 
white foam” (48) and “plunge[s] down in the middle” (48). 
 In much the same way as in The Waves, our experience of the world 
through the consciousness of the children allows for identification with the 
world of the child and thus our own childhood. This effect is achieved by 
using free indirect speech as well as internal focalization. 
 
Distance and Presence in The Great Gatsby 
The nostalgic experience depends much on the narrating’s alternation 
between presence and distance. This very opposition activates the essence of 
the nostalgic experience’s sense of now and then. More so, the distant mood 
and voice in narration must not annihilate the possibility of engaging the 
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reader in certain scenes when distance is not desired but rather a strong 
sensational presence should be achieved. Distance creates the pleasurable 
sense of something past, while presence can fuel this past with a vivid, 
nostalgic, almost surreal, atmosphere. A changeable degree of presence and 
distance can thus affect the emotional content of the reading experience; this 
means that a narrative does not have to maintain a strict focalization during 
the whole narration, but it can vary. 
Distance is created through the use of subsequent narration and the 
use of a narrator who is somewhat removed from the events and characters 
he is describing. Distance can also be achieved if the narrator himself is a 
character in the story. This distant mood almost always requires a non-
focalized narration.  
Presence is created basically through activating the mood so that it is 
close to either the consciousness of the character or narrator. This entails 
internal focalization as well as the use of free indirect speech and immediate 
speech. We also see a higher use of the descriptive pause, longer durations in 
scenes, and an inclusion of the reader in the intimacy of the narrative by 
either activating him in the reading process or clearly addressing him as a 
narratee. 
The narrator in The Great Gatsby conforms to the classic nostalgic 
narrator we find in the Recherche: the extradiegetic homodiegetic first-person 
narrator. As an extradiegetic narrator he creates distance just by having the 
highest narrative control over all narrative levels. This distance is pushed 
further through the use of subsequent narration. From the very opening of 
The Great Gatsby, we are aware of these characteristics of the narrator. The 
first sentence, “In my younger and more vulnerable years […]” (5) 
establishes the homodiegetic first-person. The extradiegetic level of narrating 
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is not that obvious but reaches awareness gradually. First Nick establishes 
the temporal point of narrating: “When I came back from the East last 
autumn […]” (6). Very soon we become aware that the extradiegetic level will 
be replaced in the most part by an intradiegetic level – the summer of 1922. 
The intradiegetic level is prepared by smoothly mentioning people and 
events from the summer of 1922 and how these have affected Nick. If he is 
narrating somewhere later than autumn, his reach back to the summer will be 
between four and thirteen months, approximately. Hence, we can speak of a 
subsequent narration within the subsequent narration, a kind of double 
distance. The clear analepsis occurs on page 7: 
 
Father agreed to finance me for a year and after various 
delays I came east, permanently, I thought, in the spring 
of twenty-two. 
 The practical thing was to find rooms in the city but 
it was a warm season and I had just left a country of 
wide lawns and friendly trees, so when a young man at 
the office suggested that we take a house together in a 
commuting town it sounded like a great idea. (7-8) 
 
As we notice, the narration is still in this intradiegetic narrative performed by 
the extradiegetic narrator. The distance is regained by the use of past tense 
and indirect speech (the young man suggested). So Nick retells something 
already in the past and consequently has knowledge of the ending of the 
story when he starts his narration. 
Very soon this distance is shortened as we become more and more 
drawn into the summer of 1922. There are inserts of direct speech and a more 
descriptive prose and the extradiegetic commentaries become rare. At times 
we forget that this is actually not the first narrative, but are reminded in short 
flashes of the extradiegetic narration in phrases such as “It was Gatsby’s 
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mansion. Or rather, as I didn’t know Mr. Gatsby it was a mansion inhabited 
by a gentleman of that name” (9) or “and the history of the summer really 
begins on the evening I drove over there […]” (10). When we enter the rich 
and detailed description of Buchanan’s mansion, we are entirely immersed in 
the summer of 1922 and have forgotten the actual time of the subsequent 
narrating. 
This alternation between distance and presence is then performed 
with varied intensity throughout the narrative. We will not lose the distant 
nostalgic mood but we must also at times become included in the events that 
are told in such a way that they can affect us nostalgically. Let us look how 
these alternations work more specifically. 
First we have to study the different narrating moods because there is 
obviously a difference in narration between Nick the Narrator and the 
focalization of Nick the Hero. Sometimes the narration is coloured by the 
subsequent knowledge of Nick the Narrator and sometimes by the romantic 
imagination of Nick the Hero. When Nick the Narrator is at work, we feel 
that we enter a more classic non-focalized narration; Nick the Narrator 
reports things he should not be aware of and his narrating tone has an 
omniscient character even though he is a homodiegetic narrator. This is most 
obvious in the absolute ending of the novel, but it also shines through some 
parts of the text such as the details concerning Wilson and Myrtle before the 
accident (143-44). Of course Nick the Narrator’s role doesn’t necessarily have 
to be an accurate one; he can himself function as a “writer” and carefully 
control the different levels of focalization. Nick the Narrator is the 
extradiegetic master voice of the narrative, and his subsequent narration 
colours the narrative mood through its distance. An excellent example of  
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how the non-focalized mood from Nick the Narrator functions can be found 
in the following passage: 
 
After two years I remember the rest of that day, and 
that night and the next day, only as an endless drill of 
police and photographers and newspaper men in and 
out of Gatsby’s front door. A rope stretched across the 
main gate and a policeman by it kept out the curious, 
but little boys soon discovered that they could enter 
through my yard and there were always a few of them 
clustered open-mouthed about the pool. (171) 
 
The almost matter-of-fact tone, the omission of details, less diegetic style, and 
the time marker of “after two years” creates a distant tone about the whole 
event. 
There are also times when we as readers need to be mesmerized 
through the events of the present story and, in those cases, it feels like the 
scenes are rendered through Nick the hero. “The narrator almost always,” 
writes Genette, “‘knows’ more than the hero, even if he himself is the hero, 
and therefore for the narrator focalization through the hero is a restriction of 
field just as artificial in the first person as in the third” (194). This artificial 
narration can be illustrated by this event that is clearly focalized through 
Nick the hero a few pages later: 
 
 It was Gatsby’s father, a solemn old man very 
helpless and dismayed, bundled up in a long cheap 
ulster against the warm September day. His eyes leaked 
continuously with excitement and when I took the bag 
and umbrella from his hands he began to pull so 
incessantly at his sparse grey beard that I had difficulty 
in getting off his coat. He was on the point of collapse 
so I took him into the music room and made him sit 
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down while I sent for something to eat. But he wouldn’t 
eat and the glass of milk spilled from his trembling 
hand. (175) 
 
Here, without time markers, and with a more detailed and adjective rich 
prose, we enter into a more diegetic narrating mood. This style can be even 
more immediate by the change from past tense into present: 
 
 Suddenly one of these gypsies in trembling opal 
seizes a cocktail out of the air, dumps it down for 
courage and moving her hands like Frisco dances out 
alone on the canvas platform. A momentary hush; the 
orchestra leader varies his rhythm obligingly for her 
and there is a burst of chatter as the erroneous news 
goes around that she is Gilda Gray’s understudy from 
the “Follies.” The party has begun. (45) 
 
 What is gained here is that the reader “perceives it directly” but is at the 
same time “avoiding that removal to a distance necessitated by retrospective 
first-person narration […]” (Friedman 1164). However, these changes in 
focalization are limited and we should call them alterations “when the 
coherence of the whole still remains strong enough for the notion of 
dominant mode/mood to continue relevant” (Genette 195). 
Through the non-focalization of Nick the Narrator our experience is 
decided through his choice of words and the tone of his commentary. Since 
his narrating tone obviously is sad or nostalgic our reading experience will 
also be nostalgic. When there is a change to a focalization of Nick the Hero 
we notice an increase in his use of a highly lyrical language, which in many 
ways conforms to the nostalgic imagery from romanticism in choice of words 
and symbols in order to lure us into his nostalgic adventure. The distant 
mood of Nick the Narrator draws us into the feeling of past times, but it is 
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more favourable to change into the internalized focalization of Nick the Hero 
at instances when it is important to seduce us into a present engagement. 
This usually creates a more detailed report of events, more of a diegesis. And 
these details allow for descriptions of scenes that carry nostalgic 
connotations. 
The focalization of Nick the Hero also constitutes the possibility of a 
higher presence through the use of immediate speech when characters tell 
their own stories. We must not forget that the presence of the prose is 
controlled by the highest narrative instance, Nick the Narrator. This often 
constitutes a commentary or a change from immediate speech into reported 
speech. In fact, most of the analepses that stem from Gatsby himself are 
carried out through the more distanced extradiegetic narrator in order to 
establish them as something past. However, they are then filtered through, 
not Gatsby, but something that resembles the romantic imagination of Nick 
the Hero. The most important analepsis, when Gatsby tells Nick about his 
love meeting with Daisy, starts distantly with Nick the narrator confirming 
that he “talked a lot about the past and I gathered that he wanted to recover 
something […]” (117). A gradual transition and alteration of focalization then 
takes place through the use of an ellipsis: 
 
His life had been confused and disordered since then, 
but if he could once return to a certain starting place 
and go over it all slowly, he could find out what that 
thing was…. 
 ….One autumn night, five years before, they had 
been walking down the street when the leaves were 
falling, and they came to a place where there were no 
trees and the sidewalk was white with moonlight. They 
stopped here and turned toward each other. Now it was 
a cool night with that mysterious excitement in it which 
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comes at the two changes of the year. The quiet lights in 
the houses were humming out into the darkness and 
there was a stir and bustle among the stars. Out of the 
corner of his eye Gatsby saw that the blocks of the 
sidewalk really formed a ladder and mounted to a 
secret place above the trees―he could climb to it, if he 
climbed alone, and once there he could suck on the pap 
of life, gulp down the incomparable milk of wonder. 
(117) 
 
The ellipsis works more like a transition than a clear temporal break because 
it is used in both the end of the analeptic instance and the beginning of the 
analepsis. The more romantic lyrical and detailed narrating enhances this 
memory and its narrative importance to the reader. Shortly afterwards, we 
seem to enter the mind of Gatsby totally when we share Gatsby’s point of 
view through “the corner of his eye.” We are perhaps fooled into believing 
that this is actually Gatsby’s focalization when it is, in fact, Nick the Hero’s 
or/and Nick the Narrator’s. A similar alternation of focalization occurs 
somewhat later when Gatsby tells Nick about the last evenings before he has 
to leave for the war: 
 
 When they met again two days later it was Gatsby 
who was breathless, who was somehow betrayed. Her 
porch was bright with the bought luxury of star-shine; 
the wicker of the settee squeaked fashionably as she 
turned toward him and he kissed her curious and 
lovely mouth. She had caught a cold and it made her 
voice huskier and more charming than ever and Gatsby 
was overwhelmingly aware of the youth and mystery 
that wealth imprisons and preserves, of the freshness of 
many clothes and of Daisy, gleaming like silver, safe 
and proud above the hot struggles of the poor. 
 
 “I can’t describe to you how surprised I was to find 
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out I loved her, old sport. (157) 
 
Here we move from the distanced observation of time and state of mind into 
a lively portrait of the situation at the porch. The somewhat ironic, or 
perhaps judgmental, tone of Nick the Narrator is obvious, although the 
dominant tone still is one of romance. In this section we return to the 
immediate speech of Gatsby in order to return to a different narrative mood 
before entering the focalization of Nick the narrator. 
As we have seen, the careful disposition of narrative mood and voice 
can either distance us or include us in the narrative. The alternation between 
these two modes carries nostalgic value through the ways it plays with 
nostalgia’s different temporal poles of past and present. More importantly, it 
can create a sense of nostalgia through the notion of past events (distance) as 






“‘Sometimes,’ said Julia, ‘I feel the past and the future pressing so hard on 
either side that there’s no room for the present at all’” (Waugh, Brideshead 
Revisited 262). 
 
Hypothetical time is the dissolution of time (see chapter two). In order to 
retreat into that idea let us repeat Morson’s definition of it: “In hypothetical 
time, the entire sequence of past, present, and future comes for one reason or 
another to seem insubstantial. It is as if real time were in some other 
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dimension, to which we have no access; as if our lives were a dream and real 
life were something we can only dream of” (Morson 214). I think the actual 
sense of this can be firmly experienced in the opening of T. S. Eliot’s first 
quartet: 
 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future, 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. (T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets 13) 
 
This passage accounts for the ways different times seem “insubstantial” with 
the result that time indeed is “unredeemable,” therefore nostalgic. It 
represents the first of four possible ways that hypothetical nostalgia can be 
created. Eliot’s opening defines the sense of a-temporality through its actual 
representation and description of it. 
 The second practice, close to the first one, involves imagery that 
further reinforces the image of hypothetical time. This can be illustrated by 
the use of the boat as a metaphor for time in Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Night: 
“One hurries through, even though there’s time: the past, the continent, is 
behind; the future is the glowing mouth in the side of the ship; the dim, 
turbulent alley is too confusedly the present” (259). 
The third way of doing it is stylistically through the use of all three 
tenses simultaneously. In The Waves we experience all three temporalities 
within a short span in Susan’s monologue: “Now I climb this Spanish hill; 
[…] I have sunk alone on the turf […] We may sink and settle on the waves 
[…]” (my emphasis, 116). 
The fourth possibility engages us in what we have spoken about 
earlier, an anachronic nostalgia that we can call “omnitemporality,” 
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borrowing the term from Erich Auerbach (545). Omnitemporality usually 
springs out of the prolepsis since prolepsis, preferably from a narrative that 
includes an omniscient subsequent narrator, seems to establish all kinds of 
temporal possibilities by announcing the subsequent omniscient narrating 
instance. Genette describes this omnitemporality as “a multitude of 
‘telescopic’ relationships” between all story events both spatially and 
temporally, organized by the narrator who “hold[s] all of its threads 
simultaneously […]” (78). Thus, the anachronic narrative, that uses a variety 
of analepses and prolepses, has the capacity to create an omnitemporality 
that diminishes the focus on one temporality and delivers an impression of 
timelessness. 
Let us look at how the idea of hypothetical nostalgia functions more 
pragmatically in a real context. In order to do so, we will analyze the end of 
The Great Gatsby. 
 
Hypothetical Nostalgia in The Great Gatsby 
The temporal tone of the narrative in The Great Gatsby lingers between the 
time of narrating and the time of the analepses that tell the story of the 
summer of 1922. In addition, the narrative mood and voice belongs, with few 
exceptions, entirely to either Nick the Narrator or Nick the Hero. When we 
approach the last four paragraphs, the clear change in the narrating can seem 
confusing at times.  Christine Johnson writes that this “deliberate confusion 
is carried further through the constant passing from present to past, then to 
future, and later the expression of all three at the same time” (115). This 




One aspect of this change in the narrative is how the narrating 
assumes a more non-focalized quality than we have been used to. It is 
apparent that the actual ending of the novel does not evoke the same distinct 
feeling of a “now” and “then” that we can observe in the main part of the 
narrative. We are prepared for a mythologization of the summer of 1922, an 
experience that rises out of Gatsby’s tragedy and becomes a universal truth of 
human restlessness and unwillingness to live in the present. It is therefore 
natural that time, in some way, is dissolved in the end. The universalization 
that is derived from the mythologization, both thematically and stylistically, 
voids the novel’s temporal structure. The mythologization creates a kind of 
non-fleeting dimension that “resembles,” as Hart implies, “the mythic 
world” (406-07). Hart continues defining the mythic time as a utopian one 
“which is generally designated as golden and paradisal because all 
idealizations of the actual present are there realized” (411). There always 
resides an aspect of virginal dreams of the past in the utopian ideal of the 
future, like the untouched soil of a continent before the explorative eyes of 
the Dutch Sailors. We can also approach this dissolution of time as something 
that “takes on beyond reality, beyond space, beyond time” (Johnson 114). 
Johnson notices that in the beginning of the last part, reality is represented 
only in the negative (114): “the essential houses began to melt away,” and “Its 
vanished trees” (The Great Gatsby 189).  
Since the golden era of hope and ambition symbolized by the Dutch 
sailors discovering a new continent abruptly is transformed into loss of faith 
and ruined achievements, the ontological nostalgia is one of deepest irony. 
This irony might seem as far away from nostalgia as we can imagine, but the 
notion of the human enterprise as deeply entropic is an essence of the  
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nostalgic sentiment. The a-temporal utopian and mythological dream is the 
residence of the nostalgee.  
 In the epilogue, Nick Carraway is placed “among the ruins of the 
tragedy he has witnessed; his lyrical meditations on the significance of what 
he has seen are utterly convincing and evocative of a multitude of meaning” 
(James E. Miller, 87). The tone of the prose, and the distinct reflections of his 
experiences, suggest that it is the older and wiser Nick the Narrator, with a 
more distant relation to the summer events, that actually closes the narrative, 
rather than Nick the Hero. When Nick the Narrator transforms Gatsby’s story 
to a universal human experience, it is evident that it is not an instant 
reflection. The usually sober and concrete tone is replaced by one more 
prophetic and thematic: 
 
I became aware of the old island here that flowered 
once for Dutch sailors´ eyes―a fresh, green breast of 
the new world. Its vanished trees, the trees that had 
made way for Gatsby’s house, had once pandered in 
whispers to the last and greatest of all human dreams; 
for a transitory enchanted moment man must have held 
his breath in the presence of this continent, compelled 
into an æsthetic contemplation he neither understood 
nor desired, face to face for the last time in history with 
something commensurate to his capacity for wonder. 
[…]  
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future 
that year by year recedes before us. It eludes us then, 
but that’s no matter―tomorrow we will run faster, 
stretch out our arms farther…. And one fine morning—
— 
 So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back 




The shift to universality is not only signalled through the discussions around 
the Dutch sailors exploring the new continent but also in the prose itself. We 
leave the concrete summer of 1922 together with the “inessential houses” that 
begin to “melt away” and end up in mythic expositions about the new world: 
“the old island here that flowered once for the Dutch sailors’ eyes.” The 
dissolve between houses and island, Gautam Kundu writes, expresses the 
“difference between promise and achievement, between vision and reality 
[…]” (69). The transition is further indicated through elevating Gatsby’s 
dream into “the last and greatest of all human dreams” and the change of the 
subject from “Gatsby” to a more universal “man” in the same sentence. 
Furthermore, in “Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that 
year by year recedes before us” (my emphasis), the concrete subject of the 
narrative is substituted for the more collective “us,” and in the last sentences 
Gatsby has completely vanished to make room for “we,” “us,” and “our.” 
Hypothetical time, with its fatalistic implications, is suggested by a 
final transformation of the novel’s recurring symbols and motifs. The “green 
light,” the lamp on Daisy’s dock, is substituted with “a fresh green breast” 
symbolizing the Dutch sailors’ utopian dream of the new world, a dream 
which through the words “fresh green breast” implies both a pastoral past 
and a new start. An even more deep human dream is exposed through the 
figurative connection to the mother’s breast, “the desire to be united again to 
nature as mother […]” (Johnson 113). This “breast” has also been torn to 
pieces earlier this tragic summer of 1922: “[Myrtle’s] left breast was swinging 
loose like a flap […]” (The Great Gatsby 145). We are receding both into the 
past, but also into the present; it is through the present that the past is 
defined. “The New World” is the future of the colonizers, but it is our present 
or past. In the beginning of the epilogue, the present is defined in negative 
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terms such as “vanished trees,” once a symbol for human striving, now 
chopped down to make room for Gatsby’s palace.  
 We have left Gatsby’s dream behind and, aided by the Dutch sailors’ 
dreams, reached our own longing. The summer of 1922 is still subtly present 
through the novel’s flower motifs, “the old island here that flowered” and in 
the way Gatsby’s dream about Daisy is connected with the Dutch Sailors’ 
dreams of a new world. The chopped down trees that once “pandered in 
whispers” (where “pander” eludes to forbidden love), both illustrate the new 
settlers’ exploitation of the innocent land and rouse Gatsby’s “deceitful 
attraction of the girl who is both too fragile and too corrupt to carry it” 
(Johnson 114). Furthermore, “this blue lawn” initiates the memory of 
Gatsby’s “blue gardens” in the description of the parties in chapter three, and 
the anticipation of Gatsby’s dream, that “he could hardly fail to grasp it,” 
evokes the scene when Nick first encounters Gatsby reaching out his arms 
towards the green light and the dream of Daisy. 
 The end of Gatsby includes all the themes and motifs of the novel. It 
incorporates the different emotional moods of the two nostalgic elements in 
an attempt to summarize the nostalgic experience and enhance it through 
universalization and mythologization. The style itself approaches nostalgic 
sentiment; the prose becomes more and more rhythmic the closer we get to 
the final image, “the current,” through a reduction of adjectives in favor of 
verbs, as well as through the use of shorter phrases. This evokes motion, 
perhaps a musical attempt to lure us out of our secret dreams, wishes, and 
longings. There is something deterministic in the way we are led inexorably 
towards the stream of life which represents the bleak reality of life. We “beat 
on,” fight through life, glance towards the future, but like “boats against the 
current” our fight is in vain and we are “borne back ceaselessly into the 
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past.” It is human fate, and this fate is emphasized through the “alliterate b’s 
[that] give that last sentence a decisive and final quality” (Johnson 117). 
 In the end, all dimensions of time are represented, even in one and the 
same sentence: “It eluded us then but that’s no matter―tomorrow we will 
run faster” (my emphasis). We are caught in the hypothetical time, or in the 










When we speak of nostalgic tropes we mean the use of imagery, symbols, 
metaphors, and recurring motifs that have the capacity to induce nostalgic 
sentiments in the reader. These tropes activate our sensations and emotions 
through their descriptive prose or carry nostalgic weight in their capacity for 
allusions and symbolism. The activating phase of these tropes will be traced 
back to certain quintessential aspects of the nostalgic experience, such as 
defined in chapter two and refined in the section about the essentials of 
nostalgia in chapter three. We will survey the terrain of nostalgic tropes 
under various headlines (such as ruins, seasons, voyages, and childhood) 
loosely categorizing the main essentials of nostalgic tropes. Obviously, this 
categorization gives an impression of a stricter division of different tropes 
than is actually the case. Many tropes use several approaches in order to 
connote nostalgia, and thus there is some overlap in the way they are 
presented. In addition, the term trope should not be used exclusively since 
some of the approaches to nostalgia in this chapter border on the thematic 
and contextual. 
 Necessarily, there is a speculative nature in the way the following 
readings and analyses are being performed. The personal nostalgic 
experience, the first phase of identification in the method developed in 
chapter one, is undeniably my own. As mentioned before, this can both 
exclude other nostalgic experiences and include more private ones, although 
the main object is to work as objectively as possible. I will not be addressing 
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my own biography in any way, but rather illustrating that there is a certain 
universal aspect of nostalgic tropes, at least universal in terms of the Western 
world. Drawing from the methodology developed in the previous chapters, 
this chapter will illustrate how this method can be executed. We are not 
aiming for a complete taxonomy of possible nostalgic tropes but for a few 
selected illustrative examples that will describe how our method can be used 
in other cases.  
 The concept of nostalgic tropes proceeds from the use and reuse of 
certain literary tropes in the history of literature, particularly the tropes 
established in the eighteenth-century Romantic pastoral and elegiac poetry. 
These tropes were then modified in the twentieth century to suit post-
industrial imagery and theories but kept much of the essential aspects of 
early nostalgic tropes.  Both modern and romantic nostalgic tropes share 
common ground in the way they approach the reader in their universal 
character, and this separates them from another kind of nostalgic imagery 
that we can refer to as iconographic imagery. Iconographic imagery, perhaps 
most evident in other art than literature, is the iconization of specific clichés 
that become markers for a certain time or era. An example of iconographic 
nostalgic imagery from the Victorian period is the idea of the estate, or from 
the Jazz age, the flapper, the bobbed hair, the Charleston. We will not further 
descend into this kind of nostalgic imagery since the private nature of these 
longings is difficult to incorporate in a more general theory of nostalgic 
experience. If we are nostalgic for the Jazz age before we read a story that 
deploys this era’s specific imagery, then these tropes will satisfy our nostalgic 
urge. If we are not nostalgic about the Jazz age, then this iconographic 
imagery will play no part in an eventual nostalgic experience. When we 
discuss different types of nostalgic imagery and tropes, we will not focus on 
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those that do require any particular nostalgic focus, but rather those that are 
developed from the universal essential aspects of nostalgia. 
 We have to be aware of that since we are looking particularly at 
modern texts, we are not entirely dealing with a trans-historic perspective. 
Even though the essentials of nostalgia are the same and might find universal 
expressions, they will nevertheless be fine tuned to suit the particular time 
when they are being used. The strong reaction to modernity in general 
illustrates this issue, whereas the imagery of anti-modernity becomes very 
specific for the early twentieth century. 
 Before we enter our survey of modern nostalgic tropes, let us first  
backtrack to the origins of the nostalgic tropes in Romantic poetry in order to 
firmly identify some of the most common and practiced strategies for 
nostalgic identification. Afterwards, we will briefly explore how the nostalgic 
motivators create the conditions for the nostalgic literary experience. 
 
The Romantic Nostalgic Tropes 
Aaron Santesso, in his very insightful A Careful Longing: The Poetics and 
Problems of Nostalgia, firmly locates the established tropes that were to be 
used in what he names British nostalgic poetry in the eighteenth century. 
Santesso primarily studies the nostalgic poetry of Pope, Gray, and Goldsmith 
and how they “popularized a body of nostalgic tropes, drawn from elegy 
and pastoral in the main […]” (24). Surely, the word popularized is essential 
since we can trace many of these tropes back all the way to the antiquity, but 
we find a more obvious nostalgic strategy in the eighteenth century.  
 At that time, the main nostalgic tropes and themes were derived from 
the pastoral while its emotional weight stemmed from the elegy. Two very 
general nostalgic strategies that we have mentioned before are the 
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impersonal and idealized attitude, and the use of clear dichotomies in order 
to convey a sense of past and present (Santesso 25). 
When we say “impersonal,” it is in the sense that the tropes and 
themes are not biographical or private, but more general. If they are too 
private the reader fails to comprehend the nostalgic value of them, but if they 
are more universal, like childhood for example, they simplify the nostalgic 
connection between the reader and the poem. This is one of the reasons why 
the nostalgic poets exchanged the pastoral shepherd with that of the child: 
“We can only sympathize imaginatively with a shepherd in a pastoral; we all 
have memories of childhood, and thus a personal connection to a child. […] 
Personal memory would serve as an intimate connection between the poet 
and audience member, creating a powerful emotional energy […]” (Santesso 
71). Thus the poet is “able to engage with the reader’s own nostalgia […]” 
(Santesso 71) through using a trope that irresistibly forces the reader into his 
own youth and childhood. The experience becomes personal, but the strategy 
is impersonal. 
 The idea of the idealized nostalgia originates in the pastoral’s 
preference, or longing for, another world such as Arcadia or the Golden Age, 
or less idealized and specified spaces such as childhood, nature, the exotic, or 
the rural world. The idealized spaces are, of course, related to that of the 
impersonal attitude. Santesso prefers to call the longing for utopian spaces 
cultural nostalgia (81) and they incorporate both spatial and ontological 
nostalgia. Historical nostalgia is reserved for idealized historical space and 
time such as in James Macpherson’s The Works of Ossian (1765) (Santesso 95-
96). Representative for both kind of nostalgias are that they both show a lost 
world, whether it is a real one or a fictive one. 
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The classic nostalgic dichotomy is naturally observed in these 
idealized spaces as a reaction to the “present.” Santesso identifies several 
other typical nostalgic dichotomies in his study of pastoral poetry: “rural 
versus urban, happiness versus misery, simplicity versus sophistication, 
innocence versus corruption, hospitality versus suspicion, contentment 
versus ambition, agriculture versus industry, self-sufficiency versus 
economic reliance […]” (147). In particular Gray’s “Ode on a Distant Prospect 
of Eton College” serves as an example for Santesso on how this dichotomy 
works:  
 
[…] the poem actually moves forward through the use 
of various binary oppositions or dichotomies: 
childhood as superior to adulthood, the country as 
superior to the city, a semimythical Edenic site as 
superior to the realistic squalor and evil of the modern 
world, simplicity as superior to complexity. These 
dichotomies―along with tropes such as the happy 
depiction of schooldays, childish games, innocent and 
happy competition or interaction―would recur in 
numerous nostalgic poems later in the century. (72)  
 
Santesso also identifies that the general structure, the temporality of 
the poem, follows the classical dichotomy of pleasure and regret, in that it 
first engages the reader into the pleasantness of childhood then confronts 
him with the more unpleasant reality (71). The idea that the nostalgic 
binaries can affect the structure of the poem is also mentioned by Laurence 
Lerner in The Uses of Nostalgia: Studies in Pastoral Poetry (1972): “For nostalgia 
posits two different times, a present and a longed-for-past, and on this 
contrast a poem can be built” (44). The idea of the nostalgic structure will be 
further examined in chapter six, but the notion of the dichotomy between 
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present and past will prove important also in the nostalgic imagery. 
Consequently, the conventions of modern nostalgic tropes evolve out 
of the idealized spaces and the nostalgic dichotomies from romantic nostalgic 
poetry. The most common tropes are the tropes of idyllic, innocent 
childhood; the nostalgic childhood tropes, therefore, will then be everything 
associated with childhood such as children, children’s games, and toys. 
Santesso writes that Schiller argued that children are also associated with 
nature because “children were emblematic of a lost relationship with nature” 
(Santesso 70). Nostalgic childhood tropes, then, come to symbolize nature as 
well. 
 Likewise, we see a great representation of longings for other idealized 
spaces, whether it is the deserted village representing a lost rural life style in 
Goldsmiths’ “The Deserted Village” or a fondness for the exotic in terms of 
idealized savages, natives, and simplicity in Gray’s “The Progress of Poesy.” 
 In addition, several tropes function as a reminder of passing times 
such as the use of astronomical imagery in some of Dryden’s elegies which 
are associated with “the ideas of decay, collapse, and change […]” (Santesso 
34) or the potent symbol of the ruin as a metaphor for change as in this stanza 
from Dryden’s “Mac Flecknoe”: 
 
An ancient fabrick, rais’d t’ inform the sight, 
There stood of yore, and Barbican it hight: 
A watch Tower once,; but now, so Fate ordains, 
Of all the Pile an empty name remains. (lines 66-69) 
 
The ruin becomes symptomatic for the time arrow in that everything (“so 
Fate ordains”) inevitably will decay and die. 
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Santesso concludes that “[m]odern nostalgic tropes might be 
different―white picket fences rather than village squares―but certain tropes 
still act as triggers that cause us to engage in nostalgic reflection” (188). Many 
of the romantic nostalgic tropes can be identified in modern fiction.  
 
Nostalgic Motivators 
The nostalgic tropes derived from the imagination of the romantic poets are 
inevitably connected with the idea of nostalgic motivation and memorative 
signs; they are based on symbols, images, or situations that can cause 
nostalgic reactions in the reader. Obviously, these tropes as nostalgic 
motivators are different from the real motivators. In internal nostalgia, our 
motivators are connected in one way or another to our private biography, 
whereas fictive nostalgic motivators aim either for a more external nostalgic 
consciousness or, at least as we saw with the romantic nostalgia, a more 
impersonal history. The universality of these tropes, then, possibly targets 
private memories through their very universal and open nature. Their 
vagueness allows for private identifications instead of exclusion. In the 
universality of, for example, childhood lies the possibility of a reader 
identifying the images or situation with his own private childhood. The 
tropes become transparent. In this case, we can only trace in theory the 
motivating aspect and its probability, and not the exact involvement of 
private memory. We can just be assured that this is the general chain of 
events and that the involvement of internal nostalgia is important in the 
fictive nostalgic experience. However, there might also be cases where the 
actual trope, its aesthetic quality as universal, triggers a less internal and 
more external nostalgia through the use of a convention and a cliché. 
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The memorative signs that fall into our category of nostalgic imagery 
are sensations and situations (see chapter two). Tropes containing material 
that alludes to or is associated with passing times, seasons, and recurring 
events prove effectual in evoking nostalgia. Let us look at a few examples of 
different kind of nostalgic tropes that use some, or all, of above memorative 
signs as a base for motivating nostalgic reactions. Since the catalyst of 
nostalgic tropes is the time arrow, we will start more generally with time, 
decay, universal grief and then move into more refined tropes that are based 
on these essentials. Before that, let us look at a key ingredient in nostalgic 
imagery: how a variety of our sensations are triggered. Just like the case with 
anachronies, nostalgic imagery benefits from addressing our sensations. 
 
Attracting the Senses 
Willa Cather writes in O Pioneers! (1913): 
 
There are few scenes more gratifying than a spring 
plowing in that country, where the furrows of a single 
field often lie a mile in length, and the brown earth, 
with such a strong, clean smell, and such a power of 
growth and fertility in it, yields itself eagerly to the 
plow; rolls away from the shear, not even dimming the 
brightness of the metal, with a soft, deep sigh of 
happiness. (29) 
 
It is a remarkable memoir of the prairie in that the prose attracts many of our 
senses and creates a distinct physical, sensational experience in us. It is 
visually striking in the description of the metal plow, bright and shining in 
the spring sun accompanied by its metaphoric sound of happiness as well as 
the use of the onomatopoetic “roll.” What stands out is its olfactory 
approach, the clear smell of earth, a smell we all relate to. The image of the 
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plow triggers several sensations in us, and it is a good example of how 
nostalgic imagery works; in recreating the phenomenology of experience as a 
whole, it creates a higher degree of possible identification with either the 
literary past or one’s own memories. 
Vivid imagery that attracts the senses captures the reader’s totality of 
senses and thus transports him into experiencing the situation or atmosphere 
with great emotion. This is perhaps more important when it comes to the 
evocation of an emotion and mood such as nostalgia. The physical aspect 
makes it more probable that the reader will associate the literary emotion 
with an event or mood of his own life and this will perhaps bear nostalgic 
connotations. As we have seen in chapter two, nostalgia is more often tied to 
strong sensations from sounds and smells, and in attracting these particular 
senses, nostalgic imagery opens up possible nostalgic connotations.  
 The representative quality of nostalgic imagery, like the romantic 
tropes, arises out of universal experiences of nature, landscapes, potentially 
romantic situations, and symbols that evoke the idea of time, the passing of 
time, and the repetition of time such as seasons. The sense of physicality does 
not necessary need to be lyrical in the sense of Woolf or Joyce, but we also 
find it, although with a different strategy, in the opening of Hemingway’s A 
Farewell to Arms (1929). Hemingway’s barren and repetitious style actually 
reinforces the sense of cold autumn: 
 
In the late summer of that year we lived in a house in a 
village that looked across the river and the plain to the 
mountains. In the bed of the river there were pebbles 
and boulders, dry and white in the sun, and the water 
was clear and swiftly moving and blue in the channels. 
Troops went by the house and down the road and the 
dust they raised powdered the leaves of the trees. The 
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trunks of the trees too were dusty and the leaves fell 
early that year and we saw the troops marching along 
the road and the dust rising and leaves, stirred by the 
breeze, falling and the soldiers marching and afterward 
the road bare and white except for the leaves. (3) 
 
Although A Farewell to Arms is not explicitly a nostalgic story, with the 
exception of Henry missing some of his old friends like the priest, it can 
create a nostalgic experience in the reader. It is a very physical narrative, and 
the repetitions of words that are associated with landscape, weather, also 
associate indirectly to the physical. Usually it is a feeling of freezing, hunger, 
and tiredness. In the quotation above we encounter the words “dust” and 
“leaves” with such regularity that these keywords are hammered into our 
reading consciousness. We do not only read about autumn, we feel it. And 
feeling it allow us to emotionally connect this literary autumn with any 
strong memory of our own past autumns. Similarly, the presence of rain and 
fog in chapter twenty-four, when Henry spends a last evening with 
Catherine before boarding the train to the front, reinforces how this event 
becomes a particularly emotional one. Someone is “crossing the street in 
rain” (141), a “horse’s head [is] hanging in the rain” (141), they are walking 
“down the wet walk” (141) while “water [is] running in the gutter” (141). 
Two carabineers are “standing under the light just out of the rain” (142), the 
“rain [is] clear and transparent against the light from the station” (142), a 
porter’s shoulder’s are “up against the rain” (142) and Henry steps out of the 
carriage and “out into the rain” (142). Since the war atmosphere is not the 
summers of our youth but rather a cold and hungry muddy winter, the 
physical sense of this season creates an utter longing for something else, 
which accompanies, of course, the idea of the book about a farewell to war 
and a longing for peace. Hemingway manages to allow the reader to share 
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his characters’ longing for a time and space outside war and winter through 
his physical prose, and this longing inhabits the nostalgia for the future 
almost in an ontological way. 
 It is not only in the physical that nostalgic memory works, but it is 
even more powerful when the imagery is infused with sounds or smell. 
Sound and smell are particularly important, since the occurrence of sound 
and smell simulates how our own memory works. 
 In Tender is the Night, as well as The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald often 
refers to music as a way to make his images more prone to nostalgic 
identification. In Tender is the Night, sounds can often be heard from a 
distance, as a way of conveying the act of hearing while not really 
participating at the same time. “The thin tunes, holding lost times and future 
hopes in liaison, twisted upon the Valais night” (29), “A small orchestra was 
playing astern” (335) or “Someone had brought a phonograph into the bar 
and they sat listening to ‘The Wedding of the Painted Doll’” (316) are typical 
references to music. Fitzgerald often quotes lines from popular songs or 
titles, as in the last quotation here, and these popular references, of course, 
carry a stronger nostalgic weight for contemporary readers. Nevertheless, the 
eternal existence of a musical space does encourage and open up more 
possibilities for nostalgic experiences in any reader. 
 Evocations of smell are equally important, as we could see in the 
quotation above from O Pioneers! Olfactory sensations more than anything 
else, seem to be profoundly connected with memory. Hence the imagination 
of past autumn in Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited (1945) is strongly built 
up around the scent of the gillyflowers “now yielded to the damp leaves 
[…]” (95). Smell can be activated less explicitly through associations to smell 
rather than descriptions of the smell itself. Such is the case in the description 
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of the orchard in O Pioneers! where the enumeration of flowers forcefully also 
carries olfactory values of summer in the experience: 
 
All sorts of weeds and herbs and flowers had grown up 
there; splotches of wild larkspur, pale green-and-white 
spikes of hoarhound, plantations of wild cotton, tangles 
of foxtail and wild wheat. South of the apricot trees, 
cornering on the wheatfield, was Frank’s alfalfa, where 
myriads of white and yellow butterflies were always 
fluttering above the purple blossoms. (58) 
 
We have observed several examples of the ways imagery containing 
associations to sound and smell possibly trigger nostalgic memories in 
addressing the phenomenology of nostalgic memory. Although we will not 
analyze other sensations deeper, at least they should be mentioned. Taste has 
been proven to also have a nostalgic connotation as confirmed by the famous 
Madeleine cake in Du côté de chez Swann. Somewhat more unusual perhaps, 
but still persuasive, is the triggering of feelings of physical touch. The spring 
fields in O Pioneers! turn in winter into frozen ground “so hard that it bruises 
the foot to walk in the roads or in the ploughed fields” (73). 
  
Clock Time 
The crucial element of nostalgia and nostalgic mood is undeniably the time 
arrow: the irreversibility of time and the fading of all stable molecules 
around us, whether that is a sand castle, a human life, or the universe. Most 
of the nostalgic tropes owe something to the teleological aspect of time, a 




The famous dichotomy of clock time and inner time (Bergsonian 
duration) has proven a common strategy to exploit the teleological aspects of 
nostalgia. The occurrence of time markers, flagging clock time as an 
impatient but steady beat towards decay and death, are common enough. 
The most famous example is the use of clock time in Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway 
where the recurring sound from Big Ben constantly reminds the reader of the 
time arrow, and this, in turn, becomes a huge contrast to the subjective 
Bergsonian time of the characters which enables a temporality that fights 
against clock time. Time markers can thus be as simple as a reminder of 
clocks, as in Mrs Dalloway, or time experienced by its characters such as Dick 
Diver “listening to time” while “listening to the buzz of the electric clock 
[…]” (Fitzgerald, Tender is the Night 213). Time markers can also be more 
grammatical as an extended use of time indicators such as tense inflections 
and time adverbials. In our analysis of nostalgia in Faulkner’s The Sound and 
the Fury (1929) in chapter seven we will discuss the idea of time further. 
 
Ruins and Decay 
The idea of the ruin as a prime symbol of decay and past time is a potent one. 
Nowhere is this stronger than in the notion of the sand castle that so quickly 
deteriorates into a sand ruin. A fine example of the use of ruin imagery is in 
the first chapter of Under the Volcano where we are thrown into an 
atmosphere of decay and ruins, a chapter which forms the spring board for 
past times since it is the last segment of the story with feelings of 
remembrance and forgetfulness for a day exactly one year before. M. Laurelle 
walks around “deserted swimming pools” (10), “dead tennis courts” (11), a 
sleeping platform (13), “a faded blue Ford, a total wreck” (19). The desolation 
is further enhanced by “small, black, ugly birds” (19), “[w]indy shadows 
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[that] swept the pavements” (29) and a “crash of thunder” which twitches off 
the street lights (30).  These ruins, gloomy images, and sounds contain the 
sentiment of change and something lost but they also illustrate 
metaphorically the havoc of a man, Geoffrey Firmin. The perception of this 
angst reaches a climax in two images: a deserted plough and an abandoned 
palace. The image of the plough, more emblematic in its presentation as a 
silhouette, clearly indicates the decayed spirit of the consul through its 
allusion to a human form: “there was a row of dead trees. An abandoned 
plough, silhouetted against the sky, raised its arms to heaven in mute 
supplication […]” (15). The abandoned palace creates an ever stronger sense 
of decay through the heavy use of negative adjectives and a prose 
stimulating primarily the olfactory senses: 
 
The broken pink pillars, in the half-light, might have 
been waiting to fall down on him: the pool, covered 
with green scum, its steps torn away and hanging by 
one rotting clamp, to close over his head. The shattered 
evil-smelling chapel, overgrown with weeds, the 
crumbling walls, splashed with urine, on which 
scorpions lurked – wrecked entablature, sad archivolt, 
slippery stones covered with excreta – this place, where 
love had once brooded, seemed part of a nightmare. 
(20) 
 
The insertion of the positive, past love, is an effective juxtaposition and 
accentuation to the decay which becomes a more pleasant alternative to the 
present. It reinforces the nostalgia in creating alternatives to the unpleasant 
present. The use of binaries once more focuses on the decay and makes it 
darker and stronger. Throughout the first chapter of Under the Volcano, we 
find numerous openings to idealized and mythological places that work in 
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contradiction to the abashed present. There are direct allusions to the 
“Earthly Paradise” (16) or more implicit references to biblical events, 
identified by Chris Ackerley and Lawrence J. Clipper (52), such as the 
allusion to psalm 8:3-5: “What, after all, was a Consul that one was mindful 
of him?” (Under the Volcano 35). Further biblical allusions are the etymology 
of the consul’s name, Geoffrey (“God’s peace” or “beloved of God”) 
(Ackerley and Clipper 32), and the constant references to him as Adam, the 
connections to Swedenborg, and Doré’s painting of Dante’s paradise (Under 
the Volcano 11). Hints of more mythological places are also found in the 
references to the seven daughters of Atlas and Pleione, the old Aztec myths, 
in the sentence “Nights of the Culmination of the Pleiades!” (35), and 
references to Atlantis through a film (21). The consul’s high regard for 
William Blackstone, a man who left the Puritans in Massachusetts in 1635 to 
live close to the Indians and nature, seems to represent this general idea of 
the simplicity of life and man’s return to nature, “away from the people with 
ideas” (96). Together with a multitude of references to the Earthly Paradise or 
other mythological spaces, as well as more historical nostalgias prior to the 
age of modernity, these idealized spaces provide both a sense of longing and 
a contrast to the present tensions of a looming world war. 
 In Stephen King’s “The Body” we meet a similar, but more consequent 
strategy of infusing the town of his childhood with the ruins and changes of 
modern times. Although not ruins in the strict sense, the “moving company” 
(293) that replaces the old tree house, the “motorcycle track” (332) built on 
the overgrown scrubland, and the river that “had narrowed up quite a bit 
during the years between” (354) all represent change and become internal 
ruins. The notion that these changes are something bad, something 
simulating the passage of times, is conveyed through a brilliant metaphor 
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where the new suburbs “have spread out like the tentacles of a giant squid” 
(300). 
 As we have seen, the image of the ruin and representations of decay 
are excellent metaphors for triggering one of the essentials of nostalgia: that 
of the time arrow. Nostalgia might be a force against change and decay; 
however, these images of change and decay are the very ingredients that 
essentially trigger nostalgia. 
 
Natural Elements 
Natural elements provide both change and stability, a set of binaries that can 
be very useful in creating nostalgic imagery. They convey romantic lyrical 
spaces as well as symbolize the passage of time and the universality of 
situations. 
 The deeply profound symbolism of water, sea, and especially waves 
has attracted human thought for ages through their associations with both 
the repetitiveness and passing of time.  The waves’ notion of change and 
obfuscation, and their relation to very basic natural elements, made them 
appropriate both as the title and the essential motif in Woolf’s The Waves, a 
novel deeply engaged in the topic of time. The use of the interludes 
describing the changing character (different waves) of an unchangeable 
activity (waves) reminds the reader repetitively about the paradox of the 
passing of life and the universe’s circle of life through death and resurrection. 
This reinforces the sense of the individual fate of one life, and the 
insignificance of this one life in a cosmic perspective. Waves stimulate a 
backtracking activity since they erase our marks in the sand and thus our 
own identities. Just mentioning a wave in prose will not automatically 
convey all its associations. We need waves that sound, smell, and can be felt 
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and thus have the capacity to transport us to our own waves. Woolf manages 
to give her waves exactly this physical appearance in the absolute beginning 
of the narrative: 
 
The sun had not yet risen. The sea was indistinguishable 
from the sky, except that the sea was slightly creased as if a 
cloth had wrinkles in it. Gradually as the sky whitened a dark 
line lay on the horizon dividing the sea from the sky and the 
grey cloth became barred with thick strokes moving, one after 
another, beneath the surface, following each other, pursuing 
each other, perpetually. 
 As they neared the shore each bar rose, heaped itself, broke 
and swept a thin veil of white water across the sand. The 
wave paused, and then drew out again, sighing like a sleeper 
whose breath comes and goes unconsciously. (3) 
 
The analogy to the human activity of breathing forces the reader to associate 
these waves with life, in addition to the other associations he may make. 
More so, the analogy also relates to children, or children sleeping, and how 
we as adults listen to their breaths, which is highly appropriate since these 
waves are supposed to symbolize the aging of man in the change of their 
nature and appearance through the novel. Accordingly, we meet the 
protagonists as children when their heartbeats resemble “thick strokes 
moving” and potently sweeping “a thin veil of white water across the sand.” 
When the protagonists are older the waves also illustrate their older age as in 
this example of late middle age: 
 
Red and gold shot through the waves, in rapid running 
arrows, feathered with darkness. Erratically rays of light 
flashed and wandered, like signals from sunken islands, or 
darts shot through laurel groves by shameless, laughing boys. 
But the waves, as they neared the shore, were rubbed of light, 
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and fell in one long concussion, like a wall falling, a wall of 
grey stone, unpierced by any chink of light. (117) 
 
The late middle age waves are contrasted to the childhood waves (relatively 
light descriptions of childhood with smoothing and calm words, and waves 
that emancipated out of the sky as the sun rose) in a remembrance of those 
early waves. The brightness of the early waves is hinted at the description of 
rays of light that flash and wander erratically and the lostness of childhood 
established in the metaphor of “signals from sunken islands” as well as in the 
mentioning of “laughing boys.” Through the sunset’s colours and a wandering 
light which abruptly ends, we enter the reality of old age: the dark, utterly 
dark waves that are passionless and motionless. The last sentence in the book 
is even robbed of any kind of life, or at least prosaic life: “The waves broke on 
the shore” (167). 
The idea of waves as a symbol is not novel at all, and just precisely 
because of that, it tends to function as a representation for the tragic and 
melancholic ingredients of life to the readers. The geniality of The Waves lies 
in the way the image of the waves alters and echoes the past images of the 
waves in order to contemplate the passage of time. The sensation of the 
waves also infiltrates the whole rhythm of the book, which further enhances 
its nostalgic potentials. “I am writing to a rhythm, not to a plot” (Woolf, A 
Reflection of the Other Person 204), wrote Woolf, and in fact the novel’s tempo 
is governed by the rhythm of the waves. One could say that Woolf’s style is 
an undulating style. Not only in the novel’s general structure, as in the 
recurring interludes, do we find this rhythm but also in the text itself. The 
rhythm in the first waves, “thick strokes moving, one after another, beneath the 
surface, following each other, pursuing each other, perpetually” (3) can be likened  
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to how the characters are presented in a rhythmic fashion that resembles 
these first waves: 
 
‘I see a ring,’ said Bernard, ‘hanging above me. It 
quivers and hangs in a loop of light.’ 
 ‘I see a slab of pale yellow,’ said Susan, ‘spreading 
away until it meets a purple stripe.’ 
 ‘I hear a sound,’ said Rhoda, ‘cheep, chirp, cheep, 
chirp; going up and down.’ 
 ‘I see a globe,’ said Neville, ‘hanging down in a drop 
against the enormous flanks of some hill.’ 
 ‘I see a crimson tassel,’ said Jinny, ‘twisted with gold 
threads.’ 
 ‘I hear something stamping,’ said Louis. ‘A great 
beast’s foot is chained. It stamps, and stamps, and 
stamps.’ (4) 
 
The rhythm of the waves is echoed in the use of the same opening word “I” 
in each sentence. Furthermore, every speaker’s line split by the word “said,” 
the absence of descriptions of how these lines are said, and even the 
repetitions within Rhoda’s and Louis’s lines, emphasize this rhythm. In 
addition, the tremendous over-representation of the “s,” “sh,” and “ch” 
sounds reverberate the sounds of the waves entering the shore. 
Waves are a common motif for Woolf, and they are used frequently in 
Jacob’s Room (1922) and Mrs Dalloway, not only as a natural phenomena but 
also more figuratively: “Tears made all the dahlias in her garden undulate in 
red waves and flashed the glass house in her eyes […]” (Jacob’s Room 1) and 
“this scent, this colour, and Miss Pym liking her, trusting her, were a wave 
which she let flow over her and surmount that hatred […]” (Mrs Dalloway 
10). In To the Lighthouse we meet the wave in numerous metaphors and 
images and one noteworthy example is when Mrs. Ramsay contemplates 
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how the waves alter meaning from being “a measured and soothing tattoo to 
her thoughts and seemed consolingly to repeat over and over again […] the 
words of some old cradle song […]” to liken “a ghostly roll of drums [that] 
remorselessly beat the measure of life […]” (19). The way in which the sea 
both comforts and creates existential broodings can be seen later when Lily 
Briscoe and William Bankes brood over the sea: 
 
 They both smiled, standing there. They both felt a 
common hilarity, excited by the moving waves; and 
then by the swift cutting race of a sailing boat, which, 
having sliced a curve in the bay, stopped; shivered; let 
its sail drop down; and then, with a natural instinct to 
complete the picture, after this swift movement, both of 
them looked at the dunes far away, and instead of 
merriment felt come over them some sadness – because 
the thing was completed partly, and partly because 
distant views seem to outlast by a million years (Lily 
thought) the gazer and to be communing already with a 
sky which beholds an earth entirely at rest. (24-25) 
 
In a way, their reaction simulates the nostalgic reaction with its movement 
from “hilarity” into “sadness.” They appreciate the beauty of nature while 
still identifying that this beauty is not, what the waves suggest, eternal. 
However, in the end there will be “an earth entirely at rest.” The sense of this 
grief will be further explored under the section “Universal Grief” below. 
The common image of the sea and water is infused with additional 
romance in the famous wading scene in Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man. In a similar fashion as with Woolf, the lyrical language and 




 There was a long rivulet in the strand and, as he 
waded slowly up its course, he wondered at the endless 
drift of seaweed. Emerald and black and russet and 
olive, it moved beneath the current, swaying and 
turning. The water of the rivulet was dark with endless 
drift and mirrored the highdrifting clouds. The clouds 
were drifting above him silently and silently the 
seatangle was drifting below him and the grey warm air 
was still and a new wild life was singing in his veins. 
(184) 
 
The musical pattering of the sentences’ pausing elements creates a syntactical 
rhythm that corresponds with that of the drifting seaweed. The use of “and” 
in the second and final sentence creates this flow and adds a sense of awe to 
the experience through the and’s impatient qualities. Similar to the romantic 
nostalgic poets who used astronomical symbols to represent the passing of 
time, the clouds in this sequence, and particularly their movements, also 
signal this passing of time. The two last sentences mirror each other and 
create a sense of cinematic fast motion that poetically adds to the romance 
and emotionality of this experience. 
 In addition to Woolf’s waves, Joyce’s wading sequence takes an image 
of time and life and their irreversibility and charges it with a proper romantic 
meeting, an idealization of love. The girl who stands still before the hero and 
gazes out to sea is likened to a “beautiful seabird” in order to nostalgically 
place her outside culture and inside a lost nature. The description of her 
creates an almost mythological figure in its idealization and sensuality: 
 
Her long slender bare legs were delicate as a crane’s 
and pure save where an emerald trail of seaweed had 
fashioned itself as a sign upon the flesh. Her thighs, 
fuller and softhued as ivory, were bared almost to the 
hips, where the white fringes of her drawers were like 
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feathering of soft white down. Her slateblue skirts were 
kilted boldly about her waist and dovetailed behind 
her. Her bosom was as a bird’s, soft and slight, slight 
and soft as the breast of some darkplumaged dove. But 
her long hair was girlish: and girlish, and touched with 
the wonder of mortal beauty, her face. (185) 
 
It could be argued that this scene is just romantic and not nostalgic, but there 
are elements that grant it this aura of nostalgia. We are stimulated 
nostalgically through the idealization of the woman and the placement of her 
in a typical detailed nostalgic scene where we observe her from a distance. 
Explicit is the joyful creation of a nostalgic memory, a nostalgic moment, but 
it seems to lack the last part of the nostalgic reaction: the melancholic 
disposition of the fading of this moment. And a moment it is, almost as if the 
world stops for a moment and as if the cyclic process of life suddenly comes 
to a still image: a gaze, a meeting when she feels his presence: 
 
Long, long she suffered his gaze and then quietly 
withdrew her eyes from his and bent them towards the 
stream, gently stirring the water with her foot hither 
and thither. The first faint noise of gently moving water 
broke the silence, low and faint and whispering, faint as 
the bells of sleep; hither and thither, hither and thither; 
and a faint flame trembled on her cheek. (185) 
 
To illustrate the stoppage of time, the use of audible and onomatopoetic 
words when she starts to wade again, is stressed in order to emphasize 
movement and movement’s sounds. Furthermore, she enters into the cyclic 
world once again through the repetitions of the words “hither” and “thither” 
and is almost swallowed up by nature and memory. The coda of this section 
encourages us to see the wading episode as something lost. The memory is 
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still joyful but less enthusiastic, and a more saddened and wistful tone is 
experienced together with the protagonist. This effect is created by the cycle 
of falling asleep and awakening, a suitable metaphor for this transformation 
from exuberant happiness into melancholia. First the protagonist closes his 
eyes in remembrance of the recent meeting, a sensation that echoes several of 
the motifs from the actual wading scene: 
 
His eyelids trembled as if they felt the vast cyclic 
movement of the earth and her watchers, trembled as if 
they felt the strange light of some new world. His soul 
was swooning into some new world, fantastic, dim, 
uncertain as under sea, traversed by cloudy shapes and 
beings. A world, a glimmer or a flower? Glimmering 
and trembling, trembling and unfolding, a breaking 
light, an opening flower, it spread in endless succession 
to itself, breaking in full crimson and unfolding and 
fading to palest rose, leaf by leaf and wave of light by 
way of light, flooding all the heavens with its soft 
flushes, every flush deeper than other. (186-87) 
 
Then, when he awakens and contemplates his memory from the sand-hill 
there is a stroke of melancholia in his imagination: 
 
Evening had fallen. A rim of the young moon cleft the 
pale waste of skyline, the rim of a silver hoop 
embedded in grey sand; and the tide was flowing in 
fast to the land with a low whisper of her waves, 
islanding a few last figures in distant pools. (187) 
 
It is a more desolate atmosphere: gone are the “lightclad figures, wading and 
delving” (184); instead “a few last figures,” isolated from each other, stand in 
a fast changing landscape that will soon turn into complete darkness. The 
tide will erase all tracks of these waders, including the girl herself. 
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Seasons 
The use of seasons, such as the autumn in A Farewell to Arms, or situational, 
ritual events such as Easter or Christmas, is a very common practice in order 
to remind the reader of times in his own life that function nostalgically (see 
chapter two). What could often be named the cliché of each season is what 
initiates this identification, mainly because they are more representational 
and impersonal. Therefore, there is a heavy over-representation of the use of 
clichés of seasons such as the crickets of summer, or the snow of winter in 
nostalgic narratives of the Western world.  
One prime example that uses the concept of snow, winter and the 
season of Christmas to evoke nostalgia occurs in the scene when Nick 
remembers his childhood train rides home for Christmas in the end of The 
Great Gatsby: 
 
 One of my most vivid memories is of coming back 
west from prep school and later from college at 
Christmas time […] I remember the fur coats of the girls 
returning from Miss This or That’s and the chatter of 
frozen breath and the hands waving overhead as we 
caught sight of old acquaintances and the matchings of 
invitations: “Are you going to the Ordways’? the 
Herseys’? the Schultzes’?” and the long green tickets 
clasped right in our gloved hands. And last the murky 
yellow cars of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Railroad looking cheerful as Christmas itself on the 
tracks beside the gate. 
 When we pulled out into the winter night and the 
real snow, our snow, began to stretch out beside us and 
twinkle against the windows, and the dim lights of 
small Wisconsin stations moved by, a sharp wild brace 
came suddenly into the air. We drew in deep breaths of 
it as we walked back from dinner through the cold 
vestibules, unutterably aware of our identity with this 
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country for one strange hour before we melted 
indistinguishably into it again. 
 That’s my middle-west―not the wheat or the 
prairies or the lost Swede towns but the thrilling, 
returning trains of my youth and the street lamps and 
sleigh bells in the frosty dark and the shadows of holly 
wreaths thrown by lighted windows on the snow. (183-
84) 
 
It is a mixture of both specific details, such as family names, and the specific 
colour of the train cars and details that are more inclined towards a general 
memory of snow, winter, Christmas, and home. No matter nationality or 
time, these details will remind us of our own youthful train trips home for 
Christmas by describing some of the clichés of the Christmas season. We also 
recognize the rhythms seen in The Waves and A Portrait of a Young Man, 
especially in the use of multiple “and” in order to create a coherent tempo of 
awe and fascination and curiosity. It is primarily the narrator’s implicit 
excitement to which we respond. 
 Just like winter has its clichés, summer seems to always be paralleled 
with the sound of crickets. Stephen King’s (or the narrator’s) perception of 
childhood summer in “The Body” is no exception, but he adds several other, 
less common but still convincing, connotations of summer. These 
connotations, although quite personal and exclusive, work very well in 
creating possible more impersonal identifications with childhood summer, 
mainly through the use of sounds. It is the sound of “change jingling” in the 
pockets while running, and “the sweet hum of crickets, the machine-gun roar 






The train memory also touches upon another important nostalgic device, that 
of voyages. Voyaging is, in a way, a cultural equivalent to the natural wave. It 
represents change, movement, passing of time, and new spaces. It can be a 
movement from one place and time to another and thus incorporate both two 
temporalities and two worlds. Susan Anderson has pointed out in her article 
“Time, Subjectivity, and Modernism in E. Nesbit’s Children’s Fiction” that the 
use of moving devices has the powerful capacity to link different spaces and 
different times. She mentions the way the plane in Mrs Dalloway “emphasizes 
the spatial relationship of city and country […]” (311) and the railway in 
Nesbit’s The Railway Children “provides a similar metaphorical link between 
the children’s lives before and after the arrest of their father […]” (312).  
 The metaphor of travelling fits well into the dichotomy of nostalgia. It 
is fundamentally representative of our own memories of change and 
happiness. Fitzgerald, for example, is very fond of using the voyage as an 
expression for this kind of nostalgic space and time, be it in boats, cars, or 
trains. The voyage could be a “going home” as in Nick’s memory of his train 
rides home for Christmas or as in Dick Diver’s ride on a local train heading 
home for his father’s funeral in Tender is the Night, where he sees “a star he 
knew, and a cold moon bright over Chesapeake Bay […]” (258). Dick also 
hears “the rasping wheels of buckboards turning, the lovely fatuous voices, 
the sound of sluggish primeval rivers flowing softly under soft Indian 
names” (258).  
 Travelling could also be “going away,” leaving something behind as in 
Fitzgerald’s short story “‘The Sensible Thing’,” where the main character, 
George, embarks on a train journey away from a lost love towards an  
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uncertain future. The memory of his love, fading irrecoverably into the past 
is conveyed brilliantly through the use of the nostalgic image of the train: 
 
 Past clanging street-crossings, gathering speed 
through wide suburban spaces toward the sunset. 
Perhaps she too would see the sunset and pause for a 
moment, turning, remembering, before he faded with 
her sleep into the past. The night’s dusk would cover up 
forever the sun and the trees and the flowers and 
laughter of his young world. (159) 
 
The sense of change is materialized through the dichotomy between urban 
space and nature (sunset) and in the way the descriptions of speed and of 
what is left behind (street-crossing, suburban space) mimics time itself. Using 
the sunset as a point of reference actually amplifies their growing distance 
while he is travelling down the train tracks. At the same time it retains the 
memory of their love. Metaphorically this journey results in an aging 
process; George is leaving the world of youth behind him as well as the 
memory. In the last sentence of this passage, we once again become 
acquainted with the nostalgic method of creating awe through the syntactical 
patterning of “and.” 
 This sense of leaving something behind is also significant when 
Charles Ryder reflects upon his last visit to Brideshead in Brideshead Revisited: 
 
But as I drove away and turned back in the car to take 
what promised to be my last view of the house, I felt 
that I was leaving part of myself behind, and that 
wherever I went afterwards I should feel the lack of it, 
and search for it hopelessly, as ghosts are said to do, 
frequenting the spots where they buried material 
treasures without which they cannot pay their way to 
the nether world. (157-58) 
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Travelling plays an important part as a definition of change in D. H. 
Lawrence’s The Lost Girl (1920) as well. Alvina leaves England to accompany 
her new lover Ciccio to Naples. The initial train ride from London captures 
verbally the sense of leaving something behind: 
 
And so the big, heavy train drew out, leaving the others 
small and dim on the platform. It was foggy, the river 
was a sea of yellow beneath the ponderous iron bridge. 
The morning was dim and dank. (293) 
 
The separation between past and future takes a more dramatic turn when 
they board the ship that will take them over the channel. Lawrence uses clear 
contrasts to create this transition from one space (and time) to another. First, 
Alvina and Ciccio are standing looking in the direction they are travelling: 
 
The sea was very still. The sun was fairly high in the 
open sky, where white cloud-tops showed against the 
pale, wintry blue. Across the sea came a silver sun-
track. And Alvina and Ciccio looking at the sun, which 
stood a little to the right of the ship’s course. (293) 
 
The future, or the idea of the future for Alvina, is bright and beautiful, 
almost, as we will see later, utopian. What she is leaving behind is less 
attractive: 
 
So they turned to walk to the stern of the boat. And 
Alvina’s heart suddenly contracted. She caught Ciccio’s 
arm, as the boat rolled gently. For there behind, behind 
all the sunshine, was England. England, beyond the 
water, rising with ash-grey, corpse-grey cliffs, and 
streaks of snow on the downs above. England, like a 
long, ash-grey coffin slowly submerging. She watched 
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it, fascinated and terrified. It seemed to repudiate the 
sunshine, to remain unilluminated, long and ash-grey 
and dead, with streaks of snow like cerements. That 
was England! Her thoughts flew to Woodhouse, the 
grey centre of it all. Home! (294) 
 
This is an example of hypothetical nostalgia (see chapter two), apodemialgia, a 
longing away from home. Like ordinary nostalgia, it is situated in a 
dissatisfaction in the present and a longing somewhere else, just that this 
somewhere is not home but away. The away for Alvina will be externally a 
world that will represent old classic rural values, but internally, in line with 
Lawrence’s interests, something new, the exotic, erotic, free, that can be found 
in nature rather than in culture. In this sense, as a contrast to the “ash-grey, 
corpse-grey cliffs,” this voyage is nothing else than a utopian dream, an 
ambition and desire to enter an idealized space. Alvina realizes this herself: 
 
For the first time the nostalgia of the vast Roman and 
classic world took possession of her […] it was to 
escape from the smallish perfection of England, into the 
grander imperfection of a great continent. (297) 
 
The notion of approaching a natural human state, symbolized by the beauty 
and freshness of the landscape, is also experienced subconsciously by Alvina 
in the way she seems to be aware of this natural state in herself: 
 
When morning came, and the bleary people pulled the 
curtains, it was a clear dawn, and they were in the 
south of France. There was no sign of snow. The 
landscape was half southern, half Alpine. White houses 
with brownish tiles stood among almond trees and 
cactus. It was beautiful, and Alvina felt she had known  
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it all before, in a happier life. The morning was graceful 
almost as spring. (297) 
 
The final fanfare occurs at next day’s sunset, where “she saw the golden 
dawn, a golden sun coming out of level country” (299). 
 Voyages, then, function both as an escape from the present and a 




Nostalgia, as in the case of Alvina above, is really nostalgia for the natural 
state of existence, much the same as the Romantic’s urge for the rural and 
idealized ancient times. Nostalgia’s objection to modernity and the use of 
animatedly contrasting images to influence the reader to join the narrative’s 
lust for nature (past times) is often explicit in Lawrence’s works. The strategy 
of juxtaposing the natural and the cultural is evident in The Rainbow (1915) in 
a series of montages in section two of chapter one. Lawrence moves between 
the idyllic, pastoral, natural landscape and the effects of the industrialization 
and civilization in a way that creates a strong impression of anti-modernity 
and longing back to a natural state. It is not only the montage itself that is 
effective, but also the choice of words in describing the narrator’s different 
attitudes to the past and present. Civilization is represented by “red, crude 
houses plastered on the valley in masses […]” (14) and “the dim smoking hill 
of the town” (14) whereas nature intrudes through its “bushes of lilac and 
guelder-rose and privet […]” (14). The “sulphurous smell of pit-refuse 
burning” (14) is contrasted with the “daffodils […] thick in green and 
yellow” (14).   
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Lawrence’s juxtaposing style is carried on in the famous scene with the 
mare and the locomotive in Women in Love (1920), where Lawrence effectively 
creates this image of now and then, or rather now and there, since this “then” 
is in its utopian, natural way, rather spatial than temporal: 
 
But he sat glistening and obstinate, forcing the 
wheeling mare, which spun and swerved like a wind, 
and yet could not get out of the grasp of his will, nor 
escape from the mad clamour of terror that resounded 
through her, as the trucks thumped slowly, heavily, 
horrifying, one after the other, one pursuing the other, 
over the rails of the crossing. 
 The locomotive, as if wanting to see what could be 
done, put on the brakes, and back came the trucks 
rebounding on the iron buffers, striking like horrible 
cymbals, clashing nearer and nearer in frightful strident 
concussions. The mare opened her mouth and rose 
slowly, as if lifted up on a wind of terror. (133) 
 
The horse, representing the natural, is also associated with such words as 
“wind” (twice) and verbs that echo natural events, “spun and swerved” and 
“rose,” while the train as a cultural and modern phenomena, is described 
with forceful alliterations and words that are identified with the modern: 
“striking,” “cymbals,” “clashing,” and “concussions.” The contrasting image 
is potent and convincing enough for the reader to feel the repulsion of the 
modern. The deterministic quality of modernity, its repetitions and 
conformity, is situated in the trucks that come “one after the other.”  
 
The Universal Grief 
“Nostalgia is inevitably tied to a personal teleological idea that the progress 
of our lives must end in death; an entropy,” I wrote in the end of chapter two, 
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describing how the mood of nostalgia is tied to the notion of how short, and 
ultimately meaningless, our lives are. The nostalgic strains against modernity 
and progress may very well be an indication of the way nostalgia’s project of 
halting time originates in this universal grief. Nostalgic imagery that evokes 
this sense of meaninglessness or death, and at the same time celebrates life, is 
not uncommon. Often there is resonance of the astronomical images or 
temporal indicators that contrasts our personal death with how life goes on 
without us. Yvonne, in Under the Volcano, has such a revelation: 
 
And the earth itself still turning on its axis and 
revolving around that sun, the sun revolving around 
the luminous wheel of this galaxy, the countless 
unmeasured jeweled wheels of countless unmeasured 
galaxies turning, turning, majestically, into infinity, into 
eternity, through all of which all life ran on – all this, 
long after she herself was dead, men would still be 
reading in the night sky, and as the earth turned 
through those distant seasons, and they watched the 
constellations still rising, culminating, setting, to rise 
again […] (323) 
 
The concept of individual annihilation is greatly contrasted with life, the 
universe, and the ever changing cycle of life. Within the cyclic motifs, this 
concept of personal death becomes a radical contrast. At first glance, 
Yvonne’s real death might not seem to communicate this idea since it is 
almost celebratory: 
 
 And leaving the burning dream Yvonne felt herself 
suddenly gathered upwards and borne towards the 
stars, through eddies of stars scattering aloft with ever 
wider circlings like rings on water, among which now  
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appeared, like a flock of diamond birds flying softly 
and steadily towards Orion, the Pleiades… (337) 
 
This passage is highly nostalgic. First, of course, because of the way the 
paragraph embraces many of the images of nostalgia: references to the 
astronomic and mythological, the idea of time passing, and the sense of 
idealization. More so, death here, as envisioned by Yvonne (or Lowry) as 
something peaceful, is a return to the origins of the world. This sentiment 
does echo Freud’s ideas about the death wish as some suspect longing for a 
natural state, or becoming once again part of the zodiac of the universe. The 
word “envision” is crucial since we have to separate Yvonne’s factual death 
from her emotions about her own. Real death, of course, is what we 
experience through the consul: 
 
Suddenly he screamed, and it was as though this 
scream were being tossed from one tree to another, as 
its echoes returned, then, as though the trees 
themselves were crowding nearer, huddled together, 
closing over him… 
 Somebody threw a dead dog after him down the 
ravine. (376) 
 
As the protagonists in The Waves grow older and become more concerned 
with the fading of life, the narrative tends to expose more and more images 
of universal grief. Close to the end Bernard likens life to a dream, a common 
metaphor for the denial of the realities of life, which he brilliantly formulates 
in the next sentence: “Our flame, the will-o’-the-wisp that dances in a few 
eyes, is soon to be blown out and all will fade” (155). If Bernard’s horror 
against time seems utterly personal, Louis’s cry against the inexorable 
passage of time anticipates the end of everything: 
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‘But listen,” said Louis, ‘to the world moving through 
abysses of infinite space. It roars; the lighted strip of 
history is past and our kings and queens; we are gone; 
our civilization; the Nile; and all life. Our separate 
drops are dissolved; we are extinct, lost in the abysses 
of time, in the darkness.’ (127) 
 
The separate drops that dissolve isolated through the unusual use of the 




Nostalgia evoked through the use of childhood is generally achieved by 
addressing the world of childhood as an alternative to the present. This is 
done either through the use of an idealized space or time, by reinforcing its 
past character, or by using common symbols or representations of childhood 
that force the reader into the sensations of his own past childhood. A third 
alternative, that of engaging the reader in a childhood consciousness, we 
have encountered in chapter four. 
 We can observe how the notion of an idealized childhood is conveyed 
through the enhanced, imaginative places and narration of the children’s 
books of the first half of the 1900s, something Fay Sampson acknowledges in 
“Childhood and Twentieth-Century Children’s Literature” (2000). Literary 
childhood is always a memory, always constructed, and perhaps idealized. 
Childhood itself is an idealized space, reflected upon with nostalgia that 
affects the narration and the style of the prose. Sampson primarily studies 
the way another type of rhapsodized places exists within these already highly  
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idealized settings, such as Peter Pan’s Never-Never Land, the Secret Garden 
in the novel of the same name, or the top of the forest in the Pooh stories (62).  
 Sometimes childhood seems to be an excuse for a resistance to 
progress and modernity. “Wind in the Willows,” writes Sampson, “is not really 
a children’s book, but a middle class adult’s nostalgia for a rural idyll, a flight 
from the industrial and proletarian present” (62). The concept of idealized 
childhood seems, thus, closely related to that of the entropic time in which 
childhood is the golden age that is bound to be destroyed by time. The 
impossibility for these spaces to exist in real life, or the impossibility of a 
return to childhood, is cleverly communicated through the name of this 
space in J. M. Barrie’s Peter Pan (1911), “Never Never Land.” The first line in 
Peter Pan, “All children, except one, grow up” (9) confirms this where the 
“one” is an imaginary hope, a nostalgic force against progress – a hope in 
vain since the reality is so firmly described by the simplicity of “grow up.” 
The nostalgic entropy is further enforced on the first page when Mrs. Darling 
exclaims why the children cannot remain the same forever and through 
Wendy’s introspective thought “Two is the beginning of the end” (9). The 
sadness of lost childhood, as represented by Neverland, is forcefully 
explained by the narrator: “On these magic shores children at play are for 
ever beaching their coracles. We too have been there; we can still hear the 
sound of the surf, though we shall land no more” (14). The idealized 
Neverland is not only rosy in its description of childhood, but also in the 
typical manner its gaming qualities of “savages and lonely lairs” (13) are 
contrasted with “chocolate-pudding day” and “three-pence for pulling out 
your tooth yourself […]” (14). For the adult these childhood memories, 




In Under the Volcano we confront our childhood, together with the 
protagonist, through an image used as a symbol for childhood: The Ferris 
wheel. The Ferris wheel as a traditional symbol tends to illustrate, based on 
its circular shape and its movement, the human heart, the circle of life with 
its ups and downs. A Ferris wheel is something that we associate mainly with 
childhood or a childhood experience of awe and fascination. It is not only the 
actual image of the Ferris wheel that comes to mind, but also other senses 
associated with it such as the blinking lights, the noise of the people in it, and 
perhaps a melody being played. In a wider sense it has become the main 
staple of the amusement park with all those associations. It carries both the 
fascination for our own past childhood and the magic we have lost with it. 
 In Under the Volcano we first encounter the Ferris wheel through the 
focalization of M. Laurelle: 
 
[…] the slowly revolving Ferris wheel, already lit up, in 
the square of Quauhnahuac; he thought he could 
distinguish the sound of human laughter rising from its 
bright gondolas and, again, that faint intoxication of 
voices singing, diminishing, dying in the wind, 
inaudible finally. (16) 
 
It is important to note how crucial the sounds are in this image, and it is 
basically the sounds of the dying voices that represent, or enhance, the sense 
of lost childhood. In the end of chapter one, commencing the long analepsis 
which will be the body of the text, the Ferris wheel becomes the emblem of 
recreating the past through its reversed motion: “Over the town, in the dark 
tempestuous night, backwards revolved the luminous wheel” (47). 
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For the consul the Ferris wheel will more explicitly come to represent 
that lost childhood through his comparison of it to that of “an enormously 
magnified child’s structure of girders and angle brackets, nuts and bolts, in 
Meccano […]” (221). 
Somewhat later he experiences something of a moment of truth when 
he enters, what he refers to as “a little confession box” (225) in the “huge 
looping-the-loop machine […]” (224). There seems to be a kind of 
desperation, not only to clear the mind of his spinning associations but also 
to regain possession of his own past, a project doomed to fail in this 
“monster” (225). But the encounter with the fair and all its air of nostalgia 
definitely charges him with revelations of the essence of nostalgia. The 
merriment of the first stage of nostalgia suddenly alters into the later tragic 
sense of having lost something; a process that simulates that of the nostalgic 
experience: 
 
At the same time, as though a cloud had come over the 
sun, the aspect of the fair had completely altered for 
him. The merry grinding of the roller skates, the 
cheerful if ironic music, the cries of the little children on 
their goose-necked steeds, the procession of queer 
pictures – all this had suddenly become 
transcendentally awful and tragic, distant, transmuted, 
as it were some final impression on the senses of what 
the earth was like, carried over into an obscure region 
of death, a gathering thunder of immediatable sorrow 
[…] (218) 
 
The tragic aspect of nostalgia and the stages of the nostalgic reaction are 
forcefully transported into the reader through the brilliant metaphor of the 
cloud obscuring the sun, and this creates a strong sensual experience 
connected to that of the “goose-necked steeds” later. It is a scene that carries 
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both the remembrance and its representation through the enumeration of 
what the fair actually displays.  The melancholia, or in this case the tragedy, 
arise out of the awareness of this lostness. 
The idea of using childhood imagery in order to both create 
possibilities for reader associations into nostalgic domains, as well as 
creating a situation for a protagonist where he can confront his own nostalgia 
is fairly common. We remember the significant scene in Salinger’s The Catcher 
in the Rye when Holden experiences a sudden happiness watching his little 
sister Phoebe on the carousel. He himself does not understand why, but the 
whole image of the carousel, always playing the same songs, reminds him of 
his own childhood. Although he is not aware of it yet, this step of looking 
back to his own childhood with a subconscious desire is actually the first step 
to adulthood where this happiness will also be infused with the tragic 
element of nostalgia. 
Since the allusion to childhood is effective in evoking nostalgia, it is 
not accidental that Woolf in her highly nostalgic novel To the Lighthouse 
chooses to address the world and wonder of childhood through James 
Ramsay in order to firmly establish the nostalgic tone of her book. The book 
opens with a series of sensations – “The wheel-barrow, the lawn-mower, the 
sound of poplar trees, leaves whitening before rain, rooks cawing, brooms 
knocking, dresses rustling […]” (5) –  that together with Woolf’s rhythmic 
style put the reader right into the wonder of sensations of childhood. 
 
Youth 
The contexts of childhood not only carry nostalgic possibilities but also the 
general appreciation of youth as a stage of physical perfection and 
opportunities. Nostalgia is evoked when youthfulness is contrasted with 
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indications of aging and human decay, either explicitly through the narrative 
or implicitly through the private awareness of this decay.  
 Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Night is a book that predominantly uses the 
idea of youth as a nostalgia for its main characters. Dick Diver’s fascination 
for Nicole is primarily her air of youth: “She smiled, a moving childish smile 
that was like all the lost youth in the world” (28). Later, when the younger 
Rosemary has taken on Nicole’s role, Nicole meditates on her own aging: 
 
She bathed and anointed herself and covered her body 
with a layer of powder, while her toes crunched 
another pile on a bath towel. She looked 
microscopically at the lines of her flanks, wondering 
how soon the fine, slim edifice would begin to sink 
squat and earthward. […] The only physical disparity 
between Nicole at present and Nicole of five years 
before was simply that she was no longer a young girl. 
(362) 
 
At the same time Dick remembers “that once he could stand on his hands on 
a chair at the end of a board […]” (352) and his romance with Rosemary is 
basically a longing back for his lost youth through her “innocent” kisses 
(145). This echoes his remembrance of the early kisses with Nicole when 
“nothing had ever felt so young as her lips […]” (53). The structure of the 
novel becomes a celebration of youth that changes into a loss of youth, a 
progress intensified by the imagery of the book and how the characters are 
scourged by the idea of youth.43 Youth not only equals strength, but also 
female beauty, and the loss of youth is clearly signified by how the characters 
experience this loss of beauty. Nicole’s years slip “away by clock and 
calendar and birthday, with the added poignance of her perishable beauty” 
                                                
43  This refers to the structure of the 1951 edition. 
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(228). In reality, the human body equals that of any other fabric and will 
inevitably become a ruin. 
 In Fitzgerald’s short story “One Trip Abroad” (1930) we meet a similar 
celebration of youth through the aging Kellys. In the beginning of the story 
the Kellys are in their twenties and they are a “handsome couple; the man 
rather intense and sensitive, the girl arrestingly light of hue in eyes and hair, 
her face without shadows, its living freshness modulated by a lovely 
confident calm” (578). The air of youth is not only communicated through 
descriptions of their physical assets, but also through the way they seem to 
experience the world in a young and naïve perspective: 
 
 They dined on the hotel veranda under a sky that 
was low and full of the presence of a strange and 
watchful God; around the corners of the hotel the night 
already stirred with the sounds of which they had so 
often read but that were even so hysterically 
unfamiliar―drums from Senegal, a native flute, the 
selfish, effeminate whine of a camel, the Arabs 
pattering past in shoes made of old automobile tires, 
the wail of a Magian prayer. (579) 
 
They are not only tourists in Africa but tourists in the world: young, 
innocent, naïve, curious, and attentive. We can compare this youthful 
description of the world around them to their visit to Switzerland four years 
later: 
 
[…] they arrived one spring day at the lake that is the 
center of Europe―a placid, smiling spot with pastoral 
hillsides, a backdrop of mountains and waters of 
postcard blue, waters that are a little sinister beneath 
the surface with all the misery that has dragged itself 
here from every corner of Europe. […] the Lake Geneva 
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that Nelson and Nicole came to was the dreary one of 
sanatoriums and rest hotels. (594) 
 
It is not only the way they look at the lake that betrays a view from another 
age that is restless, penetrating, and “postcard blue,” but also how the image 
of “sanatoriums and rest hotels” clearly indicates where life is heading. The 
end shows a clear introspection when they both envision a glimpse of the 
world experienced through youth when “the music and the far-away lights 
were like hope, like the enchanted distance from which children see things” 
(596), and Nicole whispers to Nelson: “We can have it all again […]” (596). 
This flicker of hope turns suddenly into a nightmare when they turn towards 
their doppelganger couple and realize that they are, in fact, the woman 
whose “cheeks were wan” with “little pouches of ill health under the eyes 
[…]” (595) and the man whose face was “so weak and self-indulgent that it’s 
almost mean―the kind of face that needs half a dozen drinks really to open 
the eyes and stiffen the mouth up to normal” (596). 
 The arresting image of youth, and the world through youth, makes 
identification between the reader’s own youth and the fictive youth possible. 
The descriptions of youth, especially in Fitzgerald’s works, tend toward an 
idealization of youth, as in the description of young Judy Jones in “Winter 
Dreams” (1922): 
 
She was arrestingly beautiful. The color in her cheeks 
was centered like the color in a picture―it was not a 
“high” color, but a sort of fluctuating and feverish 
warmth, so shaded that it seemed at any moment it 
would recede and disappear. This color and the 
mobility of her mouth gave a continual impression of 
flux, of intense life, of passionate vitality―balanced 
only partially by the sad luxury of her eyes. (49) 
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It is not only the beauty in Judy Jones, but more so the celebration of her 
youthfulness in the use of words associated with main characteristics of 
youth such as “flux,” “intense life,” and “passionate vitality.” Not only does 
Judy Jones embrace the ideal of youth in her physical appearance, but also in 
her activities. She is later spotted by Dexter as she is driving a racing motor 
boat, a potent image of “white streamers of cleft water [that] rolled 
themselves out behind it” before it “was sweeping in an immense and 
purposeless circle of spray round and round in the middle of the lake” (50). 
Judy Jones then, after acquainting herself with Dexter, jumps into the water 
swimming “with a sinuous crawl” where her arms “burned to butternut, 
moved sinuously among the dull platinum ripples, elbow appearing first, 
casting the forearm back with a cadence of falling water, then reaching out 
and down, stabbing a path ahead” (51). The detail of the crawl, an almost 
microscopic study of her decisive “stabbing,” creates the impression of 
watching her in slow-motion. No wonder Dexter has something of a nervous 
breakdown in the end when he realizes that Judy Jones is no longer 
representing the potent beauty of his youth, for when he is describing her he 
is, in fact, describing his own youth: 
 
 The dream was gone. Something had been taken 
from him. In a sort of panic he pushed the palms of his 
hands into his eyes and tried to bring up a picture of 
the waters lapping on Sherry Island and the moonlit 
verandah, and gingham on the golf links and the dry 
sun and the gold color of her neck’s soft down. And her 
mouth damp to his kisses and her eyes plaintive with 
melancholy and her freshness like new fine linen in the 
morning. Why, these things were no longer in the 
world! They had existed and they existed no longer.(65) 
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Dexter’s realization of time’s absolute progress forward necessitates a 
creation of nostalgic episodes that come to represent his own youth. These 
images are tied together with repeated “and” in order to emphasize the 
breathtaking character they possess. 
 
Dystopian Spaces 
The idea of the utopian novel is a nostalgic one, since it ultimately describes 
an idealized place, society, or dream that springboards from the bleak reality 
of a present setting. Although utopian worlds are not necessarily “lost” 
worlds, they inhabit the essence of ontological nostalgia, where the nostalgia 
is not temporally in the past, but only envisioned as an idealized favoured 
alternative to the present. The nostalgic dichotomy was present already in 
Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) where the present unjust England is illustrated 
in book one and then contrasted with the country Utopia in book two. Due to 
an increased criticism of the idea of utopias in the early twentieth century 
these kind of narratives disappeared mostly after H. G. Wells’ science fiction 
books. The idea of an idealized space remained though as we have seen in 
examples above from Lawrence and Lowry.  
 The appearance of the utopian critic coincided with the emergence of 
a more favoured genre, dystopia, where the utopian idea is reversed. One 
factor behind the popularization of dystopia was the general critique of 
modernity and progress that prevailed in the early 1900s. At first glance, 
dystopias like Karin Boye’s Kallocain (1940), George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four (1949), or Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 (1951) might seem the opposite 
of nostalgia since it is the future world (the present narrative world in the 
dystopia) that appears inhuman, unfair, and decadent. The celebration of the 
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old world is obvious in a work such as Fahrenheit 451 where the general 
symbol of the written word comes to represent what we have lost forever. 
These dystopian novels become nostalgic in the way they express the sense 
of something lost. They remind us of the romantic’s longing for the old 
village, the agrarian past, the simplicity of life, and the natural. In these 
examples, nostalgia is actualized through the way the future of the dystopian 
worlds is narrated in order to be experienced as a present world. From this 
“present” world/time grows a longing for the past. We could call this past 
dystopian utopia.  
One novel that is aware of the paradox of the dystopian utopia is 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), where the usually crystal clear 
definition of good and bad is muddled. At first it seems like the title bears an 
ironic touch. The brave new world is, indeed, a classic horrible dystopian 
world and not at all brave. However, the longing back for an old world is not 
uncomplicated as in Fahrenheit 451. Its representation through the 
Reservations, although controlled by the future ruling classes, does not seem 
like much to miss or long for. Who would like to exchange free sex, no 
commitments, good health, drugs without side effects, for boys being 
whipped, sweaty drunks, incomprehensible dances and drumming, painful 
deaths? On the other hand, who wants to live in a fascist brainwashed and 
emotionless classed society, where there is no music, art, literature, families, 
or real love? In not idealizing either world, Huxley completely voids himself 
from any nostalgic content and focuses instead on the restlessness of man. It 
is a good example of how nostalgia is not evoked automatically through the  
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use of different binary spaces. The irony and the argumentative tone in Brave 
New World prevent this.  
 
Conclusion 
Santesso writes in the end of A Careful Longing that these “tropes and images 
that made up eighteenth-century nostalgic poetry―ruins, bards, decayed 
small towns or villages, childhood games―remained popular […]” (185). We 
have seen how these tropes and imagery have endured all the way into 
modern fiction, sometimes transformed and changed, but containing the 
same basic essentials of nostalgia. The ways of describing the essence of 
nostalgia, and thus opening up possibilities for nostalgic experiences in an 
audience, owe much to these early attempts. We have also observed that 
there are a few basic essentials that prove the basis for these tropes and 
images: the dichotomy of nostalgia (now and then, here and there, present 
and past), the entropic time arrow, and its consequences on existential 
matters, the idea of decay and time passing, and finally idealizations of 
spaces such as childhood, the simplicity of the pastoral, the rural, and the 
mythic. 
 This chapter, though, has not only been a survey of possible nostalgic 
identifications through tropes and imagery but also an exercise in how we 
can apply our methodology to a variety of texts. Hopefully we have reached 
an understanding of the structure of our method and the ways we can 
explore possible nostalgic evocations in other readers through one private 









In the section called “The Analeptic Structure” we will explore how the play 
with narrative order, as well as its mood and voice, create a nostalgic 
narrative. The theory of the analeptic structure will then be concluded with 
an analysis of Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited. There is also another kind of 
retrospection that instead of retrieving new story events, forces us back to 
familiar ones, but with a new dimension added. This can not only be 
repeating, or completing, internal analepses, but also less obvious narrative 
mechanisms that encourage us to revalue our past narrative experience, 
mechanisms which are not incorporated in Genette’s vocabulary. The 
deliberate use of the past narration in order to create a specific effect in the 
present narration is what I call use of our textual memory. In the section 
“Textual Memory” we will explore how a text can play with our textual 
memory in order to affect us nostalgically and these theories will then come 
into practice during our analysis of the use of textual memory in Fitzgerald’s 
The Great Gatsby. 
 
The Analeptic Structure 
The analeptic structure suggests a frame structure where a narrator 
subsequently narrates the events of some past imagination or experience, 
thus creating a distinct “now” and “then” on which he is liable to comment. 
The use of first person narration further stimulates the private nature of the 
recollection and aids the seductive qualities of the narration; it grants the 
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narrator a greater freedom in rearranging the temporal order of events. By 
carefully choosing and/or altering the narrator’s voice and mood, as we saw in 
chapter four, it is possible for the author to alternate between a distant and a 
more direct narration in order to control the nostalgic reading experience.  
The analeptic structure is by far the most common narrative technique 
used to evoke nostalgia in literature and was firmly identified by Genette in 
“Discours du recit” (1972), as he explored the narrative techniques used in 
Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu. Genette uses the term “analeptic” in 
order to define a narrative that fundamentally uses “a vast movement of 
coming-and-going from one key, strategically dominant position […]” (45). 
The “going from” this one key leads back into story time and represents thus 
analepses – a retrospective movement which we call analeptic. Just like 
Genette states, the dominant position “serves as a springboard for a new 
memory-elicited analepsis […]” (44). Genette uses the following scheme in 





The letters are the chronological order of the narrative, and the numbers 
show the chronological order of the story. Thus, the dominant position is 5 
which occurs no less than five times and constitutes a late, but difficult to 
date, episode of the hero’s life when he suffers from insomnia and enters into 
remembrance of his early life. These remembrances are then activated 
through the numerous analepses back in time. Since 5 is the dominant 
                                                
44 Genette uses a more complicated scheme in order to show the difference between open 
and closed analepses, but for our purpose it is more convenient to simplify it. 
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position we should call this the first narrative from which all anachronies are 
valued.  
Although the scheme of the narrative order in Recherche above is a 
description of the narrative structure of the first volume, it follows a more 
conventional progression after J3: “henceforth the movement is established, 
and the narrative, in its major articulations, for the most part becomes 
regular and conforms to chronological order […]” (45). In this sense it differs 
slightly from the more traditional analeptic structure where we would have 
expected to return to 5 more frequently, and especially in the very end. As we 
can see, the main body of story events is not the first dominant narrative but 
instead the analeptic story. Therefore, in order not to confuse the first 
narrative, which is the one that occupies least narrative space, with the main 
narrative, which is the past retold from the first narrative (second narrative), 
let us define the latter as the analeptic narrative. 
The analepses in the Recherche are predominantly of the external kind 
since they stretch back before the first narrative. The analepses that come 
from the first narrative, and thus do not interfere with the other analepses in 
the analeptic narrative, and at the same time spring out from the same 
narrator, are called homodiegetic analepses (Genette 51). These types of 
analepses are exceptionally bound to carry nostalgic force since they are part 
of the intimacy of the extradiegetic narrator as well as reach back in story 
time without leaving the world of the first narrative. The homodiegetic 
analepses remind us of something “past” while not confusing us about the 
place and time we are transported to in the narrative. As Gautam Kundu has 
noted, the homodiegetic aspect of the analepses evokes “a mood of 
wistfulness and nostalgia […]” through its bridging qualities (67). Certainly 
there are analepses in the Recherche of the second kind, heterodiegetic, in which 
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another character than Marcel retells stories that are perhaps not part of 
Marcel’s world or knowledge. These are analepses within analepses, and 
although they create a retrograde movement that suggest past times, they are 
less prone to be nostalgic. 
 
Revisiting Brideshead Revisited 
The actual temporal and spatial springboard of the first narrative in Waugh’s 
Brideshead Revisited is not as obvious as Marcel’s sleepless nights. The frame 
story from which we inherit the past is 1944 during the midst of the Second 
World War. Captain Charles Ryder, the protagonist and the narrator of the 
novel, comes upon the Brideshead Estate, a place known to him from the 
past, and this triggers a series of memories in a first person analeptic 
narration. The analepses take us back to a period between Charles’ 
experiences at Oxford University in 1923 until the death of the father of his 
long time friend Sebastian in Brideshead at the eve of World War Two. As a 
true frame story, it concludes again in the last visit to Brideshead in 1944. The 
frame story is further distinguished through its initial and ending position 
within a prologue and epilogue. Although there is no suspicion, as in the 
Recherche, that the narration is not coming from the time of the frame story, 
the first narrative itself disappears during the course of the narrative unlike 
in the Recherche.  This means that we never return, physically, to the actual 
first narrative until the end, although the subsequent voice constantly 
interferes with the analeptic narrative. Charles’ narrative voice will 
constantly return and evaluate, comment, and colour the analepses which 
means that we are constantly going to and from the first narrative’s 
temporality. Therefore, there seems to be no physical way that Charles is 
telling the memories from the war situation since there is no obvious narratee 
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as in the case of Marlow’s listening crowd in Heart of Darkness, nor a specific 
context of narrative production such as Marcel’s writing in the end of the 
Recherche.  
 The analeptic narrative is triggered by conversation in the prologue: 
 
‘There’s a frightful great fountain, too, in front of the 
steps, all rocks and sort of carved animals. You never 
saw such a thing.’ 
 ‘Yes, Hooper, I did. I’ve been here before.’ 
 The words seemed to ring back to me enriched from 
the vaults of my dungeon. (14) 
 
Charles’ memories are like Marcel’s in the way that these memories have 
been hidden deep and, in this very moment, involuntarily expose themselves 
to Charles. The mysterious air of them is accentuated by his dry reply to 
Hooper’s fascination about the place. The selective and romantic side of the 
memory is set at the very beginning of chapter one: 
 
‘I have been here before,’ I said. I had been there before; 
first with Sebastian more than twenty years ago on a 
cloudless day in June, when the ditches were creamy 
with meadowsweet and the air heavy with all the scents 
of summer; it was a day of peculiar splendour, and 
though I had been there so often, in so many moods, it 
was to that first visit that my heart returned on this, my 
latest. (17) 
 
Naturally, in order to evoke the nostalgia of this first analepsis, the narrator 
places it in “a cloudless day in June” with a roar of the scents and visual 
aspects of summer. The grief of the present narrative position, with the war 
as a masterful symbol of a present in decay, is emphasized when we know 
that this is also the last visit to Brideshead. 
 292
 What follows then is a chronological exposé of the times between 1923 
and 1939 with extended use of subsequent narrative discourse. The narrating 
either adds nostalgic mood and voice to its scenery in order to create a 
nostalgic presence or creates a longing for the early analepses as well as 
commenting about the lostness and fleeting qualities of the past. Thus we 
cannot develop a scheme that would show where we return to the first 
narrative, since this first narrative, in a way, always is conscious. However, 
we can create a simple macro-scheme that outlines the events. It would look 
like this: 
 
PROLOGUE: Brideshead Revisited 
A30 Brideshead, 1944. 
PART 1: Et in Arcadia Ego 
B4  First visit to Brideshead, June 1923. 
C2 First meeting with Sebastian, March 1923. 
D1 First glance at Sebastian with his teddy-bear. 
E2 
F3  First Lunch with Sebastian, March 1923. 
G4 
H5 Last visit from cousin Jasper, end of Summer 
1923. 
I6  Drinks with Anthony Blanche, day after visit 
from cousin, end of Summer 1923. 
J7  Last morning of term 1923. 
K8 Holiday at father’s in London, 1924. 
L9  Brideshead, August 1924. 
M10 Venice at Sebastian’s father, 1924. 
N11 New term at Oxford, August 1924. 
O12 Julia’s party in London 1924. 
P13 Brideshead, Christmas 1924. 
Q14 Oxford, early 1925. 
R15 Brideshead, Easter 1925. 
S16 Oxford summer term. Sebastian gets expelled, 
1925. 
PART 2: Brideshead Deserted 
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T17 Brideshead, Christmas 1925. 
U18 Paris, 1926. 
V4  Julia at Brideshead (recollection). 
X19 General Strike, London spring 1926. 
Y20 Casablanca, finding Sebastian, 1926. 
Z21 London, early June 1926. 
PART 3: A Twitch upon the Thread 
AA23 New York, 1939.45 
AB22 Travelling in South America and painting, 
1929-1939. 
AC24 Meeting his wife in New York, 1939. 
AD25 Crossing the Atlantic, Storm, meeting Julia, 
1939. 
AE26 The Exhibition, 1939. 
AF27 With Julia at Brideshead, Summer. 
Remembering their past years. 
AG28 Divorces and Weddings (Ryder hears from 
Superior of Sebastian’s fate). 
AH29 Brideshead, Lord Marchmain dies. 
EPILOGUE: Brideshead Revisited 
AI30 Brideshead 1944. 
 
This scheme reflects the general structure of the text with minor analepses 
omitted as well as heterodiegetic analepses told by characters other than the 
protagonist in the analeptic narrative. Two examples of the latter occur 
during the Atlantic crossing in AD25 when Julia tells Charles about her life 
with Rex and during AG28 when the Superior tells Charles about the fate of 
Sebastian. Even if they are told by other narrators they should not be 
considered intradiegetic since their voices are unquestionably that of the 
narrator of the first narrative, and thus extradiegetic as well. We are still 
talking about an internally focalized mood from the extradiegetic narrator. In 
the case of Julia’s remembrance, the focalization is not changed due to the use 
of a peculiar use of reported speech. Julia’s memories are introduced in a 
                                                
45  Since we run out of alphabetic letters, AA means chronologically a time later than Z. 
 294
short, direct speech: “‘Rex has never been unkind to me intentionally,’ she 
said” (240). It is followed by a short conversation in direct speech but then 
“[t]en hours of talking” (239) is retold by the narrator in a reported speech 
that has an almost dreamy and fragmentary character: 
 
 Waking and dreaming, through the strain and creak 
and heave of the long night, firm on my back with my 
arms and legs spread wide to check the roll, and my 
eyes open to the darkness, I lay thinking of Julia. 
 ‘… We thought papa might come back to England 
after mummy died, or that he might marry again, but 
he lives just as he did. Rex and I often go to see him 
now. I’ve grown fond of him….Sebastian’s disappeared 
completely ... Cordelia’s in Spain with an ambulance… 
[…] (241) 
 
Later, the Superior’s story about Sebastian is similar in the way that the 
narrator takes over a direct speech. It starts out with ordinary dialogue, but 
soon the direct speech loses the voice of the Superior and turns into large 
segments of dialogue that remarkably end without the end quotation mark, 
as if they have changed from direct speech to reported speech during the 
course of the speech. 
 I have spent considerable time with these two occurrences since it is 
important to emphasize that in the analeptic structure we must not leave the 
narrative mood and voice of the dominant first narrative. Furthermore, the 
subsequent narrator who remembers from that first narrative has to control 
the whole narrating otherwise we lose the effect of subsequent narration and 
the intimacy of one narrator. 
If we return to the analeptic narrative we see that in most instances it 
is chronological, and importantly so, because it is in the chronology of 
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memory we will see the change of selected past growing into the dismays of 
time passing. If we would have omitted the frame story, the extent to which 
we would have experienced this narrative nostalgically would have been 
limited. Even with the frame story as a present and the long first analeptic 
narrative as an uninterrupted past without any interference from the frame 
position, the juxtaposition between past and present and the evaluation of 
the past would have been inessential. This is not the case with Brideshead 
Revisited since the narrative mood and voice constantly return to the 
dominant mode of the frame story in between the analepses. For example, 
between F3 and G4 we read the following: “That day was the beginning of 
my friendship with Sebastian, and thus it came about, that morning in June, 
that I was lying beside him in the shade of the high elms watching the smoke 
from his lips drift up into the branches” (29). Although we are not physically 
back to the time of narration, which is Brideshead in 1944, in a way like 
“When I saw the demolished walls of the house I remembered...” the 
narrative tone still is distinctly back into the time of narrating. First, it breaks 
with the constant direct speeches that give the analepsis before a directness, 
but also, in Genette’s term, a distance to the narrating. More so, it has a 
proleptic quality as a reminder of the time of narration and an evaluation of 
the time of the analepsis, hence it is an internal prolepsis.46 When Charles 
states that it “was the beginning of my friendship with Sebastian,” he 
undoubtedly does so from a later time when he understands that this was the 
start of their friendship. Another retreat to the time of narration, and a more 
obvious one, is between G4 and H5: “That is the full account of my first brief 
visit to Brideshead; could I have known then that it would one day be 
                                                
46  In a strict sense we are talking about an internal prolepsis, but as it occurs in the analeptic 
narrative, where the time of narrating is clear, it could as well be interpreted as part of the 
analepses from the first narrative. 
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remembered with tears by a middle-aged captain of infantry?” (34). Here we 
are not only placed definitely back to the frame story but the narrator also 
comments about the nostalgia in the analepsis through his own reaction. At 
some instances the presence of the narrator’s temporal position is inserted in 
the middle of an analepsis, for example in the middle of E2: “[…] he [cousin 
Jasper] covered most subjects; even today I could repeat much of what he 
said, word for word” (21) or in H5: “Looking back, now, after twenty years, 
there is little I would have left undone or done otherwise” (39). At key points 
the narrator’s comments are more explicit about passing time, youth, and 
nostalgia. This is evidenced in the beginning of chapter four in part one: 
 
The languor of Youth – how unique and quintessential 
it is! How quickly, how irrecoverably, lost! The zest, the 
generous affections, the illusions, the despair, all the 
traditional attributes of Youth – all save this – come and 
go with us through life. These things are a part of life 
itself; but languor – the relaxation of yet unwearied 
sinews, the mind sequestered and self-regarding – that 
belongs to Youth alone and dies with it. Perhaps in the 
mansions of Limbo the heroes enjoy some such 
compensation for their loss of the Beatific Vision; 
perhaps the Beatific Vision itself has some remote 
kinship with this lowly experience; I, at any rate, 
believed myself very near heaven, during those languid 
days at Brideshead. (71) 
 
The heaven of youth, or more specifically, the narrator’s subsequent 
appreciation of his youth, is then in nostalgic fashion narrated with such a 
tone that it enhances its selected nature, all in conjuncture with the romantic 
idioms for nostalgia. No wonder the early analepses take place on a 
“cloudless day in June […]” (17), “untroubled by any wind […]” and with 
“sweet summer scents […]” and “fumes of the sweet, golden wine […]” (20) 
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where they all “ate the strawberries and drank the wine […]” (19). 
 
Summary 
Conclusively, the analeptic structure needs a frame story, a dominant point of 
narration which we call the first narrative, from which a subsequent 
narration of usually chronological past events (analeptic narrative) 
commences through multiple nostalgic homodiegetic external analepses. The 
first person narrator, an extradiegetic homodiegetic narrator, then constantly 
infuses the past with his present position through either his comments and 
his narrating style or a direct return to the dominant first narrative. This 
gives us the following hypothetical scheme over a standard analeptic 
structure: 
 
D1        D2       D3         D4                D5 
└A1A2┘└A3┘└A4A5┘└A6A7A8┘ 
 
Fig. 9. The Analeptic Structure. 
 
Similar to how the narrating functions in The Great Gatsby, as we saw in 
chapter four, it is typical for the analeptic narration that the narrator himself 
is not the most central character in the narration, but rather a first person 
distant observer of details and emotions in the world surrounding him. This 
creates both a strong presence in the way he can describe the atmosphere 
around him, using the romantic connotations of nostalgia, and a temporal 
distance to the plot events since he is an observer. The interplay between 
narrative distance and presence stimulates the dichotomy of the nostalgic 
experience, as was the case with Nick in The Great Gatsby. 
The nostalgia within the analeptic structure is much concerned with 
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story; it is the past in the story that is evoked and coloured nostalgically by 
the narrator. However, there is also a possibility to create nostalgia within the 





The Use of Textual Memory 
A closer look at Brideshead Revisited shows that the “heaven of Youth” in the 
first half of the novel is gradually changed in the last half to a more serious 
and sad experience of adulthood. This division can be observed by the titles 
of the different parts. The summer of youth is called “Et In Acardia Ego,” 
alluding both the idealized baroque pastoral paintings of Nicolas Poussin 
and the memento mori where all dead once have experienced the felicity of 
arcadia, as well as the ironic concept that the only paradise is a doomed one 
(paradise lost). “Brideshead Deserted” is the second part where the spirit of 
youth has been deserted. This division is almost correct, but not quite since 
the desertion commences somewhat earlier in the narrative. In chapter five of 
the first part we have already noticed another tone in the narration: the gay 
old Oxford days are over and there is a temporal force backwards towards 
the first part. It is autumn and “the leaves were falling […] and the familiar 
bells now spoke of a year’s memories” (95). Within the analeptic narrative 
there are more frequent analepses, pointing back to the idealized youth, 
regretting that irrevocable past. This retro-movement is announced by the 
narrator in the first page of the second part, when he “took it to be youth, not 
life, that [he] was losing” (211). Later, the narrator continues: “I thought of 
the youth with the teddy-bear under the flowering chestnuts” (290). It is a 
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curious line, since it is both forcing us back to the earlier text through the 
explicit words “I thought of the youth” but also more implicitly through the 
use of the symbolic teddy-bear, which we, of course, remember as something 
precious to Sebastian and representative of the craziness of the early Oxford 
years: 
 
Beyond the gate, beyond the winter garden that was 
once the lodge, stood an open, two-seater Morris-
Cowley. Sebastian’s teddy bear sat at the wheel. We put 
him between us – ‘Take care he’s not sick’ – and drove 
off. (19) 
 
This retro motion in the text is exactly what we mean by activating our 
textual memory. 
In real life we “have the capacity,” Hart writes, “to hold the past in 
retention and to keep the past alive so that when the right moment arrives 
the ‘living memory’ comes into play which gives a special sense to our 
present” (401). This “living memory” is what I in narrative terms call textual 
memory. Reading “does not merely flow forward, but […] recalled segments 
also have a retroactive effect, with the present transforming the past” (Iser, 
The Act of Reading 115). Our relation to our textual memory has been 
illustrated by an experiment conducted by D. H. Howes and C. E. Osgood 
(1954). Participants were given a sequence of four words and told to associate 
with the last word only and disregard the three previous ones. Still, the 
experiment showed that the experience of the last word was fundamentally 
influenced by the previous words. The word “dark” created associations 
with hell when it was preceded by “devil, fear and sinister” whereas it had 
more neutral connotations when precedented by less emotional charged 
words. Hence, what is remembered enters into a constant interplay with 
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modified “expectations aroused by the individual correlates in the sequence 
of sentences” (Iser, The Act of Reading 111). These expectations do not only 
involve textual memory but also future expectations on the narrative. Thus 
we can decide on a diagram of what Iser terms the “wandering viewpoint” 
(109), the way we as readers constantly choose to rely in the past, present, or 
future narration.  
 
Fig. 10. The Wandering Viewpoint. 
 
The retrospective and anticipating movements are not only a result of the 
intent of the text but also due to the status of the reader: “Any successful 
transfer however―though initiated by the text―depends on the extent to 
which this text can activate the individual reader’s faculties of perceiving and 
processing” (Iser, The Act of Reading107). They are also a result of the essence 
of reading, that a text can never be grasped in the whole but always have to 
deal with temporalities. But whether we dwell in our reading memory, are 
seduced by the “presentness,” “lifted out of time […]” (156), or governed by 
our expectations, the retrospective and anticipating movements are in fact 
created by our textual memory. 
Menakhem Perry writes in his illuminating article “Literary 
Dynamics: How the Order of a Text Creates Its Meanings” that “a ‘backward’ 
directed activity, even only in the mind, plays a major role in the reading-
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process” (58). Thus he makes the important distinction between retrograde 
movements that are forced more explicitly by the text through analepses or 
narrative directions towards past narrative events and more implicit patterns 
in the present text that, in conjunction with the reader’s own investments, 
trigger past textual memories. In the former case we can perhaps not speak 
of memory since an analepsis repeats, or completes, a past story event, but in 
the latter scenario where this backward activity occurs in the “mind” we can 
definitely speak of textual memory. 
 If we return to the example of Brideshead Revisited, it is the division of 
its narrative into two parts that interests us. The nostalgic experience is, as 
we have seen in chapter two, a two-fold experience. For the purpose of 
clarity, let us resume this line of thought. The emotional content of the 
nostalgic experience consists of two emotional phases. The first is the 
remembrance of an idealized memory that brings immediate happiness and 
great emotional affection, and the senses unite in recreating something past – 
let us call this element happiness. It is soon transformed into a more 
intellectual and reasoning second state, which we can call reflection. When we 
leave the spontaneity of the first emotional response and enter the more 
reflective state, where one is reminded of the passing status of the hyper-
memory, melancholia is created. Altogether, though, the nostalgic experience 
ends in the bittersweet. 
In fiction it is possible to use these two elements of the nostalgic 
experience structurally and create a fictive nostalgic experience. One part can 
engage and thrill the reader into experiencing it as a present. A latter part 
confronts the reader through melancholia and reflections upon his own 
textual memory of the first part. What is gained here is a fictional creation, a 
substitution of the nostalgic experience, that in many ways works like the  
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real one in terms of the complicated two-folded structure and its relation 
between present and past. 
 The activation of the textual memory in the latter part of the narrative 
occurs through different narrative and stylistic techniques. It is through the 
more subtle use of narrative mood and voice that the narrator can implicitly 
control the reader’s wandering viewpoint. An internal analepsis, signalling 
its temporal departure clearly, unavoidably transports the reader into the 
past narration either by repetition or completion. It resembles the 
involuntary memory in the way we are forced back by the ordering of story 
events. However, the subtlety of connotative words, phrases, quotations, 
repetitions, and recurring themes and styles require a more deliberate 
personal reaction. The textual past will not inevitably be evoked in the reader 
but must pass a subjective interpretative phase. Thus, it is in a way the 
reader’s own choice if he wants to recall the textual memory. 
 Perry distinguishes between retrospective repatterning and retrospective 
additional patterning (59-60) Retrospective repatterning is “the sharpest 
backward action […] in the course of reading” and constitutes a replacement 
of how the reader felt about a previous event (60). Retrospective additional 
patterning is less radical; instead of replacing the textual memory, it modifies 
it (59). Since we want to modify our past textual memory, not delete it, in 
order to preserve the dichotomy between past and present in nostalgic 
narration, we are more concerned with retrospective additional patterning. 
Even if the division in the narrative is able to establish a clear and precise 
break with our textual memory, the actual experience of this break is more 
gradual. “The reader ‘strives’ to retain the old [memories] for as long as 
possible,” writes Perry, reminding us that the reader reacts more slowly than 
the narrative’s division might suggest (60). Perry also acknowledges research 
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that shows that “when two sides of a controversy or an argument are 
presented, the side presented first has the advantage” (53). This, together 
with a slower and more careful reading tempo in the beginning due to a lack 
of expectations, gives the earlier part of the text larger importance and 
increases the possibility of emotional inclusion (53). If we, with a division of 
a text, want to challenge the textual memory, we can do it easily, but we must 
do it gradually. This division will then create an emotional contrast between 
memory and the present. “When it proves impossible to regard the sequel as 
compatible with a particular aspect of the preceding material,” writes Perry, 
“[…] the discrepancy will become sharper and will tend towards the maximal 
contrast” (52). 
 To exemplify how a narrative can create a division between narrative 
parts, where the evocation of textual pasts changes our present reading 
situation, we can look at the famous sudden death of Mrs. Ramsay in 
brackets in part two, “Time Passes”, in Woolf’s To the Lighthouse. The reader is 
rather shocked by Mrs. Ramsay’s sudden death: “[Mr Ramsay stumbling 
along a passage stretched his arms out one dark morning, but Mrs Ramsay 
having died rather suddenly the night before, he stretched his arms out. They 
remained empty.]” (146-47). The shock is partly achieved, as illustrated by 
Randall Stevenson, by the strange syntax of the first sentence: “[it] is itself a 
passage readers are bound to stumble over because of its fractured 
temporality and the odd, almost a-syntactic way it is expressed” and by the 
marginalization of such an important event (Stevenson and Goldman 174). 
The shock of death’s marginalization, however intensified it becomes in its 
minimalist representation, has much more to do with the narrative set-up 
and the narrative presumptions in the reader than the actual brackets. 
Stevenson writes: “Mrs Ramsay’s death disturbs not only the readers’ 
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emotions, but their expectations of the path the story will follow and the 
structure and logic it can use to reach its end” (175). Through the focalization 
primarily through Mrs. Ramsay in the first part, “The Window,” we not only 
identify emotionally and intellectually with her, but we also determine that 
this will be “her” story; we expect that the story will end with her. The 
narration of the first section, “The Window,” also defines it as belonging to a 
specific genre by “endow[ing] [Mrs Ramsay] with many of the inclinations of 
a novelist – at any rate, a conventional Victorian or Edwardian novelist – 
especially in her concern with social harmony and the establishment of 
relationships firm and satisfactory enough to ensure continuity and a secure 
future” (Stevenson and Goldman 175). When Woolf describes Mrs. Ramsay’s 
death in brackets, she confronts us with our textual memory of “The 
Window.” The sudden death of Mrs. Ramsay is not what we expect from the 
narrative set-up; hence it is just as dramatic as death usually is in real life. It 
is not only a matter of a character’s death; it is the death of fiction itself, or at 
least it questions the validity of the normative narrative structure dependent 
on a tight closure of characters and themes. Furthermore, since the physical 
amount of pages that remain is felt by the reader as he holds the book in his 
hands, it arouses both suspicion and curiosity as to where the narrative will 
go from there.  
 The last part, “The Lighthouse”, completely confronts “The Window” 
in style and ideas, suggesting a break point in narrative fiction: “‘The 
Window’ [is] still haunted by the Edwardian age it represents, still shaped 
and concluded partly in terms of its conventions; while ‘The Lighthouse’ is 
representative of some of the priorities of the modernist age of the twenties” 
(Stevenson and Goldman 177). The nostalgic sentiments and the concerns for 
a new future in the last part of the book would not have been emotionally 
 305 
evoked in the reader if this part had not confronted the textual memory of 
“an old world” in the first part. However, and most importantly, these 
evocations are ones which the reader may or may not choose to engage in. 
 
 
Nostalgia within the Text: Textual Memory in The Great 
Gatsby 
 
The Great Gatsby47 is a prime example of how a novel is divided into two 
distinctive parts, where the second part actively creates retroactive 
movement towards its textual past in order to create a textual nostalgia, a 
nostalgia within the text. This section will provide an analysis of how this 
rather special kind of nostalgia is evoked basically through the two stylistic 
binaries distance and presence that we encountered earlier when we discussed 
the narrative voice and mood in Gatsby. We will not repeat that analysis but 
we should keep it in our mind since it is an additional technique to the ones 
we will explore here. Although Gatsby is a seminal nostalgic novel, it is not as 
such we will interpret it now. We will focus on the idea of nostalgia and 
textual memory and thus use examples that certify these connections in 
Gatsby. That means that we will not be concerned with additional nostalgic 
imagery or styles if they are not playing a part in the analysis of textual 
memory. 
 In Gatsby, chapters one to four have spontaneity, a stylistic directness 
that seduces the reader into the happiness element of nostalgia. The aura of 
mystery, uncertainty about the characters, the romantic lyricism, the 
narrative coherence – they all transfer the reader to the summer of 1922 in a 
                                                
47  I will from here on refer to The Great Gatsby as Gatsby. 
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way that turns this summer not only into Nick’s memory, but also the 
reader’s own textual memory. The way we tend to read more actively and 
slower in the beginning of a text also aids this creation of a textual memory. 
The reading of this first part of the book corresponds with this first nostalgic 
element of joy and happiness and is achieved by a literary presence. Chapter 
five forms an obvious zenith, where not only dreams and memories crash 
with the present through Gatsby’s effort to recreate the past: “‘Can’t repeat 
the past?’ he cried incredulously. ‘Why of course you can!´” (116). The novel 
also commences to captivate a more sober, distanced, and commenting style. 
This escalates in chapter six to eight where the second element of nostalgia, 
reflection, elucidates an apparent reconstruction of the past, where the effects, 
and “hang-over” after the initial gaiety are presented. This reflective phase is 
activated through literary distance.  The narrative experience as a whole is 
conveyed by Leonard Baird as a sense of party and hangover: “[…] when you 
get through with the story [The Great Gatsby] you feel as if you’d been some 
place where you had a good time, but now entertain grave doubts as to the 
quality of the synthetic gin” (208). The sense of a party and a hangover 
corresponds very well with the binaries of presence and distance. 
 Since the first part of Gatsby is so direct, so immediate, simulating 
closely that of a selected memory of our own, we confront the latter part of 
the novel with great emotion. This confrontation, one could argue, is really 
an encounter with our own textual hyper memory – the idealized memory of 
the first part of the book. The dream, not only Gatsby’s, but also our own, 
vanishes further and further away from us until it freezes into the effects of 
nostalgia – the entropic a-temporal melancholia of the last chapter (as we 
have seen in chapter four about hypothetical nostalgia). As Gautam Kundu 
has recognized, the world in the first part is “made gorgeous by the magic 
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touch of a romantic imagination that nevertheless moves inexorably toward 
eventual disintegration and dissolution” (34). Let us explore this course of 
action in a more detailed way. 
 
The Never-Ending Party – the Creation of a Textual Hyper Memory 
In order to create a lasting impression on the reader, a textual hyper memory, 
Fitzgerald uses several narrative and stylistic techniques. It is crucial to 
include the reader in the textual experience, draw him in emotionally into the 
narrative, and eliminate the distance between narrative and reader in order 
to seduce him. The narrative has to have a strong presence on the reader. One 
strategy that achieves this is a narrative mood and voice that alternates 
between presence and distance as we have seen in chapter four. There are 
other strategies that add additional presence and this section will deal with 
these strategies and how they all work towards inclusion of the reader. 
 One of the most important techniques is the carefully constructed and 
coherent narrative structure of the first part. This narrative flow, the feeling 
of narrative consciousness and order that comforts the reader in the first 
three chapters, is constructed through different “relations between the 
structural units” (Doyno 103). Let us look at three examples of how this 
coherence is achieved. 
 Several critics, among them James E Miller, Jr., have noted that the 
three first chapters of The Great Gatsby, all represent three different parties: 
“The first three chapters of the book, for example, are devoted to the 
preparation for and presentation of three scenes: the comparatively ‘proper’ 
dinner party at the Buchanan’s in East Egg, the wild drunken party at Tom 
and Myrtle’s apartment in New York, and the huge, extravagant party at 
Gatsby’s mansion in West Egg” (100). Even if Miller, first and foremost, 
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regards this as evidence of Fitzgerald’s “art of selection” in which Fitzgerald 
introduces the key characters of the novel as well as main themes and 
locations, I consider, in consonance with Norman Holmes Pearson, that it 
also introduces the reader into a world of illusions and a sense of one, long, 
never-ending party. The three parties “blend into a stereopticon of the 
illusions which give color to the world in which all of these people live […]” 
(Pearson 25). 
 Furthermore, the chapters are interlaced through a continuous 
temporal progression, even though they take place on different days, “a 
continuance in time” as Robert Emmet Long expresses it (112). The Buchanan 
party takes place from lunch to afternoon, the hotel party from afternoon to 
evening, and Gatsby’s party from evening until long after midnight. Thus, 
there is a time progression from lunch to after midnight, a structure which 
“binds the opening chapters together and adumbrates the novel’s movement 
from day into night, from light into darkness” (112).   
 Finally, in much the way a detective story works, Fitzgerald creates 
reader curiosity, thanks to a technique that links the different chapters with 
each other, reminiscent of the cliff hangers of a detective story. In each 
chapter, Fitzgerald introduces a theme, an event or a character which creates 
a certain curiosity about the next chapter. This tension increases towards the 
chapter’s coda. We can exemplify this with chapter one, where Gatsby is 
introduced almost as a mythic figure during the dinner at the Buchanan’s: 
 
 
“You live in West Egg,” she [Jordan] remarked 
contemptuously. “I know somebody there.” 
“I don’t know a single—” [said Nick] 
“You must know Gatsby.” 
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“Gatsby?” demanded Daisy. “What Gatsby?” 
Before I could reply that he was my neighbor dinner 
was announced […] (15-16) 
 
The reader is naturally well aware of Gatsby through the title of the novel, 
which includes his name, and Nick’s (vague) mention of him in the opening 
of the introductory chapter. Still, we don’t really know anything concrete 
about him. Nevertheless, we become very curious about Daisy’s strong 
reaction when his name is mentioned coincidentally. Gatsby is mentioned 
once again before the end of the chapter when Nick tells Jordan that Gatsby 
is his neighbour. Even during this scene, the dialogue changes immediately 
into something else because Jordan is inquisitive about the art of Daisy and 
Tom’s conversation: 
 
“This Mr. Gatsby you spoke of is my neighbor―” I 
said. 
“Don’t talk. I want to hear what happens.” (19)  
 
Our curiosity reaches a climax in the end of chapter one when we stand in 
“East Egg” together with Nick and gaze out over Gatsby’s garden: 
 
The silhouette of a moving cat wavered across the 
moonlight and turning my head to watch it I saw that I 
was not alone―fifty feet away a figure had emerged 
from the shadow of my neighbor’s mansion and was 
standing with his hands in his pockets regarding the 
silver pepper of the stars. Something in his leisurely 
movements and the secure position of his feet upon the 
lawn suggested that it was Mr. Gatsby himself, come 
out to determine what share was his of our local 
heavens. 
I decided to call to him. Miss Baker had mentioned 
him at dinner, and that would do for an introduction. 
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But I didn’t call to him for he gave a sudden intimation 
that he was content to be alone―he stretched out his 
arms toward the dark water in a curious way, and far as 
I was from him I could have sworn he was trembling. 
Involuntarily I glanced seaward―and distinguished 
nothing except a single green light, minute and far 
away, that might have been the end of a dock. When I 
looked once more for Gatsby he had vanished, and I 
was alone again in the unquiet darkness. (25-26) 
 
The scene is inclined to create a mysterious atmosphere. It includes several 
words associated with the gothic: “silhouette of a moving cat,” “moonlight,” 
“figure,” “mansion,” “stars,” “dark water,” “nothing,” “unquiet darkness.” 
Gatsby remains enigmatic, a “figure” since Nick chooses not to address him. 
Gatsby’s physical pose is quite peculiar: “[…] he stretched out his arms 
toward the dark water in a curious way.” Then he disappears into the 
darkness like a Mephisto, leaving Nick alone in the dark, wondering, 
together with the reader: “Who’s Gatsby” and “What does the green light 
represent”? 
 In chapter two, Gatsby is not even mentioned, so our curiosity is 
further stimulated. This is all settled in the very first paragraph of chapter 
three: “There was music from my neighbor’s house through the summer 
nights” (43). We hope that we will get closer to the character of Gatsby, but it 
is more of an illusion because, even though Nick describes in great detail the 
first party he participates in, Gatsby still remains a figure in the shadows. We 
are deluded through rumours and false statements. A woman relates an  
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incident when Gatsby bought her a new dress when her old one has been 
ruined at one of his parties. Her friend answers: 
 
“There’s something funny about a fellow that’ll do a 
thing like that,” said the other girl eagerly. “He doesn’t 
want any trouble with anybody.” […] 
  “I don’t think it’s so much that,” argued Lucille 
skeptically; “it’s more that he was a German spy during 
the war.” (48) 
 
Then the guests testify about a host nobody seems to know or hardly 
recognize. And when he finally shows, he does so in a shimmer of 
anonymity: 
 
I turned again to my new acquaintance. “This is an 
unusual party for me. I haven’t even seen the host. I live 
over there―” I waved my hand at the invisible hedge in 
the distance, “and this man Gatsby sent over his 
chauffeur with an invitation.” 
 For a moment he looked at me as if he failed to 
understand. 
 “I’m Gatsby,” he said suddenly. (52) 
 
This mystery technique runs through the whole novel, but as usual with 
mysteries they are more intriguing in the beginning than towards the end. 
We have seen how Gatsby’s background and economic enterprises purposely 
have been obscured through repeated narrative frequency; of having the 
information being retold, and repeated with different content, by others. The 
mystification of Gatsby is an important part of creating narrative movement 
and progress, and therefore also in sustaining a flow in the early chapters 
that encourages the reader’s inclusion. 
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Another inclusive strategy, identified by Kundu, is the speed and 
movement in the first three chapters (75). This motion is realized through a 
summarizing duration due to elliptic montage techniques and a distinct style, 
which Kundu relates to that of the film camera.48 The inclusive character is a 
result of these strategies’ effect on “the reader’s sense impressions” and 
creates a reader’s “happening” (75).  This summary, leaving out important 
information, engages the reader and concentrates the prose to a more 
effective and elevated style. The quick narrative pace in the opening chapters 
is partly due to the number of ellipses and scenes that are packed into these 
chapters exceeds those in the latter and that the time consuming analepses 
are almost absent.  In chapter one, commencing with Nick’s arrival to West 
Egg, we find four ellipses. Chapter two exhibits a great increase with twenty-
four, much due to Fitzgerald’s recapturing of Nick’s drunken feeling at the 
apartment party. Chapter three contains around twenty-nine. We have to be 
necessarily vague, since it is rather difficult to separate scenes with any 
accuracy from the iterative and summarizing style of Nick the Narrator. Its 
approximation, though, allow us to compare it to chapter six that contains 
ten scenes, chapter seven that contains six scenes, and chapter eight, which in 
its numerable analepses is much more a retracing of the past than living the 
present. 
 The rich texture of Fitzgerald’s prose in the first part creates much of 
visual stimuli (amera eye) in its exploration of colours and texture in its 
heavy use of adjectives. The gardens are “burning gardens” (11), windows 
are “glowing […] with reflected gold” (11) or “gleaming white against the  
                                                
48  I will not speculate on whether Fitzgerald is inspired by the language of film or not. 
However, the terminology that Kundu uses to describe Fitzgerald’s prose, a terminology 
derived from film theory, I find very useful in describing the uniqueness of his prose. 
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fresh grass” (12). Even the “Valley of Ashes” is inviting in its textured 
descriptions, despite its bleakness (Kundu 38-39). 
 The visual qualities of the prose suggest the motion of a camera that 
transforms its fluid prose into a sensation of a literary awe. Thus, the 
traditional pausing duration of a heavy descriptive narrative paradoxically 
creates a sense of movement and speed. Kundu exemplifies this in the 
opening sequence, when Nick for the first time visits the Buchanans (Kundu 
34-35).  The first description of the house is like a cinematic wide long shot, 
covering a wide scope of the surroundings over the bay: “Across the courtesy 
bay the white palaces of fashionable East Egg glittered along the water […]” 
(10). When Nick actually arrives at their house, the wide long shot has been 
replaced with a tighter one: “a cheerful red and white Georgian Colonial 
mansion overlooking the bay” (11). Then Fitzgerald’s prose follows that of an 
inward motion:  
 
The lawn started at the beach and ran toward the front 
door for a quarter of a mile, jumping over sun-dials and 
brick walks and burning gardens―finally when it 
reached the house drifting up the side in bright vines as 
though from the momentum of its run. The front was 
broken by a line of French windows, glowing now with 
the reflected gold, and wide open to the warm windy 
afternoon, and Tom Buchanan in riding clothes was 
standing with his legs apart on the front porch. (11) 
 
The inward motion towards Tom, simulating that of a camera movement, 
creates a sense of textual motion which is quite seductive in the way it 
emphasizes motion, speed, and a three-dimensional world. 
  This cinematic strategy of motion is also present in the scene when 
Nick sees Gatsby for the first time. It is identified as a pan shot, where the 
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cat’s movement reinforces the horizontal movement of Nick’s head (Kundu 
37): “The silhouette of a moving cat wavered across the moonlight and 
turning my head to watch it I saw that I was not alone […]” (25). The 
movement is continued through Gatsby’s stretching out his arms towards the 
sea: “I glanced seaward―and distinguished nothing except a single green 
light […]” (26). These “tracking shots” create the kind of motion that engages 
and draws the reader into the textual world. 
 We spoke earlier about the long never-ending party as a result of 
narrative strategies. The vagueness of such an a-temporal party facilitates 
possibilities of reader associations with their own biographical past and is 
therefore important in order to heighten the emotional content of the textual 
hyper-memory. The fact that these parties take place during the summer 
further encourages nostalgic identifications. One thing that emphasizes the 
feeling of a long, never-ending party (the party of a life time) is Fitzgerald’s 
use of iterative frequency, or more specifically pseudo-iterative frequency. In 
chapter one and two the frequency is singulative; what is told once in the 
narrative also happens once in the story. However, in the beginning of the 
third chapter, Fitzgerald departs from this classic narration and starts telling 
once in the narrative what happens several times in story time. There was not 
music from Gatsby’s house once, but “through the summer nights” (43). 
Before Nick arrives at Gatsby’s party, Nick briefly summarizes all parties of 
the summer. That passage is a cavalcade of events and experiences as these 
illustrative fragments show: “In his blue gardens men and girls came and 
went like moths among the whisperings and champagne and the stars” (43), 
“On week-ends his Rolls-Royce became an omnibus, bearing parties to and 
from the city […]” (43), and “Every Friday five crates of oranges and lemons 
arrived from a fruiterer in New York―every Monday these same oranges 
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and lemons left his back door in a pyramid of pulpless halves” (43). 
Fitzgerald’s nouns remain indefinite, such as “week-ends,” “men and girls,” 
or through the use of the word “every” before the nouns. The iterative time is 
a summarizing time, a best-of cavalcade over the memories and festivities of 
the summer. The pseudo quality arises out of the unbelievably detailed 
repetitiousness of the acts. This pseudo-iterative further creates a sense of 
idealized timelessness through its unreliable narration. 
 In the midst of this iterative description something occurs that further 
accentuates the feeling of presence in these opening chapters. Fitzgerald 
abandons his faithful and sober past tense in favour of a more direct present 
tense – shortening the distance in Genette’s terms. The transition is marked 
only with an indentation: 
 
In the main hall a bar with a real brass rail was set up, 
and stocked with gins and liquors and with cordials so 
long forgotten that most of his female guests were too 
young to know one from another. 
 By seven o’clock the orchestra has arrived―no thin 
five piece affair but a whole pit full of oboes and 
trombones and saxophones and viols and cornets and 
piccolos and low and high drums. The last swimmers 
have come in from the beach now and are dressing 
upstairs; the cars from New York are parked five deep 
in the drive, and already the halls and salons and 
verandas are gaudy with primary colors and hair shorn 
in strange new ways and shawls beyond the dreams of 
Castile. The bar is in full swing and floating rounds of 
cocktails permeate the garden outside until the air is 
alive with chatter and laughter and casual innuendo 
and instructions forgotten on the spot and enthusiastic 
meetings between women who never knew each other’s 
names. (my emphasis, 44) 
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Fitzgerald continues his lyrical meditation upon these nostalgic summer 
parties in present tense in a dozen lines before he returns to past tense when 
Nick arrives at the party. The return to past tense also concludes the iterative 
form, and the parties become the party, as in the first party Nick participates 
in. This shift in tense also become a shift from a more distanced narration to a 
more immediate prose which brings the readers closer to relating Nick’s 
experience with their own. According to the split narrative, the readers’ 
experience of this first part must be so strong that when the second element 
of nostalgia (reflection) is manifested in the second half of the novel, the 
readers react with a feeling of loss, a textual loss.  
The method of triggering nostalgia through music is very appropriate 
since music and sound in many aspects communicate more directly to our 
feelings. In doing so, they often become important connotations of memories 
to us. The long quotation above represents a good example of the musicality 
in Fitzgerald’s prose, a matter discussed by Langman (31-40) and Jackson R. 
Bryer (123-27). This musicality is especially noticeable in the first half of the 
novel when it intends to pull the reader into the ecstasy and presence of the 
narrative, as well as in the very end when there is a settlement between the 
two different nostalgic elements. The first thing that strikes us is the long 
winding sentences, where the subordinate clauses play and complement 
each other, not unlike the instruments in a string quartet. In the passage 
above, we find only four periods, which means there is a flow and a rhythm 
containing repetitions. Asyndeton and polysyndeton, as we have seen in 
chapter four, function as pausing elements instead of periods and create a 
sense of awe through the strong impressions.  
In the numerous references to music there’s also much in the style that 
associates with music. Bryer calls attention to Fitzgerald’s use of verbs to 
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create movement but also to suggest the pregnancy of audibility. As an 
example, Jackson quotes words like “splash” and “slit” (Bryer 126). In our 
sequence above we find fifteen verbs, a fact which would not be worth noting 
if they didn’t occur in a paragraph which usually is interpreted as descriptive 
and illustrative. At least one of these verbs, “shorn,” also contains 
onomatopoeic phonetic qualities. The sound imagery is otherwise based on 
phrases such as “the bar is in full swing” and “the air is alive with chatter 
and laughter.” 
 The rich texture of Fitzgerald’s prose is thus not only reflected in its 
visual qualities but also in its descriptions of sounds, which further work 
inclusively in how they add atmosphere and sensuality to the narrative. The 
sounds of the summer are constantly infiltrating and fortifying our physical 
reading experience. It is the “whip and snap” (12) of curtains, white dresses 
“rippling and fluttering” (12), and the “groan” (12) of a picture on the wall in 
the open windy summer room at the Buchanans. It is the “boom” (12) and 
death of the “caught wind” (12) when the door is shut. The nightingale sings 
outside (20). Jordan Baker reads a newspaper, her words “murmurous and 
uninflected, running together in a soothing tune” (22), turning pages with “a 
flutter of slender muscles in her arms” (22). At night the “wind had blown 
off, leaving a loud bright night with wings beating in the trees and a 
persistent organ sound as the full bellows of the earth blew the frogs full of 
life” (25). 
 In this coherent first part of the book, where we are drawn into the 
never ending party, our nostalgia is reinforced by the obvious contrast 
between the fairy, dreamy backgrounds of Daisy and Gatsby and “the ash 
heap” in chapter two: 
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This is a valley of ashes―a fantastic farm where ashes 
grow like wheat into ridges and hills and grotesque 
gardens, where ashes take the forms of houses and 
chimneys and rising smoke and finally, with a 
transcendent effort, of men who move dimly and 
already crumbling through the powdery air. 
Occasionally a line of grey cars crawls along an 
invisible track, gives out a ghastly creak and comes to 
rest, and immediately the ash-grey men swarm up with 
leaden spades and stir up an impenetrable cloud which 
screens their obscure operations from your sight. (27) 
 
The descriptive prose is just as extravagant in its profligacy of adjective and 
metaphor as in the romantic passages, although bleaker. Instead of luring us 
into the atmosphere of nostalgia, Fitzgerald scares us into the nightmare of 
the present through dark dissonant words like “grotesque,” “men who move 
dimly,” “powdery air,” “grey cars crawls,” and a resort to the present tense. 
By reminding us of the realities of life in the description of the grey, dull 
environment where Wilson and his wife live under the constant supervision 
of Dr. T. J. Eckleburg, the exquisitely beautiful parties become even more 
exquisite and suggestive. The ash heap represents the present, what we 
inevitably long to leave, while the parties are a sharply defined past. In 
nostalgia there is always a core of something positive, a never-ending party, 
but it is not until we connect it to the present that nostalgia is fulfilled. This is 
even more apparent in the latter part of Gatsby. 
 
The Nostalgic Hang-Over 
The euphoric, debauched happiness disappears in chapter five. Instead of 
continuing the joyful summer of 1922, we are moved backward in time more 
and more often through multiple analepses. These disturb the seductiveness 
and presence in the experience and bring, in addition to Nick’s more 
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diagnostic narrator’s voice, a more sober and reflective style. Since we have 
been dependent on the romantic prose in the first half of the book, we miss it 
now; everything has become duller. Fitzgerald achieves this effect in several 
different ways. 
 Early in the introduction of chapter six we notice the difference, since 
it is the first time (with the exception of chapter two) that Nick is not present 
in the very opening of a chapter. All previous chapters have opened with an 
emphasis on Nick as a subject; it has always been certain that he is the 
narrator. Chapter one starts with “In my younger […]” (my emphasis, 5), in 
chapter three, “There was music from my neighbor’s house” (my emphasis, 
43). It takes ten lines in chapter four until Fitzgerald stresses Nick’s subject, 
“Once I wrote down” (my emphasis, 65) but in chapter five he returns to his 
old principle with “When I came home” (my emphasis, 86). I have 
deliberately avoided mentioning chapter two since it is an exception. It 
begins with an introductory description of the ash heap before Nick’s 
presence is revealed after one page with “that I first met” (my emphasis, 28). 
It is not strange, in this case, that Fitzgerald awaits Nick’s arrival, because 
chapter two is a contrast to the otherwise flowing first half of the novel, as 
noted above. As in chapter two, the latter part of Gatsby, and the loss of Nick, 
creates a momentum of uneasiness; we have been used to having our 
cicerone by our side.  
 Furthermore, as we have seen in the section about narrative mood and 
voice in Gatsby in chapter four, there is an increase of distance and a decrease 
of presence in the narrative mood and voice in the latter part of Gatsby. This 
increased distance is established because we now are in a more analytical 
part of the narration. Gone are the impressionistic descriptions of events and 
characters in favour of reasoning. Nick’s narrating distance increases when 
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he penetrates the emptiness, superficiality, and alienation around him. He is 
no longer seduced by what he sees, and, in extension, he no longer seduces 
us. 
If that was not enough, enter autumn. The early summer’s promises of 
happiness and happenings transform into a blues of melancholia, decadence 
and a remembrance of the forgotten when the leaves turn yellow. The 
presence of autumn reverberates in the prose in phrases such as 
“disappearing under the August foliage” (110) and “The next day was 
broiling, almost the last, certainly the warmest, of the summer” (120). Further 
into the narrative the entrance of autumn becomes more tangible: “there was 
an autumn flavor in the air” (161), “the yellowing trees […] an unfamiliar sky 
through frightening leaves” (169). The sense of melancholia is also more 
implicit: “Her glance left me and sought the lighted top of the steps where 
‘Three o’Clock in the Morning,’ a neat sad little waltz of that year, was 
drifting out the open door” (115). Furthermore, it is not by pure chance that 
Gatsby’s first meeting with Daisy, retold by Gatsby, takes place during 
autumn, with all the clichés of autumn: “…One autumn night, five years 
before, they had been walking down the street when the leaves were falling 
[…]” (117) The autumn of memory corresponds with the narrative autumn 
and contrasts the earlier textual memory of summer and summer analepses. 
 The divided narrative in Gatsby is essential in order for us to create 
and reflect upon our own textual memory. However, in preventing this 
division from being too abrupt (what Perry calls retrospective repatterning), a 
symmetry must assist the reader in the reverberation of his textual memory. 
The usage and re-usage of simple symbols create symmetry that becomes the 
skeleton of the novel. Fitzgerald gradually transforms these symbols in order  
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to play with our textual memory and emotionally distort it. They resemble, 
in an artificial way, the triggers of memories. 
 One such recurring motif is the use of flowers in general and pink 
roses in particular. They connect our experiences from the first part with the 
latter in a way that we, perhaps subconsciously, are reminded of that first 
experience and the happiness of our textual memory. Langman writes that 
they function “as a simple unifying device, reminding us of one scene as we 
read another” (43). There are several rose motifs in the opening of the novel. 
The first that attracts Nick’s attention at the Buchanans’ home is the rose 
garden: “a half acre of deep pungent roses […]” (12). Later, Nick and Tom 
enter “into a bright rosy-colored space” (12), the hallway. They look through 
“a rosy-colored porch” (16), and Daisy (herself named after a flower) calls 
Nick “a rose, an absolute rose” (19). 
 In the latter part of the novel these rose motifs reappear with 
regularity and remind us of the beginning of the novel: “Our eyes lifted over 
the rosebeds” (124), “I could think of nothing except the luminosity of his 
pink suit under the moon” (150), and “the pink glow from Daisy’s room […]” 
(152). But it is not only through the noun “rose” that Fitzgerald reminds us of 
the past. His vocabulary is overrepresented by “rose” the verb: “With an 
effort her wit rose faintly […]” (132), “a tiny gust of powder rose from her 
bosom […]” (122). Even a melody assists our chain of associations: “someone 
had begun to whistle ‘The Rosary,’ […]” (178). 
 Gradually these symbols change. Once representing love and passion, 
they will be exchanged for resignation as in the “crushed flowers” and “fruit 
rinds” (116) at the end of the final party, the flower-laden hearse of Gatsby’s 
funeral or Gatsby’s recollection of them: “He must have looked up at an 
unfamiliar sky through frightening leaves and shivered as he found what a 
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grotesque thing a rose is […]” (169). Likewise, these roses will allude to 
Robert Herrick’s famous “Gather ye rosebuds while ye may” for Daisy when 
Gatsby leaves for the war: 
 
All night the saxophones wailed the hopeless comment 
of the ‘Beale Street Blues’ while a hundred pairs of 
golden and silver slippers shuffled the shining dust. At 
the grey tea hour there were always rooms that 
throbbed incessantly with this low sweet fever, while 
fresh faces drifted here and there like rose petals blown 
by the sad horns around the floor. (158) 
 
With J. S. Westbrook’s words, “the world cannot be made to bloom 
perpetually” (81), it is as if there is “an overripeness, an unnatural plenitude 
in this new Eden […]” (81) or a “buried fertility […]” (83) that carries into the 
last symbols of the vanished promises of the New Land. 
 Another colour motif used frequently by Fitzgerald is “white,” and 
this colour helps to mythologize Daisy for Gatsby and the reader with its 
connotations of childhood and innocence. The colour white is used in 
phrases such as “the white palaces of fashionable East Egg […]” (10) through 
“The windows were ajar and gleaming white against the fresh grass […]” 
(12) to Jordan’s voice “that was as cool as their white dresses […]” (17), and 
their innocent childhood: “Our white girlhood was passed together there. 
Our beautiful white——” (24). References to “white” appear on more or less 
every page. In the latter part of the novel “six pair of white duck trousers” 
(106) are displayed, an actress sits under “a white plum tree” (111), and 
Gatsby remembers his autumn night with Daisy when “the sidewalk was 
white with moonlight” (117) and “Daisy’s white face came up to his own” 
(117). In the end, Nick stares at Gatsby’s “white steps […]” (188). 
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 The later motifs associated with “white” effectively juxtapose our 
earlier reminisces of the glorious, promising, and innocent past such as the 
snow in Nick’s story about his youth: “When we pulled out into the winter 
night and the real snow, our snow, began to stretch out beside us […]” (184). 
Another example is the descriptions of Daisy, who is “gleaming like silver” 
(157) on her veranda, “bright with the bought luxury of star-shine […]” (157). 
Likewise, the meaning of the colour yellow is transformed, most obviously 
through Gatsby’s yellow car that first transports guests to and from his 
dazzling parties, but in the end turns into the death car Daisy uses when she 
kills Myrtle (Westbrook 81). 
 In the use of sounds, we also see a change between part one and two 
in order to assist our longing back to our textual memory. In the transitional 
fifth chapter, the summer rain subtly changes character from soft and 
wonderful to a windy and loud thunder as the story progresses towards its 
ultimate fate of Gatsby’s nostalgic dream. It is the zenith, the narrative break 
point, when the reader suddenly emotionally becomes aware of the 
impossibility of Gatsby’s project. The “faint flow of thunder along the 
Sound” (101) synchronizes with this feeling of irrecoverable moments, a loss 
that even Gatsby seems to realize when “Daisy tumbled short of his 
dreams―not through her own fault but because of the colossal vitality of his 
illusion” (101). Later on, after Myrtle’s death, the merry sounds of the 
summer birds have completely changed into singing “ghostly birds” (159). 
As Kundu profoundly has observed, “[t]he hiatus between beauty and the 
romance of nature and humanity’s tragic fate […]” is established through the 
diverse use of sounds and descriptions of nature (101). 
 Another juxtaposition is that the latter part of the story is more 
inclined to use close ups than the inclusive seductive tracking, or zooming 
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shots of the first part, thus entering a more psychological tensional discourse. 
When Nick finds Gatsby in the pool, the camera eye does not change focal 
lengths from long shot to close up in order to create a sense of awe, but 
instead moves closely between certain symbols: 
 
 There was a faint, barely perceptible movement of 
the water as the fresh flow from one end urged its way 
toward the drain at the other. With little ripples that 
were hardly the shadows of waves, the laden mattress 
moved irregularly down the pool. A small gust of wind 
that scarcely corrugated the surface was enough to 
disturb its accidental course with its accidental burden. 
The touch of a cluster of leaves revolved it slowly, 
tracing, like the leg of a compass, a thin red circle in the 
water. (170) 
 
The emotional response to this stylistic close up technique differs radically 
from the one of motion that worked so inclusively in the first part. Since we 
already know that Gatsby lies dead in the pool, there is no mystery. The 
movement of the camera eye from one image to another slows down the 
duration of the scene drastically. Fitzgerald’s literary technique “resembles 
filmmakers’ metaphorical use of the moving camera as a consumer of time,” 
writes Kundu. And this implies that Gatsby “is a victim not only of his 
impossible dream, but also of time’s cruel prodigality, indeed, of the tragic 
flux and mutability of life itself” (Kundu 42). 
 We have also reached Gatsby’s last party. Nick depicts his feelings 
toward this party with a sober sadness: “There were the same people, or at 
least the same sort of people, the same profusion of champagne, the same 
many-colored, many-keyed commotion, but I felt an unpleasantness in the 
air, a pervading harshness that hadn’t been there before” (110). As usual, 
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Nick’s emotions are planted into the language. Words like “harshness,” 
“desolate” and “crushed,” which phonetically sound unattractive, were not 
to be found in the first part of Gatsby. The words not only communicate 
emptiness and regret for the passing summer, but also in a more symbolic 
meaning, the tragedy of life: that today is tomorrow’s past. The potent boats 
that “slit” the water in the beginning are replaced by “one small sail [that] 
crawled slowly toward the fresher sea” (124). And if the first parties revealed 
a sentiment that the characters were exactly where they wanted to be, they 
seem restless now. Inspired by the pioneer spirit and “the moon […] in the 
western sky” (126) they want to go west just like Wilson and his wife. 
 These sentiments are cemented in words such as “overripe” (132), 
“motionless” (146), and “restless” (135), and the frequently used sound 
imagery changes character from a feeling of remembrance to one of 
forgetfulness: “She turned to me and her voice, dropping an octave lower, 
filled the room with thrilling scorn […]” (139), “hollow, wailing sound” (145) 
and  “I heard a low husky sob […]” (149). Even the wedding orchestra from 
the ball room seems to work in a headwind: “From the ballroom beneath, 
muffled and suffocating chords were drifting up on hot waves of air” (139).  
 In the end, Gatsby’s dream dies in a manifestation of every man’s past, 
rather than one individual’s fate; the conclusion prepares us for a 
transcendence from an individual fate to a universal one, from a presence to 
a distance, creating a myth of the themes of the entire novel: “the dead dream 
fought on as the afternoon slipped away, trying to touch what was no longer 
tangible, struggling unhappily, undespairingly, toward that lost voice across 
the room” (142). We, together with the key characters of the book, travel by 
car towards the verge of destiny, in the most brilliant prolepsis of the novel:  
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“So we drove toward death through the cooling twilight” (143). The party is 
over. Enter: Hang-over. 
 In the experience of the narrative the reader encounters two divided 
and opposing parts. The first one enhances the imagination of the reader 
through a set of stylistic and narratological devices such as movement, 
speed, narrative coherence, atmospheric imagery, and the use of sensations in 
order to stimulate a creation of a reader’s textual hyper-memory. The second 
part creates a strong movement and longing back to this textual hyper-
memory both voluntarily and involuntarily. The style of the narration is more 
distanced, reflective, mimetic, and filled with direct speech and analepses 
that slow down the speed. The past textual memory in the reader is not only 
evoked through the very change of style, but also through the reuse of 
common symbols that were developed in the first part. This division mimics 
that of the division of the nostalgic reaction. The first part represents the 
happiness of the memory, and the second part illustrates the melancholic 
reflection upon this memory. Thus, the process of reading Gatsby is similar to 
the process of a nostalgic reaction.  
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Chapter Seven 
The Nostalgic Experience in The Sound and the Fury 
 
 




In this last chapter we will practice our method and tools on a text that might 
not be an obvious choice for a nostalgic study. However, as we will see, 
William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury (1929) contains several possibilities 
for creating a nostalgic reading experience. In this analysis we will offer an 
insight into the ways a close nostalgic reading of a whole narrative can be 
performed. Hopefully, this process will be both inspirational and educational 
for future analysis of nostalgic or other emotional responses to fiction. 
 The Sound and the Fury could be named an elegy of the past. In fact, it 
has been, implicitly; an array of criticism over the years has been obsessed 
with the novel’s relation to time. Undoubtedly it has a fixation on time 
through the commonly recognized divisions of time perception in the three 
brothers’ interiorities in the first three sections: Benjy representing the 
present, Quentin the past, and Jason the future (Reed 75; Lowrey). Stated 
more distinctly, “Benjy […] is unconscious of time […] Quentin obsessed by 
time” and “Jason […] is harried by time […]” (Brooks 325). Quentin’s section, 
especially, has undergone thorough critical examinations through its 
multitude of references to clocks and time and its fluid blend of past and 
present events, as well as Quentin’s fixation on past influences; the loss of 
home, childhood, and a beloved sister, and the complex syntax of Faulkner’s  
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narrative blending tenses and disrupting syntactical flow. One main catalyst 
in these areas was Jean-Paul Sartre’s early influential essay “A propos de Le 
Bruit et la fureur: La Temporalité chez Faulkner” [“On The Sound and the Fury: 
Time in the Work of Faulkner”] (1939), where Sartre discusses the 
consequences of division between clock time and Bergsonian durée in 
Faulkner’s style. Sartre elevates the book to one of modernism’s great time 
novels.  
To argue that The Sound and the Fury is a book about time is to be very 
imprecise; rather it strips time of its usual meanings. Most of all, it is a book 
about the past, about the consequences of loss and yearnings for the vanished 
yesterday of childhood, a sister, and a home.  
 This loss is personified in the absent character of Caddy, and elevated 
through the central image of Caddy climbing the pear tree to peep into the 
funeral of her “damuddy,” exposing her “muddy drawers” to her three 
brothers. Usually this scene, with its background of Edenic allusions is 
considered “the fall” of Caddy in a moral sense. Even her name is derived 
from the Latin word “cadere” which means to fall (Fowler 32). And at least 
two of the brothers react to this moral decadence strongly: Quentin confuses 
Caddy with his longings for the past home and childhood and thus feels 
“disgusted” by the loss of purity in Caddy, and Jason confuses Caddy’s “fall” 
with his own materialistic one. Caddy’s moral decline is not problematic for 
Benjy since his defective mind cannot value the temporal changes of her 
character nor judge her morally, even though he senses and fears that she is 
slowly sliding away from him through his olfactory registrations. 
There seems to be a critical confusion between being lost and a deeper 
sense of loss. From her family’s perspective, she might be a lost girl, morally. 
Her rebellious and later promiscuous behaviour is, as Faulkner says, 
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symbolized by her muddy drawers. However, I want to argue, that the 
“lostness” of Caddy, is not a central issue. It colours the reactions of Quentin 
and Jason, but it does not alter the fact that these reactions are based on the 
loss of Caddy. This loss is not only moral, it is factual. 
For Benjy, this loss manifests itself in his bellowing after what he lacks 
and she represents: security, love, motherhood, and stability.  Caddy 
performs most of the maternal duties Benjy’s real mother rejects; hence, she 
becomes more of a mother to Benjy than his biological one. We could 
interpret Benjy’s longings as nostalgic in the Freudian sense as a desire to 
return to the childhood/mother. 
As for Benjy, Caddy fills the absence of a mother for Quentin; she is a 
“mother surrogate” as suggested by John T. Matthews (The Sound and the 
Fury: Faulkner and the Lost Cause 39). He also refers to Quentin’s death by 
water as a return to the womb (48-49). Quentin’s incestuous interest in Caddy 
thus enters an even more problematic and Freudian longing for a mother. 
More importantly, Caddy represents the loss of childhood for Quentin. This 
becomes most acute, as pointed out by Mark Spilka in “Quentin Compson’s 
Universal Grief,” in the juxtaposition of the encounter of the little girl and 
Quentin’s memories of the sexual awakening of his sister (301-02). 
 Many see Caddy as the true heroine of the novel, patched together 
from bits and pieces of others’ characterization and memories of her. I would 
argue against that interpretation. She is a central narrative force, something 
of a “heroine of the narrative,” the sun of the past who other orbiting planets 
long for. But as a character in a story, she remains a ghost. We are betrayed, 
narratologically, to suppose it is a story about her; in that sense we feel 
abandoned in the end. We never come close to Caddy. We do come close, 
however, to the loss and longings of her brothers. Matthews writes in “The 
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Discovery of Loss in The Sound and the Fury” that “Caddy is the figure that 
the novel is written to lose […]” (396). He thereby extends the loss of Caddy 
from that of her brothers to that of the reader, which could be ascribed to a 
textual loss, or rather, a textual absence. 
In the way Faulkner avoids the textual presumptions and 
anticipations in the reader, his specific style and structuring creates a textual 
absence of a central image or idea. We share the brothers’ loss. This is quite a 
different strategy than Fitzgerald uses in Gatsby, but not completely, since 
both narratives are a sort of “suspense in retrospective,” where we are aware 
of the “crime” early on and the rest of the narrative circles around it in an 
explanatory and revealing way. If Fitzgerald in Gatsby creates a textual 
memory through a repeated emphasis on presence in the early parts, so does 
Faulkner in a different way through his symbolic central image of the girl 
with muddy drawers. Let us look at this central image: 
 
He [Versh] went and pushed Caddy up into the tree to 
the first limb. We watched the muddy bottom of her 
drawers. Then we couldn’t see her. We could hear the 
tree trashing. 
     ‘Mr Jason said if you break that tree he whip you.’ 
Versh said. 
     ‘I’m going to tell on her too.’ Jason said. 
     The tree quit trashing. We looked up into the still 
branches. (31-32) 
 
This scene is mentioned in Benjy’s section an additional fourteen times (Ross 
and Polk 6), but not in as much detail as the quotation above. Being a central 
image of the whole book, it might not seem so vivid at first. However, we 
must keep in mind that it is rendered through Benjy’s three-year-old 
consciousness and hence is void of associations, metaphors, and descriptive 
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language. Bared of temporal and spatial detailing, it creates an intensified 
now, a strong presence. It is not, however, completely void of minimalist 
poetry. There is the sound of “the tree trashing,” foreboding something 
dramatic and symbolic. There is the symbolic idea of the tree itself and its 
branches sensing “the dark, harsh flowing of time […]” (Faulkner, “An 
introduction” 222). We have the sudden transformation of the “three 
thrashing” to “still branches,” accentuating the sense of change and quickly 
contrasting the rebellious act with an elevation of the bravest of them: Caddy 
is positioned above her brothers in order to signal superiority. This act will 
create an enlarged emotional impact on them; this is an act of envy, of 
putting Caddy on a pedestal, not unproblematic nevertheless. Caddy will 
haunt the brothers’ consciousness to a great extent in their sections, though in 
very different manners.  
 The absence of detail of the central image, and Caddy as a symbol for 
the brothers’ varying sense of loss, encourages the reader to exchange Caddy 
for whatever personal loss they might experience. The loss of Caddy will be 
the reader’s personal loss, a loss that the novel constantly charges around. 
This alone does not necessarily create a nostalgic experience in the reader; it 
is complemented with constant anachronies, forcing us backwards, not only 
to story pasts, but also to textual pasts. The actual analepses change from 
being homodiegetic to heterodiegetic, simulating closely that of voluntary 
and involuntary memory, and become the specific triggers of nostalgic 
memories. Furthermore, Faulkner works to both include us and alienate us 
from the narrative through his stylistics. The general structure of the novel 
also encourages a nostalgic experience, building up a personal loss through 
the internalized sections of Benjy and Quentin, preparing us for two different 
temporalities: that of our childhood, and that of losing it.  
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The final section leaves the personal nostalgia and commences, not 
unlike Gatsby’s final section, with a more hypothetical and universal grief 
that creates the plateau of the entropic, nihilistic tendencies of nostalgia. The 
nostalgia is not for the past, it is for an a-temporal life; it is a bitter feud 
against time itself, may it be cosmological time, clock time, objective time, 
monumental time, or whatever we might call it. It is fear of death, fear of 
aging, fear of extinction. And this can result in nihilism, among other things. 
The Sound and the Fury does engage in Nietzschean philosophy in the way its 
characters feel the emptiness of present life and how this triggers fatal 
nostalgias in Quentin’s case and vivid opportunism in Jason’s. The chaos of 
the present world is fulfilled through the chaotic prose of Faulkner. This 
explains the obsession with memory both Faulkner and his characters 
expose. This meaninglessness is also echoed in the famous lines from Macbeth 
that the novel’s title derives from: “The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief 
candle! / Life’s but a walking shadow; a poor player, /  […] it is a tale / Told 
by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing” (197-98, V v23-28). 
 This chapter will explore how the nostalgia of The Sound and the Fury 
creeps into the reader’s consciousness according to our principles of the 
fictive nostalgic experience; hence, we will perform a close reading of the 
text’s most important sections, Benjy’s and Quentin’s. Examining Benjy’s and 
Quentin’s sections more closely, we will investigate the style and structure 
that reinforces their respective nostalgic content before approaching the 
universal grief in the final section. In short, the novel creates a feeling of loss 
through its central characters’ longing and yearning for the past, a loss that is 




Benjy’s Section: The Age of Childhood 
 
Structural Temporalities 
The symbolic image of loss in Caddy is explicit from the beginning. The 
importance of Caddy for Benjy is evident already in the golfers’ screams of 
“Caddie” in the first page, confusing Benjy, and the reader, with his sister’s 
name. Of course, this fact cannot be comprehended by the reader until he 
becomes aware of who Caddy is a few lines later and her importance for 
Benjy throughout the section. Just like Wolfgang Iser suggests, we are then 
forced back from the point in the narrative when we make this connection to 
the second sentence of the book, further adding to the textual pastness of the 
reading experience. The chaotic narrative encourages the reader to make 
sense of things, which guides us into re-evaluating both the present part of 
the reading as well as story events we have read before. Hence, the narrative 
memories cooperate with that of the textual ones. 
It is difficult not to relate the golfers’ screams with Benjy’s inner shouts 
for his lost sister. Caddy is present with great regularity, either as part of 
Benjy’s memories or his present emotions. Her appearance is accentuated 
through Benjy’s lack of synonyms. Irena Kaluz states: “Benjy’s beloved sister 
is always ‘Caddy’, whether she is seven or nineteen years old” (49). Being the 
child he is, his reaction to Caddy’s absence is sudden grief, or “bellowing.” 
While Caddy is just temporarily gone, this grief is short and ends upon her 
return. When she disappears, this grief must turn into trauma. However, 
since Benjy has no concept of time, he does not understand how long she has 
been gone, and that she will never return. This results in a permanent clash 
between hope and despair. That is perhaps the reason why his present is 
invaded suddenly and abruptly by memories of his sister, even though for 
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Benjy these memories do not appear as memories but as present states. His 
constant reference to Caddy smelling like trees links his memory to the tree 
episode. The abrupt memories, usually, but not always, signalled by the 
change of normal font to italics, seem strong and very vivid in their 
involuntary capacity. Ross and Polk identify that the temporal transitions are 
often guided in a Proustian manner from one sensation to another (10-11). In 
the novel’s first time change, it is the action of getting caught in the fence that 
transports Benjy into an earlier episode with Caddy: 
 
We went along the fence and came to the garden 
fence, where our shadows were. My shadow was 
higher than Luster’s on the fence. We came to the 
broken place and went through it. 
 ‘Wait a minute.’ Luster said. ‘You snagged on that 
nail again. Can’t you never crawl through here without 
snagging on that nail.’ 
 Caddy uncaught me and we crawled through. (2) 
 
This is different from Proust’s method, where the narrator simplifies the time 
shifts by commenting on them. We are guided here only by the italic font. 
The actual doubling of human memory functions through associations or 
motivators and gives us a more physical presence of memory and 
recollection. The physical presence is further aided by the use of a wide 
range of non-visual senses in describing forcefully the strength of the pasts, 
primarily through smells and sounds. Benjy rather smells or hears the past, 
than understands it: Caddy reminds him of the smell of trees, or leaves, pigs 
smell like pigs rather than look like pigs (28), trees are buzzing (30), father 
smells like rain (53), and Benjy hears the roof (55). This underlines the 
general sensorial aspects of memories in the way they are mainly associated 
with the non-visual senses.  
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The repetitions, such as “smells like rain” and the reoccurring symbols 
like “fire,” constantly force us back into both textual memory and the past 
narrative events. It is the incentive of a narrative movement backwards that 
engages us in recharging the meaning of our present situation through the 
past. 
 Thus, the repetitious nature of the Benjy section, with not only the 
imagery repeated, but also the simplicity of language, certain mantras, the 
physicality of the events, the similarities between the motivators, all become 
internalized repetitions in the reader, changing, recharging, constantly 
forcing us backwards into remembering things that are essentially nostalgic 
sentiments. Specifically, there are identical repetitions, but in the experience 
of the reader we must also refer to the backward movements as recollections. 
 
Stylistic Temporalities 
The ambiguity of temporality as seen in the main structure of Benjy’s section 
is further established on its micro level. At a first reading it seems that scenes 
from April 7, 1928, are conveyed mainly through the use of progressive 
forms. Benjy’s account starts with “I could see them hitting” and “They were 
coming toward” (1). We are, of course, lacking time indicators since Benjy’s 
narrative is void of traditional time markers due to Benjy’s lack of sense of 
temporality and spatiality. Especially past progressives are very appropriate 
for conveying a nostalgic tone, since they have this unique mix of 
temporalities in the tense itself. If we study the first page more carefully, we 
notice that the past progressive style is not constant. The golfers suddenly 
were not taking out the flag, they “took the flag out” and Benjy was not 
holding on to the fence, he “held to the fence.” Throughout this section, there 
is a mix between past tense and past progressive tense, further blurring the 
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temporalities between now and then. However, if we look at the first 
narrative time change, we observe that we, with one exception, enter a total 
past tense: 
 
Caddy uncaught me and we crawled through. Uncle 
Maury said to not let anybody see us, so we better stoop over, 
Caddy said. Stoop over, Benjy. Like this, see. We stooped over 
and crossed the garden, where the flowers rasped and rattled 
against us. The ground was hard. We climbed the fence, 
where the pigs were grunting and snuffing. I expect they’re 
sorry because one of them got killed today, Caddy said. The 
ground was hard, churned and knotted. (2) 
 
The verbs are all past tense, except for the activities of the pigs. The present 
tense “stoop,” “see,” “expect” are all part of the dialogue of Caddy, which is 
referred to as something present for Benjy. 
 As the narrative proceeds it becomes equally difficult to establish a 
concrete difference between the narrative present and past. In the present, we 
are, like in the beginning, challenged by the intervening past and past 
progressive tenses. The past sections tend towards the past tense, but the 
feeling of present is then balanced through the use of the present in direct 
speech. However, it is noteworthy that Benjy’s precarious symbolic 
memories, especially the ones concerning Caddy, always are in past tense, 
establishing them as definitely past, even for Benjy (this is something that 
contradicts the sense of complete a-temporality with Benjy). For example, all 
Benjy’s recollections of the smell of Caddy are “she smelled like rain” (my 
emphasis).  
 
The Childhood Aspect of Benjy’s Section 
Even though we can, through the use of italics, make distinctions between 
 337 
the scenes from April 7, 1928, and the other fifteen located times, they seem 
appropriately muddled together, almost creating a sense of timelessness, a-
temporality, perhaps even a hypothetical time. It is truly a Bergsonian time 
flux, where the past times flow over us involuntarily and unexpectedly. 
Donald M. Kartiganer writes that “The Quality of Benjy’s memory is the chief 
indicator of his non-human perception, for he does not recollect the past: he 
relieves it” (365). It is definitely not non-human, quite the contrary, rather 
human. It is in the matter of Bergsonian time, and not clock time, that we 
capture the human sensations of temporalities. Polk is closer to the truth, and 
addressing a more important issue, when he acknowledges that Benjy “does 
not use words; he does not tell us things, but experiences the world directly” 
(145). Through Benjy’s experience, readers do have the possibility of sharing 
this kind of experience – reminding us of the phenomenological experiences 
of childhood. 
 The simplicity of Benjy’s world is an important matter in the 
general structure of the novel. It is crucial that our experience of the first 
section of the novel prepares us, in different ways, for the result of nostalgia 
in the Quentin section. Benjy’s temporality is that of a child’s. Thus, in 
experiencing the temporality of a child, we are encouraged to return to our 
own past, childhood temporality. Surely, this experience is not solely one of 
childhood temporality since the complex narrative requires a ratiocinate 
reconstruction of how temporalities work. Quentin’s desire, located through 
his dreams of Caddy and his visions of the past events in section two, is a 
retreat to that a-temporal state of pure childhood. Therefore, it is convenient 
that we are to experience that temporality previous to losing it together with 
Quentin in his section. 
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 There are several aspects of Benjy’s section that create the 
possibility of childhood identification. The first is the way Benjy seems to 
perceive the world in synaesthetic impressions: the world of Benjy is smell 
and sounds mostly, thus recreating the impression from the overwhelming 
physicality of childhood prior to intellectual perception.  
 Second, Benjy’s narrative is also highly visual, rather than verbal 
(except dialogue), and almost “completely visual, cinematic […]” (Polk 145). 
If we look at the very first sentence “Through the fence, between the curling 
flower spaces, I could see them hitting” (1), the visual aspect comes through 
in the “curling flower spaces.” Later Benjy does not only see a flag but he 
also sees how it “flapped on the bright grass and the trees” (1). 
 Furthermore, Benjy’s, and children’s, incapacity to link one thing 
with another, is replicated in the prose, since the lack of cause and effect is 
obvious. He sees “them hitting,” but not what they are hitting. The omission 
of the ball is central. Two sentences later, “Luster was hunting in the grass by 
the flower tree,” but what is he hunting?  
 Another aspect is Benjy’s lack of perspective. As Ross and Polk 
notice, when the golfers are further away, Benjy experiences them as “small 
rather than as distant” (10), communicated through Faulkner as “They were 
hitting little” (1). 
 Finally, the repetitious prose also reinforces the simplicity of 
childhood, and the somewhat limited perspective of the world is simulated 
through these repetitions and the use of a reduced number of words and 
expressions. When Benjy sees something twice, it gives him the same 
impression (the narrative often using the same exact words). In the first page, 
certain images are repeated constantly: the fence is mentioned eight times. 
The flag is mentioned five times, but the description of it is exactly 
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reproduced twice: “flapped on the bright grass and the trees.” The flower 
tree or flower space is mentioned four times.  
 
In Preparation for Quentin 
Toolan recognizes that “[a] reader would have to be very insensitive to fail to 
discern the contrasting styles of the sections of that novel, expressing the 
different narrating persona of each section” (60). The Sound and the Fury is by 
all means a polyphonic novel in the ways the different styles of the four 
sections harmonize to create meaning. The contrast between the first two 
sections is enormous, as Joseph W. Reed, Jr. exclaims when he posits that 
coming to Quentin’s section from Benjy’s is to “return to the narrow world 
familiar to us from most other first-person fiction: the intimacy and 
participation of a shared confessional” (79). This intimacy is a key component 
to the textual loss we as readers will experience in Quentin’s section.  
As we enter Quentin’s section, we are mentally identifying with the 
consciousness of childhood and its particular temporality through the style 
of Benjy’s section. However, in Quentin’s section we will soon share 
Quentin’s longing for that very childhood. This longing is not only 
communicated through representation but also through structure and style. 
Benjy might, in a general sense, be difficult to identify with because of the 
non-traditional way he is represented. The style of his narration, though, 
creates possibilities for us to achieve inclusion in the narrative since we have 
to interpret the lack of traditional narrative meaning. We must constantly 
define and redefine the narrative through the section’s anachronies within 
our own perceptions. The almost pre-lingual style of the prose offers us a 
pre-lingual experience, and this opens up memorial triggers to our own  
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childhood. In the Quentin section, we will share the melancholy and grief 
over the inevitable loss of that time with Quentin. 
 
 
Quentin: The Dualism of Time 
 
Lawrence Thompson writes in “Mirror Analogues in The Sound and the Fury” 
that the frequent mirror analogues act as “figurative or symbolic mirroring of 
the meaning of a past action in a present action” (118). The importance of this 
evaluation is exactly the juxtaposing of past and present. It is in the 
distinction between how the past interferes and contrasts the present that the 
reading experience of anachronies turns from memory to nostalgia. Where 
memory is rarely connected or, more precisely, evaluated through the 
present, nostalgia feeds off the impossibility of the present. Memory, just like 
nostalgia, is triggered from something in the present. The difference is that 
memory leaves, unabashed, the present state to resurrect a previous episode, 
whereas nostalgia cannot leave the present because it is the combination of 
the present and past that creates the entropic melancholy. Faulkner’s careful 
treatment of past and present always links them inevitably together and 
distinguishes them as nostalgic rather than, as critics often insist, memorial.  
The constant play between mechanical clock time and Bergsonian 
duration is an important factor in triggering the dualism of nostalgia: 
entrapment in the entropy of time and temporal freedom of memory and 
internal time. Quentin’s grief might be Caddy, or whatever she symbolizes in 
terms of a past as we have seen above, but our own nostalgic grief is very 
much based on the impossibility to halt time, to defend ourselves against 
death. Obviously, Quentin’s narrative informs us of this universal grief 
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through his interior monologues. More so, the effects of Faulkner’s style 
create an even stronger nostalgic response in the reader. 
 
Clock Time: The Temporality of Adulthood 
Quentin’s section begins with “When the shadow of the sash appeared on the 
curtains it was between seven and eight o’clock and then I was in time again, 
hearing the watch” (63). The timelessness of Benjy’s section has been 
precisely the opposite of the obsessions with time in Quentin’s section. The 
early signalling of time through Quentin’s grandfather’s old clock inverts 
this. The temporality of childhood, which we have been lulled into through 
Benjy, is now fearfully changed into the adult clock time, and thus we are 
also as readers forcefully aware of the loss not only of the Benjy narrative, 
but also our own timeless childhood. This is important because, when the 
contrast is emphasized, it assists the nostalgic experience in the second 
section through the change of narrative mode and mood. We are “in time” 
again, and reminded of this throughout the first part of the second section.  
The many time markers do not need to be demonstrated here, but 
their regularity does not only remind us of clock time through their actual 
content (one o’clock, afternoon, etc.) but also through their regularity, 
creating a graphic and repeated sense of a clock ticking. This is at least true in 
the present narrative time, which is June 2, 1910. As Quentin’s narrative and 
psychic state becomes more and more confused and thrown into the 
phantoms of the past, the sense of this ticking regularity ceases to exist. It 
evokes, through the absence of clock time and the multiple analepses, an 
eerie feeling as well as a sense of freedom and a return to the a-temporal state 
of Benjy. The childhood Quentin evokes in the reader, in both the nostalgic 
imagery and narrative connotations to the repetitiousness of Benjy, forces the 
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reader to once again meet his own childhood and the childhood 
consciousness in section one. 
The contrast to this clock time is then subjective time, and Quentin’s 
movement into subjective time is symbolized through breaking his 
grandfather’s clock. As the day goes on and Quentin drifts more and more 
into an analeptic narrative, the stylistic idea of repeated time markers 
vanishes, just like Quentin admits himself: “[…] I could hear my watch and 
the train dying away, as though it were running through another month or 
another summer somewhere […]” (101), alluding to the times of the past 
rather than the clock time. Later, Caddy, in a dreamlike memory, reinforces 
this by asking what time it is and having Quentin answer that he does not 
know (129). In the car with Shreve and Gerald Bland, Quentin “could see the 
twilight again, that quality of light as if time really had stopped for a while 
[…]” (143). At the very end, just before the suicide, the clock returns with the 
force of its reality and Quentin’s resistance to live in the present coincides 
with his watch “telling its furious lie […]” (147). 
 
The Involvement of Inner Time 
If the present times at Harvard start out as a frame from which memory 
bubbles up, then in the end it is reversed as memory obsesses Quentin fully, 
only to be interfered sparsely by inputs from the present. It might prove 
valuable to study the kind of memories that obsess Quentin, all four 
emotionally related to Caddy. The earliest one, just preceding the present 
date of June 2, 1920, by little more than a month, is Caddy’s wedding to 
Herbert Head. What seems to cause Quentin most grief and anger is Caddy’s 
loss of virginity and consequently Quentin’s confrontation with Dalton 
Ames, followed by a lengthy conversation with his father, all around August 
 343 
1909. Then there is one memory difficult to specify in time, but according to 
Ross and Polk set sometime between 1901-1906, that deals with Quentin and 
Caddy’s sexual awakening and specifically one episode where Quentin 
engages in sexual doctor play with Natalie. Last, the earliest one is the central 
image of Caddy climbing the tree in her muddy drawers at the funeral of 
their grandmother. These memories are all unhappy ones, so in the sense of 
nostalgic memory they are certainly not idealized at all. His memories, rather 
like Polk recognizes, “evolve out of scenes of trauma” (150). They seem to 
have been distorted by Quentin himself in order to provide him with the 
necessary material for his inner anger. When Quentin remembers these 
things, they are fuelled by anger, grief, and jealousy, usually connected to 
Caddy in one way or another. Let us examine one of the earliest analepses: 
 
If it had been cloudy I could have looked at the 
window, thinking what he said about idle habits. 
Thinking it would be nice for them down at New 
London if the weather held up like this. Why shouldn’t 
it? The month of brides, the voice that breathed She ran 
right out of the mirror, out of the banked scent. Roses. Roses. 
Mr and Mrs Jason Richmond Compson announce the 
marriage of. Roses. Not virgins like dogwood, milkweed. 
I said I have committed incest, Father I said. Roses. 
Cunning and serene. If you attend Harvard one year, 
but don’t see the boat-race, there should be a refund. 
Let Jason have it. Give Jason a year at Harvard. 
 Shreve stood in the door, putting his collar on, his 
glasses glinting rosily as though he had washed them 
with his face. (64) 
 
As we noticed in Benjy’s analepses, the transitions are made through the idea 
of associations. In this case, the time at Harvard, June, is considered the 
“month of brides” (Ross and Polk 47) and thus generates the memory of 
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Caddy’s wedding, which is evoked through the use of italics just as in the 
case with Benjy’s memories. As Ross and Polk claim, the shift into the past is 
not always accompanied by italics, but when italics do occur, the memory is 
usually a very vivid and strong one (47).  
The language, in describing the memory, is not that far away from the 
way Benjy experiences things. It is the use of unconnected images that create 
a confused, but immediate, capturing of emotions. “She ran right out of the 
mirror” seems at first to be a typical Benjy perception, but when we consider 
it more carefully, it just means that Quentin was looking at Caddy in a mirror 
when she ran out. This way of describing memory links us to the world of 
childhood and loss, as captured in Benjy’s section.  
The memory then adds material from the wedding announcement 
before entering the realm of anger, colouring the choice of words, especially 
the repetition of roses. This rose theme symbolizes sexuality and passion, 
and in the case of Caddy, her not being a virgin such as the white “dogwood” 
or “milkweed.”  
Then, quite abruptly, Quentin remembers a conversation with his 
father some time before, when he accused himself of having committed 
incest with Caddy. The anger at Caddy’s sexuality, linked to his father’s 
equally strange conception of women, creates this transition – emotionally 
logical, but prosaically difficult to follow.  
Next, the roses return in an odd oxymoron as being “cunning and 
serene.” This, as Ross and Polk observe, creates a peculiar new feeling: “The 
roses are beautiful yet complex, like love itself, which is both beautiful and 
threatening to Quentin” (48). Like nostalgia’s two contrasting elements, the 
oxymoron also contains this dichotomy of happiness and regret, and as a 
synthesis of these, creates an absolute new emotion.  
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The memory is then concluded with a fragment of a conversation 
about how Quentin really does not want to go to Harvard and that his 
brother Jason could have gone instead, before the present re-enters through 
his friend Shreve. The memory lingers on in the prose through the use of 
“rosily” which alludes to the memory’s rose-theme. 
Quentin’s kind of memories are a very different kind of memories 
than Benjy’s (although they share some common characteristics), whose were 
more like a boxed event, clearly distinct to the present time through the use 
of italics. Quentin’s memories operate in a different way in that they are 
much more fragmentary and fluid. His memories are much more realistic 
than in the more common literary homodiegetic style where the memory is 
included in the narrative voice, since our own memories tend to be more of 
this associative, fragmented sort. 
These memories capture the essential phenomenology of nostalgia, 
and as such, give the reader a fictive nostalgic experience by closely 
simulating that of a real nostalgic experience. The order of the experience in 
Quentin’s memory resembles the order of the nostalgic memory: 
remembering a past event, regretting this past event, and feeling a strong 
emotion of regret and loss which results in the peculiar feeling of contrasts 
between pleasure and pain. Quentin’s memories and nostalgic memory, thus, 
share the same transitional system. Furthermore, they both reach back to an 
emotional state rather than a scenic memory. As we have seen in exploring 
the nostalgic experience, we realize that nostalgia usually concerns a 
consciousness or a complex emotional state of mind. The use of triggers and 
motivators, as well as the specificity of memory, is only one phase in 
grabbing this nostalgic consciousness. What Faulkner does, simultaneously  
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to describing the memory, is to also add the melancholy of loss into the 
vibrations and emotions of his prose. 
 
The Sensations of Memory 
As Quentin’s section progresses, the past mingles with the present in more 
complicated ways, climaxing in one deep and long analepsis, concerned with 
the preceding events of Caddy’s adventures with Dalton Ames (starting on 
page 125 and ending on page 138). The lack of punctuation, capitalizations, 
indentations, and apostrophes seem to be “indicative of Quentin’s fractured 
narrative control” (Ross and Polk 128). For once, the term stream of 
consciousness seems highly appropriate, since it is a flow of emotions, 
sensations, flashes of memories, poetic images, and allusions, that forcefully 
propels the reader into the same dream world of involuntary memory.  
In this sense of fluid and almost naïve narration, we seem, once again, 
to get closer to the world of Benjy. The links to his section are particularly 
obvious through a reference to Benjy’s mantra about how “people smell like 
rain”; a few lines before the long analepsis begins, Quentin’s narration 
appears to mirror that of Benjy’s: “[…] T. P. was feeding him he started again 
just whimpering at first until she touched him then he yelled she stood there 
her eyes like cornered rats then I was running in the grey darkness it smelled 
of rain and all flower scents the damp warm air released and crickets sawing 
away in the grass […]” (my emphasis, 126).  
The Quentin section then increasingly refers to Benjy’s smelling of the 
rain: “then not two heads the darkness smelled of rain of damp grass and 
leaves […]” (130), “in the woods the tree frogs were going smelling rain in 
the air […]” (131), and “I had to stop and fasten the gate she went on in the 
grey light the smell of rain and still it wouldnt rain […]” (133). As we can see 
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in the last example, the smell of rain does not refer to, as in Benjy’s case, the 
smell of Caddy, but rather the particular smell of the air when it feels like it 
will rain. The actual typography that the reader has become intensely 
familiar with through the narrative, that of “smell” and “rain” connects it 
inevitably to the textual past.  
Quentin’s section possesses some recollections as well. We have 
discussed the recurring references to time and clocks. Likewise, the 
“Macbethian” shadow seems to linger everywhere, and constantly forces us 
to both pause and reverse in the narrative in order to create meaning out of 
its obviousness. In extension, we also associate it intertextually with Macbeth. 
However, the strongest emotional repetitions and recollections are similar to 
the ones in Benjy´s section in that they use words that arouse sensations in 
the reader.  For instance, in the phrase “crickets sawing away in the grass,” 
the image and the sound of the crickets seem to constantly interfere with the 
memory, like some reminder of the past in its symbolic value of childhood 
summers. It is a sound that neither comforts nor troubles, Quentin, but 
reminds the reader of the physicality of memory through its recurrence.  It is 
in the way it addresses primarily the senses of the reader that it constitutes 
the possibilities of transporting the readers into their own pasts as well as the 
textual past. As we see with the crickets, it is mainly their sound that creeps 
into the text: crickets are “sawing,” and later “[…] I could hear the crickets 
watching us in a circle […]” (130), and “I got up and followed we went up 
the hill the crickets hushing before us” (129). If we study the long analepsis 
we find it constantly charged with auditive references; it is simple auditive 
verbs like “hear,” “sound,” or “singing” but more often it is onomatopoetic 
verbs that are charged with an action that makes sounds like “crying,” “she 
rose her skirt flopped against her draining […]” (my emphasis, 126), “the 
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water sucked and gurgled across the sand spit […]” (my emphasis, 126), and 
“her clothes rustled […]” (my emphasis, 132).  
These sounds, as recognized by Karl F. Zender in “Faulkner and the 
Power of Sound” seem to produce “a heightened awareness of the 
destructive power of time. Implicit in his effort at preserving the vanishing 
world of his youth is a sense of the evanescence of reconciliation” (91). 
Zender means that in Faulkner’s prose, these sounds often work like 
narrative pauses, that “intrude” on the narrator in their hostility and drive 
him back “to the world of time and loss” (92). This “intrusion” can, of course, 
equally work for the reader and force him back in his own past since, as we 
observed in the case of the Quentin section, these sounds are recognized 
through their repetitions and their traditional nostalgic and symbolic value. 
As we have seen with the smell of rain, Faulkner creates a memory of 
the senses mostly through the olfactory. Quentin’s memories are cramped 
with the smell of “damp clothes” (129), “damp grass and leaves” (130), 
“water” (132), and the “odour of summer and darkness” (143). This last 
example is especially interesting in its non-specific quality, which encourages 
the reader to fill in his own smells of summer and darkness into the 
narrative.  
However, most remarkable is, of course, the often recurring smell of 
honeysuckle, the “saddest odour of all” (143). Quentin associates this 
peculiar smell with the August night when Caddy loses her virginity. It also 
seems in a larger context, as Ross and Polk realize, to symbolize sexuality, 
and then particularly Quentin’s disgust for female sexuality (Ross and Polk 
115). Similar to Benjy’s repetition of Caddy smelling like rain, Quentin’s 
obsessive smell of honeysuckle works in both referring back to the previous 
times this mantra is used but more importantly; it also forces us back in our 
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We have observed how Faulkner uses the idea of repetition, recollection, and 
mirroring through the similarities between Benjy’s and Quentin’s narration. 
Faulkner employs repetitive words, phrases, and scenes in order to guide the 
reader’s viewpoint back into the narrative. The memory of the fight with 
Dalton Ames is similarly mirrored through Faulkner’s exquisite transition 
through parallel temporalities. Quentin’s present fight with Gerald is 
paralleled with his fight a year earlier with Dalton Ames. The transition into 
parallel narratives is initiated through the image of the little Italian girl 
Quentin has met earlier. When the car with Quentin, Shreve, and Gerla 
passes the little girl, the narrative opens up into four different temporalities: 
the present car ride, the previous episode with the little Italian girl which in 
its turn mirrors Quentin’s brotherhood against Caddy, and then the Dalton 
Ames episode: 
 
We passed that house, and three others, and another 
yard where the little girl stood by the gate. She didn’t 
have the bread now, and her face looked like it had 
been streaked with coal-dust. I waved my hand, but she 
made no reply, only her head turned slowly as the car 
passed, following us with her unwinking gaze. (123-24) 
 
It is significant that this image of the girl is one of melancholy; Quentin’s 
gesture of friendship and memory is not returned and the sense of passing 
time and melancholy is further established through the actual “passing” of 
the car. It is as if this linking time image encourages us to think about the 
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earlier episode as a sad, nostalgic one. This confirms the general sadness of 
past times in Quentin’s memories and makes the different narrative 
temporalities nostalgic for the reader. Quentin’s remembrance of the Dalton 
Ames episode is signalled clearly by Faulkner’s use of italics. The unique 
way in which Faulkner creates two simultaneous temporalities, which in its 
structure so profoundly mimics that of how our own memory works, can be 
illustrated by the following excerpt: 
 
 ‘If that hamper is in his way, Mr MacKenzie, move it 
over on your side. I brought a hamper of wine because I 
think young gentlemen should drink wine, although 
my father, Gerald’s grandfather’ ever do that Have you 
ever done that In the grey darkness a little light her hands 
locked about 
 ‘They do, when they can get it,’ Spoade said. ‘Hey 
Shreve?’ her knees her face looking at the sky the smell of 
honeysuckle upon her face and throat 
 ‘Beer, too,’ Shreve said. His hand touched my knee 
again. I moved my knee again. like a thin wash of lilac 
coloured paint talking about him bringing 
 ‘You’re not a gentleman,’ Spoade said. him between us 
until the shape of her blurred not with dark […] (124) 
 
This passage is the closest we can come to the cinematic superimposure of 
images, where we have parallel temporalities simultaneously. Of course, it is 
not only the italics themselves that attract the reader’s attention but also the 
floating, dreamy, involuntary memory aspect of the other temporality. 
According to Ross and Polk, this is communicated through the lesser control 
of the narrator’s storytelling: the lack of punctuation, grammar, and strange 
syntax (47). Like earlier memory transitions, we can see certain connections 
between the present and the past, such as Shreve touching Quentin’s knee,  
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and thus triggering memories around Caddy’s knee.  Furthermore, the italics 
seem to have a certain fluidity over the time changes.  
Sometimes the blending of times appears in a single sentence: “Now 
and then the river glinted beyond things in sort of swooping glints, across 
noon and after” (93). The use of two opposing time definitions (proximate 
and non-proximate words) in the beginning of the sentence are paralleled in 
the end with “noon and after,” thus creating a hypothetical temporal affect in 
reaching out for present and past, and present and future.  
The Quentin episode contains much nostalgic imagery. We encounter 
images of water and rivers: the piece of bark that “float[s] away” (134) in the 
water, or water that ripples (127) and “all the oceans all around the world” 
(127). We also notice the recurrence of clocks or time specifics such as the 
afternoon and the twilight. Nostalgia echoes strongly in a phrase such as “the 
train dying away, as though it were running through another month or 
another summer somewhere […]” (101). Furthermore, there is a 
concentration of summer images such as butterflies, crickets, tree frogs, 
swings, roses, honeysuckle, and cedars. This summer imagery also evokes 
non-visual senses such as sound and smells. Universal grief is accentuated 
through the use of the shadow as a symbol of death. 
As Ross and Polk identify in the following time shift, most of the 
imagery and motifs are associated with Caddy (Ross and Polk 86): 
 
“What a shame that you should have a mouth like that 
it should be on a girl’s face” and can you imagine the 
curtains leaning in on the twilight upon the odour of the 
apple tree her head against the twilight her arms behind her 
head kimono-winged the voice that breathed o’er eden clothes 
upon the bed by the nose seen above the apple what he said? 
just seventeen, mind. (88) 
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The twilight, especially in the expression “her head against the twilight” is 
associated later with Quentin’s memory of the central image of Caddy’s 
muddy drawers, where Caddy’s “face was a white blur framed out of the 
blur of the sand by her hair” (126), and the apple tree alludes to both the 
Edenic quality of the central image and Caddy climbing the pear tree. The 
association of smell links both to the smell of the tree that Benjy associates 
with Caddy in his reoccurring “smells like trees” and the pear tree itself. 
“seen above” equals the three brothers’ perspective glancing up on Caddy on 
the branch of the pear tree and her muddy drawers. Similarly, the 
associations to the central image, which is preceded by Caddy in the water 
and mud, are to be found in several scenes which evoke the motif of 
cleansing and water. Examples of this are the Natalie episode, the boys 
swimming in the River in Harvard, and, of course, Quentin’s suicide in the 
river. The simple sketching of the central image early in Benjy’s narrative is 
thus constantly re-evoked, altered, and added to. 
 
 
The Universality of Loss: The Last Section 
 
One part of the nostalgic sentiment of the novel can perhaps be attributed to 
Faulkner’s romantic ideas of the vanished South. He himself denied any such 
attributes in his literature; instead he furiously attacked historical fiction as 
“a degenerate form” and a “sentimentalization of the past” (Rollyson 14). 
Nevertheless, in his more personal recordings of the past South, there is a 
tendency to romanticize. His retelling of his grandfather’s, the old Colonel’s, 
adventures and misfortunes, certainly breathe a sense of overcharged reality: 
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“He [old Colonel] built the first railroad in our country, wrote a few books, 
made grand European tour of his time, died in a duel and the country raised 
a marble effigy which still stands in Tippah County” (Blotner 24). According 
to David M. Wyatt, the truth was that there was no duel; the colonel was 
actually shot from the side while crossing Ripley Town Square, and the 
marble effigy was purchased by the colonel himself (Wyatt 99). 
The South that Faulkner grew up in, and that was the location for all 
his writing, was a very conservative one. Robert Penn Warren describes the 
rural South as,  
 
[…] cut-off, inward-turning, backward-looking. It was a 
culture frozen in its virtues and vices, and even for the 
generation that grew up after World War I, that South 
offered an image of massive immobility in all ways, an 
image, if one was romantic, of the unchangeableness of 
the human condition, beautiful, sad, painful, tragic – 
sunlight slanting over a mellow autumn field, a field 
the more precious for the fact that its yield had been 
meager. (3) 
 
It is true that the characters of The Sound and the Fury all show signs of 
failure, tragedy, and immobility. Quentin is constantly battling the clash 
between his father’s old fashioned view of life and women, and the new 
times represented by Caddy and his Harvard life. His suicide is the result of 
a decision not to participate in life’s meaninglessness. Jason, too, fights the 
burden of his own past but in different ways. He is obsessed by the decline of 
everything associated with the family: the mansion, the honour of the family, 
and the Compson traditions. This decline is described subtly in the contrast 
between the old-fashioned gravel road up to the mansion and the main 
modern concrete road below. 
 354
Is it really, however, the specific decline of the South that is central 
here? The Sound and the Fury certainly is no historical novel in the Victorian 
sense; there is neither the spectacle nor the antiquarianism so often found in 
historical novels. There is, of course, a story of a family, but not in an epic 
sense, since the information about this family is densely blurred through the 
interiorities of the main characters. Surely, like Rollyson notes, the novel is 
also about “characters who are obsessed with a personal, family, or regional 
past” (1), but the key word here is personal. The historical novel has an 
omniscient view of things, usually told in classic third person narratives, or a 
frame narrative, where the narrator in the frame has the opportunity to 
comment and judge, and thus bring the story into a more universal context. 
Matthews writes in “Faulkner’s Narrative Frames” that “the frame promises 
to be the site of fuller comprehension and the point of contact between the 
plights of the individual characters and the historical realities that condition 
the narrative” (74). This means that an unframed story such as The Sound and 
the Fury is less able to transcend from its personal experience into a more 
social and historic one because “loss is strictly personal and seems to 
impinge on characters purely in psychological and emotional registers” 
(Matthews, “Faulkner’s Narrative Frames” 74).  
The last section takes place on April 8, 1928, and thus it is not only 
textually but also chronologically the last part of the story. It could have had 
the role of, if not framing, at least contextualizing, or commenting on the 
earlier three sections in a way that would be expected of a historical novel. 
This is, however, not the case. The last section’s difference from the previous 
sections is to be found in its narrative mood. It is clearly not as strictly 
focalized as the earlier parts. The master narrative voice of Faulkner shines 
through this section in the opening paragraph: 
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The day dawned bleak and chill, a moving wall of grey 
light out of the north-east which, instead of dissolving 
into moisture, seemed to disintegrate into minute and 
venomous particles, like dust that, when Dilsey opened 
the door of the cabin and emerged, needled laterally 
into her flesh, precipitating not so much a moisture as a 
substance partaking of the quality of thin, not quite 
congealed oil. (225) 
 
It is a description that takes place before the section’s main character enters 
the stage. We are not sharing Dilsey’s impressions, but Faulkner’s. 
Furthermore, several times in the course of the narrative, we are permitted to 
leave the perspective or spatiality of Dilsey, such as when Jason drives away: 
“He [Jason] was twenty miles away at that time. When he left the house he 
drove rapidly to town […]” (256). There is no general conception of the 
particularity of the past South that glimmers through the overtly narrated 
part, but instead there is a very important master narrative voice that 
concludes the sentiments of the prior three sections: that of the sad progress 
of time and change, and loss of belief. If we return to the part’s opening 
paragraph, we notice the choice of words “bleak,” “chill,” “grey,” 
“disintegrate,” “venomous,” clearly indicating a melancholic state of mind.  
Instead of looking at historic or social contexts, we must, like Marco 
Abel in “One Goal is Still Lacking: The Influence of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
Philosophy on William Faulkner’s ‘The Sound and the Fury’,” acknowledge 
the sense of something vanished to a more Nietzschean pessimism and a 
general concept of meaninglessness closely related to that of nostalgia. Benjy, 
Quentin, and Jason are all so obsessed with their own pasts that there is not 
really any chance for a sustained meaning in their present lives. Quentin is, 
perhaps, the most nihilistic of them, but also the one with the intellectual 
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ability to address and communicate this nihilism. If we link nostalgia with 
nihilism, or rather the entropic, we can appreciate why the sense of nostalgia, 
the meaninglessness of our short time on earth, manifests itself so strongly in 
the last section. “And what else but chaos,” asks Abel, “faces the reader 
exposed to The Sound and the Fury for the first time?” (42-43). The chaos in 
recreating the chronology echoes the chaos of temporalities in modern man, 
similar to what Nietzsche acknowledged in the 1880s and 1890s: “a clearly 
structured form of narration is an inappropriate way of coping with the 
dawn of the modern age” (Abel 41). The lack of classic structure in the novel, 
the many anachronies, and the difficulties associated with stream of 
consciousness and interior monologues, create a sense of uneasiness in the 
reader, an aura of disbelief in the future and the overwhelming strength of 
the past. It is reminiscent of the Shakespearean quotation from Macbeth that 
inspired the title of the novel. 
The importance of the last section, in terms of the nostalgic experience, 
lies not therefore in its contextualization of the vanished South, even though 
a Southerner perhaps could read this into his own experience. Rather, it is, in 
its overt master narrative voice, a conclusion of the chaos and nihilism 
expressed in the previous three sections. It is at times almost a requiem over 
the progress of time in a variety of phrases and nostalgic imagery that echo 
death and decay: “The clock tick-tocked, solemn and profound. It might have 
been the dry pulse of the decaying house itself […]” (242), “It might have 
been all time and injustice and sorrow become vocal for an instant by a 
conjunction of planets” (244), “trees that partook also of the foul desiccation 
which surrounded the houses; trees whose very burgeoning seemed to be the 
sad and stubborn remnant of September, as if even spring had passed them 
by […]” (247), “As the scudding day passed overhead the dingy windows 
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glowed and faded in ghostly retrograde. A car passed along the road outside, 
labouring in the sand, died away” (250), “for the first time Jason saw clear 
and unshadowed the disaster toward which he rushed” (263). Even Dilsey 
who “seed de beginning,” and now “sees de endin” (253) acknowledges this 
universal grief.  
If any belief in the importance of our own persona persists, it is 
definitely broken in the end, together with Benjy’s narcissus. Beverly Gross 
writes that “[t]he novel becomes more objectified, more outwardly social, 
more universalized […]” in the end, and this suggests that Benjy becomes 
“more and more an embodiment of the suffering of all mankind” (Gross 287). 
Benjy’s screams in the end might perhaps allude to Kuntz’s “horror” in 
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness: “For an instant Ben sat in an utter hiatus. 
Then he bellowed. Bellow on bellow, his voice mounted, with scarce interval 
for breath. There was more than astonishment in it, it was horror; shock; 
agony eyeless, tongueless; just sound […]” (271). Benjy’s sentiment, in turn, 
reverberates Quentin’s tormented experience of the sound of the bird, “a 
sound meaningless and profound, inflexionless, ceasing as though cut off 
with the blow of a knife, and again, and that sense of water swift and 
peaceful above secret places, felt, not seen not heard” (114). This passage 
echoes Sartre’s words, “Man’s misfortune lies in his being time-bound”: it is 
only in death, as in death by water, that the meaningless cry of horror, “the 
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Anachronies: The temporal discrepancies between story and narrative. 
 
Analepsis: Retrospection in the narrative of a past story event. Internal 
analepses reach back after the start of the first narrative. External analepses 
reach back before the start of the first narrative. 
 
Analeptic Structure: The analeptic structure suggest a frame structure where a 
narrator subsequently narrates the events of some past imagination or 
experience, thus creating a distinct “now” and “then” on which he is liable to 
comment. The use of first person narration further stimulates the private 
nature of the recollection and aids the seductive qualities of the narration; it 
grants the narrator a greater freedom in rearranging the temporal order of 
events. 
 
Analeptic Narrative: This is the main body of past story events that are told 
from the first narrative. It is actually the second narrative but in order to 
emphasize that it is the main narrative (the main body of the text) we will 
refer to it as the analeptic narrative. 
 
Asyndeton: connects clauses through the use of comma. 
 
Clock Time: This refers to Time as progressing and irreversible. It is also 
known as objective time, monumental time, or mechanical time. 
 
Closed Nostalgia: Nostalgia evoked through art that is more specific and 
needs a specific knowledge, culture, ethnicity, or personality, in order to be 
evoked. 
 
Competent Reader: A theoretically constructed reader in order to fully 
understand how certain responses can be evoked in readers. The competent 
reader brings in history, sociology, anthropology, aesthetics, language, 
linguistic competence into the critical close reading when necessary. 
 
Diegetic Emotions: Emotions that are basically related to the text. 
 
Distance: Literary distance is created through the use of subsequent 
narration and the use of a narrator who is somewhat removed from the 
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events and characters he is describing. Distance can also be achieved if the 
narrator himself is a character in the story. This distant mood almost always 
requires a non-focalized narration. 
 
Dualism of Nostalgia: This refers to the contrasts between joy and sadness 
that defines nostalgia. This dualism creates a range of dichotomies such as 
now and then, here and there, joy and sadness, life and death, new and old 
etc. These dichotomies are of outmost importance when it comes to 
recreating nostalgia through aesthetics and representation. 
 
Duration: The speed of a narrative in relation to the story confirms the 
narrative’s duration. It can be either a pause (narrative < story), a scene 
(narrative=story), summary (narrative>story), or an ellipsis (a cut to a new 
story event). 
 
Durée: Bergson’s concept of subjective time as contrast to clock time is called 
durée. It is also known as inner time, duration, or Bergsonian time. 
 
Emotion: An emotion (feeling) can either be a basic emotion (singular and 
pure) or a complex emotion (constituted of more than one emotion). Modern 
research tends to see emotions as cognitive with intentionality and an object 
or action triggering it. 
 
External Nostalgia: External nostalgia is not related to our own biography 
and person. It is the nostalgia for a time or place we never have experienced. 
This was formerly referred to as public nostalgia. 
 
External Nostalgic Fictive Experience: This is a nostalgic experience that is 
triggered by the text (textual nostalgia) and that in turn trigger an external 
nostalgia (something not experienced in real life). 
 
Extradiegetic Narrator: A narrator who narrates the first narrative. 
 
Extra-textual Emotional Experience: When emotions involved in experience 
of a text are not triggered by the text itself but by other external influences, 
we speak of extra-textual emotional experiences. 
 




Focalization: Part of the narrative mood. Focalization is concerned with from 
which perspective and how a narrative is perceived. It can either be a non-
focalized narrative (omniscient narrator), an internally focalized narrative 
(filtered through a character in the story: interior monologue, stream of 
consciousness, free indirect speech), or an externally focalized narrative (when 
the narration is being performed by a hero but without the readers ever 
accessing his mind or thoughts).  
 
Free Indirect Speech (FIS): A mix between first and third person narration 
which retains the omniscient tone of indirect speech but at the same time 
enters into a more focalized style through a first person. 
 
Frequency: The number of times a story event is told in the narrative. It can 
be singular (narrative tells once what happens once in story), repetitive 
(narrative tells several times what happens once in the story), or iterative 
(narrative tells once what happens several times in the story). 
 
Heterodiegetic Narrator: A narrator that stands outside the world he is 
narrating. 
 
Homodiegetic Analepsis: Transporting us to a past story event while not 
confusing us about the place and time we are transported to in the narrative, 
as well as referring to a past time that is part of the first narrative. 
 
Homodiegetic Narrator: A narrator that is part of the world he is narrating. 
 
Homomaterial Souvenirs: Physical objects that are part of the nostalgic past 
it triggers. 
 
Hypothetical Nostalgia. This belongs to internal nostalgia even though 
strictly speaking it is not a longing for a place or a time but a general sense of 
timelessness or disillusion of temporality. The effect of this dissolution is one 
of awareness and sadness over the time arrow and the irreversibility of time, 
as well as a sense of that the present is in fact the nostalgia of tomorrow. 
 
Identity Theme: A term coined by Norman Holland which means a personal 
way of dealing with everyday situations that spill over on our interpretation 
of texts as well. 
 
 378
Imaginative Memorative Signs: Trigger nostalgia through dreams, thoughts, 
hopes, that are created within our intelligence and being and act as the 
motivation for recreating our memories or dreams 
 
Internal Nostalgia: Internal nostalgia is related to our own biography and 
person. It is the most common nostalgia and typical examples are our 
childhood and our first love. This was formerly referred to as private 
nostalgia. 
 
Internal Nostalgic Fictive Experience: This is a nostalgic experience that is 
triggered by the text (textual nostalgia) and that in turn triggers an internal 
nostalgia (something personally experienced). This nostalgia does not 
necessarily have to have anything to do with the text; the text functions 
primarily as a motivator. 
 
Intradiegetic Narrator: A narrator that narrates the second narrative. 
 
Involuntary Memory: A memory that is recalled subconsciously without will. 
 
Iterative Frequency: When several story events are retold only once in the 
narrative. Example: “I remember all those parties that summer.” 
 
Macro-Nostalgia: Nostalgia evoked through larger units of text such as 
narrative structures and persistent narrative mood or voice. 
 
Memorative Signs: Motivates and triggers the nostalgia. They can be divided 
into souvenirs (physical objects), sensations, situations, and imaginations. 
 
Memorial Nostalgia. Belongs to internal nostalgia and deals with times we are 
nostalgic for that we have experienced.  
 
Memory: A remembrance of a past event without the regret or reflective 
phase that defines nostalgia. Memories can be either voluntary or involuntary. 
 
Meta-Experience: An experience that for different reasons assures us that it is 
in fact fiction and not reality we are experiencing. This can commonly be 
created through the Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt or a variety of techniques 
that reveal the structures of art and violates our sense of simulation. 
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Metaphysical Nostalgia: This belongs to external nostalgia and the object of 
nostalgia is grounded in human existence but used metaphorically or 
symbolically to convey a bigger idea – a metaphysical idea, a melancholic 
state of mind in relation to death versus life. 
 
Micro-Nostalgia: Nostalgia evoked through small units of text such as signs, 
words, sentences, syntax, and paragraphs. 
 
Mood: Typically less intense and more sustained as well as more 
subconscious than emotions and also less bound to the intentionality and 
cognitive character we find in emotions. 
 
Motivation: Triggers a nostalgic experience or reaction. See Nostalgic 
Reaction. 
 
Narrative: How the plot is narrated. 
 
Narrative Mood: The distance between story and narrative as well as who 
sees (focalization). 
 
Narrative Voice: Refers primarily to the voice of the narrator or narrators 
who report the narrative. When we explore the aspects of voice we study the 
relations between the narrator – plus, should the occasion arise, his or their 
narratee(s) – and the story he tells. Simplified, it is about who tells. 
 
Non-Diegetic Emotions: Emotions that are basically related to the 
biography/personality of a person. 
 
Non-Textual Nostalgia: Nostalgia that is evoked within the nostalgic fictive 
experience but not related to the text itself. 
 
Nostalgee: The person who is nostalgic. 
 
Nostalgia (the): The space or time one is nostalgic for. See Nostalgic Reaction. 
 
Nostalgia in Art: Based on a distinction by Ricœur, nostalgia in art refers to 
ideas, theories, or characters that through representation and content 
explicitly echo nostalgia. 
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Nostalgic Art: Based on a distinction by Ricœur that refers to nostalgia which 
is evoked through a phenomenological or aesthetic experience of nostalgia 
through form and style. 
 
Nostalgic Experience: The feeling of nostalgic emotions or being in a 
nostalgic mood. 
 
Nostalgic Fictive Experience: When a nostalgic experience is triggered or 
evoked by a fictive experience. 
 
Nostalgic Mood: The nostalgic mood is less concerned with the actual 
nostalgia (object of nostalgia) than a general feeling of sadness of the 
irreversibility of time. Fear of death and personal annihilation, as well as 
carpe diem, are emotions that linger close to the nostalgic mood. These 
nihilistic feelings are usually called universal grief. 
 
Nostalgic Reaction: The nostalgic emotional experience can be divided into 
three main phases: motivation, nostalgia, and reflection each one triggering the 
other in chronological order. Motivation is what triggers the reaction, nostalgia 
is what or when one is nostalgic for, and reflection is the psychological, 
philosophical, and more cognitive reaction to the second phase. Generally 
the phase of nostalgia is pleasant and happy and the reflective phase one of 
sadness, regret, and sense of loss. 
 
Nostalgic Tropes: Nostalgic tropes refer to imagery, ideas, metaphors, and 
symbols that in different ways work evocative of nostalgia. 
 
Ontological Nostalgia: This belongs to external nostalgia and the object of 
nostalgia is either a future or a mythological time and space. 
 
Open nostalgia: Nostalgia evoked through art that is very general and not 
specific and thus open for most people. 
 
Paradox of Fiction: Resulting from the cognitive theories of emotions and 
which deals with how we can feel emotions related to fiction when emotions 
need intentionality and real objects (real fear, real anger, afraid of the dog, 
angry at the police etc.) 
 
Polysyndeton: Connects clauses through the use of the words “and,” “or,” 
“but,” and “nor.” 
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Potentiality of a Text: In regard to the subjective experience of emotions in 
texts we speak of a text’s potentiality or possibility to evoke specific emotions 
in a reader. 
 
Presence: Literary presence is created basically through activating the mood so 
that it is close to either the consciousness of the character or narrator. This 
entails internal focalization as well as the use of free indirect speech and 
immediate speech. We also see a higher use of the descriptive pause, longer 
durations in scenes, and an inclusion of the reader in the intimacy of the 
narrative by either activating him in the reading process or clearly 
addressing him as a narratee. 
 
Prolepsis: Anticipation in the narrative of a future story event. Internal 
prolepses reach forward within the fist narrative. External prolepses reach 
forward to after the first narrative. 
 
Pseudo-Iterative Frequency: When several story events are retold once in the 
narrative but in a way that seems to be too detailed to be entirely true. 
 
Pseudo-Memorial Nostalgia: This belongs to external nostalgia and refers to a 
longing for a space or time that one has not experienced in person. 
 
Reflection: The phase of a nostalgic experience which brings in the sad 
element of nostalgia when one understands that the memory (nostalgia) is 
gone or impossible to recreate. See The Nostalgic Reaction. 
 
Representative Souvenirs: Physical objects that represent something from the 
nostalgic time or place it triggers. 
 
Second Narrative: The second narrative within the first narrative. Usually a 
story within a story. 
 
Selected Memory: The sense that we somehow idealize or choose certain 
parts of a memory in order to make it seem happier than it perhaps was in 
reality. 
 
Sensational Memorative Signs: When nostalgia is triggered mainly by a 
sensational experience such as smell, taste, sound, music, or feeling, rather 
than a physical object or visual sign. 
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Simulation: Walton’s idea that we create a belief and a truth through our 
interaction with the fictive world in a game of make-believe, but the 
emotions are not real emotions but quasi-emotions. 
 
Situational Memorative Signs: Signs that trigger nostalgia through situations 
or symbols that encourage ideas of stability and repetition. Such examples 
are summer, birthday, and Christmas. 
 
Souvenirs: Physical objects that act as memorative signs or motivation for 
nostalgic experience. 
 
Spatial Nostalgia. This belongs to internal nostalgia and deals with spaces 
that we are nostalgic for and have experienced. The idea of “home” is in its 
different metaphorical meanings especially valid here. 
 
Story: The plot in chronological order. 
 
Textual Emotional Experience: When emotions involved in experience of a 
text are triggered by the text itself. 
 
Textual Memory: The reader’s memory of the past narrative. 
 
Textual Nostalgia: Nostalgia that is evoked through the text. 
 
…the Hero: When the narrator and the hero of the narrative is one and the 
same (homodiegetic narrator) it is important to separate the two of them. The 
one who is the hero is then called the Hero. 
 
…the Narrator: When the narrator and the hero of the narrative is one and 
the same (homodiegetic narrator) it is important to separate the two of them. 
The one who is the narrator is then called the Narrator. 
 
Universal Grief: The nihilistic feeling that the laws of life are grieving and 
bleak; that our time on earth is very short, and an awareness of the 
teleological and entropic aspects of life. 
 
Voluntary Memory: A memory that is recalled by will. 
 
Wandering Viewpoint: Wolfgang Iser’s perception of the act of reading can be 
illustrated as a process (a wandering viewpoint) that constantly involves 
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anticipation and retrospection which changes how we experience the present 
narrative. 
 
